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This is an account of the social and work experience of 
successive generations of immigrants in a mushrooming industrial city, 
Paterson, New Jersey, 1880-1915. In the late nineteenth century the 
city became the centre of the American silk industry. It's economy 
flourished, dominated by the production of this one product. Its mills 
and machinery were technologically the most advanced of any in the world. 
Paterson quickly became a Mecca for immigrant silk hands. Their 
adaption to the new work routines in the city's mills forms the focal 
point of this study. Immigrant workers brought with them work and 
collective traditions coloured by their experience in the silk industries 
of their homelands. They were ill-suited to the advanced form of production 
in Paterson mills and constantly disrupted the plans of local factory owners. 
The resultant tension became an ingrained feature of industrial life in the 
city as a continuous stream of immigrants re-enforced the disruptive 
tendencies of their predecessors in the mills. 
Paterson millowners were so hidebound by their wayward workers that 
by the end of the century they formed concerted plans to assume a new 
dominance over the economic fortunes of the city. Their campaign was directed 
primarily against Paterson's newest immigrant group, Italian millhands. It 
assumed a distinctive flavour from that fact. In 1913 the new stance of 
millowners culminated in the notorious "War in Paterson". Although the 
19,13 strike is commonly attributed to the inflammatory presence of the 
Industrial Workers of the World, it was rooted in tensions wholly independent 
of that organization. The failure of the strike confirmed the new social 
and political status of Paterson's factory owners, and the eclipse of a 
long tradition of collective disruption by the city's immigrant millworkers. 






Paterson, New Jersey was conceived as a manufacturing centre. 
Its founder was Alexander Hamilton, George Washington's first Secretary 
of the Treasury. Hamilton, anxious that the new republic be free from 
the economic stranglehold of Britain, proposed the growth of native- 
industries. In casting about for an industrial location he seized upon 
the Passaic Falls in northeastern New Jersey, where the might of the 
Passaic River could be harnessed to turn the wheels of American industry. 
Hamilton founded the Society for Establishing Useful Manufactures to fund 
and develop the area. The poet William Carlos Williams depicted Hamilton's 
grandiose schemes for the site: 
"Paterson he wished to make capital of the country because there 
was waterpower there which to his time and mind seemed colossal. 
And so he organized a company to hold the land thereabouts, with 
dams and sluices .... 'His company. -His United 
States. Hamiltonia - 
the land of the companyf .I 
During the 1790's and early nineteenth centry the Society 
constructed canals and raceways from the river, built mills and houses 
for operatives. It imported. skilled hands and machinery from England. 
Within 
'a 
short time Paterson was a busy hive of industrial activity. 
2 
The history of Paterson is the growth of this small manufacturing 
village into a leading U. S. industrial city. It is not a story of 
untramelled progress; indeed "Hamiltonia - the land of the company" often 
seemed threatened with decline and extinction. Cotton manufacturing, the 
city's earliest specialization, suffered many setbacks before steadily 
declining in the 1840's. Iron and locomotive production superceded 
cotton from the mid-nineteenth centry but likewise declined rapidly from 
the 1870's. Only the expansion of the silk industry during and after 
the Civil War seemed to assure the future growth, of Paterson. 
I W. C. Williams'In the'American'Grain (London 1971) pp. 199-200. 
2 B. Mitchell'Alexander Hamilton: The National*Adventure'1788-1804 
(New York 1962) pp. 181-198. 
ii 
Silk manufacturing heralded the city's emergence as a major 
industrial centre. Moreover the new industry signalled a dramatic and 
unprecedented change in the lives of Paterson's inhabitants. Although 
traditionally a manufacturing site. the scale and nature of the silk 
industry transformed the small town. In 1840 Paterson inhabitants 
numbered a mere seven thousand five hundred. Thirty years later, 
stimulated by the labor demands of locomotive and silk producers, 
population rose to over thirty three thousand. Industrial and 
residential development mushroomed. Paterson was soon to be 
numbered amongst the nation's leading manufacturing cities. 
I 
Other aspects of this dramatic change are not so readily qualified. 
In the early nineteenth centry Paterson, despite its industry, was 
pictured at the heart of a rural Arcadia. The poet Thomas Ward could 
walk from Paterson into virgin countryside where: 
"Bees buzzed and wrens that thronged the rushes, 
Poured round incessant twittering gushes; 
While thousand reeds whereon they hung, 
Bent with the weight of nests and young. 
Like a huge bear, alone and still, 
Crouched on the meadow, lay Snake Hill, 
Shaggy with bushy forest-hair, 
Wild as the savage left it there. " 
2 
Even on the eve of Paterson's industrial boom an observer described 
the city as "hitherto almost isolated", its rural and unspoiled landscape 
possessed of "a romantic character" and "peculiar charm". 
3 
/ 
I C. Shriner Paterson, New Jersey: Its Advantages For Manufacturing 
and Residence, Its Industries, Prominent Men, Banks, Schools, Churches 
etc. (Paterson 1890) pp. 120 
2 Flaccus (pseud. ) Passaic: A group of Poems Touching That River (n. p. n. d. ) 
3 New York Times July 24th 1870. 
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With intensive economic development after the Civil War the picture 
of "unspoiled" Paterson would soon appear fanciful. Within a few years the 
city displayed the worst features of industrial life: bad housing, inadequate 
sanitation and municipal services, poor working conditions along with the 
characteristic social problems which accompanied them. Even the Passaic 
River, once the glory of Paterson, degenerated into"the vilest swillhole 
in christendom". 
1 
Although this study takes as its starting-point the emergence of 
Paterson as an important industrial centre, its direct concern is not with 
the environmental, urban or even demographic aspects of industrialization. 
For one thing all have received extensive coverage in recent U. S. social 
history .2 Secondly this study focuses upon a limited area of industrialization 
in an American city. Principally it is concerned with the working class 
response to the new way of life implicit in industrialization. Larger 
questions concerning the urban or demographic impact of industrial growth 
receive attention only insofar as they directly intrude upon the specialized 
focus of this story. 
Two questions form the basis of this study. Although they are not 
stated explicitly in the text they remain a guiding motif throughout. 
One: what are the determinants of working class power in a nineteenth centry 
industrial city such as Paterson? The second is in a sense derivative from 
the first: What are the determinants of violence as a form of this power? 
Both questions are suggested by the nature of industrial society in the 
United States, and in particular by the apparent weakness of a class conscious 
and organized labor movement in the period 1870-1920. What, in the character, 
of U. S. industrialization, gave rise to frequent bitter and violent industrial 
upheavals but underminded the emergence of a "mature" labor movement? 
I Williams In The American Grain "p. 199 
2 For a summary of recent research in U. S. urban history see H. P. Chudacoff 
The Evolution'of'American'Urban Society (Englewood Cliffs, 1975) 
iv 
Obviously this study is limited by its specificty to Paterson, 
The merits and disadvantages of this order of specialization are well 
known and need no reiteration here. Nevertheless it should be stated 
clearly that this is not a social history of Paterson 'per se 
I 
The city 
has been selected because it appeared to reflect features common to cities 
in industrializing America. Most importantly, perhaps even to an 
exaggerated extent, Paterson possessed a weak organized labor movement 
alongside a vibrant and ongoing tradition of industrial upheaval and 
disorder. 
Unfortunately my research was limited by a paucity of funding perhaps 
common to students of "foreign" lands. A longer sojourn in the United 
States would surely have permitted more intensive exploration. However it 
is not clear that further research would have yielded startling new sources. 
Few unknown or unpublished materials were discovered, whether municipal, 
business or workingmen's records. Instead this work was founded upon the 
sources common to much social history. Its findings rest upon the 
contemporary press and statistical compilations not only because these 
were, in the main, the only materials at hand but, more importantly, 
proved the most rewarding even when other sources were available. 
In the main I have adhered to "English" spelling throughout the 
text apart from key words, phrases and colloquialisms where the "American" 
version seemed more appropriate. 
Thanks are due to the Social Science Research Council for funding 
much of this project and to the New Jersey Historical Commission for a 
research award which proved essential. The late Sol Walkowitz and 
D.. Walkowitz deserve special mention. Their generous advice and assistance 
made possible an extended stay in the U. S. The staff of several libraries 
did their best to cope with my requests, including those at the Paterson 
Public Library, the New Jersey Collection of Rutgers University, the 
Tamiment Institute New York University, the Labadie Collection at Ann Arbor 
Michigan, and the Wisconsin State Historical Society. M. Snow kindly 
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assisted with the statistical material. The staff and students at 
Warwick University's Centre For The Study of Social History provided a 
stimulating environment. I have benefitted from the supervision of 
Dr. J. Winter. Dr. A. Mason proved a searching critic of the manuscript. 
A series of U. S. visitors to Warwick provided guidance and support. 
Professor David Brody directed my initial research and throughout remained 
a stimulating critic. Professor Joseph Conlin provided invaluable 
assistance and encouragement with all aspects of this work. Professor 
Harvey Levenstein read the manuscript and suggested important improvements. 
Finally, Professor Royden Harrison provided interest, support and unfailing 
encouragement for longer than I dare recall. 
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Chapter One 
SILK: A NEW INDUSTRY 
The U. S. silk industry and the city of Paterson became 
almost synonymous in the last quarter of the nineteenth century. 
Overnight silk production transformed the local economy, until 
by the end of the century Paterson was effectively dominated by 
this single industry. The growth of silk manufacturing was, by 
any standards, impressive. It was called an industrial "romance", 
testimony to native skill and ingenuity. 
l 
Such praise was not entirely divorced from reality. The 
American industry developed characteristics which distinguished 
it from European counterparts. U. S. silk manufacturers consciously 
strove to pioneer new forms of work organization and new produc- 
tion techniques. In doing so, they fashioned an industry remark- 
ably advanced by the standards of the Old World. It was this 
industry and its distinctive unit, the factory, which shaped the 
development of Paterson during the Gilded Age. 
In a speech at the annual dinner of the Paterson Board of 
Trade in 1876, a local manufacturer optimistically asserted that 
the "... success of the city depended solely upon the success of 
its manufactures". Despite economic depression, he continued, 
the expansion of the silk industry has "... helped bridge over 
the chasm of dull times". Such a contribution in the face of 
adversity, he claimed, demanded encouragement from the whole 
community. He ended his address with a rousing appeal: "It 
, 
New York Daily Tribune. Septemberý25 1880. 
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was time to make this city bear the same relation in point of 
importance to other parts of America, that Manchester and Leeds 
did to Great Britain"*' 
The prodigious expansion of silk manufacturing in Paterson 
in the three decades following the Civil War seemed to sub- 
stantiate local boosters' claims. Within twenty years Paterson 
became one of the nation's leading industrial cities. Although 
cotton and locomotive manufacturing rapidly declined during the 
Gilded Age, the city's economic base was more than amply refur- 
bished by its flourishing silk industry and textile machinery 
trades. Paterson was "Lyons of America" and "Silk City". 
In 1870 Paterson was a flourishing, but hardly a major, 
industrial city. It numbered just over 33,000 inhabitants. 
Although the city had expanded considerably during the previous 
decade - its economy stimulated by the demands of the Civil War 
- more pronounced growth was yet to come. For by 1890 Paterson 
boasted over 78,000 inhabitants, and ten years later more than 
105,000 (Table 1). 
Expansion of this order was perhaps typical of a host of 
Gilded Age cities. It was remarkable in Paterson for only one 
reason: the extent to which it was founded upon the growth of 
silk production. So long as the city's silk industry seemed to 
prosper, the city expanded, despite the decline and disappear- 
ance of older industries and the failure of other new rivals to 
appear. Paterson's transportation system, commercial activity, 
and professional life all revolved around this one industry. 
Even where older industries survived they did so by adapting to 
1Board 
of Trade Paterson N. J. Third Annual Report 1876 (Paterson, 187) pp. 81-82. 
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Table 1 
Paterson Population 1850-1900 













(Source: U. S. 'Bureau of Census, Tenth Census of the U. S. 1880 
(Washington, 1884) XVIII pp. 721, Eleventh Census of the U. S. 
1890 (Washington, 1895) XV pp. 240, Twelfth Census of the U. S. 
1900 (Washington, 1901) I pp. 628-629,4)6. ) 
Table 2 
Paterson Silk Industry 1860-1900 (includes Dyeing) 
No. of Establishments Nos. Employed 
186o 9 716 
1870 27 2,551 
i88o 92 i0,448 
1890 112 12,862 
1900 i66 i8,65o 
(Source: Ninth Census of the U. S. 1870 (Washington, 1872) III 
pp. 624, Tenth Census of the U. S. 1880 II pp. 430-431, 
Eleventh Census of the U. S. 1890 XII pp. 422-423,426-429, 
Twelfth Census of the U. S. 1900 IX pp. 206-08. 
r1 
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a local economy dominated by the manufacture of silk. Cotton 
producers, although decreasingly important, switched to the 
manufacture of mixed textiles - cotton and silk. More impor- 
tantly, the city's machine shops, once ancillaries to locomotive 
and iron producers in Paterson, now took to producing textile 
machinery for the city's silk mills. Only a jute mill, a flax 
manufacturer, a few local breweries, and two shirt factories 
remained outside the orbit of Paterson's silk manufacturers by 
the end of the nineteenth century. 
Silk manufacture was introduced to Paterson in 1840 by a 
young immigrant silkworker from Macclesfield, John Ryle. 
I 
Although Ryle's personal business prospered, the city did not 
attract a significant number of silk manufacturers until the 
time of the civil war. Then, almost overnight, Paterson became 
the unrivalled centre of the nation's fledgling silk industry. 
Major producers in New York, Connecticut and New England trans- 
ferred their operations to the city. 
Native businessmen were augmented by an exodus of silk 
manufacturers from England, France, Germany and Switzerland. 
These Europeans were undoubtedly the greatest source of new 
entrants to the industry. Men such as Catholina Lambert, 
Jacob Weidmann and Jerome Vacher fled unfavourable conditions 
in their homelands to find that in the United States their skill 
and technical expertise would ensure them healthy profits. In. 
C. Shriner Paterson, New Jersey: Its Advantages, ` for 
Manufacturing and Residence Its Industries Prominent men, 




the 1860s and 1870s British manufacturers emigrated en masse 
to Paterson, bringing plant and workers with them. Even the 
Swiss dyer Weidmann, who maintained substantial investments in 
Europe, was not unusual in opening new factories in the United 
States. As late as the 1890s European manufacturers were still 
arriving in Paterson to invest in new plant. 
1 
Paterson proved a desirable location to such newcomers, 
possessing several unique and endearing features. The Passaic 
River, on the banks of which Paterson was built, was not least 
of these. Plentiful supplies of water were essential to the 
preparation and dyeing of silk. Additionally, as. a longtime 
industrial location, Paterson was, already equipped with manu- 
facturing facilities. The decline of cotton manufacture left 
ample mill buildings for sale or rent. Three major railway 
lines served the city, linking it with New York, Philadelphia 
and other major commercial centres on the, Eastern seaboard. 
In 1870 Paterson's transport network was still in the process 
of completion, bringing "... this hitherto isolated city... in 
close proximity with the rest of the world". Twenty years later 
more than fifty trains were daily stopping in Paterson. 
2 
Proximity to New York, the nation's major port of entry for raw 
silk, was a further boon. Whilst Paterson lacked the high 
taxes and rents of the Eastern metropolis transport costs for 
hauling imported silk the sixteen miles from'New York to Paterson 
W. C. Wyckoff American Silk Manufacture (New York, 1887) 
pp. 37,42-43, Paterson Dry Goods Bulletin Handbook of the 
'''Silk Manufacturers, Dealers Dyers and Others' Interested in 
the Silk Trade of Paterson, New Jersey (Paterson, 1881) - 
hereafter Dry Goods Bulletin. -American Silk Journal`- January, 
February and July 1 890.. 
2New York Times July 24-1870, Shriner Paterson'pp. 120. 
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can hardly have discouraged prospective millowners. Similarly 
silk products from Paterson factories were easily available to 
the fashion centres of New York and Philadelphia. Last, but 
not unimportant, Paterson was already home to a labour pool to 
man new looms. The wives and children of locomotive workers 
and machinists proved ideal for many of the tasks involved in 
silk production. With the decline of cotton production they 
could be expected to be favourably disposed to new work oppor- 
tunities. Where skilled hands were required, Paterson's silk 
manufacturers could import or even bring them along. Their 
contacts with European silk centres and the cheapness of trans- 
atlantic passage both favoured the migration of European silk 
hands to the city. 
Favourable conditions within the city certainly explain 
Paterson's early pre-eminence as the centre of the U. S. silk 
industry. In turn the industry fostered the growth of the city 
as a major industrial centre. Yet the industry as a whole made 
a relatively late appearance on the American industrial scene; 
and not without good reason. European centres of silk produc- 
tion all pre-dated the emergence of the industrial system and 
the new methods of production and social relationships associated 
with an industrial society. In America, on the contrary, silk 
was a factory industry from its outset. Paterson was a herald of 
industrial society. This seeming contradiction can only be 
explained in relation to the specific conditions which fostered 
the emergence of the industry in-the United States. The unusual 
relationship to its competitors elsewhere produced features 
peculiar. to' the, American industry. ', These characteristics were 
at the heart of. the early success of the. industry. 
-7- 
Silk weaving in America lacked the indigenous roots of much 
European production. The cultivation of silk works never 
flourished in the New World despite sustained attempts to 
encourage it dating from colonial times. No handicraft industry 
of any importance emerged. The nation was thus dependent on 
imports of finished goods, and any emergent industry on 
imported raw silk. The stimulus given to silk production 
following the Civil War is largely attributable to the protective 
tariff. Duties on imported silk, first adopted in the 1860s, 
were crucial to both the growth and continued prosperity of the 
industry. I Tariffs adopted-by successive administrations con- 
tinued to protect the industry. 
2 Cheap foreign labor and the 
superior qualities of European silks were early seen as threats 
to both American manufacturers and their operatives. During 
the 1870s' depression Paterson weavers were actively petitioning 
Congress for tariff adjustments to protect their industry. 
3 
As late as 1900, long after American manufacturers were confident 
of their ability to produce silk of equal quality and price as 
their European competitors, they were still fully cognizant of 
the role protection played in this competitive balance. 
4 
Indeed, 
the least tinkering with tariff schedules would send deputations 
of Paterson's silk manufacturers scurrying to Washington. 
5 
1Wyckoff American Silk Manufacture pp. 41, C. C. Kirkland 
Industry Comes of Age (N. Y. ) 196-1), pp. 165,189- 
2 F. W. Taussig The Tariff Histor of the United States (New 
York, 1930) pp"337-9,388-90,436-439. 
3New York Times January 16 1874, Paterson Daily Guardian 
December 9 1893- 
4 
U. S. Industrial Commission Reports on the Relations and 
Conditions of Capital and Labor 1900 Washington, 1901), 
XIV pp. 700,7039706 - hereafter Ind. Comm. 1900. -',; '. 
5Silk 
Association of America Thirty Ninth Annual Report ý.. ' 
(New York, 1911) pp. 22-23. 
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Important as the tariff was the American silk industry 
received succour from other sources. Supplies of raw silk were 
limited until the mid-nineteenth century. Italian silk, the 
staple of the European industry, was not readily available in 
the U. S. French and British manufacturers captured the cream 
of the Italian harvest, leaving only the inferior silks to their 
competitors. From the mid-century new sources of raw material 
came on to the market, however, principally from China, and later 
from Japan. The "revolution" in ocean transport made them 
accessible whilst preventing shipping costs becoming prohibitive. 
i 
By the 1870s imports from the Orient could reach Paterson's 
mills via San Francisco and the transcontinental railroad, or 
from the port of New York via the Suez Canal. 
2 Far Eastern 
sources increasingly dominated imports of raw silk into America. 
By 1900 China and Japan supplied 80% of the raw material con- 
sumed by American silk manufacturers. 
3 Oriental silk was 
generally inferior to the European varieties, but it suited the 
needs of American manufacturers and the demands of the American 
public. More importantly an alternative supply prevented 
European manufacturers from contemplating strangling American 
competitors by monopolizing the purchase of Europe's best silks. 
The importance of this independence from European suppliers was 
underlined in the 1880s when disease amongst Italian silk worms 
seriously curtailed European production of raw silk. 
4 
1Kirkland Industry Comes of Age pp. 296-297. 
2M. Garber"The Silk Industry of Paterson, N. J. 1840-1913: 
Technology and the Origins, Development and Changes in an 
Industry" (Ph. D dissertation, Rutgers University, 1968) 
pp. 111-114, V. S. Clark History of Manufactures in the United 
States (N. Y. 1929) p. 449, Wyckoff American Silk Manufacture p. 4j. 
3Silk 
Association of America Twenty Ninth Annual Report (N. Y. 
1901) p. 95. 
4C. 
M. Cippola The Fontana Economic History of Europe: The 
Emergence of Industrial Societies (London, 1973) pp. 289-290" 
ý3 
Even with plentiful supplies of raw materials, however, 
American silk manufacturers found that the growth and pros- 
perity of their industry was not guaranteed. Fortunately for 
them, circumstances in the latter half of the century favoured 
them. The American consumer market was the largest in the world 
for silk goods. Dresses, handkerchiefs, hat bands, ribbons, 
umbrellas and a host of silk trimmed goods were all demanded in 
ever increasing quantities. European silks had traditionally 
dominated this market. European suppliers, with generations of 
expertise, access to the best sources of raw silk, cheaper labor 
costs and a hold on the American market, possessed clear advan- 
tages over their American counterparts. Competition was fierce 
and the tariff provided only partial protection to American 
manufacturers. But other factors favoured U. S. silk producers. 
The rapid decline of the British silk industry following the 
Cobden Treaty of 1860, and the disruption of French production 
by the Franco-Prussian War and later by inadequate supplies of 
raw silk from Italy, enabled native manufacturers to break the 
hold of Europeans on the American market, just as it induced 
Old World concerns to re-locate in the U. S. 
1 More importantly, 
American producers based their industry upon factory production 
and technical progress. By pressing relentlessly for innovations 
in advance of their European rivals, American millowners 
eventually captured control of the expanding home market. 
Mechanization was the key to the success of American silk 
manufacturers. As in so many industries, it was only by 
1Clark lIistory of Manufactures pp. 449-452. 
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mechanized production and higher productivity than European 
rivals that U. S. manufacturers could produce silk of competitive 
price and quality. For only by higher productivity could they 
offset the cheaper labor costs of European producers. Indeed, 
in those branches of the industry where mechanized production 
was absent or retarded American silk manufacturers did not even 
attempt to compete, such was their dependence upon technological 
advances. Silk reeling, the preparation of silk from cocoons, 
was uncommon in the U. S. because American producers could not 
compete with the cheap female and child labor of Italy and the 
Orient; the raw silk Paterson imported was already reeled. 
Similarly, handloom weaving was never very extensive in America. 
Some immigrant weavers in Paterson'tried to continue working by 
the traditional methods, and occasionally a small firm special- 
izing in high grade silks would employ handlooms; but they were, 
on the whole, exceptional. Everywhere in America the_powerloom 
predominated. 
I 
Dependence upon mechanized production limited American 
producers in the range of goods they could produce. High grade 
goods requiring skilled handloom weaving were uncommon in American 
silk factories. Similarly the cheapest silks were not manu- 
factured because of the high cost of labor in the United States. 
Manufacturers concentrated on medium grade silks, the staple of 
the American market. 
2 While they were unable to build an export 
1F. R. Mason "The American Silk Industry and the Tariff" 
American Economic Association Quarterly Series 3, II 
December 1910 pp. 12-13, R. C. Rawlley Economics of the Silk 
Industry (London, 1919) PP-771 96-97" Eleventh Census of the 
U. S. 1 90 XIII pp. 221-222. 
2Mason "The American Silk Industry" pp. 118-122. 
- 11 - 
trade for their product, in the 1870s and 1880s this scarcely 
seemed a drawback. 
' American silk manufacturers were pre- . 
occupied with the struggle to win the home market from foreign 
competitors. A good deal of snobbery in favour of European silks 
existed amongst American consumers. 
2 Native producers had to 
prove their silks were of comparable price and quality before 
public approval was granted. Initially they were able to compete 
with Europeans only in silk braids, trimmings and ribbons, but 
gradually their portion of the market increased and their range 
of goods was widened to include all medium range silks. As 
a consequence the quantity of home products grew enormously. 
In 1860 American mills were producing silk with an annual 
value of less than $4 million. Twenty years later the figure 
was %341 million, and by 1900 %921 million. European imports 
for the same period remained static, at roughly $30 million per 
annum. Thus from supplying a mere 20% of home consumption in 
1860, American silk mills provided almost 85% by the end of the 
century. 
3 
It was an impressive achievement and American silk manu- 
facturers did not hesitate to congratulate themselves. Nor 
were they short on explanations for the growth of the industry. 
Mechanization, they felt, was the basis of their ability to 
compete with European rivals. In Britain, France and Germany 
silk was a predominantly artisan and handicraft industry. It was 
based upon home-work and primitive forms of production until 
1Ind. Comm. 1900 XIV P-703- 
2 New York Times November 9,1873. 
3Clark 
History of Manufactures pp. 118-129 451-453. Mason 
"The American Silk Industry" PP. 5-6. 
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late in the nineteenth century. Nowhere in Europe was the 
industry a pioneer of mechanized, factory production. Every- 
where it lagged behind other textiles in adapting to the new 
modes of industrial society. Only in the throwing of silk had 
extensive factorization taken place, and this was untypical of 
the industry as a wholes'Untilthe mid-century and after the 
handloom predominated in the weaving of silk. Home work, 
organized around the master and journeyman weavers consequently 
characterized much of the industry. Weaving in factories was 
not only uncommon but actively resisted by handloom workers. 
Even after the appearance of the powerloom European silk centres 
only slowly adopted mechanized production under factory rooves. 
In America, factory organization and the powerloom were. taken up 
from the outset. The contrast between the U. S. and European 
industry was striking. An English visitor to Paterson in 1883 
remarked: 
"There are differences between the methods of 
manufacture adopted in the States and those in vogue 
here. Anyone who has visited Macclesfield, Leek, 
Congleton and Coventry would see many evidences of 
much of the work being done at the house of the oper- 
ative. In Paterson and Connecticut, where the silk 
industry is also carried on, all the work is done at 
the mill. 
This work at home is carried on by hand looms, while 
at the American mills steam power is used in every 
instance". 1 
Mechanized production was fundamental to the success of 
American silk manufacturers because by raising output per weaver 
it enabled them to compete with the cheaper labor costs abroad. 
Moreover in the early years of the industry U. S. manufacturers 
T. Greenwood A Tour of the United States: Out and Home in 
Six Weeks (London, 1883) pp. 139. 
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lacked a workforce sufficiently skilled to man a handloom 
industry. The powerloom reduced much of the skill requirement; 
and with the assistance of a healthy immigration of European 
weavers American manufacturers were able to overcome their 
problem of labor supply. America's position at the forefront 
of technological innovation in the industry clearly impressed 
itself upon native observers. "Our countrymen have been much 
more prompt than Europeans in this matter", one remarked, 
"substituting steam-driven machinery for the handloom upon each 
new kind of goods as fast as they were demanded". 
1 
The mechanized loom was the fulcrum, and the factory the 
basic unit of production in America. U. S. millowners strove 
to integrate the manufacturing process, from importing raw 
and reeled silk to turning out finished goods. In the more 
traditional industry of Europe each stage of production was 
separated, and often completed by different firms working on a 
commission basis from a silk merchant. Thus silk would be reeled 
and wound, twisted and doubled in factories and returned to the 
merchant. lie would parcel it out to be dyed, receive it back 
before contracting it out to be woven. "He has no factory and 
no machinery", an American observer noted in characterizing the 
typical European manufacturer. 
2 
In America the whole manufacturing process was likely to 
take place within one establishment. " In several of the Paterson 
mills*, an English visitor remarked, "all the different processes 
are conducted under a single roof, so that the raw silk becomes 
W. C. Wyckoff The Silk Goods of America: A Brief Account of the 
Recent Improvement and Advances of Silk Dlanufacture'in the 
United States (New York, 1879) p. 8. 
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finished goods before it leaves the place". 
1 Although silk 
throwsters, working on a commission basis, often appeared in 
the early years of American silk manufacture they had all but 
disappeared as a separate branch of the industry by the end of 
the century. Silk dyeing requiring much skill and experience. 
always remained a separate branch of the industry, although some 
of the larger Paterson firms had their own dyehouses. 
2 
At the point of production the weaving of silk was profoundly 
altered by the power loom and factory organization. In Europe 
the handloom worker performed many tasks besides actually weaving, 
more often than not requiring assistance from other members of 
his household. Preparing the loom and silk for weaving were 
the artisan weavers' task. Warping, quilling, twisting-in and 
loom-fixing were usually performed by the handworker, prior to 
weaving, and after he would pick the finished goods to remove 
waste particles and flaws. In America all these tasks were,. 
divided and a separate class of workers employed for each. 
3, 
Such a work process was not only to give the American industry 
its distinctive features but also to radically alter the 
relationship of the worker to his labor. As powerlooms were 
improved and perfected weaving increasingly became little more 
than machine-tending, the tedium abating only when the machine 
or silk proved inadequate. The pace of work was dictated by 
the loom not the operative, and the weaver a cog in a much 
larger machine - the factory and its integrated system of produc- 
tion. 
1Greenwood 
A Tour'of the United States-p. 141. 
2Dry`Goods Bulletin"p. 35, Industrial Commission 1900 XIV 
pp. 672,700. 
3Wyckoff The Silk Goods of America p. 27, 
I 
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Concern constantly to improve mechanization prompted a series 
of important inventions in various branches of the industry which 
kept American millowners one step ahead of their European com- 
petitors. Throwing and winding were greatly speeded up as was 
silk warping. Moreover powerlooms were constantly improved, and 
in 1889 an automatic, high-speed ribbon loom introduced in the 
one branch of the industry that lagged behind in machinery. 
1 
Moreover the demands of millowners for improvements stimulated 
the ancillary industry of machine-making. Much of the machinery 
in the early silk mills had to be imported or was brought over 
the Atlantic by immigrant manufacturers. But it did not take 
long for native machine producers to respond to the new situation. 
Machine plants had long existed in Paterson, feeding the 
older cotton and locomotive industries. They quickly adapted to 
the demands from silk producers. Within a decade they were 
supplying the entire industry with machinery and forging ahead 
with the latest innovations in the mechanization of the industry. 
As one Paterson machine builder claimed: "All kinds of looms 
have been tried in our silk factories - English, French, German, 
Swiss etc. - but the best and most effective are those made at 
home, and constructed according to ideas that have emanated 
from the minds of men who are practically familiar with silk 
weaving". 
2 Technological advance was crucial to the continued 
competitiveness of the industry. The growth of machine building 
coupled with a string of inventions preserved the American 
1Clark History of Manufactures PP-453-4- 
2 DrGoods Bulletin pp. 49,19-20,51, Industrial Comm. 1900 
XIV P-704- 
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industry's position in the forefront of mechanized production. 
By the end of the nineteenth century American silk machine 
builders were exporting their looms to Europe. 
l 
The importance of technological advance to the continued 
expansion of the industry was clearly recognized by American 
silk manufacturers. Only by mechanized production could they 
compete with the cheaper labor costs of their European rivals. 
Paterson millowners explained: 
"Our people have a genius for improving machinery, 
and it has made itself felt in the manufacture of silk 
goods. We have introduced power looms in all descrip- 
tions of work, and because of our rapidity of production 
we have been able to compete with the cheap labor of 
Europe, who invariably use slow hand looms. 
Because labor is high here. our manufacturers must use 
the best raw material and such improved machinery as 
will turn out the greatest amount of goods in the short- 
est time. The American idea is. to substitute machinery 
for manual labor, and'that is the main reason why our 
manufacturers can sell dress silks at a profit. " 2 
The "American idea" certainly seemed to pay dividends. - 
The struggle against European imports was in the long term 
successful. By the 1880s a combination of tariff protection and 
continuous technological advance enabled American millowners to 
capture almost all of the home market for silk. The resultant 
expansion of the industry was prodigious. 
1Ind. Comm. 1900 XIV p. 707. 
2 Dry Goods Bulletin pp. 30-31. 
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Table 
The U. S. Silk Industry 1880-1909 
No. of Firms Capital No. of Wage Earners Value of 
inc. owners/ Products 
salaried) 
1880 382 19,125,300 31,337 34,549,723 
1890 472 51,007,537 50,913 69,154,599 
1900 483 81,082,000 68,553 107,256,258 
1909 852 152,158,000 105,238 196,912,000 
Source: Eleventh Census of U. S. 1890 XIII pp. 211-212, Twelfth 
Census of the U. S. 1900 IX pp. 210-211, Thirteenth Census of 
U. S. 1910 X_p. 170. 
The number of firms producing silk more than doubled in the 
thirty years 1880-1910. Capital invested in the industry 
increased sevenfold during the same period. The number of wage 
earners trebled in the race to expand production, and the value 
of silk products increased sixfold. It was an impressive record, 
testimony to the gospel of protectionism and to native ingenuity 
and ambition. 
Paterson as the centre of the industry shared disproportion- 
ately in this expansion. 
Table 4 
The Paterson Silk Industry 1880-1910 (not including dyeplants) 
No. of Firms Capital No. of Wage Earners Value of Products 
188o 82 55,, 660,525 9,809 14,164,465 
1890 90 12,533,491 11,596 22,058,624 
1900 136,19,025,564 16,704 26,006,156 
1910 276 26,446,795 20,099 40,358,271 
Source: Tenth Census of the U. S. 1880 II p. 430, Eleventh Census 
of the U. S. 1 90 XII pp. 2- 29, Twelfth Census of the U. S. 1900 
VIII pp. 570-571, Thirteenth Census of the U. S. 1910 IX pp. 782-783. 
- 18 - 
The city was not only universally recognized as the home of the 
industry, but its continued prosperity was confidently expected 
to accompany the growth of silk production. "The history of the 
growth of Paterson is a romance of American enterprise and 
American industry", the New York Press recorded in 1880.1 
Practically everyone in the city shared the optimism. Even the 
city's silkworkers joined the enthusiastic chorus. "The time is 
not far distant", they declared before the Annual Congress of 
New Jersey Trade Unionists in 1897, "when Paterson will become 
Greater Paterson, embracing within its limits Passaic City, 
Haledon and North Paterson, and that time can be hastened by 
the advancement-of the silk industry... " 
2 
1New York Daily Tribune September 25 1880. 
2New 
Jersey Federation of Trades and Labor Unions Nineteenth 
Annual Congress 1897 (Jersey City 1897) n. p. 
- 19 - 
Chapter Two 
TUE EXPERIENCE OF INDUSTRIALIZATION 
The rapid and distinctive development of the silk industry 
transformed Paterson and its economy in the last quarter of the 
nineteenth century. It also heralded a radical change in the 
lives of the city's expanding population. The experience of 
industrialism was new to both millowners and their workers. 
Both drew upon past, and usually European, experiences to take 
stock of the change. But beyond that similarities between the 
two groups diverge. 
Silk manufacturers looked back over their shoulders towards 
competitors in Europe. They judged their performance and gauged 
their success by such comparisons. Mechanization, the "American 
idea", received sustenance and justification from the same source. 
The marked contrast between handloom centres in Europe and 
Paterson's towering mills inspired local millowners. 
For Paterson's older social groups and its new army of 
silkworkers the fruits of industrial progress were less apparent. 
Ironically, by drawing on similar comparisons to their masters, 
the city's millhands discovered good reasons for dissension. 
Traditions and attitudes formed in European silk centres shaped 
their refusal to endorse the methods of Paterson's pioneering 
manufacturers. Workers' opposition to the new industrial tech- 
niques of silk manufacturing formed a dominant motif in the 
industrial development of the city. 
Following the Civil War the new silk manufacturing industry 
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quickly became Paterson's single most important source of employ- 
ment. As early as 1870 millhands were more numerous than any 
other work group in the city. The work experience of this 
expanding factory proletariat was to be shaped by the pre- 
occupations of its new masters, in-particular by silk manu- 
facturers' desire for technological progress. Despite the city's 
long established reputation as an industrial centre, work in 
most Paterson silk factories was distinctly advanced. By 
adopting the latest innovations of mechanization, powerloom 
weaving and accompanying forms of work organization, local 
millowners introduced a novel stage of factory production. 
There was nothing in Paterson's industrial past to presage 
the sophistication of the new silk factories. The rapid growth 
of the silk industry and the vast expansion of factory produc- 
tion marked a new departure in the industrial life of the city. 
Cotton manufacturing, the basis of the city's industrial life 
in the early nineteenth century, had been only partly adapted to 
factory production. As an industry it lacked many of the charac- 
teristics of later silk manufacturing, most notably the steady 
application and discipline required of workers in a mechanized 
factory. The bulk of cotton yarn, after being spun in the city's 
mills, was sold off to independent weavers, working in their 
own homes or the small workshops that dotted the city. The 
workforce that had been brought into these early cotton mills 
was largely composed of women and children; and although little 
is known of the work routine of this early labor force, there 
1Garber "The Silk Industry of Paterson, ' N. J. 1840-191311 
pp " 29-35. :...... .:..... ... 
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are hints that it scarcely resembled the regimentation of 
later factory labor. For instance, little or no value was placed 
on uninterrupted production, a prime concern of silk manufac- 
turers. Hours of work were regulated by hours of daylight, 
being much shorter during winter months. Likewise, pre-factory 
customs, such as the morning break for breakfast were an 
established component of early cotton mill life. The existence 
of "sub-bosses" within the mills, and cotton spinners acting 
as overseers of child labor, suggest that the adaptation-of 
this workforce to mill life was not only a problem, but one which 
the city's cotton manufacturers ultimately gave up on. 
1 By 
transferring the onus of "responsibility" onto sub-bosses who 
could make use of their familiarity with the workforce to coax 
or bully the millowners were in reality evading the problem of 
industrial discipline. 2 More importantly the exodus of cotton 
manufacturers from the city in the 1840s and afterwards pre- 
vented the development of more sophisticated techniques for the 
creation of a stable second-generation of factory workers. 
The city's other major industry before silk took over was 
the manufacture of locomotives and the allied machine-tool 
industry. Here too, the plants were huge but the high degree of 
skills enabled the locomotive workers and toolmakers to 
maintain a status and independence which their employers were 
reluctant to abridge. Many shop-floor practices were governed 
J. R. Commons A Documentary History of American Industrial 
Society (Cleveland, 1910) V. pp. 3- . 
ZThe 
use of "sub-bosses" was a technique commonly employed 
by early British industrialists; see S. Pollard The Genesis 
of Modern Management: A Study of the Industrial Revolution 
in Great Britain (London, 
-1965) p. 
139 and passim. 
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11 
by custom as much as by the dictates of employers and mechanized 
production. During a molders' strike in 1886 in the principal 
machine and locomotive shops in the city, a principal grievance 
of employers was the objection to "... taking back the men who 
have been in the habit of staying out Mondays and Tuesdays to 
get over their Sunday holiday". 
1 The problem did not disappear 
with'a new generation of skilled metal workers. Twenty years 
later, despite the rapid decline of the locomotive industry 
and its amalgamation under the American Locomotive Company, the 
city's skilled metal workers were still resisting attempts to 
alter their customary workshop practices. At the Rogers plant 
of the American Locomotive Works, a two month strike occurred 
in 1907 because of a new manager's refusal to allow beer on the 
firm's premises or to allow workmen leave during the workday to 
visit a saloon. The "... beer privilege had been agoyed for 
many years and was valued very highly". 
2 
At the root of this dispute was the determination of the 
new locomotive corporation to increase efficiency in the plant 
but that goal, as usual, involved an assault on traditional work- 
shop practices. 
3 The truculence of the city's skilled locomotive 
builders in the face of such pressure was re-emphasized later in 
1New York Times September 14 1886. 
2New Jersey Bureau of Statistics of Labor and Industries 
Thirtieth Annual Report 1907 (Trenton, 1908) PP-554,667,670 
- hereafter NJUS Annual Reports. 
31t 
seems probable that the drive for efficiency in the city's 
metal trades was part of the same movement throughout the 
engineering trades of the industrialized nations that was 
putting new pressures on skilled workingmen. See E. J. Iiobsbawm 
"Customs, Wages and Work-Load" in Labouring Men (London, 
1964) PP. 344-370, -and D. Montgomery "Workers Control of 
Machine Production in the Nineteenth Century" Labor History 
17, No. 4,1976Epp..:. 485-509". ` 
- 23 - 
1907 when blacksmiths in the Rogers shop struck at the intro- 
duction of "time-cards" by the plant's new management. The new 
system, which required the"men to have their workcards punched 
at noon and again at 6.00 p. m., was offensive to workers who 
traditionally "... were at liberty to leave the shops on the 
completion of their day's work". 
' 
Both the cotton and the locomotive industries indicate that 
Paterson's industrial heritage did not guarantee silk manu- 
facturers a carte blanche to introduce at will their mills and 
new forms of work. Indeed other inhabitants also resented the 
intrusion of this new manufacturing element upon the city. In 
1880, residents in the vicinity of the newly established Weidmann 
dyehouse complained virulently over the blowing of the factory 
whistle at 6.30 in the morning, at the noise of machinery and 
smell of chemicals from the plant. They went so far as to 
band together, raise funds and employ a leading city lawyer to 
secure an injunction forcing the removal of the plant. The 
resultant compromise was described as "a complete victory for 
the complainants"; Weidmann agreeing to stop the whistle, employ 
quieter machinery and cease both night and Sunday work shifts. 
2 
Likewise locomotive builders had earlier found it impossible to 
build a siding from the main railway track in the city straight 
into their plants, which were located in the industrial and 
commercial heart of Paterson. Popular opposition forced loco- 
motive manufacturers to pull newly completed engines by teams of 
horses through the city's major thoroughfares to the rail 
terminus. 3 
N. J. B': S. 'Thirty, 'First Annual Report '1908 p"374. 
2New 
York: Times. September 25,26 and 28-1880. -- 3Garber 
"The Silk Industry of Paterson". p. 92. 
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Incidents such as these underline significant features 
of industrialization and its impact on Paterson. Clearly in 
a city with firmly established manufacturing roots the trans- 
ition from workshop and highly skilled industry to factory 
production was not simply or uniformly accomplished. The work 
organization and practices of factory life were radically new 
and often resented as disruptive. Until late into the nine- 
teenth century they were imposed rather than welcomed. In their 
primitive forms, industries such as cotton did not necessarily 
create a stable and disciplined workforce available to a later 
generation of industrialists. Locomotive building was the pre- 
serve of workers who maintained their traditional trade customs 
at least until the turn of the century. The regularity and 
discipline required in intensively mechanized industries was 
evident nowhere in Paterson before the arrival of the silk 
industry. Consequently a principal task of the new millowners 
was to forge a factory workforce attuned to their demands and 
presuppositions. 
Early millowners, although mindful of opposition to the 
regimentation of mechanized factory production, were confident 
that harmonized relations between manufacturer and worker were 
possible. Several factors encouraged this view. Although 
factory organization predominated in the industry, prior to the 
1880s weavers* work was not wholly dictated by mechanized 
techniques. In the 1860s and 18709 handloom work was much in 
evidence. Weavers toiled in factories, but inside their skills 
were at a high premium and provided them with an independence 
and status unknown"to later generations of silkworkers. The 
powerlöom was adopted. on-a.. wide. scale in- America_`_in', the . 
1870s - 
and at a much faster. rate than-in Europe - but in 1880 the 
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handloom had been far from extinguished. In that year, in 
New Jersey's silk industry, there were still more than fifteen 
hundred handlooms alongside almost three thousand powerlooms; 
although the employment of the handloom was to be virtually 
non-existent by 1890.1 
In some factories handlooms still made up a high proportion 
of the looms in operation. At Hamil and Booth's, one of the 
city's largest mills employing over one thousand workers in 
1880, there were still one hundred and fifty handlooms alongside 
one hundred and fifty powerlooms. In the Phoenix' Manufacturing 
Company it was a similar story. In the workshops of smaller 
producers, such as the Paul Crawford Co. or John Lockett Co. 
handlooms also survived; their owners specializing in fine, 
handwoven silks or unable to afford the capital outlay on 
mechanized looms. 
2 
The survival of the handloom, at least into the 1880s, was 
important for it gave silkworkers at least some measure of control 
over their work situation. It eased the transition to fully 
mechanized factory work. If the mill buzzer signalled their 
arrival and departure from-the plant, it did not determine the 
pace at which handloom workers labored. Before the powerloom 
weavers toiled at their own, usually customary, speed concerned 
as much with the quality of their product as with the pace at 
which they manufactured it. As local manufacturers observed 
in 1880: "A weaver will produce about eight or ten yards of 
broad goods per day upon a hand loom while the power loom turns 
, Tenth Census'of the U. S. 1880 II p. 25, Clark History of 
Manufactures ipp. 52- 5. 
2Dry Goods Bulletin pp. 33,36,48,49. 
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out about eighteen yards, but the hand woven fabrics are con- 
sidered superior in finish and durability". 
1 
The latter was a powerful argument amongst millowners for 
the adoption of powerloom weaving. Its widespread application 
during the 1880s transformed work in Paterson's mills. On 
power looms the weaver's task was essentially one of machine 
minder. The automatic loom dictated the pace of work, stopping 
only when the silk threads broke, at which point the weaver 
intervened repairing fibres to set the machine in motion once 
more. 
2 Not only must such work have been excruciatingly tedious, 
but perhaps more importantly, it demanded new work customs and 
discipline. To weavers it implied a new, and degraded status. 
By the end of the 1880s labor in Paterson's mills was 
almost wholly transformed by this new form of production. 
"Labor in the silk mill has become so divided and sub-divided", 
a trade journal noted, "that in these latter days the operative 
does no more than the mechanic who makes a small though integral 
part of a vast machine. Practice, therefore, and not innate 
artistic sense, is what makes the worker perfect in the per- 
formance of his or her part in the work of producing the finished 
silk fabric". 
3 Nevertheless local millowners expressed confidence 
in the plastic qualities of their workforce. They believed 
their weavers could or would see the virtues of tachnological 




S. Congress, Senate Commission on Industrial Relations 
'Final Report and Testimon 1st Cong., 2nd sess., 1915-1916, 
. 
III pp. 2434,24692117O. hereafter C. I. R. ) 
3Textile America December 12 1897. 
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statement made by the Silk Association of America in 1879: 
"Our countrymen have been much more prompt than Europeans in... 
substituting steam-driven machinery for the handloom.... The 
workers have also been learning, so that they waste less silk, 
and perform their labor more efficiently in connection with the 
new machinery". 
1 
Manufacturers felt their optimism was not without foundation. 
They were confident of attracting workers to their mills;, and 
in the early years of the silk industry, Paterson's economic 
structure appeared conducive to their aims. In the 1870s, 
the city's.... 
"... men were employed in machine-shops and on heavy 
work. Their wives and children needed employment; and 
although this was afforded by the cotton mills, the oper- 
atives objected to it as being too confining and hard.... 
the girls and young women of Paterson thought it an honor, 
or at all events an evidence of respectability to be 
employed in the silk mill". 2 
Silk manufacturers liked to extoll the theme of "healthful, - 
and profitable employment": 
"The work is cleanly, comparatively light, and is not 
hurtful in any way to the operative. Hence it happens 
that respectable parents who would object to having their 
families employed in other factories are glad to have 
them busy in the silk mills. The contrast between the 
laboring classes of this country and of Europe is nowhere 
more striking than in this industry". 3 
In fact, of course, it was necessity rather than respon- 
sibility that provided "respectable parents" their chief motive 
in seeing their offspring employed. During the economic 
1Wyckoff The Silk Goods of America, p. 8. 
2L. P. Brockett The Silk Industry in America (New York, 1876) 
P, 115. 
3Wyckoff 
The Silk Goods of America p. 9, and American Silk 
Manufacture P77- 
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depression of the 1870s when production had all but ceased in 
Paterson's locomotive and machine shops, the silk industry 
provided the sole source of income for many local families. 
I 
William Strange, silk manufacturer and organizer of relief in 
the city, congratulated himself; for "... had it not been for 
the thriving state of our industry great distress must inevitably 
have prevailed among the poorer operatives, many of whom, having 
been deprived of employment, were dependent upon the wages earned 
by their children in the silk mills for support of their families. 
2 
Women and children formed a large proportion of the work- 
force in the early silk mills (Table 5). In 1890, the first 
year for which figures are available, women and girls composed 
zinost half the mill labor force. Most were young and unmarried, 
as were many male employees. In comparison with Paterson's 
locomotive builders the age and conjugal structure of this 
textile workforce suggests that local silk factories were 
filled with daughters supplementing the family income in the 
years between school and marriage, and sons awaiting the oppor- 
tunity to enter apprenticeships or more skilled and highly 
paid employment (Table 6). Almost sixty per cent of Paterson's 
silkworkers were under twenty four years of age in 1890, and 
over two thirds of the workforce was single. Although older 
and married hands made up a higher proportion of male workers 
in the industry, very few females toiled in the mills once 
married. 
1Shriner Paterson p. 29. 
2Brockett The Silk Industry in America p. 175. 
- 29 - 
The other striking feature of the new mill workforce was 
the extensive employment of immigrants by local silk manu- 
facturers. Of more than twelve thousand silkworkers in 1890, 
over fifty percent were foreign born. Of the remainder the 
vast bulk were second generation Americans. "Natives" cons- 
tituted little more than ten per cent of the city's millhands. 
The labor demands of silk manufacturers did not introduce 
immigration to Paterson. The city had long been a magnet for 
the foreign born and was familiar with some of the problems 
characteristic of the newly arrived. As early as the 1830s 
manufacturers had been attracting skilled metal workers from 
Sheffield with "tempting offers". Similarly, English mill- 
owners, weavers, and spinners had come to the city in the 1820's 
and 1830's to invest and work in Paterson's cotton mills. The 
"monied manufacturers" were "esteemed highly" by the natives,, 
but the English workers were disconcerting. Patersonians 
viewed them as "beastly people" who "get drunk, and curse and 
swear and use indecent language, and give great offence to the 
Americans". 2 
Despite this antipathy, British immigrants continued to 
flock to the city. In 1870 they made up the bulk of the city's 
foreign born. Of nearly 13,000 immigrants in the city in that 
year, over 9,000 were of English, Scottish or Irish origin. 
1Anon. The British Mechanics and Labourers' Hand Book and 
True Guide To The United States With Ample Notices Respecting 
Various Trades and Professions (London, 1840) p. 233- 
2 
Rev. Isaac Fidler Observations on Prof essioris,. Literature, 
Manners and Emigration in the United States and Canada 
Made During a Residence There in 1832 (London, 1833)-PP-154-160. 
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Table 
Paterson's Silkworkers 1890 (does not include c. 200 dyeworkers) 
Sex and Nativity 
Male Native/N. P . Native/F. P. Foreign Born 
6,340 624 1,616 4,098 
Female 
6,031 835 2,505 2,690 
Country of Birth of Forei gn Born 
Males Germany Ireland Great Britain Other 
988 450 1,650 1,010 
Females 346 846 1,009 489 
Age Structure of Silkworkers 
Males 10-24 25-44 45-64 6ý+ 
2,804 2,542 945 77 
Females 4,327 1,508 189 5 
Males and 
Females 7,131 4,050 1,134 82 
Conjugal Condition 
Males Single (and unknown) Married Widowed/Divorced 
3,246 2,943 151 
Females 5,326 421 284 
Source: Eleventh Census of the U. S. 1890 XVI pp. 708-709. 
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Table 6 
















(includes some workers not 
employed in the city locomotive 
and machine shops) 
















Totals 3,242 679 977 1,586 
Country of Birth of Foreign Born 
Germany Ireland Great Britain Other 
Blacksmiths 26 io9 -95 33 
Brass Wkrs. 8 25 36 8 
Iron, Steel Wkrs. 38 174 - 191 142 
Machinists 64 151 314 54 
Steam Boiler Makers - 86 26 6 
136 545 662 243 










Blacksmiths 70 233 147 24 
Brass Wkrs. 70 65 18 - 
Iron, Steel Wkrs. 327 503 224 23 
Machinists 310 581 333 54 
Steam boiler Makers 42 149 66 3 
Conjugal Condition 
Single (and unknown)'' Married Widowed/Divorced 
1,079 2,032 131 
Source: Eleventh Census of U. S. 1890 XVI pp. 708-709. 
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Besides them only Germans and Dutch, amounting to another 
3,000, formed a major immigrant group. 
I This pattern prevailed 
over the next twenty years despite Paterson's remarkable 
expansion. 
Immigration to Paterson was closely tied to the expansion 
of the silk industry. A local observed the newcomers' arrival 
"every night by the 'emigrant train'... quaintly attired new- 
comers... with their quainter luggage, who had come straight 
to Paterson, attracted hither by the enthusiastic reports sent 
"home" by friends who had come earlier to try their fortunes 
in the "Lyons of America"". 
2 The hope of regular employment, 
higher wages and personal contacts . all played a part 
in attract- 
ing newcomers to Paterson and its mills. 
Waves of immigration closely followed trade conditions, 
both in Europe and Paterson. The emigration of British silk- 
workers, the most important source of labor for early mill- 
owners, typified a general European movement to Paterson. Free 
trade in Britain snunded the death knell of the country's silk 
industry. With the signing of the Cobden Treaty between Britain 
and France in 1860 the industry all but collapsed. The agree- 
ment removed import duties from cheaper French silk goods and 
almost immediately had a drastic effect on British silk produc- 
tion. Tariffs imposed by the U. S. Government to protect its 
1Ninth Census of the U. S. 1870 Is pp. 379-391- 
21 
W. W. Clayton and W. Nelson History of Bergen and Passaic 
Counties, New Jersey with Biographical Sketches of Many of 
its Pioneers and Prominent Men (Philadelphia, 3E382) p. 1O7. 
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fledgling silk industry compounded English manufacturers' 
problems. Thousands were thrown out of work as the mills and 
workshops of Coventry and Macclesfield shut down. In 1863 
the Macclesfield Silk Weavers' Emigration Society in a pet- 
ition to Parliament complained that "... more than one half of 
the hands engaged in the silk trade are hopelessly thrown out 
of employment". 
1 Nor did the industry show many signs of 
reviving in the next twenty years. Apart from brief revivals 
during the 1860s, and again during the Franco-Prussian War 
when the French industry was seriously disrupted, British silk 
declined more or less constantly. The ribbon weaving districts 
of Coventry and Congleton all but disappeared. Even in Maccles- 
field, where the industry was better equipped to compete with 
European rivals, decline was unavoidable. From 1859 to 1885 the 
number of silk mills fell from fifty five to thirty, and the 
number of silk operatives from fourteen thousand to less than 
five. - In the latter year the community boasted two thousand 
empty houses. Such statistics cannot convey the resultant hard- 
ship and misery for the workers of the "Doomed Town". But they 
do suggest reasons for the particular emigration patterns from 
British silk centres. Some went to. the textile centres of 
Lancashire, whilst others sailed for America. 
2 
Emigration was sometimes of short duration. Many who had 
left for Paterson in the 1860s returned to Macclesfield a decade 
House of Commons "Reports of the Select Committee on Public 
Petitions 186311 App. 837, PP- 395-396. - British Library, 
London. 
2"Royal 
Commission into the Depression of Trade and Industry 
- Second Report" Parliamentary Papers XXI 1886 Cd. 4715 
Q"7197, and "Third Report" P. P. XXIII 1886 Cd. 4797 Q. 13736, 
4056 (hereafter "R. C. - Reports"). 
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Table 
Nativity of Paterson Population 1890 
Total Population = 78,347 
Native Born/Native Parentage = 19,730 
Native Born/Foreign Parentage = 26,824 
Foreign Born = 31,162 
Leading Immigrant Groups (includes native and foreign born) 
Irish = 14,791 
English = 9,274 
Scottish = 4,074 
German = 9,047 
Dutch = 4,449 (includes only foreign born) 
Source: Eleventh Census of the U. S. 1890 XV pp. 580-583, 
670-6739 710-711. 
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later when trade prospects brightened for a short period in 
the British industry. 
I The flow of emigrants from England was 
always at its most intense when employment prospects in the 
homeland were least favourable. As soon as trade prospects in 
Macclesfield brightened, and particularly when the American 
economy was depressed, as in the late 1870s, English immigrants 
began returning to their native land. 
2 Then, when conditions 
reversed, the normal flow of traffic resumed. As the Maccles- 
field Chronicle noted in 1886: "The resumption of emigration to 
Paterson is a sign that the prospects of weavers - especially 
handloom weavers - are far from hopeful... " That the bulk of 
Paterson's immigrants were hard-pressed weavers fleeing a 
depressed industry in Europe can hardly be doubted for the same 
issue of the journal contained the week's list of emigrants 
and their destinations. It consisted of one farm laborer going 
to Toronto,. one fustian cutter off to New York and eleven 
weavers all heading for Paterson. 
3 
That Paterson should prove a common destination is scarcely 
surprising. It was not only the bustling centre of the infant 
U. S. silk industry, and adjacent to the chief port of entry, 
but more important in Paterson "... the manufacturers, many of 
them, are Macclesfield men, and a Macclesfield weaver is selected 
for 
1Paterson 
Labor Standard May 29 1880. 
2New York Herald March 8 1880. Hosts of French immigrants 
followed a similar' route during the depression of the 1890s. 
See U. S. Congress, Senate Reports of the Immigration 
Commission S. Doc. 633,61st Cong., 2nd sess., 1909-1910 
PP. 17-20 (hereafter Immigration Commission). 
3Macclesfield 
Chronicle May 7 1886. 
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his ability before the'wPavers of other countries". 
1 Many 
of Paterson's early silk manufacturers were Coventry and 
Macclesfield factory owners who had emigrated after the collapse 
of the British industry, bringing their machinery and know-how 
with them. 
2 
Probably the most important were the Kyle family from 
Macclesfield who had pioneered silk production in Paterson from 
the 1840s. During the 1860s and 1870s a spate of others 
followed, men such as Benjamin Tilt, a Coventry ribbon manu- 
facturer; George Frost, William Crew, and James Nightingale, 
all from Macclesfield. 
3 The best remembered of them was 
Catholina Lambert, an emigrant fron, the Coventry silk region, 
who was by the beginning of the twentieth century a millionaire 
and the city's leading manufacturer. He left a spectacular 
memorial to his "Old World" origins and was to be immortalized 
in the verse of William Carlos Williams 
"the poor English boy, 
the immigrant.... 
.... a Limey, 
his head full of castles, the pivots of that 
curt dialectic (while it lasted), built himself 
a Balmoral on the alluvial silt, the rock-fall 
skirting the volcanic upthrust of the "Mountain". 4 
The "Balmoral" was actually a replica of Warwick Castle (Warwick 
was his birthplace) built on Garrett Mountain, a steep ridge 
1P. P. XXIII 1886 "R. C. - Third Report" Q. 13839, R. T. Berthoff 
British Immigrants in Industrial America (Harvard, 1953)- 
2Textile America October 30 1897" 
3See 
the biographical details in the Dry Goods Bulletin and 
W. W. Clayton & W. Nelson History of Bergen and Passaic 
Counties. 
4W. 
C. Williams Paterson (New York, 1963) Book III p. 99. 
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bordering Paterson which today still casts an imposing shadow 
across the city. 
Undoubtedly these pioneering English employers brought 
skilled hands with them. In the early years of the American 
industry skills were not entirely diluted by mechanization; 
thus technical knowledge was at a premium in a country with 
no recognized traditions of silk manufacture. As early as 
1873 an American millowner exclaimed: "We are importing not 
fabrics but men". 
1 
Emigrating manufacturers from France, 
Germany and Switzerland also brought their skilled hands along, 
but the English were the most conspicuous. 
2 
With prospect of 
regular employment and earnings three times higher than in 
England hundreds of British silkworkers left for Paterson during 
the-1860s and 1870sß soon earning the city the title: "The 
Macclesfield of America". 
3 
John Twemlow, a Macclesfield weaver 
who left for Paterson in the 1860s was quick to point out that 
"... as a rule they are the better class of people-that will go 
out to America", often the young and ambitious who "... in 
Paterson can always obtain employment in preference to either 
Germans or French". Many probably shared the dream of Robert 
Clark, a weaver who had left for Paterson in 1863 and returned 
1"Reports by fi. bt. Secretaries of Embassy and Legation 
Respecting Factories for Spinning aniWeaving of Textile 
Fabrics Abroad" Parliamentary Papers 1873 LXVIII Cd. 826. 
2See 
entries in Dry Goods Bulletin and in A. H. Heusser The 
History of the Silk Dyeing Industry in the United States 
(Paterson, 1927)- U. S. Congress, Reps., Letter from the Secretar' 
of the Treasury Transmitting a Report of the Commissioners of 
Immigration upon the Causes which Incite Immigration to the 
U. S. 52nd Cong., Ist sess., Exec. Doc. 235,1892 I p. 124, 
II pp"68,73,75,89,95-100. (hereafter Commissioners of 
Immigration 1892). 
3p. Y. XXIII 1886 1'R. C. - Third Report" (4.13940-13943,13839" 
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in the 1870s. His intention was to save his American earnings 
and return to a life of relative ease in his hometown, like 
the Macclesfield manufacturer before him "... who came back a 
few years ago independent and spent the rest of his life in 
Macclesfield in a very nice position". 
1 
Certainty of employment and high wages clearly impressed 
an English visitor to Paterson in 1883. Pleased with the city's 
"clean, well-ordered" appearance, he thought it a fit and proper 
place for the throngs of English silk-workers who, "out of 
employment are making their way to Paterson, and becoming 
quickly absorbed in'the increasing number of manufactories there. " 
Thomas Greenwood was not alone in 4is favourable impression. 
On his ocean crossing he met "a Paterson silk dyer,. who had been 
on a visit to Dfacclesfield, his native place, after an absence 
of some years. " They fell into conversation and Greenwood 
".... asked him if he would prefer to have remained in 
England rather than be returning to Paterson... and his 
answer was a very decided negative. As a place of 
residence he said he would prefer Macclesfield but 
as for labour and its relative remuneration, the 
comparison lay most decidedly, he said, in favour of 
Paterson. He was, I should remark, evidently a well- 
skilled artisan, who had, by a thoroughly experienced 
knowledge, made himself invaluable to his firm... " 
The material well-being of Greenwood's fellow voyager is 
attested by his holiday in his homeland, and his affluence was 
not unique among Paterson's millhands. Greenwood found that 
"the condition of those in the trade in Paterson is very 
creditable. The operatives have a comfortable and well-to-do 
appearance.... They are infinitely better off than hundreds. 
in the English districts referred to. 
11_. Q. 14011,14044,14055,14066. 
2Greenwood 
A Tour in the United States pp. 138,139,141. 
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Whether prompted by dread of the workhouse or by the dream 
of gold-paved streets, thousands of European immigrants were 
attracted to Paterson in the three decades following the Civil 
War. Many, like Greenwood's anonymous dyer, prospered and 
some quickly became indistinguishable from native Americans. 
"It was curious", one observer remarked of Paterson's newcomers, 
"to see how speedily these strangers were absorbed into the 
common body of inhabitants, and how quickly they doffed their 
old-country ways and became citizens 'to the manner born 'lleL 
But most immigrants probably agreed with Greenwood's man that 
"as a place of residence" they preferred their land of birth. 
Ethnic origins were commonly. etxpressed in the growing 
city. The Macclesfield "wakes" survived the journey across 
the Atlantic, as did the Macclesfield Provident Society and 
other friendly society lodges. 
2 
The "Macclesfield Arms" was 
a favourite tavern on Market Street. 
3 
Association football, - 
rugby and cricket were all regular features of social life in 
the city until the turn of the century. Even pidgeon-racing 
attracted a considerable following amongst English immigrants 
in the 1880s. 
4 
Most important was the Sons of St George, a 
federation of fraternal lodges, which by 1887 was celebrating 
1Clayton 
and Nelson History of Bergen and Passaic Counties 
P-407- 
2 
Paterson Evening News July 12 1892, Macclesfield Courier 
and Herald Octobe1883, American Silk Journal May 1 90. 
3Paterson 
Labor Standard August 6 1881. 
4Paterson 
Pencilings September 26, October 17, December 26 
1891, Paterson Daily Guardian March 2 1887. 
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its tenth anniversary, and included the Wilberforce, Shakespeare 
and Loyalty lodges. In that year a vigorous meeting of its 
members met in the rooms of the English Philanthropic and 
Athletic Society in the city to listen to Richard Walmsley 
lecture on a recent visit to Macclesfield. 
1 
The role of these fraternal lodges extended beyond a mere 
sentimental concern for the homeland. They provided a medium 
through which knowledge and prospects for immigration were 
disseminated, sending back frequent reports to the Macclesfield 
press of employment and trade conditions in Paterson. Thus 
they were fundamental to the major waves of British immigration 
to the city. It was from the meetings of such lodges that 
visitors to Paterson returned to Macclesfield to encourage 
emigration across the Atlantic. 
2 Many would-be emigrants were 
too poor to raise the fare. A local weaver noted "... it is not 
that they have the money themselves, their friends in Paterson 
send them over money, and it is in that way that hundreds have 
gone out". 
3 Friendly and fraternal lodges both in Macclesfield 
and Paterson assisted in the process by raising funds. 
4 
Such was the volume of Macclesfield emigration to Paterson 
that the city became celebrated as a miniature "hold Hingland". 
5 
1Paterson Daily Guardian March 19 1887- 
2 Macclesfield Courier and Herald January 20, February 3, 
March 24, April 28 1883, January 20, February 10 1894. 
3P. P. XXIII 1886 "R. C. - Third Report" Q. 14067-- 
ibid. Q. 13957-13960, Macclesfield Chronicle February 26 1886. 
5New York Herald March 8 1880. 
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"Here I could listen to my native dialect in its almost pure 
state, and stumble upon faces that I had missed without 
knowing to what 'bourne' they had gone", remarked Ben Brierley 
an English visitor, in 1885.1 In turn, the English immigrant 
community commanded a prominent position in Paterson society. 
Brierley's visit was toasted with "high jinks" -a "grand 
reception" at the City Opera House - attended by "aldermen, 
councilmen and officials of the corporation" and chaired by 
ex-mayor Buckley, an Englishman and manufacturer of textile 
machinery. 
2 Similar celebrations feted other British visitors 
to Paterson. 
3 
If friends, relatives and some-familiar institutions eased 
the process of adaption to a new environment newcomers still 
found conditions in the New World fell far short of their ideals. 
An "Anglo-Patersonian" wrote home in the 1880s lamenting the 
"miserable" condition of his adopted city. "When trade is slack" 
the writer noted, "the unemployed weaver... has no alternative 
but to tramp through the dirty, ill-paved streets of the city.... 
What a contrast the intellectual life of Paterson presents to 
that of any English town or village. I have before me a news- 
paper printed in a small town in the West Riding of Yorkshire. 
It contains reports of lectures... of literary and scientific 
societies, and in addition it records the meetings of the 
B. Drierley Ab-O'Th'-Yate in Yankeeland: The Results of 




Wright A Centennial Tour in the United States and Canada 
Macclesfield, 1877) p. 27. 
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Parliamentary debating societies, where the village politicians 
meet to answer the questions of the house.. How much better are 
all these methods of spending the time than those which prevail 
here". 1 Concerns more basic than intellectual stimulants fed 
the-grievances of another "English Sparrow" who wrote home: 
"If the distress which at present prevails in this 
city were found in any English town, charitable assoc- 
iations would be organized at once and relief given, 
but because the poor are left to suffer in silence, 
because there are no soup kitchens or blanket dist- 
ribution, foolish people on your side of the Atlantic 
imagine we are well off, and Paterson is regarded as 
a capital market still for the surplus labour of 
Macclesfield". 2 
For those who found work life in Paterson silk factories 
was scarcely less distressing. Millwork was unlike that in 
England or most silk centres in Europe. It proved a constant 
source of grievance for newcomers. 
Many immigrants had woven silk in the "Old Country". 
England provided a large contingent of newcomers, but sizeable 
groups also came from France, Germany and Switzerland. In 
each of these European centres the silk industry conformed to 
a similar level of development and its workers shared common 
work traditions and experiences. In England, France and 
Germany most had worked as master or journeymen weavers. 
3 
1Macclesfield Courier and Herald February 17 1883- 
2 ibid. February 3 1883- 
3 
A. Milward and S. B. Saul The Economic Development of 
Continental Europe 1780-1870 (London, 1973 
, 
PP"322,324, 
458-4599 J. H. Clapham The Economic Development of France 
and Germany 1815-1914 (Cambridge, 1921 -pp. 252-255" 
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Weaving in the attic of their own home, or perhaps in the 
small workshop of a master weaver, they were familiar with a 
productive process that was essentially pre-industrial. Unlike 
in the cotton industry the production of silk in Europe, at 
least in the weaving branches, remained relatively untouched 
by steam driven machinery and the factory unit until well into 
the second half of the nineteenth century. 
1 In 1880 Carrol 
D. Wright, a United States Census reporter, claimed that there 
were still over forty thousand hand looms at work in the French 
silk centre of Lyons. Here whole families would live, work and 
sleep in the rooms from which they plied their trade, "sullen 
and listless" and fiercely resistant to the attempts of manu- 
facturers to induce them to weave on power looms under factory 
roofs. 
2 Even when French silk manufacturers opened factories 
in the countryside surrounding Lyons and St. Etienne the city 
handloom weavers preferred to eke out a living in their tiny 
workshops, leaving power loom work to the peasant girls or 
Italian migrants who had trekked over the Alps in search of 
work. 
3 
1P. Mantoux The Industrial Revolution in the Eighteenth Century: 
An Outline of the Beginnings of the Modern Factory System in 
England London, 192 pp. 197-201. P. Mathias The First 
Industrial Nation: An Economic History of Britain 1700-1914 
(London, 1969) pp. 128. A. Dunham The Industrial Revolution 
in France 1815-1848 (New Yorh, 1955) PP- 170-1741 307-327- 
2 C. D. Wright "Report on the Factory System in the United 
States" Tenth Census of the U. S. 1880 (Washington, 1883) 
II pp. 19-20.. 
3P. P. XXII 1886 "R. C. - Second Report" Appendix Pt. II 
pp. 125-129, "Report of Commission of Inquiry into the 
Depression of Trade in France 1884-188511. Parliamentary 
Papers 1886 XXIII Cd. 1i667 pp. 6-9. Macclesfield Courier -- 
and'Herald February 17 1877, New York Times February 20 1877. 
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In Germany and England the picture was scarcely different. 
During the 1880s the silk industry of Crefeld, Germany was 
still largely a "cottage industry" in which "thousands of poor 
people" were doomed to "a treadmill existence... with but the 
coarsest of food... (and) no future but days of ceaseless toil". 
As late as 1890 handlooms still outnumbered power looms by 
4: 1 in Crefeld. 1 In England, the. single most important source 
of immigrant weavers to Paterson, the picture was changing, 
but still essentially pre-industrial. In its basic character- 
istics the English industry typified the background of early 
European emigrants to Paterson. 
Spitalfields, London had traditionally been the home of 
the English handicraft silk industry. In the early nineteenth 
century it was supplanted by new centres in northern England. 
Coventry, in the southern Midlands, developed as the chief 
silk ribbon producing region. Further north Macclesfield and 
its surrounding villages became the centre of the broad silk 
industry. 2 A weaving area since the seventeenth century, 
Coventry was characterized by handloom and household work until 
the 1830s. In that decade power looms and factorization were 
adopted on a substantial scale. Despite a spate of industrial 
upheavals, sometimes violent as weavers resisted the disruption 
of traditional work methods, production continued to shift to 
newly constructed factories in the city. 
3 
iNiacclesfield Courier and Herald November 11 1883. Wright 
A Centennial Tour; Royal Jubilee. Exhibition, Manchester 1887 
Proceedings of a Conference for'the Promotion of the Silk 
Industries of the United Kingdom Manchester 1887) pp. 37-41; 
S. Pollard and C. Holmes Documents in European Economic 
History (London, 1968) I PP-307-308; Clapham The Economic 
Development of France and Germany pp. 298-299,93-94- 
21 
Sir F. Warner The Silk Industry of the United Kingdom: 
Its Origin and Development (London, 1911) pp. 57- 2- 
3P. Searby "Weavers and Freemen in Coventry 1820-1861: 
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In Macclesfield the picture was much the same. Although 
some processes of silk production had been organized on a 
factory basis relatively early in the nineteenth century, the 
weaving branches were still largely in the hands of journeymen 
and master weavers toiling in their homes or small workshops. 
Like their counterparts in Coventry and the other silkweaving 
villages and towns of Cheshire and south Lancashire, the 
Macclesfield workers had staged a long rearguard campaign 
against the introduction of power looms and the factory. In 
the 1820s and 1830s opposition to factory production resulted 
in riots in both Macclesfield and Coventry. Again in 1860 
the Coventry industry was brought to a halt as weavers fought 
bitterly against new loom techniques housed in factory buildings. 
l 
Aversion to factory life stemmed from a recognition that 
it would shatter the work and social traditions of these weaving 
communities, and with them a culture based upon the indepen- 
dence of the self-governing artisan. It was a drama that had 
been enacted earlier in the nineteenth century in the cotton 
and woollen districts of Britain and could scarcely have 
Social and Political Traditionalism in an Early Victorian 
Town! ' (Ph. D. Dissertation Warwick, 1972) pp. 143-162. 
1Warner The Silk Industry pp. 107-169; V. G. Chancellor ed. 
Master and Artisan in Victorian England: The Diary of 
William Andrews and the Autobiography of Joseph Vutterid e 
(London, 1969) PP-174-177; Searby "Weavers and Freemen" 
PP"509-531; J. Prest The Industrial Revolution in Coventry 
(Oxford, 1960) pp"93-95,116-119; C. S. Davies A History of 
Macclesfield (Manchester, 1961) pp. 129-135,188-19 ; A. Rushton 
D1 Life as Farmer's Boy, Factory Lad Teacher and Preacher 
(Manchester, 1909 PP"31-2" 48-5 63-69- 
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reassured handloom silk weavers of the Midlands. 
1 Because 
silk weaving required a level of skill and expertise uncommon 
in cotton or woollen production it had escaped, at least until 
the 1830s, the advent of the power loom and factory organization. 
Only in the preparatory stages of silk production, spinning 
and twisting, had extensive factorization taken place in the 
first half of the nineteenth century, and here the hands were 
largely those of women and children. 
2 But from the 1830s the 
skilled handloom weaver was threatened by mechanization and 
the factory in all aspects of his trade. 
Pressure on wages was one aspect of the handloom weavers' 
reluctance to enter the factory, but it can hardly convey the 
weight of feeling behind their opposition to the power loom and 
cheap female labor in the newly erected mills. The slavery and 
degraded status of the factory was to be avoided at all costs. 
For men, factory life had a "low moral status" and many objected 
even to their children and wives entering such employment. 
"Respectable hands strive to keep their children out of factories", 
an observer of the Coventry silk industry noted in the 1850s, 
for not only did the "mixing of sexes" prevent young girls from 
learning the "duties of maternity", but steady wages gave them 
an independence such that "... if they have cause to be dis- 
E. P. 1Thompson The Making of the English Working Class 
(London, 1963) pp. 297-3 . 2Mantoux The Industrial Revolution pp. 197-201; Mathias 
First Industrial Nation p. 126. 
_ý ... 
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satisfied with the conduct of their parents, they will leave 
them". 1 Moreover such attitudes often survived the collapse 
of homework and the arrival of the factory on a wide scale. 
In 1870 we can still find a weaver urging: 
"If silk weaving cannot be retained for the men, 
for God's sake let us try to keep it for the women. 
It is a clean, healthy, and, I may also say, a comfor- 
table occupation. It can and has been carried on at 
home, and thus enables the girls to be under the control 
of their parents. " 2 
The evil possibilities of factory employment for family 
life were not the only-or even the main thrust behind the 
handloom weavers' opposition to the industrialization of their 
craft. But they do indicate the spirit and quality of that 
resistance. When machine-breaking'and general disorder proved 
ineffective in the 1830s the opposition of weavers forced their 
employers to reach more complex arrangements for preserving the 
independence of the craft. In Coventry weavers achieved the 
erection of rows of cottages containing looms in the upper 
floors and powered by a shaft running through the upper storey 
which was turned by a steam engine erected in the centre of the 
row. 
3 More commonly manufacturers supplied homeworkers with 
looms which were rented out of their earnings, - "loom standing" 
- or independent weavers rented machines in the new mills. 
4 
1Chancellor Master and Artisan p. 122; C. Bray The Industrial 
Employment of Women: Being a Comparison Between the Con- 
dition of People in the Watch Trade in Coventry, in Which 
Women Are Not Employed, and the People in the Ribon Trade 
in Which They Are Employed (London, '1857) PP- 4-8- 
2 
British Silk Supply Association, Journal'of the Silk Supply 
Association April 1870. 
3J. Watts The Facts of the Cotton Famine (London 1866) 
pp. 12-13. 
Chancellor Master and Artisan p. 177, Warner The Silk Industry 
117-118,1341 1409 Y. P. XXII 1886, "R. C. - 2nd Report" 
Q"13735" 
-h8- 
Unsatisfactory as such arrangements may have been they pre- 
served, for weavers, some measure of independence. It was, at 
least, a far cry from the factory organization that was to 
characterize the industry after 1860, as an "old time" hand- 
loom weaver made clear in a letter to the local press in the 
1880s. "Forty years ago", he declared, "... employment was 
clean, easy and healthy, the workers... were not called up by 
"bell" or "buzzer", nor were they regulated by an Imperial 
Factory Act.... Their homes were pictures of cleanliness... 
Their habits were characterized by simple sports and amusements, 
and they were as free from vice as they were from extravagance". 
1 
The writer went on to reminisce about the decayed culture of 
the weaving community; with hits accent on self-improvement and 
education, its radical traditions, and the meetings of local 
groups of musicians and amateur naturalists and botanists. 
It was patently a world that had disappeared by the 1880s. 
Yet rosy and sentimental as the letter may have been, it 
contained a shrewd perception in its insistent abhorrence of 
factory discipline and regulation(whether in the form of 
"buzzer" or "factory act") and its celebration of the virtues 
of the independent artisan. The writer had presided over the 
dissolution of the world of the self-regulating weaver, and he 
was shamed and grieved by the experience. His truculence was 
based as much upon moral as economic considerations. For with 
iLetter from Andrew Mellor in Macclesfield Courier April 7 
i883. 
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the passing of the hand loom went not only the living standards 
of the independent weavers but also their ability to sustain 
a distinct work and social culture. It was a way of life that 
stemmed essentially from the control of the weaver over his 
work situation, and captured so accurately in the humorous 
tales of the local dialect writer Thomas Brierley. 
I Brierley's 
characters are invariably handloom weavers who due to their 
excessive taste for "whoam-brewed" ale fail to meet their 
delivery deadlines. The tales are almost monstrously repetitous 
and perhaps in that present the valuable insight into the work 
rythins of the weaving communities. Brierley's weavers work 
as and when their pocket demands, usually in fits and starts, 
and often with the assistance of the family or neighbours. 
The easy conviviality of their social orbit, often centred 
around the local taproom, and their confident and sometimes 
abrasive bargaining with the textile merchant who supplies them 
all caricature the pre-industrial world of the independent 
artisan. That Brierley's popularity was at its height in the 
1860s and 1870s suggests that for his audience his world was 
not a distant memory. 
Many cultural artifacts of this pre-industrial heritage 
survived the advent of silk mills and impinged upon factory work 
until late in the nineteenth century. In 1870 the chairman 
1See 
for example lirierley's Nonsense and Tomfoolery (Manchester, 
1870) and Th' Silk Weaver's Fust Hearin-Whoam Manchester, 
1864). See also Rushton My Life; Warner The Silk Industry 
pp. 500-515; S. Bamford Passages in the Life of a Radical 
and Early Days (London,, 1 93 ed. ) I pp. 106-071 130-139" 
ti 
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of the Silk Supply Association of Britain was exhorting: 
"... the handloom is doomed, and must make way for its iron 
competitor the power loom, and the whole system of our silk 
manufacture must be regenerated and brought under factory 
discipline". 1 His insistence betrayed the difficulties faced 
by factory masters in regulating unco-operative millhands. 
Even when brought into the fold of the factory formerly indepen- 
dent weavers did not prove pliant material. Artisan traditions 
were preserved. The annual weavers' "Wakes" were a regular 
feature of Macclesfield mill life until late in the nineteenth 
century, as was the celebration of "barnaby", a local holiday 
during which brass bands and friendly societies paraded, 
excursions took place and the silk'factories closed down for a 
week. 
2 As late as 1886 a leading Macclesfield silk manu- 
facturer complained: "... it cannot be justly said that the 
weavers of Macclesfield are as a class indolent... (but) in many 
cases the weavers do not work the full number of hours recog- 
nized by the rules of the factory". 
3 Moreover traditional 
attitudes towards work and its payment could govern millowners 
as well as weavers. Long after the once powerful silkworkers' 
unions had been broken in Macclesfield, a local manufacturer 
explained that custom made it difficult for millowners to 
lower prices paid to weavers during the dull season. "There 
used to be in Macclesfield a disinclination", he observed, 
"more sentimental than seriously founded, to accept nominally 
1Journal 
of the Silk Supply Association January 1870. 
2Macclesfield Courier and Herald October 6-1877. 
3P. p. XXI 1886 "R. C. - Second Report" Q. 7658,7761. 
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low prices for certain fabrics". 
I 
Many weavers sought to avoid the regimentation of factory 
labor. Although some were drafted into silk factories it was 
more often women and youths who manned the power looms. 
Numerous weavers continued to eke out an existence on handloom 
work, even at the cost of longer hours and less wages than 
factory employment. In Macclesfield, for example, workers revived 
the Handloom Weavers' Association, first established in the early 
nineteenth century, and invested in their own cooperative, the 
Macclesfield Silk Manufacturing Company. 2 Even more fled the 
English industry entirely; migrating to new employment within 
Britain, or more usually emigrating to the United States, 
especially after the decline of the British silk industry in 
the 1860s and 1870s. 
Paterson's early immigrants brought with them distinctive 
attitudes to work. But their European background had ill- - 
prepared them for the, rigorous demands of U. S. silk manufac- 
turers. Nowhere had they experienced mill work as technologi- 
cally advanced as that in Paterson. Nowhere was the emphasis 
on mechanization and factory organization as dominant as in the 
U. S. Immigrant attitudes were rooted in an earlier phase of 
silk production. Even when exposed to the limited intro- 
duction of factory work in Europe they had recoiled. In effect 
Paterson's immigrants comprised a workforce in the process of 
'ibid. 
Q. 7394. 
2Davies. History of Macclesfield pp. 188-196. 
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becoming a modern factory proletariat. They were only beginning 
to come to terms with what Eric Hobsbawm has called, "the 'rules 
of the game' of modern industrial society". 
1 
As in Europe the immigrant weavers' response to Paterson's 
silk industry was characterized by resistance to the factory 
and the powerloom. In the early years some were able to work 
in a customary manner. Before 1890 loom improvements had not 
entirely diluted traditional skills. Moreover the adoption 
of power looms organized in large production units was not 
uniform throughout the industry. Small employers, especially 
those concentrating upon specialized goods, required skilled 
hands and preserved handloom work.. Their workshops dotted the 
city until the 1890s. 
In this atmosphere some manufacturers were forced to defer 
to the traditional work practices of immigrants. In the hand- 
kerchief branch of the silk industry much of the hemming and 
finishing was subcontracted out to women and girls who worked 
in their own homes. Over 1,000 workers were employed thus, 
some having up to half a dozen sewing machines in their houses 
and employing others to work for them. It was in 1880 a 
thriving branch of the silk industry "... affording occupation 
to hundreds who disliked working in a mill". In that year, 
however, it was re-organized on a factory basis wnere steam- 
driven machinery facilitated cheaper production "by hands 
E. IIobsbawm Primitive Rebels: Studies in Archaic Forms of 
Social Movement in the 19th and 20th Centuries Manchester, 
1959) p. 1u . 
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employed by the week or by the piece". 
1 Similarly in nearby 
West Hoboken and Jersey City, silk manufacturers provided looms 
for weavers to work in their own homes. It was a system of 
production apparently fraught with risk for the manufacturers 
and disagreeable into the bargain, for during a wave of silk 
strikes in New Jersey in 1877 they openly battled with weavers 
in an-effort to repossess their looms. 
2 
Other immigrant silkworkers sought greater independence 
from manufacturers. They desired self-employment or to avoid 
mill work entirely. The two were often synonymous. The employ- 
ment structure of the silk industry surely reflects this aspir- 
ation. Mature weavers were content to leave the drudgery of 
machine tending to women and children. Similarly the prevalence 
of "commission" work in late nineteenth century Paterson 
signifies the attachment of immigrants to customary modes of 
labor. Those arriving in the 1870s and 1880s frequently. shunned 
mill work preferring to take a chance on making a living by 
weaving, on a commission basis, in their own tiny workshops 
rented in mills or set up in their own homes. 
If self-employed weavers can later be seen as anachronisms, 
they were enduring, for as late as the 1920s and '30s they could 
3 
still be found in Paterson. Their eventual demise was not as 
1New York Times January 4 1880. 
2New York Times April 25 1877- 
3G. Hutchins Labor and Silk (New York, 1929) PP"24-25,53" 
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clear as might be expected, In a rapidly expanding industry 
the prospect of building up a profitable business, if slim, 
was not impossible. A number of prominent silk manufacturers 
in the city testified to the American ideal of the "self made 
man". J. Phillips Mackay, who in 1880 employed over two hundred 
hands, had started but six years before in a single room rented 
in one of the city's factories. There were others. J. Marland, 
a "self made" weaver, rented a workshop in the Dale mill where 
he had installed fourteen looms. In another workshop in the 
same mill John Lockett, who set up on his own in 1878, commanded 
eighteen looms two years later. Similarly J. J. Scott, "from 
insignificant beginnings", rented a whole floor of the Grant 
Locomotive works, where he employed upwards of one hundred and 
fifty workers in 1880.1 
Other encouragements existed for aspirant manufacturers. 
In a city with ample mill properties, often only in partial use 
since the exodus of cotton manufacturers from the city in the 
mid-nineteenth century, workshops were readily available. 
Looms were scarcely more difficult to obtain - some were brought 
over as part of the luggage of immigrant weavers, others could 
be obtained on credit from silk commission merchants. The most 
important prerequisite, skilled experience in silk production, 
was usually in abundance. Demand for silk products, stimulated 
by the protectionist policies of the federal government, made 
for an industry in which "everybody who can borrow a loom goes 
1Dry Goods Bulletin pp. 39,59,1i9,48. 
- 55 - 
into the silk business". By 1880 local boosters announced: 
"... it is not impossible for a skilful, industrious workman to 
commence business with a single loom and in a few years become 
the head of a large concern". 
1 
Reflecting their artisan backgrounds English immigrant 
weavers were the most likely to establish their own workshops 
and weave, on a commission basis, for silk merchants. Hawthorne 
to the north of Paterson, "Weavertown" in the eastern section 
of the city, and Totowa on its western edges were described as 
"... reproductions of English weaving hamlets" in the 1860s and 
1870x. 
2 
There are, a local observer noted in the latter decade, 
"... numerous instances in and around Paterson, where a so-called 
master weaver who has previously been a journeyman weaver, has 
two or three looms in his house. Within the past year this class 
of weavers has been largely increased by immigration from France 
and England. They bring their looms with them". 
3 The same- 
observer pointed out that far from being a temporary adjustment 
to a new form of industrial organization the survival of these 
small master weavers actively encouraged their multiplication. 
Independent producers "... employ so-called journeymen weavers, 
who in turn will become master weavers and loom owners... "4 
Large manufacturers did not always look upon the independent 
1American Silk Journal October 1890; Macclesfield Courier and 
Herald December 1 1883; New York Daily Tribune September 25 
1880. 
2American 
Silk Journal June 1892. 
3Brockett The Silk Industry in America pp. 119; Paterson Labor 
Standard March 20 1 880. 
4ibid. 
pp. 153-4" 
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artisan weavers with disfavour. Indeed some were pleased with 
the development of a "jobbing" trade. It did not threaten the 
big producers because independent weavers concentrated upon 
specialized, high grade silks which could not be produced upon 
factory power looms anyway. Moreover these small producers 
comprised a surplus labor pool to which work could be farmed out 
during a busy season without representing, during slacker times, 
capital overheads. Yet clearly other, and more important 
considerations were influencing manufacturers' attitudes. They 
reflected a concern to discipline hands to factory production; 
or at least avoid disruption resulting from artisan weavers 
non-compliance with power loom work. Thus, 
"... we learn that this movement (of master and journey- 
men weavers) meets with the approval of and support 
of the employers, and undoubtedly in time those who 
approve themselves to the good opinion of the manu- 
facturers will be helped in the purchase of machines, 
and the way be opened for better understanding and more 
cordial relations between employers and employed". 1 
The response or William Strange, the city's leading silk 
manufacturer, to scores of English weavers who were flooding 
into Paterson in 1880 indicates as much. "Manufacturers will 
not put on these immigrants who are swarming hither", he 
contended. "They are generally a'bad set, a very bad set. 
They are so tainted with a communistic spirit that we prefer 
to have nothing to do with them". Thus, Strange continued, 
"most of these new arrivals work in small mills or set up looms 
of their own at home.... "2 It was an arrangement probably as 




2 New York Herald March 8 1880. 
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By the 1880s the jobbing trade was clearly doomed. 
Avoiding the mill could not prove a long term solution to the 
problem of factory discipline for either workers or employers. 
Improvements in the efficiency of power looms and in the-quality 
of goods they produced, alone, put paid to the survival of the 
independent weaver. But even before these technological develop- 
ments, and in spite of Strange's proclaimed attitude, Paterson 
millowners found they could not do without the dexterous hands 
and nimble fingers of experienced silkworkers. Thus, however 
reluctantly, immigrant weavers entered the city's mills. 
The fitful adaption of immigrants to factory labor posed 
serious problems for Paterson millowners throughout the last 
quarter of the nineteenth century. Manufacturers might boast 
that the development of silk manufacturing had "elevated the 
standard of labor", but numerous examples in the 1870s and 1880s 
of labor difficulties make such a picture appear fanciful. 
1 
The over-assertive millowner, who bragged to the Industrial 
Commission in 1900 that "... the celebrating of 'Blue Monday' 
is not in vogue*, and that he would tolerate "... no German 
festivals (Scheutzenfeste and Saengerfeste); no 'blue' (idle) 
Mondays", was guilty of the same wishful thinking. 
2 In pleading 
his case so stoutly he inevitably raised doubts as to its 
veracity. If, as late as the turn of the century, millowners 
were still mindful of the problems of absenteeism - and a form 
of absenteeism distinctly associated with the artisan back- 
grounds of their immigrant millhands - it is difficult to 
believe that it had not long before been of serious concern. 
'Shriner Paterson p. 26. 
2Ind. Comm. 1900 IV p. 727. 
- 58 - 
Absenteeism was directly related to the new discipline 
required by mechanized production, and resulted in constant 
friction on the shop floor. Immigrant workers refused to curtail 
customary work traditions, especially drinking habits, and chose 
to drop their work at will. Thus the traditional holiday of 
English silkworkers - the Macclesfield wakes - flourished in 
Paterson, as did the German singing festivals. Often these 
customary breaks were not limited to the ethnic group amongst 
whom they originated. In 1880, for example, during the May 
Day festival of the German singing societies, a riot broke out 
between Orange and Catholic Irish factions in the city, hardly 
' the basses and tenors of the German choirs. 
1 
Faced with the absence of a large group of workers from 
their mills manufacturers shut down the plant giving all other 
immigrants employed the day off. Thus, Pfingster, a Dutch 
holiday, was "... always religiously observed-in silk city, the 
mills and shops being closed down". 
2. At certain times of the 
year customary breaks could result in constant interruptions 
of production. A trade journal described the situation in 
May 1890: 
"The month just closing was quite up to the average 
in the number of its holidays. It is a poor week that 
Paterson silk and other operatives do not manage to 
get at least one day for recreation. During May there 
was a holiday the great labor anniversary, to start 
with, on the 1st; next came Forepaugh, and no Paterson 
mill-hand, with a proper self-respect, can be kept at 
spinning-frame, or loom, - when a circus is in town - 
it has been tried thoroughly; Pfingster Monday followed, 
and just at the close, Memorial Day occurs to finish 
up with. Of course the 'wheels of industry' must 
stand still while the thousands of operatives take a 
day off.... " 3 
1New York Times May 3,4,5 and 6 1880, New York Tribune 
May 3 and 18 80. 
2American 
Silk Journal June 1892. 
3ibid. May 1890. 
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Visits of circuses were indeed an enduring attraction to" 
millhands and a frequent cause of absenteeism in the 1880s 
and 1890s. The arrival-of a travelling show meant loom shops 
and throwing plants shutting shop for the day. Millowners had 
tried locking the doors of their workshops to prevent hands 
leaving work at the sound of a circus fanfare. But they were 
defeated. Millhands simply opened factory windows and climbed 
out. So determined. were workers in this particular pursuit 
that by the twentieth century it was customary for mills to 
close when a circus came to town. 
1 
Local unions and fraternal lodges also arranged regular 
excursions during the summer months, a feature most unwelcome 
to Paterson millowners. When silk manufacturer Fred Dale 
decided to circumvent-the irregular habits of his workers by 
arranging. an excursion for them in 1880 he was roundly denounced 
by his fellow millowners. 
2 Two years later a German silk - 
manufacturer, Grossenbacher, fired twenty eight of his workers 
for taking the day off to visit a circus in town. 
3 Before the 
end of the decade, however, attitudes appear to have been 
changing. Aware that mass absences of workers on traditional 
holidays could not be stamped out, millowners organized their 
own, firm's outings, thus at least retaining the initiative 
and some measure of control over such stoppages. 
4 
The celebration 
1Paterson Daily Guardian June 5 1905" 
2Paterson Labor Standard September 18 1880. 
3ibid. May 20 1882. 
4American 
Silk Journal July and August 1890. 
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of Labor Day, which originated amongst Paterson hands, was 
likewise given the sanction of employers and eventually the 
national government in the opening decade of the twentieth 
century. 
1 
Less benevolent were millowners' attitudes to other 
traditional workshop demands and practices. William Strange 
reflected a pervasive feeling amongst Paterson manufacturers 
when he complained of silk-workers: "They do not recognize the 
laws of the trade, -when brought to bear upon their labor; but 
seem to be impressed with the idea that their employers are in 




was the unwillingness of silkworkers to recognize the "laws 
of the trade" which resulted in almost continual battle between 
millowners and workers during the 1870s and 1880s. During the 
1870s depression, for example, when there were "thousands" 
out of work in the city, silkworkers preferred unemployment-to 
a return at reduced wages. Meetings of workingmen and 
"inflammatory speeches made from wagons and barrels" had aroused 
fears of a "bread riot" amongst city politicians, and manu- 
facturers, and both met hastily to find a means to avoid the 
expected trouble. But when the Mayor and Board of Aldermen 
negotiated with millowners to re-employ workers, at reduced 
wages to relieve distress, their efforts met with blank non- 
cooperation by the local workforce. Paterson workers "... 
would rather worry through the Winter, using up what little 
J. Grossman "Who is the Father of Labor Day? " Labor History 
14, No. 4 1973, pp"612-623. 
2Brockett The Silk Industry in America p. 178. 
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they have been ahle to save, and borrowing from their friends,. 
in hopes of having fair wages in the Spring". 
1 
It was this same independence and distrust of millowners 
which provided the main impetus behind silkworkers' attempts to 
resist technological innovation in Paterson mills. Factory 
work, and in particular tending a mechanized loom, was a 
threat not only to weavers' wages and employment prospects but 
also to their status as skilled and independent artisans. 
Disputes surrounding the introduction of power looms in the 
1870s were the hardly surprising result. They were followed in 
the 1880s by strikes against the new two-loom system, by which 
workers would operate two automatic looms, doubling output but 
neither wages nor future employment opportunities. 
2 Both 
attempts at resistance were ultimately unsuccessful. More 
importantly the successful introduction of the power loom began 
to mark the demise of a skilled workforce hostile to the new 
disciplines of factory production. Within a decade apprentice- 
ship was ended in the weaving shops, and with it workers' 
control of entry into their trade. Increasingly the tending of 
looms was meted out to unskilled and semi-skilled workers, often 
children and women. 
3 
Thereafter silkworkers' resistance was expressed in covert 
and sometimes deviant forms. Theft of silk from the city's 
mills, by employees, was not uncommon. 
4 
In a city in which 
1New York Times 
2 New York Times 
February 2 and 
3New York Times 
January 27 187 
Paterson Labor 
November 24 and December 2 1873. 
January. 14 1884; Macclesfield Courier and Herald 
17 1883. 
January 14 and February 13 1884; The Socialist 
7" 
Standard May 13 1882. 
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small independent workshops survived into the twentieth century' 
there was a ready market for such contraband. In 1906 a weaver 
at the Ashley and Dailey mill was taken to court for stealing 
over $300 worth of silk from his employers. Police discovered 
a loom in his house from which he plied a lucrative trade. 
1 
Eight years earlier at the annual dinner of the Silk Association 
of America an urgent telegram was received from a Paterson 
manufacturer "... relative to the operations of sneak thieves 
in stealing silk fabrics from the mills, and requesting co- 
operation in the effort to protect the interests of all concerned". ý 
Presumably some producers were encouraging thefts by buying 
stolen goods. But perhaps more important in accounting for 
this illicit trade was the long tradition of silk stealing that 
dated from the early industrialization of the English silk 
industry. Thefts of silk were common in Macclesfield and 
Coventry earlier in the century, and the ethos may well have 
been transferred to Paterson. ' It was one way of supplementing 
a low income, may well have gratified disconsolate weavers, and 
perhaps small thefts were even regarded as a customary right. 
Certainly silk stealing did not raise indignation amongst 
Paterson workingmen comparable to that amongst their employers. 
Edward Cross and Sam Mulligan, two weavers sentenced to five 
years apiece for breaking into a mill, beating the proprietor 
N. J. B. S. Twenty Ninth Annual Report 1906 p. 527; Paterson 
Evening News October 12 1906. 
2Silk 
Association of America-Twenty Seventh Annual Report 1899 
(New York, n. d. ) 
3Davies 
History of Macclesfield p'.. 184, B. Weinberger "Crime 
and Police in the late Nineteenth. Century: A Case Study from 
the Coventry Area" (M. A. dissertation, Warwick University 
1976)pp. 24-25. 
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and stealing silk, were shown "... considerable sympathy... 
by their fellow-workmen", when convicted in 1880.1 
Ca'canny was also employed by workers to defy millowners 
or subvert the dictates of their machines. 
2 A "go-slow" or 
tampering with machinery proved a simple and effective means of 
resisting millowners' insistence upon unstinting labor or 
equally of sabotaging attempts to "speed-up" production. 
Ca'canny was a favourite technique in the doubling rooms of 
Paterson mills, where "soaping the belt" ensured slow-running 
machinery. Similarly bobbins could be "oiled" for the same 
3 
effect. 
Outright and malicioud damage to millowners' plant and 
machinery, if less common, was not unheard of. In the spring 
of 1892, during industrial troubles in the mills, "... some 
unknown vandal or vandals... entered the Voorhis mill... and 
caused much damage by cutting warps from the looms and destroying 
everything right and left". 
4 
As nothing was reported stolen 
from the plant the action appears to have been the reprisal of 
bitter millhands. The same took place a year later in the 
Vermorel and Kimball dyeworks: 
"During the panic of 1893... a body of strikers broke 
into the dyehouse and committed such serious acts of 
sabotage as to practically ruin the firm". 5 
A variant of such forms of ca"canny was the immediate 
1New York Times May 26 1880. 
2For the origin and use of the term "ca'canny" see 
E. Partridge A Dictionary of Historical Slang (abdg. ed., 
London, 1972). 
3American 
Silk Journal May 1890. 
4ibid. 
April 1892. 
51ieusser The History of the Silk Dyeing Industry p. 231. 
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downing of tools by workers when a strike was called. Unfinished 
work was left to waste, a source of much anxiety to silk 
manufacturers. In 1875 William Strange made it a condition of 
employment that his workers sign a contract by which they were 
obliged to finish the warp they were weaving before quitting 
work. A recent strike in which much silk had been thus sabotaged 
provided the motive behind the contracts. Even so the contracts 
themselves suggested that this millowner's problems were of a 
longer-standing and less discrete nature. One of their principal 
clauses required: "That I will not, unless by consent of my 
employers or in case of sickness, absent myself from my work 
during mill hours". Presumably ca'canny and irregular work 
habits were closely related. ' Two years later Strange was taking 
out suits against weavers who had quit work in violation of the 
contracts and spoiled warps valued at over $800 each. 
1 
Millowners used contracts as a principal means of discip- 
lining uncooperative workers. Written rules would hopefully 
teach immigrants the "laws of the trade" and refashion their 
casual work ethic. By the final decade of the century a trade 
journal noted that "... no workman may begin his toil until he 
has signed the manufacturers' code of laws, if not at once, 
after a few days trial". 
2 
Strict and often rigid regulations 
were common. In 1880 one millowner's work rules included the 
provision that: 
"Any employee damaging or walking from loom to loom 
or any part of the shop during working hours will be 
1The Socialist July'7,21 and 28 1877, New York Times 
July 1U, 141 17 and 21 1877- 
2 
Textile America October 30 1897" 
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dismissed immediately .... It I 
Movement from loom to loom could be simply restricted, 
but other cardinal "laws of the trade" were certainly more 
difficult to instill. One was the axiom "time is money", and 
its concomitant "time lost is money lost". Silkworkers' 
refusal to sacrifice customary workshop practices coupled with 
their opposition to a work routine conditioned by the pace of 
machinery, resulted in much lost time. Weavers absented them- 
selves from the mills, or from their looms for what millowners 
often regarded as trivial reasons. Conversely the merest hint 
of slackness at work or absence from an appointed task enraged 
employers. In 1886, for example, - ailkworkers went back to work 
after a successful strike which had paralyzed the industry for 
several weeks. Their efforts upon their return did not satisfy 
their employers, however. Millowners complained that: 
"Ever since the settlement of the strikes labor has 
been in an unquiet condition. The working people 
have spent their evenings in meetings and discussions 
prolonged to late hours, and in consequence have been 
less fit for work in the daytime. The practical result 
to the manufacturer has been an increased cost of 
labor in proportion to the amount of production". 2 
Neither relief at the resumption of work nor resentment over 
concessions made were at the forefront of manufacturers' 
concerns; only the "fitness for work" of their employees. 
"Fitness for work" plagued millowners' attitudes towards 
their workers. Some adopted an aggressive and capricious 
1The Labor Standard July 3 1880. 
2Wyckoff 
American Silk Manufacture pp. 66-7. 
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interpretation of what it constituted. The poet William Carlos 
Williams captured the pervasive spirit amongst Paterson silk 
bosses, when he pictured millowner Lambert stalking his 
factory: 
"This is MY shop. I reserve the right (and he did) 
to walk down the row (between his looms) and fire any 
son-of-a-bitch I choose without excuse or reason more 
than that I don't like his face. " 1 
Most millowners delegated their power to trusted servants. 
Foremen and overseers were the usual symbol of factory official- 
dom. They were obvious objects of contempt amongst millhands, 
and if too vigorous in their duties, could become sources of 
disruption. In 1905 girls in the winding room of the Bamford 
mill struck against a "too domineering" foreman. 
2 Invariably 
during disputes superintendents and overseers were targets of 
strikers' objection. 
Ultimately loss of wages was the millowners' most effective 
weapon in combatting uncooperative workers. Fines were used 
to induce accurate and regular work habits. In the 1880s an 
English weaver, writing home to Macclesfield, complained of the 
"enormous fines" imposed "for the most trifling defects in 
weaving". 
3 Payment by the piece was extensive in the weaving 
branches of the industry, again to discipline wayward hands. 
Piece payment, if a partial solution to millowners' 
problems, could rebound on then with a vengeance. During a 
strike in 1884 weavers demanded payment during "idle time" - 
1Williams Paterson p. 99. 
2Paterson Daily Guardian May 20 1905" 
3Macclesfield Courier and Herald February 17 1883. 
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the period during which their looms were being "fixed" ready 
to resume production - traditionally a break in which weavers 
could do as they pleased. If "time is money" millhands were 
clear about who was paying for it. They asked for twenty five 
cents an hour recompense. The response of manufacturers was 
characteristically hostile, but nevertheless revealing. A 
millowner explained that if such payments were made 
"... there would be scores of weavers who would be 
constantly disarranging their looms in order to have 
a chance to spend their money and time in beer saloons, 
while they would be drawing pay at $2.50 per day for 
idling.... " 1 
The premises of manufacturers, even when adopted by the weavers 
in presenting their case, were clearly not the basis for a 
common outlook between the two. 
Aside from fines and piece payments dismissal was used to 
discipline workers. Instant dismissal was usual if a worker 
was discovered not to be at his or her loom at the appointed 
hour. It proved the most effective check on "Blue Mondays". 
2 
Moreover with the increasing mechanization of silk production 
in the 1880s the threat of replacement by cheap female and 
child labor or imported "green" hands must have weighed heavily 
with dissident weavers. 
Female and child labor had been fundamental to the rise 
of the early Paterson silk industry. But with the widespread 
adoption of mechanization in the 1870s and 1880s it assumed a 
1New 
York Times January 20 1884. 
2Ind. Comm. 1900-. XIV p. 675. 
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new importance for millowners, directly related to the struggle 
against uncooperative weavers. Earlier they were employed 
principally in the preparatory stages of production - winding, 
cleaning and doubling. During the 1880s and 1890s increasing 
numbers were tending looms. 
1 Strikes against female weavers 
reflected their new functions, but did not preserve weaving as 
a male domain. 
2 
There is good reason to suppose that child and female 
labor was preferred by millowners. Such workers were unlikely 
to bring to the mill the jealously guarded traditions of inde- 
pendence and status common amongst male immigrant weavers. 
D1ost had little or no first-hand experience in the industry. 
Millowners could expect to find them more tractable and adaptable 
to mechanization. Taken on as "learners, who are expected to 
work for the first two weeks free, after which time we start 
them at 50c. per week", children and young women could easily 
be fired if they failed to reach the required levels of 
"efficiency". 3 
This workforce of women and children may have brought 
positive disciplinary attributes into the mills. Family and" 
kinship guidance possibly proved a more useful and efficient 
corrective to slacking and absenteeism that any foreman or super- 
visor could hope to impose. Although the extent of kinship 
1Textile America November 13 1897- 
2American 
Silk Journal Narch, May 1890; Paterson Dail Press 
February 27 1890; Paterson Daily Guardian April 23 1886; 
NJBS Twenty Fourth Annual Report 1901 p. 430-, 
3Textile 
America October 31 1898. 
i 
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networks within the mills is unknown, their existence can 
surely have not been uncommon. An English female silk finisher 
who came to Paterson in 1890 took her twelve year old son into 
the mill with her. 
1 Similarly early "boosters" of the silk 
industry made much of the prospect for employment of the whole 
family within the city's mills. 
2 In such circumstances the 
guiding or chastising hand of a parent, older brother or sister 
was probably a useful adjunct to manufacturers' work rules, 
fines and threats of dismissal. 
Yet the employment of women and children did not entirely 
rid silk manufacturers of the annoying habits of immigrant 
hands. While apprenticeship was maintained in a few skilled 
branches of the industry older silk-workers likely passed on 
their customary work routines to their "learners". Where 
not it seems likely that they, an older and more experienced 
generation, may have acted as peers to younger members of the 
workforce, colouring learners' adjustment to factory employment 
and sustaining some features of the traditional routines. 
The employment of a high proportion of children and adoles- 
cents likely, and ironically raised new problems of discipline 
in the workplace. Factory life could scarcely have been but 
boring and grinding for the young. Communal singing to the 
rythms of the looms was a traditional means of regulating this 
tedium. Even so, temptations to skip work, or distractions 
3 
American Silk Journal May 1890. 
2New York Daily Tribune September 25 1880, Brockett The Silk 
Industry in America p. 115; Wyckoff American Silk Manufacture 
PP- 9,73; Wright A Centennial Tour p. 2. 
3R. 
J. Vecoli The Peoples of New Jersey (Princeton, 1965) 
PP"73-75. N. Most "The 1913 Silk Strike Terror", Bergen 
Record September 30 1973" 
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within the factory, despite the watchful eyes of kin, over- 
seers, foremen and the like, must have been tantalising. The 
enduring fascination of visiting circuses for Paterson factory 
hands presumably stemmed from the young element in the mills. 
The response of millowners to the disciplining of children 
and adolescents was equally consistent with that shown to artisan 
weavers. Women and children were stamped on, if at all, even 
more rigorously than men for irregularities at work. Fines, 
dismissal and even physical assault were resorted to. In 1882 
millowner I3annigan dismissed a young female employee who had been 
absent from work for three days on account of a family bereave- 
ment. 
1 
Her dismissal was hardly, unique in its severity. It 
certainly did not match that meted out by silk manufacturer 
Joseph Bamford to a young girl in his employ in 1890. The girl, 
Antonia Fischer had returned to work after illness. When 
"... she presented herself at the mill ... Bamford took 
her to task for remaining away... seized her by the arm 
roughly, and told her to get out. The girl was pre- 
pared to do so, but asked for three days salary due 
to her, when... Bamford again took hold of her and 
threw her bodily out of the mill, tearing her clothing 
after which he threw her working dress into the street 
after her". 2 
Charged with "assault and battery" Bamford was found 
guilty by a local court and fined %5 with costs. Indignant 
silkworkers held a meeting at which "the alleged brutal treat- 
ment" was discussed for "over an hour". There were reports 
'Paterson 
Labor Standard May 20 1882. 
2American 
Silk Journal October 1$90. 
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that assaults on millworkers were "of every day occurrence". 
Praising Miss Fischer for her "courage to go before the courts", 
"Several persons reported that assaults were committed 
on other occasions, but that the girls were afraid to 
make complaints before the courts". 1 
Employing the young was apparently not a completely satis- 
factory resolution to the problem of industrial discipline. 
The recruitment of "green" hands reflected its persistence. A 
constant supply of newly arrived immigrant workers was actively 
cultivated by silk manufacturers throughout the closing decades 
of the nineteenth century. Even after the passage of the voran 
Act in the 1880s Paterson millowners regularly flouted the ban 
on contract labor. 
2 
A plentiful supply of immigrant labor could be used to 
give added weight to threats of dismissal and to divide a 
workforce resisting new work procedures. As early as 1876 
differential wages resulted in hostility between French, German 
and English weavers, causing local workiggmen to denounce their 
employers. "How dare you speak of 'unjust measures"', 
complained silkworkers, "when you make distinctions on account 
of nationality". "For a long time past", millhands explained, 
"... it has been the policy of these gentlemen to arouse feelings 
of hostility between these different nationalities, in order to 
attack them in detail, beat them... "3 Four years later, at a 
1The American Silk Journal November, December 1890. 
2Baker's 
Journal August 18 1888, April 20 1889, American Silk 
Journal April, August 1890; Commissioners of immigration 
1892 I pp. 124, II- pp. 68-100. 
3The Socialist May 6 1876. 
". 
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time of acute depression in the silk trade, silkworkers pro- 
tested against the continuing traffic of English "sparrows" 
to the city, who "... can live on bread and porridge, whereas 
we are accustomed to meat three times a day". 
1 New arrivals, 
often penniless, were usually anxious to secure employment 
immediately. They formed a pool of pliant and cheap labor 
- "a class of weavers which is outside of unionism and shows 
a disposition to work all night as well as all day". 
2 In 
this context the cheapness of labor and the problems of indus- 
trial discipline were closely interwoven. 
Imported labor and newly arrived immigrants were consciously 
used by manufacturers to discipline the workforce. In 1884, 
during a strike over apprenticeship, millowners declared their 
intention to take on "learners" as they pleased, to "... train 
up a class of American hands who will be free from the social- 
istic doctrines of the foreign weavers". 
3 In fact there is 
little evidence to suggest that millowners took this intention 
very seriously. Native Americans never entered the mills in 
great numbers nor was there much concerted attempt by silk 
manufacturers to encourage them. Clearly by "foreign" mill- 
owners meant something other than European immigrants. Foreign- 
born labor was, on the contrary, used for the very purpose of 
ridding mills of dependence upon uncooperative workers. 
4 
"American hands", it seems, were those, of whatever nationality, 
'New 
York Herald 1larch 8 1880. 
2American 
Silk Journal June 1890. 
3New 
York Times February 13 1884. 
4See 
for example the use of Turks and Armenians for this 
purpose during strikes in 1890. American Silk Journal may 1890. 
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who willing to submit or unable to effectively resist the 
dictates of factory masters. Conversely "un-American" or 
"foreign" were workers who submitted less easily. 
On the shop floor millowners could more squarely confront 
the problems of disciplining their workforce by adroit use of 
immigrant hands. Workers of one nationality would be used as 
"pacemakers" -'given good quality silks or simple designs to 
facilitate speedy output - in order to set standards of pro- 
ductivity which the rest of the plant could not hope to match. 
Prodding and scolding followed as rivalries were established 
between groups of workers. 
I More important to millowners, 
standards of regular, rapid and unrelenting production were 
set. 
Millowners believed new immigrants to be more easily 
moulded to their demands. "When I get a new man who comes over 
here, he is green", silk dyer Jacob Weidmann explained 
"... and it takes him some time to get worked in; but 
after he has been here five or ten years he is just 
as good as any of them, and he will turn out in our 
factory in Paterson one third more work than when he 
first came". 2 
If "green" hands did not reach the required level of efficiency, 
Weidmann made clear, it was not the millowner who suffered. 
"The laborers we take in from the street", he continued, "we 
take them in for a time of three months and if we can make 
fair hands of them, to handle silk, they get %9 a week". 
If hands could not be easily trained dismissal was apparently 
their saving grace. 
1CIR III pp. 2586-2587,2595-2596. 
2lnd. Comm. 1900 XIV p. 704. 
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In the long term immigrant labor had a more disconcerting 
effect on manufacturers. The malleable qualities of-green 
hands did not usually endure beyond initial training and settle- 
ment in the city. Thus alongside the use of immigrants as a 
means of cowing and disciplining the workforce are the frequent 
complaints of manufacturers about the "socialistic doctrines 
of foreign weavers". With them immigrant millhands brought 
their own work traditions, as had the weavers who preceded them. 
More often than not these customs proved inimical to the will 
of millowners. It was "foreigners", a manufacturer explained, 
who were intent upon fostering a spirit of resistance to the 
demands of their employers. "A feeling of self-preservation, 
which keeps up their interests"and'also brings together-the 
laborers of the same nationality", he continued "... has misled 
them... into demonstrations very much against their advantage". 
1 
Among them the "unadulterated gospel of communism" could expect 
a sympathetic hearing, for they were "restless, unreasoning 
and excitable". 
2 
Here again the attack on "foreigners" is revealing in its 
double-meaning. For millowners the term simply denotes people 
resistant to mill life, who were likely by a feeling of "self- 
preservation" to "keep up their own interests" and, especially 
grieving to manufacturers, to band together in defence of these 
interests. The ambiguous and at times contradictory use of the 
terms "foreign" and "American" was not entirely fortuitous. 
'ibid. 
p. 676 
2New York Times August 8 1877, American Silk Journal June 1892. 
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By encouraging immigrant labor to Paterson millowners, in fact, 
negated their interest in establishing a stable and disciplined 
workforce. To be sure, in the short term new arrivals might 
solve particular problems of individual factory owners. 
Shortage of skilled and experienced hands, resistance by workers 
to technological change, or simply-disputes and non-cooperation 
within mills could all favour the introduction of new immigrant 
labor. In the long term however, the effect of immigration 
constantly replenished a workforce to whom factory life was 
novel; people hostile or reluctant to accept new industrial 
discipline; indeed, "foreigners" to it. Unlike Britain, where 
by the final third of the nineteenth century a relatively stable 
and disciplined factory workforce had emerged - at least in 
principal industries such as cotton - American cities like 
Paterson followed a divergent path. Successive waves of 
immigration made the impact of industrialization uneven in its 
timing and prevented a similar development. As one immigrant 
group replaced another to become the principal workers in Paterson 
mills so the problems of adjustment to the factory were repli- 
cated. 
1 It was a recurrent and persistent feature of the city's 
principal industry from the 1860s through to the First World 
War, and had striking effects upon both industrial and social 
conditions in Paterson. 
H. G. 
1Gutman 
"Work, Culture and Society in Industrializing 
America 1815-1919" American Historical Review 78, 
June 1973 PP-531-588. 
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Chapter Three 
ORGANIZATION AND RESISTANCE 
The uneven impact of industrialization upon Paterson workers 
profoundly influenced the form and quality of the city's working 
class movement during the last decades of the nineteenth century. 
There was no single or even dominant response to the experience 
of industrial life. The silkworkers' attitudes were at best 
ambiguous and at times they revealed sharply conflicting res- 
ponses. At the root of this ambiguity lay the constant immig- 
ration into the city. 
On the one hand, some workingmen in the city - more often 
than not skilled workers with some measure of protection against 
the arbitrary rule of employers and against the importation of 
"green" labor - accepted the industrial system, albeit with- 
strong reservations. They sought to humanize it, actively 
organizing for their own protection and lobbying for a range of 
legislative measures designed to further the interests of 
workingmen and curb the excesses of factory lords. 
In contrast, the dominant response of the city's silk 
workers was more "primitive". They lacked a clear conception 
of their status and role in an industrial system. They had not 
yet accepted the "rules of the game". In consequence, during 
periods of crisis, they reverted to traditional forms of defence, 
usually riot and disorder. Their actions manifested a blanket 
refusal to endorse the rights or the legitimacy of the city's 
silk barons. Paterson's silkworkers could often expect and 
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receive widespread support for their actions. For one thing 
industrialism was new to the city and regarded by many as dis- 
ruptive. Millhands were not alone in opposing the new factories 
and their masters. Secondly, and in contrast to the novel 
features of the silk industry, the city's political structure 
predated industrialism. It was fashioned by traditional notions 
of participatory democracy and this had important consequences 
for the social and political influence of both millowners and 
their workers. To the frustration of manufacturers, Paterson 
politicians typically responded to popular pressure, enabling 
workingmen to voice, loud and clear, their discontents. 
In the summer of 1876, James Patrick McDonnell, editor of 
The Socialist, a radical New York journal, addressed William 
Strange, Paterson's leading silk manufacturer: 
"You recognize the rights of men do you? You recognize 
the right of a man to support a wife and six children 
upon a dollar a day; but suppose he has not got the 
might, what becomes of the right? You have the might, 
they have the right. You speak of invoking the law. 
Have a care Mr Strange. Be not too eager to use the 
law as an engine of oppression, lest the oppressed 
lose their respect for the law, and when that takes 
place - what then? Well, we shall see! " 1 
McDonnell, soon to move to Paterson where he was the out- 
spoken champion of the city's workingmen for the remainder of 
his life, articulated a familiar moral indignation in his 
attack on millowner Strange. His warning of the possible 
calamities should "the oppressed lose their respect for the law", 
1The Socialist May 6 1876. 
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served as a reminder to himself as much as to Paterson's mill- 
owners. A vision of enraged lawlessness, spawned by manufac- 
turers' gross contempt for the rights of their workers, was 
to inform his life's work. With scant resources and aided by 
a mere handful of followers, McDonnell worked tirelessly to 
reform and humanize the burgeoning industrialism in cities such 
as Paterson. His aim was to obtain legal guarantees for the 
rights of working people to provide a constitutional framework 
within which workers would be afforded some protection from the 
harshness of the new factory barons. The route that McDonnell 
travelled in this quest is indicative of a strong current of 
feeling amongst Paterson's working class during the last quarter 
of the nineteenth century. 
McDonnell arrived in the United States in 1873, already 
an active radical. Born of middle class parents in Dublin in 
1847, McDonnell displayed a rebellious nature from an early age. 
In 1862, fifteen years old, he fell foul of his superiors at 
Dublin University for his support of Irish Nationalism. He 
left to join the editorial team of the United Irishman and 
later the Irish people, both Nationalist journals. Arrest 
and imprisonment followed as the British government suppressed 
the Irish rebels. McDonnell was not deterred. Even his father's 
investment in a cordage business, which young James Patrick 
managed 'for a short time, could not deflect him from his commit- 
ment to radical politics. In 1868, after years of harassment 
by Irish police, McDonnell left Dublin for London. 
In London, McDonnell immediately plunged into the turmoil 
of radical and working class politics. The experience; influenced 
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him profoundly broadening his horizons beyond mere nationalism. 
Whilst working for the Irish cause in London he came into 
contact with the city's circle of British and European radicals, 
including Marx, Engels, and other socialists and trade unionists. 
His activities diversified, leading him to take up the cause of 
the Paris Communards, the International Workingmen's Association, 
and the demonstrations for free speech in London's parks. 
Again prosecutions followed, but for McDonnell the experience 
was rewarding. 
McDonnell left England in late 1872, ostensibly to expose 
the terrible steerage conditions of trans-atlantic emigrant 
ships. Upon arrival in New York McDonnell's passion for radical 
politics soon embroiled him in the struggles of New York's 
tiny socialist community. For the next four years his life was 
devoted to propaganda and editorial work. The Socialist (later 
the New York Labor Standard), a Marxist weekly journal, was his 
chief vehicle of expression. He also spoke throughout New 
England and the Atlantic states and it was on these tours that 
McDonnell first made contact with Paterson's textile workers. 
' 
For a succinct review of McDonnell's background and career 
see H. G. Gutman's "Class, Status and the Gilded-Age Radical: 
A Reconsideration, The Case of a New Jersey Socialist" in 
H. G. Gutman and G. S. Kealey, Many Pasts: Readings in American 
Social History II 1865 - Present (Englewood Cliffs, 1973) 
pp. 125-151. On McDonnell's early years see Press Clippings 
in Subject File, J. P. McDonnell Papers (State Historical 
Society, Wisconsin), R. J. Harrison Before The Socialists 
(London, 1965); H. Collins "The English Branches of the 
First International" in A. Briggs and J. Saville ed. Essays 
in Labor History (London, 1960) pp. 242-275. An indication 
of, NcLonnell's varied activities during the 1870s can be 
gleaned from Y. S. Foner Histor of the Labour Movement in 
the United States I pp. 452-3,493 and J. R. Commons et. al. 
A Locumentarv History of American Industrial Society IX 
PP-309 469 378- See also "J. P. McDonnell" in the Fifteenth 
Annual Report and Proceedings of the New Jersey Federation 
of Organized Trades and Labor Unions 1893 (n. d., n. p. ) 
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Between 1877 and 1880 McDonnell became the celebrated 
spokesman of Paterson's wage-earners. 
' In 1876 and 1877 he 
was frequently in the city to address meetings of striking 
weavers, attack millowners and try to organize a union of 
textile workers. 
2 Fined in 1878 for labelling strikebreakers 
"scabs" and jailed in 1880 for libel after exposing working 
conditions in a Passaic County brickyard, McDonnell became the 
bete noire of Paterson manufacturers. His dramatic inter- 
vention in the city's industrial upheavals caused others less 
concern. Crowds of workingmen marched through the streets of 
Paterson, howling and jeering at millowners and strikebreakers 
to acclaim McDonnell. So intense was community support for him 
during the trial and imprisonment, in 1880 that upon his release 
a vast celebration was arranged. A marching band led McDonnell, 
triumphant, through the city's streets to attend a banquet at 
3 
which the hero was presented with a gold watch. 
By the time of his first trial in 1878, McDonnell was a 
permanent resident in Paterson. lie changed the name of his 
journal to the Paterson Labor Standard and henceforth concen- 
trated his attention on the lot of New Jersey's workingmen. 
Under the auspices of the International Labor Union McDonnell 
attempted repeatedly to organize Paterson's silkworkers. 
4 
1Gutman ibid., and his earlier "Class, Status and Community 
Power in Nineteenth Century American Industrial Cities - 
Paterson, New Jersey: A Case Study" in F. C. Jaher ed. The 
Age of Industrialism: Essays in Social Structure and Cultural 
Values (New York, 1968) Pp"2 3-2 7" 
2The Socialist May 13, July 8 1876; The Labor Standard 
September 2 1876, April 21, July 21 and December 9 1877. 
3The 
Labor Standard October 26, November 2 1878, October 11 
1879, March 13, April 10 1880. Paterson Labor Standard 
November 23 1878, March 13 and 20 188o. See also McDonnell's 
diary for 1880 in J. Y. McDonnell Papers. 
4The 
International Labor Union, founded by McDonnell and a 
group of supporters in New York City, was an outgrowth of the First International. 
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His efforts were of little avail, Despite bitter and lengthy 
strikes during 1877 and 1878, McDonnell lamented the lack of 
organization amongst the city's workers. 
1 
His call to "build 
your union on benevolent and protective principles" apparently 
fell on deaf ears. 
2 Paterson's millhands were certainly active 
in resisting threats to their customary work routines or living 
standards. But they showed little inclination to organize 
permanently. 
During the 1880s McDonnell continued his-efforts to estab- 
lish organization amongst Paterson's workers and wage-earners 
throughout New Jersey. Aided by a handful of local activists 
he was the guiding light behind the Passaic County Trades 
Assembly founded to co-ordinate the actions and influence of 
the city's workers. He was active at the-. state level. Samuel 
Gompers appointed McDonnell the American Federation of Labor's 
General Organizer in New Jersey. More importantly McDonnelll 
was elected chairman of the New Jersey Federation of Organized 
Trades and Labor Unions in 1883, a position he retained until 
1897. His work for the N. J. Federation, chiefly organizing 
and lobbying for legislation favourable to workingmen, was to 
achieve considerable recognition and respect for the former 
rebel. Whether in the local or state setting McDonnell, in 
many respects, typified a generation of trade unionists and labor 
The Labor Standard December 13 1879, Paterson Labor Standard 
March 25 1 882. 
2The 
Labor Standard April 14 1877. 
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activists anxious to make their presence felt in shaping the 
growing industrial cities of New Jersey. 
Within Paterson, McDonnell's attempts to organize the 
city's silkworkers continued to fail. Despite major strikes 
in 1884,1886,1887,1889 and 1894, no permanent organization 
emerged. 
1 The International Labor Union, into which McDonnell 
had tried to organize striking millworkers in the late '70s, 
had a brief revival in 1883-1884, sending representatives to 
the state'federation's annual sessions, but was soon defunct. 
2 
Two years later when a spate of strikes disrupted the city's 
industry for almost the whole year it was the Knights of 
Labor, assisted by McDonnell, who were organizing locals amongst 
Paterson's textile hands. They in turn disappeared almost as 
rapidly as previous unions. The rapid demise of the Knights 
in Paterson paralleled that of the national organization. 
Successfully led strikes by the Knights in 1886 were followed 
by dismal failures the following year. 
3 
Thereafter it was 
small craft unions of the highly skilled which characterized 
organization amongst Paterson's silkworkers. 
In 1889, the loomfixers and twisters withdrew from the 
remnants of the Knights' local Textile Workers' Assembly to 
form the Silk Loomfixers and Twisters Benevolent and Pro- 
tective Association. Shortly afterwards the horizontal 
warpers formed a similar benevolent association, as did the 
city's ribbon weavers. The vast remainder of the silk labor 
1 J. E. Wood "History of Labor in the Broad Silk Industry of Paterson New Jersey" (Ph. D., University of California, 1941). appendix B pp5'75-578. 2Report 
of the Fifth Annual Session of the Federation of 
Organized Trades and Labor Unions of the State of New Jersey 
1883 (Paterson, --i883) p. 2, and Sixth Annual Session 1 
p. 1-2. 
3NJBS Tenth Annual Report 1887 pp. 224-225,262-265. 
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force remained unorganized. 
I Only for brief interludes did 
organization take place amongst the lesser skilled. It was 
usually in response to a crisis in the industry and strikes. 
Thus in the late 1890s broad silk weavers were organized. 
Similarly in 1902 the United Dyers, Helpers and Finishers was 
launched. Neither endured. 
2 
McDonnell's success and support in the 1880s and 1890s 
can hardly be attributed to organized assistance from Paterson's 
textile hands. To be sure, his efforts, both in organizing 
workers and in lobbying for labor legislation, reflected a 
concern for the city's silkworkers. But it was predominantly 
the skilled workers in craft unions who provided the backbone 
of support for the local trades assembly and city representation 
in the state federation. Paterson's most consistent represent- 
atives at the state federation meetings were from the cigar- 
makers, carpenters, typographical and electrical workers' 
unions in the city. It was their interests, under the guiding 
hand of McDonnell, which most clearly shaped the development 
and programmes of the federation. Their influence, because of 
their craft union background, should not be seen exclusively 
as a conservatizing influence on McDonnell and the policies of 
the federation, for some had followed similar, if less specta- 
cular, paths to McDonnell in their response to the development 
of industrial society. They shared with him a belief in the 
permanence of modern industry, and following from this a belief 
in the necessity of workers' organization to reform 
1Wood "History of Labor" PP-154-5- 
2 ibid. pp. 164-6,187-188. 
- 84 - 
and humanize such a system. 
Samuel Sigley, secretary of the Passaic County Trades 
Assembly in the 1880s and later a vice-President of the New 
Jersey Federation of Trades Unions, was such a man. Born in 
Ashton-under-Lyne, Lancashire, in 1821, Sigley's radical symp- 
athies were evident from an early age. An ardent and active 
Chartist Sigley was imprisoned and in 18118, charged with 
treason, he fled to the United States. Although a house- 
painter by trade, Sigley worked tirelessly with McDonnell in 
his struggle with Paterson's millowners in the 1870s. He was 
president of the National Painters' Union and a prominent figure 
in both Passaic County and New, Jersey labor movements. 
1 Sam 
Holt, president of the Paterson lodge of the Carpenters union, 
was another McDonnell ally both locally and in the state organ- 
ization. Born in Paterson in 1842 and educated in the city's 
public schools, Holt became treasurer of the local trades 
assembly and a delegate to the New Jersey Federation in the 
1880s and 1890s. 
2 George McNeill possessed similar creden- 
tials. This Massachusetts born reformer was an old time asso- 
ciate of McDonnell's, who had lived in Paterson and edited 
McDonnell's journal during his imprisonment in 1880. An ex- 
mill hand, ardent abolitionist, and later union organizer 
and Eight Hour reformer McNeill's activities were centred in 
Boston. Here he organized the Massachusetts Mutual Accident 
1"Samuel 
Sigley" in Report and Proceedings of the Seventeenth 
Annual Congress of the Federation of Trades and Labor Unions 
of the State of New Jersey 19-95 (Jersey City, n. d. , National Labor Standard December 21 1 899. 
2"Samuel 
Holt" Report and Proceedings of the Fifteenth Annual 
Congress of the Federation of Trades'and Labor Unions of the 
State of New Jersey 1893 (Jersey City, n. d. 
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Association, an insurance company for workingmen in the 1880s, 
and pioneered factory and reform legislation in the Common- 
wealth. McNeill remained a loyal supporter of McDonnell's 
and gave his efforts publicity. 
' So too union organizers and 
reformers such as John Swinton, George Gunton, T. V. Powderley 
and, perhaps most important, Samuel Gompers were all associates 
and publicists for McDonnell and the state federation. 
2 They 
comprised a group of activists, who having experienced the 
advent of the factory and the transformation of cities such as 
Paterson, had resolved to humanize and control industrialism 
in their own interests. Their outlook clearly influenced the 
emergent state federation of labor. 
Between 1883 and 1892 work by the legislative committee 
of the New Jersey Federation of Organized Trades and Labor 
Unions achieved the passage of a substantial body of reform 
and labor measures in the State legislature. The progress of 
the federation, founded in 1879 by local Knights of Labor, had 
been slow prior to the mid 1880s. A state Bureau of Labor and 
Industries had been established to investigate and report 
annually on industrial conditions, the truck system of payment 
had been abolished, and a conspiracy law hampering union organ- 
ization and activity amended. In 1883 McDonnell's influence 
1Biographical 
sketch of McNeill in "Subject File", J. P. 
McDonnell Papers, National Labor Standard September 7 1899. 
2 American Silk Journal April 1890. See McDonnell's remarks 
at the Proceedings of the Seventeenth Annual Congress of 
the Federation of Trades and Labor Unions of New Jersey 1895, 
and letters of Gunton to McDonnell, February 8 1897, and 
McNeill to McDonnell, December 4 1897 in "Correspondence", 
J. P. McDonnell Papers. 
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in the federation began to be felt, as he re-organized the 
body and became chairman of its Committee on Permanent Organ- 
ization and its Legislative Committee. 
I 
Henceforth labor legislation followed much more quickly. 
In 1883 and 1884 child labor was restricted in the state, the 
employment of females brought under stricter control, the 
wages of state employees was raised, prison contract labor was 
abolished and a tenant protection act passed. It was followed 
in 1885 by a General Factory act, with supplements to it in 
1886,1887,1889,1890 and 1893. Amongst other things the 
act and its supplements covered working conditions, the employ- 
ment of women and children, "sweated" labor and the provision 
of an enlarged factory inspectorate to enforce the state's 
labor legislation. A compulsory education bill was another of 
the federation's major achievements, along with the establish- 
ment in 1892 of a State Board of Arbitration to mediate in - 
industrial disputes, and a shorter hours bill limiting the 
working week to fifty five hours. 
2 
Such a body of reform legislation must rank as a consid- 
erable success for McDonnell and the federation. It had been 
achieved in accordance with the classic role assigned to labor 
as a lobbying power, first espoused by the British Trade Union 
1L. Troy Organized Labor in New Jersey (Princeton, 1965)pp 
52-56,58- and see McDonnell's remarks at the annual gathering 
in 1883 in the Report of the Fifth Annual Congress 1883 p. 2. 
2For 
a summary of the Federation's programme and achievements 
see McDonnell's review of the years 1879-1892 in the Report 
of the Fifteenth Annual Congress 1893 n. p., and "General 
Business Papers 1872-1892" in J. P. McDonnell Papers. 
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Congress during the latter half of the nineteenth century. 
The British model undoubtedly influenced McDonnell and the 
development of the New Jersey federation just as it had Sam 
Gompers. Indeed, McDonnell's early associations with British 
labor leaders and his regular reports on the British trade 
union movement in the Paterson Labor Standard point clearly 
to the connection. 
1 More importantly he found that such a 
policy could guarantee considerable gains for labor in a 
fluid political system. If organized labor lacked enough 
weight nationally to influence legislation during the Gilded 
Age, at the local level it could exert considerable persuasion. 
"Reward your friends and punish your enemies" was McDonnell's 
watchword throughout the 1880s and 1890s. "That the organized 
labor of this State is recognized by the legislators as a 
force too potent to be disregarded is very apparent, and that 
its power is rapidly increasing cannot be denied", McDonnell 
expounded to the federation in 1886.2 Seven years later, after 
the successful passage of numerous reform and labor measures, 
McDonnell's position remained unchanged. "The organized working- 
men of New Jersey hold the political balance of power", he 
reiterated in 1893, "and if they fail to use it well and wisely 




Labor Standard June 17 1882 for an example. 
2Report 
of the Eighth Annual Congress 1886 p. 13. 
3Report 
of the Fifteenth Annual Congress 1893 n. p. 
_8a_ 
The balance of power that McDonnell and his colleagues 
placed their faith in certainly exerted considerable influence 
upon the state legislature. Assemblymen and senators were 
circularised with labor's demands, and given the endorsement 
of the New Jersey Federation upon agreement to introduce or 
support labor legislation. 
I Praise was not stinted if labor 
legislation was forthcoming and conversely active campaigns 
were launched against opponents of workingmen and the federa- 
tion's legislative aims. 
2 The party affiliation of candidates 
was of little concern to the federation, only their commitment 
to the interests of workingmen. Thus, in 1881, McDonnell could 
urge both the election of Thomas Flynn, candidate of the Irish 
Democrat machine, and Jo Greaves, local Republican, as assembly- 
men for the Paterson area. 
3 
During the 1880s and 1890s the interests of organized 
labor in Passaic County were well served through the efforts 
of McDonnell and the local trades assembly to elect sympathetic 
representatives. In industrial cities, like Paterson, local 
political machines were, of necessity, sensitive to the con- 
cerns of workingmen. Thus they threw up candidates such as 
Tom Flynn, elected a state assemblyman for four successive 
terms in the 1880s and again in 1892,1893 and 1894. Flynn, 
born locally of Irish parents, had strong roots in the pre- 
dominantly Irish and working class section of south Paterson. 
1See the circulars of 1889 and 1895, for example, and T. Lane 
to J. Y. McDonnell November 12 1892 in "Correspondence" 
J. P. McDonnell Papers. 
2Re 
ort of the Fifth Annual Congress 1883 p. 3, Paterson Labor 
Standard November 24 1883. 
3Paterson 
Labor Standard October 15 and 22 1881. 
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He had worked as a machinist and later as a liquor dealer in 
the city. Early in his career at Trenton, Flynn took up labor's 
cause, sponsoring a bill to guarantee workingmen a one hour 
dinner break. 1 The apex of his service to McDonnell and the 
city's working class voters was undoubtedly his campaign in 
the early 1890s to limit the working week in New Jersey to fifty 
five hours - the success of which earned him the nickname 
"Fifty Five Hour Flynn". 2 
Flynn's was hardly untypical of the support local activists 
expected and obtained. James Keys, elected to the state 
assembly in 1887 and again in 1888, was in a similar, if less 
successful, mould. Irish born and-a former iron moulder in 
the Rogers Locomotive plant, Keys worked as a self-employed 
boatman and local agent for Paterson brickworks and breweries. 
Described in the state legislative manual as a man whose 
"... sympathies are decidedly on the side of those who labor 
for a living" Keys took an active interest in workingmen's 
interests, serving on the legislature's Committee on Labor and 
Industries and later as a state Deputy Factory Inspector in 
Passaic County. 3 Tom McCran, again Irish born, and elected to 
the legislature in 1889 on a Republican ticket, was another of 
McDonnell's allies. McCran had been a labourer in New Jersey, 
'Paterson Labor Standard March 25 1882- 
2 
New Jersey Legislature 1lanual of the Legislature of New 
Jersey 1894 (Trenton, 19 pp"23 -9" hereafter Legislature 
of N. J. ); Paterson Evening News October 26 1893, Report 
of the Fifteenth Annual Congress 1893 n. p. 
3Legislature 
of N. J. 1889 pp. 230-231, Paterson Daily Press 
July 51 892. 
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railroad navvy in the West and cotton picker in the Deep South 
before establishing his own hide and tallow factory in Passaic 
County. McCran it was who received the local trade assembly's 
backing in the 1889 election, and in return introduced a bill 
at Trenton limiting the working day to eight hours. 
McDonnell's legislative campaigners from Passaic County, 
if often of humble origins, were seldom formally attached to 
local unions. They were machine candidates, reliant on working- 
men's votes and reflecting the aspirations of their constit- 
uents. 
Sam bullock was an exception. A Macclesfield born silk 
twister, he was elected on ä Republican ticket in 189'i, and 
re-elected on an Independent slate the 'following year. Bullock, 
an ardent trade unionist, had been active in the local assembly 
of the Knights of Labor during the 1880s, and at the time of 
his election was a prominent figure in the Loomfixers' and 
Twisters' union. He, like Keys, served his time in Trenton on 
the state's Committee on Labor and Industries. 
2 
Other trade 
unionists were John Donohue and Robert Carroll, both elected 
on a Labor Democrat ticket to the state assembly in 1886. 
Donohue, born in Wales of Irish parents, was a former silk 
worker now a printer by trade. fie had been active in Knights 
of Labor local and was the regular representative of his union 
at the New Jersey Federation's annual sessions. Carroll, 
American born and a brass finisher, was likewise an'active 
unionist. Both were swept into office on the tide of sentiment 
1See 
S. Y. Hays' suggestive article "Political Parties and the 
Community-Society Continuum" in W. N. Chambers and J. Burnham 
The American Party Systems (New York, 1967) pp. 152-181. 
2Legislature 
of N. J. 1895 pp. 246-247. 
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surrounding the Knights of Labor's success in the city in 
1886, and with the tacit support of the local Democratic 
machine. Yet their term of office was remarkable only for its 
lack of success. The following year they were unable to sus- 
tain an independent Labor platform. Donohue, standing again 
on a Labor ticket against a Democrat and a Republican, was 
soundly defeated. Carroll, adopted by the Democrats, suffered 
the same fate. Their eclipse was hardly surprising -a fact 
that the Irish World had noted soon after their election 
in 1886 - for the local political machine could accommodate 
their demands quite comfortably. 
1 
The most eminent, and in some respects most surprising of 
McDonnell's supporters in the state legislature was Garret 
Hobart, an assemblyman and state senator in the 1870s and 1880s, 
chairman of the New Jersey Republican Party and later Vice- 
President under William McKinley. Hobart was of old Puritan, 
stock. He had been educated at Rutgers University and trained 
in law. A former counsel to the Paterson city government, by 
the 1880s Hobart was a leading corporation lawyer with director- 
ships on many of New Jersey's leading banks, railroads, and 
manufacturing concerns. His background and interests notwith- 
standing, Hobart received glowing and repeated praise from 
2 
McDonnell for his efforts to promote labor and social reform. 
'Legislature 
of N. J. 1887 pp. 204-06, Legislature of N. J. 1889 
pp. 22 -230, Irish World and American Industrial Liberator 
April 9 1887, October 8 1887- 
2 Paterson Labor Standard November 2 1889, October 31.1896. 
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The two had been associated almost from the time of McDonnell's 
arrival in Paterson. Hobart's father-in-law, Socrates Tuttle, 
was the lawyer who defended McDonnell during his celebrated 
trials in 1880. McDonnell and Hobart maintained friendship 
from that date on. In a glowing obituary of the vice-President 
McDonnell lamented the passing of a man "... always ready to 
aid the side of the weak and oppressed". 
1 
Although men such as Flynn and Hobart provided valuable 
support for organized labor's legislative programme, the real 
key to McDonnell's and the federation's success was the election 
of a favourable state governor, who would press workingmen's 
demands and engineer their passage, through the legislative 
chambers of Trenton. Leon Abbett, New Jersey governor in 
1883-1886 and again in 1889-1892, proved just such a man. Born 
in Philadelphia in 1836, Abbett came from a long line of Quakers. 
His father was a journeyman hatter in the city, and consequently 
young Leon received no more than a public school education. 
Abbett hardly found his humble origins a handicap. He entered 
the offices of a local lawyer and soon after established his 
own practice in Hoboken, New Jersey. Moving on to Jersey City 
Abbett became City Counsel and a Hudson County assemblyman in 
the 1860s. By the 1870s he'was a New Jersey State Senator, 
and in 1883 Democratic nominee for Governor. 
2 
Attacking corporation corruption of the state government, 
1National 
Labor Standard November 23 1899, Correspondence 
between Hobart's daughter and McDonnell July 7 1902 in 
"Correspondence", J. P. McDonnell Papers and D. Magie Life 
of Garret Augustus Hobart: Twenty Fourth Vice-President 
of the United States (New York, 1910) passim. 
2Legislature of N. J. 1890 pp. 187-189" 
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Abbett built up a considerable following in the state based 
upon the support of labor, immigrants, and both urban and rural 
smallholders. The New Jersey Federation's support for him 
in 1883 was almost a matter of oourse. Giving it added bite 
was the fact that Abbett's opponent was Judge Jonathan Dixon, 
the presiding judge at McDonnell's trial in 1880. McDonnell 
declared loud and clear for Abbett. 
I 
In office Abbett did not disappoint his supporters. A 
major body of labor and social legislation was passed, much of 
it emanating from the New Jersey Federation. 
2 ]Moreover Abbett's 
appointments helped ensure its enforcement. McDonnell himself 
was appointed a state Deputy Factory Inspector in 1884, and 
eight years later was made chairman of the State Board of 
Mediation and Arbitration, a position he held until 1894.3 
Others of McDonnell's local associates received appointments 
also, if less prestigious. Donohue was an enumerator for the 
state Bureau of Labor and Statistics in 1885. Emil Kaminski, 
former Master Workman of the Knights' Silkworkers' Assembly, 
received the same appointment in 1890. Similarly, local assembly- 
man, Jim Keys was made a Deputy Factory Inspector during Abbett's 
second administration. 
4 
Trivial as the appointments may seem, 
they gave labor activists unprecedented access to important 
government agencies and men of influence. 
1Paterson 
Labor Standard November 24 1883, R. A. Ilogarty 
"Leon Abbett of New Jersey: Precursor of the Modern Governor" 
(Ph. D. dissertation, Princeton, 1965) PP-30-33- 
2 
Abbett to McDonnell March 7 1886, November 11 1892 in 
"Correspondence" J. Y. McDonnell Papers, Hogarty ibid. 
pp. 120-122, "Justice Leon Abbett" in Report of the Fifteenth 
Annual Congress 1893 n. p. 
3"General 
Business Papers" J. P. McDonnell Papers. 
4Legislature 
of N. J. 1887 p. 205, American Silk Journal 
July 1890, --Paterson- Daily Press my 5 1892- 
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By far the most important was Abbett's appointment of 
Lawrence T. Fell as State Inspector of Factories during his 
first term of office; a position Fell maintained until 1895" 
Fell worked conscientiously to enforce the new code of factory 
and social legislation in the state, actively cooperating with 
McDonnell (his deputy for a time) and the Federation. In 
return he received the blessing and support of the state's 
labor movement. Repeated efforts to remove Fell and abolish 
his office were successfully resisted by Abbett with the aid 
of the state federation and its supporters. 
1 
For all their success and apparent influence, the demise 
of McDonnell and the New Jersey Federation came rapidly with 
the 1890s. Abbett was removed from office in 1893 and his 
successor sacked McDonnell and emasculated the State Hoard of 
Arbitration. The following year, Fell was also toppled. 
2 
More labor legislation was out of the question. Indeed, the 
New Jersey Federation spent the next few years fighting to 
preserve its gains. In summing up the 1895 New Jersey legis- 
lative session, McDonnell noted that "... every measure in the 
interest of the exploiters was promptly passed, every measure 
in the interest of the proletarians was promptly killed". 
3 
Two years later McDonnell's dismay had not lifted. All aspects 
'Fell to McDonnell April 11 1889 in "Correspondence", 
J. Y. McDonnell Papers, Report of the Sixth Annual Congress 
1884 p. 4. 
2See 
attacks on the board in "Scrapbook 1892-1893", 
J. Y. McDonnell Papers. 
3Report 
of the Seventeenth Annual Congress 1895 n. p. 
ý. 
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of the federation's legislative programme "... were slaughtered 
with glee and without a pang of remorse by men whom the wage 
earners elected as representatives". 
1 The dimensions of this 
reaction to organized labor and reform in New Jersey remain 
unexplored. Republicanism triumphed in New Jersey during the 
1890s'depression and with it big business dominated the state 
legislature for a decade or more. 
2 The sudden eclipse of the 
Federation had far-reaching consequences both for McDonnell 
and organized workingmen in New Jersey. 
With the erosion of McDonnell's influence in state politics, 
his primary position within the New Jersey Federation declined. 
Failing health contributed to his. demise. More important was 
the reaction to his reliance on, and association with the 
state government and its officials. For ultimately the state 
government had snubbed him and was launching a concerted cam- 
paign to undo his work. If McDonnell could not curry favour. 
at Trenton then he was plainly of no use to the Federation. 
Within the Federation hostility to McDonnell and his 
policies revealed itself in 1895. The recent death of ex- 
Governor Abbett prompted McDonnell to appeal for funds from 
New Jersey unions to erect a statue in honor of his benefactor. 
The appeal met with vehement opposition. The Hudson County 
representatives of the Federation reacted "with contempt" to 
McDonnell's suggestion. It was a symbolic, if ungenerous, 
1Report 
of the Nineteenth Annual Congress 1897 n. p. 
2See 
S. T. NcSeveney's The Politics of Depression: Political 
Behaviour in the Northeast 1893-1896 (New York, 1972), on 
the triumph of the Republicans in New Jersey. Unfortunately 
McSeveney does little to clarify the eclipse of organized 
labor in the state. 
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denial of McDonnell's pre-eminence in the Federation and rejec- 
tion of his policy of the past two decades. 
I The Federation 
increasingly came under the dominance of craft unionists, with 
their narrow and all but exclusive sectional concerns. 
2 Zeal 
for labor and reform legislation waned. In his old age, 
McDonnell was left a bitter and lonely figure. 
Yet McDonnell's eclipse cannot be accounted for or appre- 
ciated solely in relation to struggles within the New Jersey 
Federation and the State legislature. Basic to it was his 
failure to lay the foundations of a strong local base of 
support. McDonnell himself attributed the decline in his own 
and the Federation's fortunes, to the state's wage-earners. 
In 1895 he declared that: 
It... in order to accomplish the aims of progressive 
trade unionism it is necessary that trades unions be 
built upon the solid and lasting principles of mutual 
aid, high dues, less hours, higher wages and political 
independence". 3 
1F. 
L. Merkel to J. P. McDonnell January 5 1895, "Corres- 
pondence", J. P. McDonnell papers. 
2See 
the opposition of craft unionists to McDonnell in 
1899 over the seating of the Paterson Federal Labor Union 
7003 at the annual convention, and again to his introduction 
of an "anti-imperialistic" resolution at the same convention. 
McDonnell similarly complained of lack of support in his 
fight against the Republican introduction of "biennial 
sessions" in the State legislature. Report of the Twenty 
First Annual Congress 1899 pp. 27,57, G. Bradford to 
J. Y. McDonnell February 20 1897, "Correspondence", J. P. 
McDonnell Papers. 
3Report 
of the Seventeenth Annual Congress 1895 n. p. 
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Following from this, the failure to "reform and ameliorate 
industrial abuses" was: 
"**.. the just punishment of the wage workers themselves. 
It is their apparent indifference to the fact that 
what has been accomplished has been the outcome of 
many years of hard struggle. 
We should not forget that if we won't aid ourselves 
no one else will, and that we shall get just as much 
as we fight for, and no more". 1 
Nowhere was his analysis more applicable than in his own locale, 
Paterson. And ultimately the "indifference" which so chafed 
on McDonnell reacted most forcefully against him. 
Just as McDonnell lost support at the state level, so was 
his local position eroded. McDonnell's concern to "reform 
and ameliorate industrial abuses"., backed by a strong and 
disciplined labor movement, was simply irrelevant to the 
character and pre-occupations of the city's silkworkers. Few 
Paterson'millhands appear to have shared McDonnell's convictions. 
Further, most discovered methods of bargaining more appropriate 
to their immediate concerns. 
Spontaneous , ad hoc organization was the silkworkers' 
characteristic response to industrial strife. It was usually 
formed in response to a discrete issue and scarcely ever sus- 
tained after the settlement of the problem. Moreover, at 
times of crisis, local millhands relied on a variety of other, 
extra-union activities and relations to bolster their cause. 
During strikes disorder, or its threat, was as. important as the 
organized withdrawal of labor. Community support for workers 
'Report 
of the Nineteenth Annual Congress 1897 n. p. 
McDonnell's italics 
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was another crucial determinant in these struggles. Silk 
manufacturers' opposition to disorderly strikers was often 
undermined by an indulgent city administration and police force. 
Extra-union activity almost appeared to obviate the need for 
unions. As a result trade organization amongst Paterson silk- 
workers was weak. Sporadic union activity could not teach them 
the benefits of sustained organization nor convince them of 
the need for a long term strategy for industrial improvement. 
This critical weakness had important implications for 
McDonnell. At the regional level it provided McDonnell neither 
with a strong local base within the state federation nor evid- 
ence of widespread support, even in, his own locality, for his 
campaign for industrial reform. Locally, its effect was to 
severely restrict McDonnell's influence. 
During the long and bitter strikes which bedevilled the 
local silk industry McDonnell could be relied on to back the 
city's textile hands. He offered editorial support in his 
journal, strove to provide leadership and coordination through 
the Passaic County Trades Assembly, and he was willing to act 
as an intermediary between strikers and millowners or even 
city authorities. But it was a limited role, and often with 
little effect on the outcome of disputes. Moreover as McDonnell 
increasingly emphasized organization and reform of the 
industrial system through labor legislation, his views were 
plainly at variance with those of the city's immigrant textile 
hands. By. the 1890s McDonnell was becoming alienated from the 
concerns of the mass of Paterson wage-earners. 
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In 1894 McDonnell's position was brought sharply into 
focus. A strike by the city's ribbon weavers seriously dis- 
rupted silk manufacture. Industrial action in other branches 
of Paterson's textile industry followed. Production all but 
ceased. As head of the State Board of Arbitration, McDonnell 
stepped in, hoping to reach an amicable settlement. Despite 
two months without wages, the ribbon weavers flatly refused 
his overtures. He was left bitter and disillusioned by the 
experience. Attacking a "minority" who opposed settlement, 
McDonnell called for a "good, sound, common sense trade organ- 
ization" amongst the city's ribbon weavers. 
1 It was an empty 
call serving only to mark McDonnell's alienation from the city's 
silkworkers. 
The city's silkworkers had failed to mature in the way 
McDonnell hoped and expected. Their proclivity to erupt spon- 
taneously at threats to accustomed work practices or living 
standards disturbed him. Their failure to transform such 
collective outbursts into sustained organization disenchanted 
him. Uncontrolled and uncontrollable, they provided Trenton's 
legislators with ample excuse to undo McDonnell's hard-won 
gains. McDonnell's position was made explicit in a review of 
Paterson's silk industry published by the New Jersey Federation 
of Labor in 1897: 
"When the silk operatives organize in bona fide 
trade unions for mutual help, when they pay weekly 
dues of 25 or 50 cents, when they make provision 
1Paterson Labor Standard April 14 1894. 
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for out of work, sick and death benefits, and unite 
intelligently, not in moments of heat and passion, 
or for the sole purpose of striking, when they select 
their most brainy and competent men to act as officers 
and to make a thorough study of the silk market from 
A to Z, then they will have won public respect, and 
then can they meet their employers and discuss and 
annually settle all questions of dispute". 
Only by such rationalization of industrial relations could 
silkworkers hope to make advances, the reviewer contended. 
' "Many of the worst strikes in Paterson have resulted 
from misunderstanding and might have been prevented 
by the exercise of good judgement and forbearance 
on the part of manufacturers and employees, and if the 
latter were organized in bona fide trade unions for 
benefit and protective purposes. It is clear to many 
of the manufacturers and workers that there is less 
to fear from organized labor than from labor acting 
as a mob, without reason or experienced leadership. " 1 
"Labor acting as a mob"'had no use for McDonnell. A 
labor activist replying to McDonnell's appeal for a local A. F. 
of L. organizer questioned the virtue of trying to organize 
those who only heaped scorn and abuse upon one's efforts. 
2 A 
letter from William Prall, the lawyer who had defended McDonnell 
at the celebrated Paterson trial of 1880, expressed similar 
sentiments. Written at the turn of the century, it suggested 
the distance McDonnell was removed from the rank and file in 
the silk industry, and a certain contemptuousness mixed with 
' fear that he perhaps shared with his correspondent. Casting 
aspersion upon those silkworlcers who had attracted notoriety in 
a series of dramatic and disorderly strikes, Prall wrote: 
1Report 
of-the Nineteenth Annual Congress 1897 n. p. - although 
authorship of the review is unknown it was almost certainly 
McDonnell, or one of his close Paterson associates, for it 
re-iterated his views expressed in the Paterson Labor 
Standard. 
2Josiah West to J. P. N. June 14 1897 in "Correspondence" 
J. P. M. Papers. 
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"It is not indeed the really hard-working men and 
women who have brought such opprobrium upon the old 
town. Rather, the wretched riff-raff, who, like 
scum, are seen, but who are really of no weight and 
consequence". 1 
It marked a sad conclusion to McDonnell's distinguished 
career and his untiring efforts to improve conditions for 
New Jersey's wage-earners. And more importantly it signalled 
the sharply divergent responses to industrialism found in 
industrial cities like Paterson. 
During the three decades after 1872, scarcely a year passed 
without a major strike disrupting Paterson's silk industry. 
Often these strikes were general, and the city's mills ceased 
production. In 1877 a general walkout by the city's ribbon 
weavers lasted three months. Nine years later a spate of 
strikes in both weaving and dyeing plants seriously disrupted 
output. The following year, 1887, the city's entire force of 
dyeworkers struck. In 1894 over fifty mills in the city were 
halted by a mass walkout of weavers. Seven years later silk- 
workers again struck in large numbers. 1902 brought a general 
strike by the city's dyeworkers. It reads like a catalogue of 
almost incessant warfare between millowner and worker. Yet the 
list could be ever further extended. Strikes abounded even 
during apparent lulls. In 1872, and again in 1880, ribbon 
W. Prall to JYM undated letter in "Correspondence" JPM 
Papers, see also letter'of'G. McNeill to Mrs. 'McDonnell 
April 6 1906 ibid. 
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weavers came out for over three months in individual mills. 
In 1884 weavers in eight factories struck for over twelve 
weeks. 
1 Nor can strikes in individual plants be simply dis- 
missed as reflecting the special grievances of isolated groups 
of millhands. More often than not the effects of them rever- 
berated through the entire city. 
For sheer volume and frequency of strikes Paterson was a 
desperately. ailing industrial community. One student of unionism 
in the city's mills has calculated that during the last two 
decades of the nineteenth century, one hundred and thirty seven 
2 
strikes took place in the New Jersey silk industry. The vast 
bulk of them would have been in Paterson, for it dominated 
the state's silk production. In these one hundred and thirty 
seven strikes, two hundred and thirty five individual mills 
struck and a further one hundred and seventy five establishments 
were closed as a result of the industrial action. Thus if most 
strikes took place within individual mills their effect often 
involved other plants. Of the one hundred and thirty seven 
only fifty nine strikes were ordered by any form of labor 
organization. The bulk of strikes were spontaneous in nature, 
relying on shop committees, or at times nothing more than shop 
loyalties, to prompt a downing of tools. Where organization 
did precede, and recommend industrial action, it was usually of 
1Wood "History of Labor" Appendix B pp. 575-576. 
2ibid 
p. 160, N. J. B. S. Tenth Annual Report 1887 pp. 246-249 
and passim. 
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recent standing and often unable to exert much control over the 
walkout or subsequent return. In 1886 The Knights of Labor, 
who had been organizing in the city, tried in vain to prevent 
a walkout by dyeworhers. : Nevertheless the strike-succeeded 
and as a result the Knights were able to establish with local 
millowners a board of arbitration to avert further disputes. 
1 
Yet-within eight months the dyeworkers were out again, despite 
opposition from both the District and General Assemblies of 
the Knights. Attempts by the Knights to arbitrate failed, 
ignored by both strikers and millowners. 
2 Both manufacturers 
and workers assumed, and predicated their responses upon spon- 
taneous walkouts. 
Despite lack of planning and organization the strike 
record of Paterson's silk hands was not entirely one of failure. 
In the two hundred and thirty five mills in which strikes took 
place between 1881 and 1900 over one hundred were successful- 
or partly so. One hundred and thirty three failed outright. 
The majority of stoppages were ostensibly the result of wage 
cuts or to demand wage increases, although more often than not 
other issues were closely involved; apprenticeship rules, 
shorter hours, or, most often, new work assignments and the 
introduction of new machinery. 
3 Depression in the industry 
almost always resulted in wage reductions. The strikes of the 
1870s, the late 1880s and 1890s were in response to wage cuts. 
1Paterson Daily Guardian March 31, April 12,23 1886, February 
9 1887. 
2N. J. II. S. Tenth Annual Report 1887 pp. 274-276. 
3Wood "History of Labor" pp. 160,575-576. 
ýtw 
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When the industrial production picked up during economic peaks 
silkworkers usually took the initiative in striking for increases, 
as in the mid 1880s. Frequently disputes involved new work 
assignments and the introduction of new machinery. These 
cannot be easily separated from wage concerns , for in an 
industry in which piece-rates were dominant, methods of pro- 
duction was intimately linked to wage levels. Certainly the 
disruption of familiar work routines and new systems of pro- 
duction and payment featured prominently in the strikes of the 
1870s, explicitly in the disruptions of 1883-1884, and again 
in 1894 and 1901. The prevalence of the question of tech- 
nological change may help to explain the persistence of spon- 
taneous or loosely coordinated strikes in the city. For tech- 
nological change was usually introduced piecemeal and unevenly, 
in one or two leading mills. Thus it was often of direct con- 
cern to only a limited number of millhands. 
The cyclical pattern of the strikes should also be noted. 
Demand for silk was seasonal. Production rose during February 
and March each year in anticipation of the year's new Spring 
fashions and strikes almost invariably coincided with this. 
1 
Many factors contributed to the spate of springtime disputes. 
Labor was most scarce during this period. For manufacturers 
interruptions to production were always unwanted, but never 
more so than at the height of this, their busy season. Thus a 
. short strike in springtime could often meet with success, 
especially if silk was. "in fashion" and demand for it great. 
Cyclical production emphasized silkworkers'. propensity to 
strike spontaneously. By a quick and"totaIwithdrawal of4 
labor, millhands hoped. to, wring concessions fromltheirýemployers 
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before the "season" was over. 
The absence of stable trade unions, a tradition of frequent 
and spontaneous walkouts, an industry bedevilled by wage cuts 
and seasonal production - all doubtlessly contributed to the 
instability of industrial relations in the city. They fail, 
however, to illuminate the dominant and persistent character- 
istic of industrial action by Paterson's millworkers; strike 
disorders and violence. Disorder or outright violence accom- 
panied every major industrial dispute in Paterson's silk indus- 
try in the last quarter of the nineteenth century. Its prom- 
inence can only be accounted for in terms of the main partici- 
pants in these industrial battles; recent immigrant workers, 
the city's millowners, often recent arrivals also, and the 
chief custodians of public order, Paterson's City Government 
and Police Department. 
Just as millowners found disciplining workers within their 
factories a wearying and often unsuccessful exercise, so too 
in the public domain they discovered a workforce which refused 
to acknowledge their right to dictate terms of employment. 
Moreover, during industrial disputes, millowners confronted 
an added burden which detracted seriously from their efforts 
to subdue unruly and uncooperative millhands; their inability 
to count on support from the guardians of public order in the 
city. 
Time after time during industrial upheavals, factory owners 
called upon Paterson's police force to quell riotous strikers 
and to protect mill property. After each incident a ritual 
was repeated. riillowners would issue a condemnation of 
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"communistic" workers and censure city authorities for the 
inadequate number of policemen in the city, and for the city's 
failure to request the assistance of state troopers to suppress 
the disorders. 
' "In the case of a strike", a prominent silk 
manufacturer grumbled in 1897, "there is no move to protect 
loyal operatives from taunt, infamy and intimidation. Absolute 
violence must be committed before the city authorities will 
interfere. Hands are followed through the streets, jeered at 
and maligned without hope of protection in any form.... "2 By 
1900 industrial disorder had become a familiar, if unpleasant, 
fact of life for the city's silk magnates. At the turn of the 
century an official of the Silk Association of America affirmed: 
"The same spirit of unrest exists in Paterson today as it ever 
did.... " Disorder, he explained, was endemic in the city, " 
... whereas when you get in other cities you do strike a good 
vein of sound American common sense, honest and law-abiding 
character". 
3 
Even allowing for a complete absence of "sound 
American common sense", disorder over such a time period suggests 
that something more fundamental was at the root of the mill- 
owners' problems. It suggests that disorder cannot be seen as 
exceptional or atypical of the bargaining process in Paterson, 
but rather as a central, almost hallowed tradition, drawing 
1New York Herald March 8 1880, New York Times February 13 1884, 
August 3 1877, august 29 1880. 
2 Textile America October 16 1897. 
31nd. Comm. 1900 XIV p. 703.4 
... ... 
- ýz x. ý. 
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sustenance from a variety of sources, but not least, from the 
failure of silk manufacturers to utilize the power of city 
authorities effectively in their own interests. 
Why should this be so? Paterson was no frontier boomtown, 
lacking an established and responsible government. Nor were its 
workers the lawless "desperados" we associate with the American 
West. 
l Paterson was an old municipality with, in normal circum- 
stances, an effective and stable government where transitions 
between administrations were typically uneventful. 
The explanation of disorder offered by Sam Bass Warner in 
his work on Philadelphia is scarcely more useful. ` There, 
immigrants rioted to demand political recognition. In Paterson, 
on the contrary, the government was traditionally responsive 
to workingmen's pressure. It is this. that explains strike 
violence in the city. Disorder was neatly tailored to Paterson's 
industrial and social structure. Aimed against millowners, it 
depended on city hall's favour or, at least, neutrality in 
industrial disputes, and took its pattern. from that significant 
fact. 
The character and form of strike violence in Paterson was 
analogous to the "collective bargaining by riot" with which 
Eric flobsbawm describes the actions of machine-breakers in 
industrializing Britain. Unlike British machine-breaking, 
3 
1See the contributions of J. B. Frantz and R. M. Brown in 
H. D. Graham and T. R. Gurr ed. Violence in America: Historical 
and Comparative Perspectives (New York, 1969). 
2S. 13. Warner The Private Cit : Philadelphia in Three Periods 
of its Growth Philadelphia 1968) pp. 125-157, M. Feldberg 
"The Crowd in Philadelphia History" Labor History vol. 15 
No. 3 Summer 1974 Pp"323-336. 
3E. 
Hobsbawm "The Machine Breakers" in Labouring Men: Studies 
in the History of Labour (London, 1964 pp. - see also 
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however, disorder in Paterson was not the precursor of trades 
unionism and a more stable base for collective bargaining. It 
is the weakness of organization,. not its absence or legal 
curtailments to unionism, which marked silkworkers' actions. 
For whilst the work of McDonnell and the New Jersey Federation 
of Trade Unions had guaranteed Paterson's millhands a framework 
of protection, silkworkers lacked organization at the point of 
production where their immediate concerns were at stake. 
Bereft of effective unions and lacking a tradition and 
established machinery of collective bargaining, Paterson's 
workers found disorder a natural and effective alternative. 
That it rarely gave rise to widespread fears of a breakdown of 
law and order, despite the scaremongering of manufacturers, is 
testimony to a general recognition of its limited nature. 
Disorder was not an irrational expedient, born of futility and 
despair and threatening to rend all asunder. - Directing their 
behaviour against scabs, city authorities, the workplace or 
even millowners' private residences, millhands could expect, 
and often obtained, the sympathy of much of the city. 
I In 
1877, after a Board of Trade meeting at which the "inefficiency 
of the city authorities" was roundly denounced by millowners, 
city mayor Buckely refused to submit to demands for protection 
of scabs-and prosecution of disorderly strikers. He stormed 
G. Rude on the "pre-industrial crowd" and early labor riots. 
The Crowd in History (New York, 1964) and Paris and London 
. 
in the Eighteenth Century (London, 1969). 
1H. G. Gutman. "Class, Status and Community Power". 
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out of the gathering. 
1 Almost twenty years later, both the 
mayor, Christian braun, and the city police chief, Fred Graul, 
rejected similar demands from the Board of Trade during a 
general walkout in the silk industry. Indeed when "an immense 
crowd gathered in the streets and cheered", Mayor Braun, a 
local brewer, accompanied his family in reviewing the proces- 
sion, "removed his hat and bowed his acknowledgments", promising 
the assembled free beer once the dispute was settled. 
2 
Clearly industrial disorder was an effective weapon. But 
to. seek reasons for its persistence solely in terms of the 
responsiveness of city authorities towards it would be mis- 
leading. It was rooted as much in the character of the city's 
labor force and their work situation as it was in the nature of 
local government. As Hobsbawm made clear, solidarity, the 
basis of an effective working-class movement, is only slowly 
learned and cannot, overnight, become the unquestioned prac- 
tice of workingmen. Nowhere is this truer than in nineteenth 
century America where the process of immigration alone impeded 
the growth of a working class with common traditions and 
experiences. Paterson shared with most other American cities 
in this cycle of immigration, and with it a constant turnover 
of its workforce. The sheer expansion of the city, from 
33,000 inhabitants in 1870 to over 78,000 twenty years later, 
'New 
York Times August 3 1877- 
2 New York Times April 21 1894, Paterson Daily Press April 
14 1894. _ 
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and by 1910 to over 125,000, is staggering in itself. 
1 
Englishmen, Scots, Irish, Germans, French and Dutch all came 
in large numbers. They were followed from the mid-1890s by 
Italians and in the 1900s by East European Jews. Although 
often from artisan textile centres, these immigrants were for 
the most part unfamiliar with factory discipline, and more 
often than not unfamiliar with each other. Each group faced 
the problem of adjustment to their new life in the city's mills. 
However that adjustment was uneven in its timing and impact, 
because immigration into Paterson was staggered, spread over 
half a century. The absence of a common background with shared 
values and traditions, coupled with the forcing of older immig- 
rant groups into new occupations or out of the city as "green" 
hands moved in, all made for a workforce fragmented rather than 
unified. Although most immigrants underwent a similar process, 
it was an experience that was never collective., As such it 
was unlikely to form the basis of a deep-rooted and permanent 
solidarity. 
Stephan Thermstrom and others have portrayed nineteenth 
century America as a highly mobile society, residentially if 
not occupationally, and although reliable mobility statistics 
are not available for the city, there seems little reason to 
doubt that Paterson differed substantially from Newburyport or 
Boston. 2 A mere twenty miles from the world's major port of 
1Ninth Census of the U. S. 11370 I p. 379, Eleventh Census of 
the U. S. 1890 XV p. 240, Thirteenth Census of the U. S. 1910 
III P. 119. 
2S. 
Thermstrom Poverty and Progress: Social Mobility in a 
Nineteenth Century City (Harvard, 196 and S. Thermstrom 
and U. Sennett Nineteenth Century Cities: Essays in the 
New Urban History (Yale, 1969). 
- 111 - 
immigration, it is difficult to imagine that Paterson's work- 
force did not experience high rates of turnover, especially if 
we recall that from the 1890s unskilled or semi-skilled work 
predominated in the silk industry. A high proportion of the 
labor force was made up of children, young women at work in 
the years between school and marriage, or young men in their 
teens and early twenties awaiting the prospect of a move into 
skilled or more lucrative employment. They were scarcely good 
union material, as a local organizer was well aware: "... by 
the time you get a few of them together and get them educated 
along the lines of the benefits of trade associations there is 
another big bunch in, and you have to educate them, and those 
you have educated drift off". It was a problem as insoluble as 
it was inevitable. "I have seen fifty organizations in my time 
in this city of all kinds and descriptions", he continued, but 
there is still a "lack of organization": ." 
"... and why is there a lack of organization is on 
account of the great influx of immigration to this 
country... there are so many different classes and they 
seem to be antagonistic to organization unless you 
can form an organization that will give them instant 
action. They want something to strike right away and 
seem to think strikes is the only thing to benefit 
them". 1 
In this context orderly strikes were impossible. Even 
McDonnell, despite his scepticism of the rash actions of 
unorganized millhands, had to admit that disorder could perform 
1C. I. R. III pp. 2422,2429-2430. 
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an important educational function in achieving a clearer sense 
of workers' solidarity. "During strikes", he observed, "it 
has not been the intent of labor to intimidate working opera- 
tives, only to persuade them that union means strength and 
strength ultimate good. Persuasion is all that strong labor 
men will allow and they expect to lose and not to gain by 
the other thing. Where there has been intimidation it must be 
placed at the doors of unsanctioned, over-enthusiastic individ- 
ualism". Despite the apologetics, McDonnell clearly saw the 
1 
necessity for "intimidation" as the only means of "union". 
"Strong labor men", he knew, were scarcely in abundance amongst 
Paterson's immigrant silkworkers, and their pleas for peaceful 
"persuasion" were cries in a wilderness. The street demon- 
stration, hooting, jeering, symbolic gesture, intimidation and 
violence, or the threat of it, were a natural alternative to 
orderly strikes, for they achieved a solidarity, albeit temporary, 
that was effective. As McDonnell remarked in the Paterson 
Labor Standard: 
"... all the police in the world could not reach the 
annoyances that the (scab) weavers have at home and 
on the streets that are not particular offences - 
taunts and flings, insults and remarks. A weaver 
would rather have his head punched than be called 
a "Nobstickk' and this is the class of injury that 
they hate the worst and that keeps them out more 
than direct assault". 2 
1Textile America October 30 1897- 
2 
Paterson Labor Standard January 3 1880. The taunt, "Nob- 
stick" was an import from England, doubtlessly brought over 
by immigrant weavers. Similar patterns of communal intim- 
idation were traditional amongst silk weavers in'mid-nine- 
teenth century Coventry. See P. Searby "Weavers and Freemen" 
PP"516-525 and E. Partridge A Dictionary of Historical Slang. 
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If the weakness of trades unionism encouraged the use of 
disorder, action of this kind was found to be a particularly 
potent weapon in an industry bedevilled by sudden market 
fluctuation. Slump followed boom in the textile trades during 
the nineteenth century, but nowhere was this more acute than 
in the production of silk. Bad harvests of silk worms or even 
the whims of fashion could suddenly disrupt production. As a 
luxury item silk was dispensable when money was short. Economic 
depression usually hit the industry hard. Moreover, silk 
production was seasonal, in response to changes in the spring 
and winter fashions, hardly requiring the constant levels of 
production of more basic commodities. 
I This influence upon 
the pattern and frequency of strikes in the city is evident. 
Together these features of the silk industry made for situations 
in which intermittent rather than constant pressure was neces- 
sary if silkworkers were to resist the "speed-up" or short- 
time. Spontaneous and disorderly. strikes were to be expected. 
No carefully amassed strike funds were available for an orderly 
withdrawal of labor. Nor were any necessary. An outburst of 
strike violence was threatening. It demanded the immediate 
attention of millowners who might have preferred to ignore 
the requests of less vociferous opponents. 
Paterson's textile hands normally took to the streets en 
masse during strikes. Processions of chanting and singing 
For an insight into the problems of the industry see Chapter 
Four, silk manufactu ers' testimony before the Ind. Comm. 1900 
XIV pp. 670-707. N. W. Garber passim "The Silk Industry of Paterson N. J. " 
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operatives, often headed by a brass band and sometimes carrying 
placards or the "Stars and Stripes", would bring the normal 
traffic of the city to a halt. Their route would usually 
encompass City Hall, often the mayor's private residence, the 
city's major commercial thoroughfares and mill districts. It 
would usually end with a rally, accompanied by musical enter- 
tainment, speeches by strike leaders and sometimes a picnic. 
l 
Public display was fundamental to striking millhands. It 
served notice to manufacturers and city authorities of collec- 
tive sentiment. Also, and probably more important, it was 
essential to strike solidarity. Collective demonstration 
could galvanize strikers of different nationalities, often only 
recently introduced to the new discipline of mill life and 
dubious of their status as a factory proletariat. by its 
strident visibility it challenged-not only the city's manu- 
facturers to flaunt its demands, but also renegades to ignore 
the strike call and cross picket lines. ` 
If processions were on the whole orderly, and at times 
took on an almost carnival atmosphere, they were frequently 
accompanied by bitter attacks on scabs, mill property, and some- 
times on millowners. Processions of disciplined and orderly 
strikers could, and often did, revert to forms of behaviour 
which suggest that violence was more appropriate to them and 
their needs. The most obvious object of attack was strike- 
breakers. Picket lines were thrown around mills during strikes 
1The Labor Standard August 25 1878, New York Times January 
19 1884, Paterson Daily Press April 1 189i 
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and an incessant din of "blasts on tin horns, jeers and cat- 
calls" begun, to induce strikebreakers from their looms. 
l 
"Serenading" was often supplemented by pelting the windows 
and doors of factories with bricks. Derisive howls and scuffles 
greeted the arrival of any police who tried to intervene. In 
1894 Police Captain John Bimson was forced to draw his revolver 
to quell a furious crowd of pickets. Eight years later gunfire 
was exchanged between police and enraged strikers. 
2 
Strikebreakers were ostracized from the communities they 
lived in. A focus for derision, they could expect to be howled 
at on the streets or simply ignored in local saloons and stores. 
Millowner William Strange was certainly discouraged by the 
effect public scorn had on "loyal" operatives. During indus- 
trial troubles, he observed, "... if a man tried to work he 
was called a "scab" and that clung to him all his life. His 
wife could not venture on the streets without being pointed 
out, and the children were afraid for their lives". 
3 
As Strange 
intimated physical coercion was the prop on which the social 
ostracism of strikebreakers rested. During the investigation 
of disturbances amongst dyeworkers in 1894 an Italian witness 
for the prosecution was reluctant to testify about assaults on 
a mill foreman and bookkeeper. Asked if he had been threatened 
by fellow Italian dyeworkers, the witness clammed up tight. 
4 
1NJBS Twenty Fourth Annual Report 1901 pp. 437-438. 
2Paterson Daily Press March 1,9,10 and 12 1894, American 
Silk Journal May, June 1902, Paterson Daily Guardian April 
23 1902. 
3Paterson Daily Press March 14 1894. 
Paterson Daily Guardian July 5i894. - 
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Direct physical assault of,. blacklegs was also common. In 1877 
female workers threw salt in the eyes of a male weaver who 
refused to join their walkout. When a female weaver was 
arrested as a result "... a large number of strikers accompanied 
her to the magistrates office, hooting and cursing the police- 
men as they. went along". They waited to cheer her upon the 
announcement of bail. 
' Usually scabs were punched, stoned 
and beaten. Crowds would follow strikebreakers from the mills 
and picket their homes. Sometimes the picketing would degen- 
erate into wholesale attacks on scabs' houses. In defiance 
of police posted outside the door, strikers stoned windows 
and hurled insults. Indeed, scabs might have to be taken into 
custody for their own safety. 
2 
Millowners and their property were similarly singled out 
for attack. Manufacturers made a sustained drive to impart to 
workers a sense of respect for mill property. But despite the 
restraints of factory disciplinary codes ca'canny was a potent 
weapon in their workers' armoury. The 1877 court cases in 
which strikers were tried for the destruction of unfinished 
silk point to the possibilities of industrial sabotage during 
disputes. Uyeworkers commonly tipped up vats of unfinished 
work, destroying their contents during walkouts. 
3 The stoning 
of mills usually accompanied picketing, but cannot be inter- 
preted exclusively as intimidation of strikebreakers, for attacks 
1New York Times June 21 1877- 
2 Paterson Daily Press March 2,9 and 13 1894. 
3Paterson Daily Guardian February 11 1887, Paterson Daily 
Press March 1 1894, American Silk Journal April and May 1902. 
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on mill property per se were fairly common. The worst outbreak 
of destruction to millowners' property was in 1902, when crowds 
of striking dyeworkers marched through Paterson systematically 
stoning mills, smashing doors, windows and where possible 
machinery. In one instance they even went so far as to impro- 
vise a giant catapult to hurl rocks at a mill building. 
1 
Threats to blow up mills, if not common, were sometimes resorted 
to by strikers. After a six month strike at the Little Company 
in Paterson silkworkers threatened to dynamite the mill. The 
owner, at least, took the warning seriously, "got a little 
2 
shaky over it", and conceded to the strikers. 
Foremen, supervisors and even millowners, themselves, were 
not exempt from the fury of disorderly millhands. Attacks on 
mill managers and foremen generally took place during walkouts 
or the picketing of factories. They were doubtlessly coloured 
by grievances accumulated during he-no mal running of the mill, 
not least because to overseers fell the bur en of enforcing 
factory disciplinary codes. Both manufacture s and mill super- 
visors were at pains to display their contempt for crowds of 
enraged strikers, which in turn fuelled the passions of mill- 
hands. During the 1894 troubles millowner William Strange 
1American Silk Journal ibid., A. W. Wishart The Case of 
William Nacqueen: Reasons Why He Should Be Liberated 
tTrenton, 1905) PP-5-91 New York Times June 19 1902. 
2Ind. Comm. 1900 YII p. 980. 
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flaunted the crowd of pickets around his factory by casually 
pacing the sidewalk outside, protected by police, and probably 
looking for familiar faces. At the Pioneer'Mill, Superintendent 
Thomas Ryle strove to create a similar impression of unconcern 
by appearing at the mill entrance puffing on a huge cigar-1 
Their bravado belied frequent attacks and threats to manu- 
facturers and their supervisory staff during industrial disputes. 
In both 1894 and 1902 attacks on mill foremen were savage. 
2 
During the ribbon strike of 1901 a supervisor at the Frank and 
3 
Dugan mill had his carriage wrecked by "serenading strikers". 
Threats to the city's millowners were more ominous. During 
the industrial upheaval of 1877 William Strange found himself 
surrounded by a jeering and hostile crowd of strikers whilst 
driving through the city's streets. Three years later during 
a subsequent strike a parade of disenchanted millhands publicly 
burned an effigy of Strange. 
4 
In 1894 opposition to Strange, 
took a more concrete form. A bomb was planted under his home. 
Fortunately for him it was discovered before exploding. 
5 Yet 
if Strange provides the most spectacular example of millhands' 
threats he was not singled out. During the dyers' strike of 




Daily Press March 1 1894. 
2Paterson Daily Press July 5 1894, New York Times April 23 1902. 
3American Silk Journal October 1901. 
4New 
York Times June 21 1877, Paterson Labor Standard 
January 3 1880.51nd. 
Comm. XIV pp. 703,680. Paterson Daily Guardian May 24 
1894. 
6Paterson 
Daily Guardian March 2 1887. 
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1890, after Jacob Weidmann, Paterson's leading dyer, had 
replaced a "restless and turbulent mob" with strikebreakers, 
a local German newspaper issued the following warning: 
The Weidmann Helpers are All To Work backturned, while 
the better people, -like Dyers and Finishers, themselves 
after Work outlook. If Weidmann yet one pair such 
Victories secures will he also gone be". 1 
Twelve years later Weidmann received letters threatening him 
with death. lie was reported to be... in constant dread of the 
foreigners whom he has had in his employ". 
2 Weidmann apparently 
took the threats seriously for he manned his mill with armed 
guards, and "Winchester rifles poked out of the windows 
menacingly". 
3 
During the rioting of 1902 the owner of the Ashley and 
Bailey mill was captured by strikers, thrown into a dye vat 
and badly scalded. At the American Dyeing and Finishing Company 
one of its proprietors, George Arnold was severely beaten. 
4 
The home of millowner Joseph hanford was bombarded with stones. 
At the Geering dychouse the owner, trying to placate an unruly 
crowd, was fired at. 
5 
Millowners were not alone in appreciating the drama of 
the silkworkers' action. Silk dominated the city's economic 
1Quoted in American Silk Journal November 1890. 
2Paterson 
Daily Guardian April 23 1902. 
3New 
York Times June 19 1902. 
4American 
Silk Journal May 1902. 
5New 
York Times June 19 1902, Paterson Daily Guardian 
April 23 1902. 
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life by 1900. From employing a mere three thousand workers 
in 1870, Paterson's silk industry expanded at a prodigious 
rate. By the turn of the century almost nineteen thousand 
were employed in mills and dyehouses in the city, over sixty 
per cent of Paterson's industrial workforce. 
I There was hardly 
a household in the city that did not shelter at least one 
silkworker. Moreover the city's business and commercial life 
was dependent upon millhands' earnings. Saloon-owners, shop- 
keepers,. and much of Paterson's petit-bourgeoisie relied on 
workers' patronage, had perhaps extended credit to them, and 
were intimately tied to them in a score of familiar ways. Time 
and again during industrial disputes it. was this petit-bourgeoisie, 
more often than not storeowners and saloonkeepers, who provided 
support and, perhaps even more important, respectability to 
silkworkers' actions. In 1894 it was a German saloonkeeper who 
stood trial for planting a bomb under the house of William 
Strange. 2 When an Italian shopkeeper, that same year, assaulted 
a youth who was supplying strikebreakers with food, the local 
press cynically commented: 
"It is supposed that (he) made the assault... to show 
his sympathy with the strikers, to 'make himself solid' 
with them so that they would further patronize his 
place. 
These are the people who furnish the backbone of 
the strike; perhaps not all voluntarily, but out of 
necessity. They have many persons on their books who 
have been good customers when times are brisk... If 
He (the shopkeeper) would refuse them now he would 
in all probability lose what they owe him when they 
return to work, and at the same time lose their trade. " 3 
1Ninth Census of the U. S. 1870 III P. 624, Twelfth Census 
of the U. S. 1900 VIII PP-570-571- 
2 
Paterson Daily Guardian June 28, July 20 1894. 
3Paterson 
Daily Press April 6 1894.. 
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Despite the obvious community of interest between the 
shopocracy and millhands, there is a grain of truth in such 
cynicism. As early as 1881 the Paterson Labor Standard had 
urged shopkeepers not "... to sympathize with the operatives 
for their own sake, we ask them to do so for their own interests". 
1 
Recalcitrant store-owners were publicly denounced, their goods 
boycotted, and their stores "serenaded". 
Z 
The naming of scabs 
was directed as much to neighbourhood store and saloon keepers 
as to strikers. Scabs were to be shunned not only by their 
fellow workers but throughout the community at large. Neigh- 
bourhood pressure on blacklegs was often as important to strikers 
as the extension of credit by-local merchants. In 1878 strike- 
breakers brought in from Fall River, Massachusetts, were 
successfully turned back from Paterson by a strike committee. 
Their employer had been unable to find a boarding house in the 
city to offer them accommodation. 
3 
No economic self-interest impelled the support of men such 
as the Reverend Gallaway, a local Presbyterian minister, who 
remained the outspoken defender of workingmen's interests in 
Paterson for more than a quarter of a century, nor that of the 
retired judge from Newark who advised jailed strikers in 
1901.4 Indicative of the widespread support that silk-workers 
IPaterson Labor Standard October 15 1881 
2The 
Labor Standard July 14 1878, Paterson Daily Press 
April 6 18914. 
3The Labor Standard August 4 1878. 
4Paterson 
Daily Press March 29 1894, National Labor Standard 
July 18 1901, April 18 1903. 
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could command is the list of arbitrators submitted by them 
during the industrial disputes of 1887. It included a local 
"contractor", a clerk, a wholesale grocer, a cap trader, a 
grocer, an assistant engineer of the Fire Department, a furni- 
ture-dealer, a dry goods merchant, a School Commissioner, a 
printer and a local clergyman. 
1 If the dimensions of this 
support remains largely unexplored, such people suggest that 
a good deal of public opinion did not comply with manufacturers' 
attempts to break workers' resistance, and further that the 
form that resistance took received at least tacit support. 
The attitude of those who held the reins of power in local 
government is less ambivalent. Dependent upon workingmen's 
votes, the mayor and board of aldermen found it politically 
impossible, should they have so desired, to back millowners' 
demands for prompt and outright suppression of strike disorders. 
The support or control of city government was crucial to mill- 
owners if they were to effectively combat industrial violence. 
Compared to a country like England, responsibility for 
the maintenance of law and order was considerably more decen- 
tralized in the United States. At the city level the mayor was 
vested with executive authority over Paterson's police force. 
If the mayor required he could request assistance from the 
County Sheriff, who was responsible for upholding the law with 
1Paterson Daily Guardian February 9 1887. 
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Passaic County, exclusive of cities within the county. But 
with meagre funds and a small force of constables, he was 
unable to offer much assistance even if requested. The mayor 
could further appeal to the Governor of New Jersey for state 
troopers if he felt them necessary. But neither the County 
Sheriff nor the state government could intervene in the city 
unless invited by the mayor. The mayor's power was limited 
however; but significantly at the local rather than a higher 
executive level. True to the American system of checks and 
balances, the mayor was responsible to the city's board of 
aldermen. Although aldermen lacked the mayor's authority to 
influence the functioning of the police force, they possessed, 
through the city budget, control over the size of the Police 
Department. Moreover complaints against the police had to be 
forwarded by the mayor to the board of aldermen to be heard 
and decided upon. Thus the structure and personnel of local 
government played a critical role in the industrial relations 
of the city. 
A succession of mayors and aldermen proved uncooperative 
when pressed by manufacturers for more effective policing of 
the city and suppression of strike disorders. They persistently 
thwarted millowners' pleas for strict surveillance of strikers 
and intervention during disputes. At most, police were detached 
to protect mill property and strikebreakers. Moreover, city 
fathers refused to bow to demands for state intervention. 
Although state and federal troops had been used against strikers 
in the upheavals of the railroads in 1877, at Homestead, in 
the mining towns of the West, and most notably at Pullman in 
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1894, state intervention was not typical and stemmed, at 
least partly, from doubts about the reliability of local 
police authorities. At Pullman it was directly initiated by 
the Federal Government over the opposition of local politicians. 
Moreover in all these disputes strikers confronted industrial 
and transportation magnates of immense wealth and influence. 
1 
In Paterson the situation was hardly comparable. Local mill- 
owners lacked the weight of steel and railroad barons, and 
strikes in a localised, luxury industry were unlikely to attract 
the national attention of a railroad dispute. Strikes were 
endemic in Paterson. Intervention of this kind was scarcely 
practical. When New Jersey state troops did enter the city 
during the dyeworkers riot of 1902 it was to mark a significant 
new departure in the industrial history of the city. 
Analysis of the occupational and ethnic background of a 
generation of city fathers has revealed some-basis for their. 
independent stance from the millowner elite of the city. Most 
were of Yankee or British stock, often "self-made" men, or 
still employed in skilled or self-employed occupations, who 
owed their incomes and status to non-industrial business or 
property. They have been pictured as a generation predating 
the arrival of factory owners, whose outlook was rooted in the 
1A. Lindsay The Pullman Strike (Chicago, 1942) partic. 
147-175, J. Brecher Strike San Francisco, 1972) pp. 1-100, 
R. Wiebe The Search For Order 1877-1920 (New York, 1967) 
pp. 91-2. H. Ginger Lugene V. Uebs: A Biography. (Rutgers, 
1949) pp. 136-167. J. H. Cooper "The Army as Strikebreaker: 
The Railroad Strikes of 1877 and 1894" Labor History 18 
No. 2, Spring 1977, pp"179-196, R. Rheinders "Militia and 
Public Order in Nineteenth Century America" Journal of 
American Studies II No. 1, April 1977 pp. 81-101.1t. V. Bruce 
1877: Year of Violence (New York, 1959)" 
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smaller, pre-factory communities of mid-nineteenth century 
America; and that indeed many of them may have resented the 
disruption that the new factory lords brought in their wake. 
i 
This background surely influenced the relationship between 
city administrators and millowners. Ties between city fathers 
and millhands were not so obviously attributable to common 
origins. Here mutual interests were more functional, a product 
of the structure of local government. Both mayor and aldermen 
relied on silkworkers' votes and, as with McDonnell's supporters, 
the city political machines proved responsive to workingmen's 
pressure. When, as in 1894, they did not, workers served a 
harsh reminder of their political sway, electing Matt Maguire, 
a Socialist Labor Party candidate, to the board of aldermen, 
in opposition to the incumbent, machine prospect. 
2 
The political influence of workers on city government was 
most clearly demonstrated during industrial disputes. In 
1878 Mayor Buckley, who the year before had successfully 
resisted manufacturers' pressure to stamp out strike disorders, 
ignored the request of a Paterson millowner to arrest McDonnell, 
who was organizing a strike demonstration. Instead he and 
other local government officials contributed to the strikers' 
R. A. Noble "The Relation of the Middle Classes and Local 
Government of Paterson, New Jersey, to the Labor Movement 
in the Paterson Silk Industry 1872-1913" (B. A. dissertation, 
Princeton, n. d. ) pp. 71-109. ". G. Gutman "Class, Status 
and Community Power". 
2Paterson Daily Guardian April 7,11,12 and 14 1894, The 
People April 22, May 13 1894, Paterson People July 1T1894, 
July 21 1894. 
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relief fund. 
1 Such support often was not gained without local 
politicians being reminded of the dangers of ignoring working- 
men's interests. Two months after Buckley refused to listen 
to the millowner's demand McDonnell was convicted of libel. 
His prosecutor was a leading figure in the Passaic County 
Democratic Party. Mass demonstrations paraded the city in 
protest. When the local Democrats held a ratification meeting 
in October 1878 they faced a hostile audience. Disenchanted 
millhands refused to let Prosecutor Woodruff speak. Cries of 
"tar and feather him", "Put the scab out" and "Cowhide him" 
led to a suspension of the proceedings. Neither Mayor Buckley 
nor McDonnell's defence lawyer could placate the crowd. Police 
were hastily summoned to disperse the assembled. Two days 
later the meeting was reconvened. Woodruff again rose to speak. 
On this occasion an estimated five hundred rose and walked 
from the hall in silence. Police attempts to prevent the 
exodus failed; instead millhands marched through the streets 
cheering. 
2 
Such pressure hardly went unheeded. In 1880 Mayor Graham 
again rejected millowners' demands for an increase in the size 
of the police force. The Paterson Labor Standard dryly noted 
that the arguments of manufacturers carried "little weight" 
1The Labor Standard July 28, August 18 1878- 
2 New York Times October 29 1878, The Labor Standard 
November 2 and 9 1878. 
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with the Board of Aldermen. 
l Both mayor and aldermen received 
sufficient warning when the same journal, "a year earlier, 
suggested: 
"If any of our public officials want to be re-elected 
let them show their usefulness by advancing measures 
for the good of the work people. To all public empl- 
oyees, whether they be Aldermen, policemen or so forth 
who do their duty like decent men the Labor Standard 
will give full credit". 2 
The power of workingmen to influence successive city 
administrations apparently endured. In 1894 Mayor Braun, 
like his predecessors, took scant regard of manufacturers' 
calling for state troops to suppress disorders. Instead he 
issued a statement to strikers asking for peaceful obser- 
vance of the law. Condemned by the Board of Trade for a "milk 
and water proclamation which was more likely to urge these 
people on", Braun made clear his support for silkworkers by 
publicly addressing a strikers' parade. 
3 
Millowners'provisions for an effective policing of the 
city during industrial upheavals were undermined not only by 
city officials, but also by community pressure at a grass roots 
level. In the late 1870s millowners sponsored the Paterson 
Light Guard, a private militia which they hoped would supplement 
local police in controlling unruly strikers. Discredited by 
1Paterson Labor Standard January 24, March 13 1880. 
2Paterson 
Labor Standard November 11 1878. 
'Paterson Daily Guardian March 12,13 and 14, April 14 1894. 
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its failure to disperse Orange and Catholic rioters in the 
city in 1880, and actively opposed by Paterson millhands the 
guard served manufacturers little useful purpose. 
1 Millhands 
formed their own units to compete with the Light Guard. The 
Labor Guard and Dunphy Guard were pledged to defend the city's 
workers should millowners launch an attack. 
2 
Consistent workingmen's hostility towards the military in 
any form convinced both millowners and city officials of the 
hazards of inviting militiamen into Paterson. McDonnell 
launched a virulent campaign against the Light Guard and the 
city government's proposal to fund an armoury in the city. 
3 
Even an innocuous event, such as the proposed military parade 
during the 1892 Centennial celebrations in Paterson, taxed 
working class tempers. Local labor figures protested against 
giving state militiamen "too much prominence" because "... a 
procession of working people ought to be the most notable 
feature of the centennial". 
4 
The expected arrival of President 
Cleveland for the street processions prompted a local reverend 
to exclaim: 
J. E. Growell The Excursion of the Paterson Light Guard 
(Paterson, 1883), New York Times May 3 and 1 09 
Shriner, Paterson PP-88-97- 
2 Paterson Labor Standard January 3 1880, January 24 1880. 
3ibid. October 22, December 24 1881, July 15 1882. 
4Paterson 
Daily Guardian May 6 1892. 
- 129 - 
"... that the military from other places did not represent 
Paterson, and that the President undoubtedly would 
rather see the brawn and muscle from the manufactories 
of this city than military from other places; besides 
that, military displays were not looked upon with 
favour by the working classes, who always considered 
the military as a menace to them". 1 
Although a detachment of state troops did eventually arrive, 
a local newspaper noted that "... it was with considerable 
reluctance that they obeyed the order to 'fall in' yesterday 
morning to come to this city". 
2 
Local police suffered similar opposition from Paterson's 
silkworkers during industrial disputes. Many policemen prob- 
ably had strong roots in the city's working class neighbourhoods. 
James Moore, a local labor activist, was the brother-in-law of 
Patrolman Draper; similarly Alderman Matt Maguire, champion 
of strikers during the 1894 dispute, had a brother on the 
force. 3 The extent to which kinship and community ties 
influenced police conduct cannot be accurately assessed; but, 
it certainly was not entirely absent. Policeman Andrew 
McBride, who joined the force in 1886, remembered how his ethnic 
ties in the city's Irish community often had to be invoked 
to preserve public order and overcome popular suspicion of the 
police. "I had to appeal to our people many a time after 
becoming a policeman", he recalled. 
t In 1877 Officer John 
Dimson discovered feeling against the police could run high. 
'Official Programme of the Centennial Celebration of the 
Founding of the City of Paterson 1892 (Paterson, 1892 
(in W. Nelson Collection, Box 19, Paterson Public Library) 
pp. 67-8" 
2Paterson 
Evening News July 6 1892. In 1903 a resolution at 
the convention of the short-lived United Silk Workers of 
America prohibited members from joining the National Guard 
"or any other armed force used for the purpose of breaking 
strikes and shooting strikers". National Labor Standard 
March 14 1903. 
3Paterson Daily Guardian July 30 1894, The People June 30 1895- 
4 
C. I. lt. III r. 2569. 
- 130 - 
Chasing a minor felon Bimson attracted a crowd determined to 
prevent the arrest. Pelted with mud and stones, Himson was 
forced to threaten all with arrest before taking the culprit. 
The policeman was both surprised and dismayed, for he "knew 
most of them". His surprise turned to anger when his father 
was beaten up by the crowd as a result of the arrest. 
1 
During industrial disputes police were probably glad to 
cooperate with city government in not making their presence 
Pelt too forcefully. An observer noted the low profile that 
the police strove to maintain: 
"The city authorities have sent policemen to protect 
the industrious working men, but the officers make 
no arrests, although at times the streets have been 
blockaded with the crowd gathered to intimidate the 
workers. In some cases the Police have taken the working 
men home by back ways to evade the crowd. This mani- 
festation of fear has encouraged the strikers to be 
bolder in their display of violence". 2 
Community sentiment was at sufficient pitch during strikes to 
deter a more resolute stand by the city's police authorities. 
A manufacturers' journal complained: 
"... Paterson has become so accustomed to having her 
peaceful or orderly work-people hounded through the 
streets, driven from their work, and abused and 
assaulted even in their homes, that citizens look 
on with comparative indifference, while the police 
make only the most feeble attempts to curb the riotous 
elements". 3 
Even during periods of industrial calm Paterson's policemen 
hardly ex. huded confidence and authority. In 1880 after the 
1New York Times August 26 1877- 
2 
New York Times August 29 1880. 
3American 
Silk Journal June 1902. 
- 131 - 
numbers of patrolmen in the city had been increased, the 
Paterson Labor Standard was able to gleefully remark: "The 
new policemen blush when they are stared at". 
1 
The size of the police force was in fact increased from 
twenty four members in 1880 to just over a hundred by 1900. 
In the same period the number of Paterson inhabitants doubled, 
from fifty one thousand to one hundred and five thousand. 
Thus although the proportion of officers to residents rose, such 
a marked increase in the absolute size of the city's population 
can scarcely have made its policing any easier. Aiost notably, 
supplements to the force in the late nineteenth century do not 
appear to have resulted from millowners' requests. 
2 At times 
additions to the force seemed dramatic. In 1895, following the 
disorders of the previous year, over twenty additional patrol- 
men were taken on. Yet within two years a truculent millowner 
was calling for the "... right of workmen to labor unmolestedly", 
a right which he felt had been "... violated during the past 
years by our officials, in whatever capacity, and by citizens 
at large who have encouraged disorder... 113 
Only in the courts, could Paterson's silk barons expect 
assistance from public officials, and even there a cooperative 
judiciary was not guaranteed. Judges were state appointees: 
'Paterson 
Labor Standard May 29 1880. 
2New 
York Times March 30, April 20 1880, City Officers, 
Paterson N. J. Annual Report of the City Officers of Paterson 
1901-1902 (Paterson 1902) pp-135-137 (hereafter Annual 
Report of the City Officers). 
3Textile 
America October 23 1897" 
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their sympathy with the millowners' predicament would depend 
very much upon the political character of the state executive 
and the men he had assigned. In the late 1870s manufacturers 
had found the state judiciary pliable enough to twice convict 
McDonnell, and to enforce millowner Strange's work rules for- 
bidding weavers to join a walkout before finishing their work 
in hand. But it was often only from the higher echelons of 
the state judiciary that millowners could expect favourable 
decisions.. At the local level, that of city Recorder, the 
bench was much more susceptible to community persuasion. All 
judges were partisan political appointments, and at the local 
level were often the product of the city's political machines. 
1 
The degree to which local politicians were influenced by the 
pressure of workingmen was reflected in the Recorder's Court. 
Thus in 1882 we find Recorder Greaves warmly greeted by Paterson's 
workingmen for refusing to side with millownerA during a wages 
dispute. 2 Moreover, a governor sympathetic to workingmen, such 
as Leon Abbett, was unlikely to appoint even senior judges 
favourable to employers' interests. For a decade or more, during 
the 1880s, the judiciary was effectively removed from employers' 
1New Jersey's judicial system was unusual amongst American 
states in that no posts were elective. For an outline of 
its complex structure, see Y. F. Gill and R. S. Brennan 
"Report on the Inferior Courts and Police of Paterson, 
N. J. " unpub, ms. in Records of the Department of Labor, 
Reports of the Commission on Industrial Relations 1912-1915, 
R. G. 1711, National Archives, Washington. 
2Paterson 
Labor Standard May 27 1882. 
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influence; but from the mid-1890s men such as Abbett were a 
dying breed in the state executive. Business interests increas- 
ingly dominated the state executive and brought in their wake 
a series of governors with scant regard for workers' concerns. 
Their appointments were to have significant implications for 
the industrial relations of Passaic County. 
During the 1901 disorders Paterson millowners for the 
first time obtained an order from the Court of Chancery, 
enjoining crowds from gathering outside mills, "serenading" 
scabs or even using "disrespectful treatment". 
1 Strikers 
ignored the injunction and were jailed on charges of contempt. 
The reactions of police and city authorities to this judicial 
directive which seriously compromised their traditional stance 
during industrial disputes is of great interest, for it reveals 
much about popular attitudes towards manufacturers' encroachment 
on striking silkworkers' most potent weapon, control of the city 
streets. 
Strikers themselves found it easy to defy the injunction 
by simply "enlisting some adjoining property-owner or resident 
in their cause" in order to "occupy the front stoop of his 
place and from this vantage-point... defy all efforts to remove 
them from the block". "This", a local observer remarked, "seems 
to be a 'horse' on Mr. Injunction". 
2 Despite this success, 
1N. 
J. B. S. Twenty Fourth Annual Report 1901 pp. 437-438. 
2American 
Silk Journal May 1902. 
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the resourcefulness of silkworkers was not limited to mere 
evasion of the law. Paterson's millhands possessed a sense of 
proprietorship in the public domain - by custom the streets 
were theirs, and their political "pull" guaranteed that custom 
was to be respected. Mass gatherings of strikers condemned 
the courts. Local labor leaders attacked police rigour in 
implementing the injunction with a curt-warning: "We have not 
yet forgotten that police officials are employees and not 
masters, and we won't forget it next fall". 
1 
A demand was 
issued to the Board of Aldermen calling, for an investigation 
of police actions in enforcing the court's directive. The 
outcome was the passing of a new city ordinance, before a City 
Hall crammed full of strikers, permitting picketing in the 
city. 
2 
Although the 1901 troubles seem to indicate the police 
officers were zealous in their desire to curb unruly strikers, 
the department as a whole was far from uniform in its pursuit 
of such aims. Chief Graul faced an unenviable dilemma. Sworn 
to uphold the law, he lacked a sizeable enough force to wage 
all-out war on the strikers. As head of the department since 
the 1860s, he doubtlessly recognized how deeply strikers' 
contempt for the injunction ran. Counselling reason, Graul 
strove to maintain a position of impartiality, not dissimilar 
from his superior in City Hall, the mayor. That conflict 
existed between Graul and his second-in-command, John I3imson, 
1National Labor Standard May 30, June 13 1901. 
2ibid. 
August 22 1901. 
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seems fairly certain. While Binison was condemned by silkworkers 
for "abuse of his authority", Graul was applauded in resisting 
pressure to ban public meetings of millhands. 
1 üimson had 
proved a similar bane to millhands in previous strikes, but not 
so his chief. Seven years earlier during a wave of strike 
violence, a delegation of silk dyers had called on Graul and 
were encouraged by him to elect their own stewards to assist 
police at street gatherings. 
2 Again in 1902, when the wholesale 
wrecking of dyehouses had resulted in Mayor Hinchcliffe bowing 
to millowners' demands for state militia to assist the police 
department, it was Chief Graul who bore the brunt of blame in 
not suppressing the disorders. Hinchcliffe, no doubt anxious 
to deflect responsibility, denounced the chief before suspending 
him from duty. 
3 
The insistence of successive mayors and police authorities 
on maintaining a position of neutrality in effect denied mill- 
owners the degree of control they needed to combat disorderly 
strikers effectively. One manufacturer bitterly complained: 
"... the authorities in Paterson seem to have done their best to 
drive manufacturers from the city... in the large strikes that 
have occurred in the past few years they have taken sides with 
the men against the manu£actuers". 
4 
A trade journal voiced 
similar discontent with the community sentiment that seemed to 
1National 
Labor Standard June 13, August 8 1901. 
2 Paterson Daily Press April 3 1894. 
3New York Times June 19 and 20 1902. 
4Textile 
America October 30 1898. 
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conspire to undermine the manufacturers' position: 
"... the police are tied up by politics, the tradesmen 
fear a boycott by the large working class, the news- 
papers vie with each other in trimming sail to curry 
favor with the same element, the saloons open wide 
their doors to the beer-drinking mob by which they 
live, and they and the brewers go on their bail-bond 
when any of the wild-eyed Anarchi'sts, ' Socialists and 
others of the heterogeneous masses, who are foremost 
in all the strikes, go a step too far and get them- 
selves before the courts". 1 
Such instability was taxing not only millowners' resources but 
also their will and faith in the future of their mills. 
Confronted with their failure to control city government, 
Paterson's silk barons faced one of two alternatives; either 
they could move their plant to new locations where labor was 
more pliable and city governments more amenable to their 
requests, or they could seek to influence changes in the form of 
Paterson's municipal government, changes that might make it 
more responsive to their needs. Clearly millowners bore such 
calculations in mind. As'one of them put it: "As for the 
politicians who imposed obstacles in the path of the city's 
progress, there is but one thing to say. They should be shorn 
completely of the power which they have wielded so perniciously". 
2 
'American Silk Journal June 1902. 
2Textile America December 18 1897. 
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Chapter Four 
INDUSTRIAL. CRISIS 
Their failure to control local government, and in turn 
the workforce of the mills, became a pressing problem for 
Paterson's manufacturers during the 1890s and the first 
decade of the twentieth century. The problem of an uncooperative 
and, at times, belligerent labor force had long pre-occupied 
them. Now it assumed new proportions. The rapid expansion 
of the silk industry and the easy profits of the 1870s and 
1880s were no longer possible. Economic depression in the 
closing decade of the nineteenth century revealed instabilities 
within the industry which had previously been masked by the 
race for increased output and profit. Even when trade prospects 
appeared rosy, Paterson's silk manufacturers expressed a 
decidedly guarded optimism. It must not be expected that this 
city will ever again see the prosperous times in that industry 
that it enjoyed many years past"$ the American Silk Journal 
declared in 1902, even though "... it is about to be greatly 
better than it has been... "1 
Despite their troubles Paterson's millowners were far 
from resigned to accepting passively a diminished field of 
opportunity. They had built the silk industry more or less 
from scratch and greatly contributed to the expansion of 
Paterson; a fact, they felt, often ungenerously. overlooked by 
1American Silk Journal January 1902. , 
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both the city's workers and, its middle class. They were deter- 
mined to continue in business, either in Paterson or, if need 
be, elsewhere. Their prescriptions for the industry's ailments 
were not uniform, however, and they showed that millowners 
were struggling against each other almost as much as against 
their workers and an unsympathetic local government. Only one 
factor united them, the need to cheapen labor costs. All 
solutions inevitably confronted this problem and, consequently, 
the opposition of millhands. The bitterly fought strikes of 
the period were one result. Less immediately apparent were 
longer term changes in the social and economic character of the 
city. 
By the 1880s American silk manufacturers had established a 
flourishing and successful industry. They had broken the back 
of European competition. Yet in their early success can be 
traced the origins of later difficulties. The American industry 
had been founded upon the principle that only by more efficient 
organization and technological innovation could native producers 
compete with the cheaper labor costs of European competitors. 
Their success in ousting European silks from the American 
market appeared to confirm this. Factory production and the 
powerloom were pictured as heralds of a glorious future. The 
notion of reducing labor costs was a continuing and dominant 
motif in the outlook of American millowners. Where machinery 
could replace the worker it was sought. Where it could not, 
mechanization that would reduce labor to an unskilled status 
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and cheaper cost, was acceptable. Long after the spectre of 
cheap European imports had ceased to cloud their horizons 
American millowners were still adamant in their quest for 
reduced labor costs. 
The American silk industry "... is conducted within close 
lines of prudence, with marked economies in manufacture and 
care in management", an observer remarked in 1887. In the 
wake of the successful struggle against European competition 
his claim was pertinent. Intense competition within the 
industry now replaced international rivalry. "Tore than all 
else", the writer continued, "in every branch of the American 
silk industry which has obtained control of the market and 
distanced European rivalry, a home competition has arisen which 
is more relentless and severe than the old conflict with the 
foreigner". 1 It was this native competition which placed a 
continuing onus on silk manufacturers to reduce costs, and the 
greatest scope for reduction was with labor. 
Competition was a direct outgrowth of the silk industry's 
expansion. As the capacity of native producers to compete with 
foreign competitors became increasingly evident so newcomers 
tried their hand at silk manufacturing. The prospect of 
large profits must have appeared within easy reach for the 
number of individual silk establishments increased rapidly. 
By the 1880s Paterson was clotted with both large and small 
producers. 
1 Wyckoff American Silk Manufacture p. 47. 
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During the early decades of silk manufacturing, entry 
into the industry was relatively simple. So great was the 
need for experience that anyone with a thorough knowledge of 
the trade and a little capital stood a chance of fulfilling 
the "rags to riches" dream. 
l More likely, anyone with a 
background in silk production would find financial backing 
as had John Hyle, the pioneer of the Paterson silk industry. 
Immigrant manufacturers from Europe were another important 
source of new entrants and long after the arrival of major 
European producers newcomers continued to open up small plants. 
A major reason for the ease and frequency with which new 
producers sprang up was the financial arrangement of the industry. 
Although major silk weaving businesses were financially 
independent - either as limited liability companies, or more 
commonly, through their owners ploughing back profits - many 
of the smaller producers were heavily dependent upon external 
credit. Silk merchants, either as importers of raw silk or 
selling houses for finished products, were an important source 
of finance for manufacturing establishments. Builders of silk 
machinery sometimes performed a similar function. For both, 
credit extension was a means to a limited end; to sell goods 
or to procure finished silks. So reliant were many smaller 
manufacturers upon silk merchants that the slightest depression 
1Dry Goods Bulletin pp. 39,46,48,49. 
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in trade prospects and tightening of credit could send many 
to the wall. A trade journal, in praising New York's bene- 
volent commission houses during the bleak winter of 1890, 
revealed the basis of the relationship between merchant and 
small manufacturer: 
"It is pleasant to note the fact that during the 
pendency of what has certainly been a sort of crisis 
in domestic. silk circles the commission merchants 
and dealers in raw material have dealt most tenderly 
with the lambs of the industry who, instead of having 
been shorn by their creditors, have had the cold 
wind of adversity tempered to them very kindly.... 
(we) heartily congratulate all concerned on the 
adoption by New York silk merchants of so lenient 
and liberal a policy, which... has saved many'a 
struggling manufacturer from the odium of failure 
and the bankruptcy court". 1 
Such an arrangement scarcely seems to have advanced 
much beyond that prevalent in the early European handicraft 
industry. Certainly it appeared primitive to the industry's 
larger manufacturers who complained bitterly of the credit 
facility that enabled new manufacturers to spring up almost 
at random. Pilloried as "guerilla manufacturers" whose 
"... proper vocation is driving mules, shoving a plane or, at 
the very utmost, running a loom", the newcomers were the bane 
of the larger producers. 
2 Petty manufacturers were denounced 
for lowering the quality of American silks and thus ruining 
the hard-earned reputation of the industry's pioneers. More 
trenchant was the objection to their glutting the market with 
1American Silk Journal March 1890. 
2 American Silk Journal October 1890. 
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cheap goods. 
I "The American manufacturer gained his market 
in the face of bitter protest only because he was jealous of 
the reputation of his goods and was ever mindful of the 
quality that bore his trade-mark", a manufacturer announced 
to members of the Silk Association of America in 1899. "In 
the fierce struggle of present trade conditions", he continued, 
"the temptation is indeed strong to act upon not 'how good? ' 
but 'how cheap? ', let it not be forgotten that public confidence 
once lost is hard, to regain". His answer to the problem of 
intense competition and declining quality of product was 
simple: "Let an effort be made to bring back conditions to a 
more normal basis so that the raw silk dealer, the manufacturer 
and the retailer each take upon himself his own risks and 
responsibilities and not call upon the other to do so". 
2 
The plethora of small and marginal producers took little 
notice of such pleas. Over-production and a, cönsequent decline 
in silk prices characterized the industry in the late 1880s 
and 1890s. A leading trade journal explained: 
"This... is not done by experienced and business- 
like manufacturers, who may be counted upon to trim 
their sales to correspond with wind and tide, but 
by a certain class of men who should never have 
entered the business at all. This class is composed 
of ex-butchers, ex-grocers, and ex almost every other 
conceivable calling who, without any qualification 
or fitness, have been induced to tackle silk through 
'ibid. March, May 1890. Textile America November 30 1898. 
2Silk 
Association of America, Twenty Seventh Annual Report 
1899 (N. Y. n. d. ) p. 31. 
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a mistaken idea that there were 'millions in it' - 
for them; also of ex-employees in silk mills who, 
. while 
they might know something about operating 
a loom... are utterly ignorant of the condition 
of the market and of the commercial side of the 
business generally. " 
These petty producers had not the resources to limit production 
until prices revived. Bound by tight credit arrangements 
they could only produce more, whatever the market. 
"Many of these beginners have little or no capital, 
but start looms. purchased on credit, and continue 
on advances made by the commission merchants on 
the produce as delivered, or in advance of delivery. 
Manufacturers thus circumstanced are compelled to 
go on; they have no choice in the matter". 1 
Added to the problem of over-production were periodic 
declines in the market for silk goods. A luxury industry, 
silk was hit hard during economic depressions. Although the 
emergent industry combatted the depression of the 1870s, 
during the late 1880s and again in the 1890s hard times brought 
many silk mills to a standstill. 
2 Although a few lonely - 
voices called for the development of an export trade to 
stimulate production their words fell on deaf ears. 
3 So heavily 
protected were American silk products that competition for 
markets abroad was almost unthinkable. Yet singularly dependent 
upon consumption at home, the industry paid heavily during 
downturns in the American economy. 
1American Silk Journal October 1890. 
2Paterson 
Daily Guardian December 4,9,15 and 16 1893, 
NJ1S Seventeenth Annual Report 1894 pp. 24-31. 
3Textile 
America November 30 1898. 
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Seasonal changes in fashion could have almost as 
devastating an effect on demand for silk products. "The 
whims of fashion can no more be controlled than they'can be 
understood", silk manufacturers lamented during a dull season 
at the turn of the century. 
' A decade later the problem 
remained. Despite trade organizations urging the silk 
manufacturer to "study the condition of the selling market" 
and not rely on "his commission house or selling agents whose 
interests do not always correspond with his own", manufacturers 
developed little in the way of marketing that may have influenced 
trends in fashion. 
2 Instead they lived in hope of a return to 
fashions that would require their. product in abundance. "The 
trade has been hoping for a number of seasons past that the 
era of wide skirts and full sleeves would again give opportunity 
for the disposal of larger quantities of merchandise", a 
spokesman declared in 1911.3 His hopes were fulfilled a few 
years later. The "... introduction of the tango and other 
South American dances has had somewhat of a stimulative effect 
upon the silk industry", the Silk'Association of America 
commented, "by reason of the great number of dancing gowns 
required, not only by women of fashionable society, but also 
by women of moderate means, who dine out much more than 
1Silk Association of America Twenty Eighth Annual Report 1900 
P-38. 
Silk Association of America Twenty Ninth Annual Report 1901 
p. 56, Ind. Comm. 1900 XIV PP- 674-675- 
3 Silk Association of America Thirty Ninth Annual Report 1911 
p. 21. 
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formerly". 1 Not all manufacturers were as passive as this 
in awaiting solutions to their problems. As early as the 
1880s'some had begun to take positive steps to overcome the 
industry's difficulties. 
A crisis in the silk industry was commonly admitted by 
American manufacturers. Its recognition prompted a variety of 
responses which can loosely. be termed a "movement" to rationalize 
the industry. Two major tendencies were readily apparent, both 
re-enforcing each other. One was to achieve some measure of 
amalgamation, by which larger producers could take over small, 
marginal manufacturers, or, at least, guarantee limits to 
output whilst upholding the quality and price of American silks. 
Amalgamation, it was hoped, would end ruinous competition 
whilst preserving native competitiveness against foreign imports. 
In like fashion silk manufacturers pressed for cuts in production 
costs. By cost reductions producers could hope to resist 
falling prices whilst further diminishing the competitiveness 
of foreign silks. Cost reductions were only likely through 
integrating productive processes and achieving economies of 
scale, or by technological innovations in the techniques of 
manufacture. In turn, both were likely it was hoped to spur 
the movement towards amalgamation. Economies of scale would 
only be possible through combination. Moreover it was likely 
1Silk Association of America Forty Second Annual Report 1914 
p. 15. 
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that the investment required for innovations in production 
techniques could only be afforded by the larger silk concerns. 
The small unable to compete would be driven from the field. 
Trusts and combinations were being formed throughout 
American industry in the late nineteenth century. It is hardly 
surprising that silk manufacturers were touched by the example 
of America's oil and steel barons. Testifying before the U. S. 
Industrial Commission in 1900, Charles F. Homer, treasurer of 
the Silk Association of America, praised the tendency towards 
amalgamation in the industry and the integration of production 
processes within individual companies. "Many of the manufac- 
turers take a bale of silk today in the raw and turn it back 
upon the market a finished product in all its details", he 
proudly announced. 
1 It was an excellent public relations 
performance, perhaps. Yet there was little substantive evidence 
to support Homer's claims. His remarks were, based more upon.. 
wishful thinking than any boastful self-satisfaction shared by 
the industry's leading figures. 
The desire for amalgamation and cost reductions were at best 
tendencies. Unity amongst silk manufacturers was never suffi- 
cient to give such ideas the force or direction of a concerted 
drive to effect a major rationalization of the industry. No 
single producer or group of producers emerged to dominate the 
1Ind. Comm. 1900 XIV p. 700. 
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industry. Indeed the industry's expansion was featured by a 
commensurate increase in individual manufacturers. The Silk 
Association of America, the principal trade organization, 
expounded the virtues of amalgamation, but could achieve little 
materially to forge unity amongst manufacturers. Its membership, 
whilst including leading manufacturers, was also composed of 
raw silk merchants, commission and retail houses - the very 
source of credit for the industry's marginal producers. 
I 
During the closing decade of the nineteenth century attempts 
were made to achieve measures of unity amongst manufacturers. 
They remained the individualized and sporadic efforts of small 
groups of men, however. In April 1892 the American Silk Journal 
reported a desire to "combine" in the silk throwing trade. The 
object was to "gain control with a view to elevate prices", a 
measure which would ensure "great economies at every turn" and 
result in "uniform prices" throughout the industry. 
2 The out- 
come of this particular venture is unknown, but it probably 
accomplished little of lasting importance. Eleven years later 
a syndicate of leading Paterson manufacturers combined to 
purchase an extensive throwing plant in Pennsylvania with a view 
to ending their reliance on commission merchants for thrown 
silk. 
3 In the dyeing industry the desire for combination found 
expression with the Silk Dyers' Association of America, formed 
'See for example the membership rolls for the Twenty Ninth 
Annual Report of the Silk Association of America 1901 
(N. Y. 1901) and the Forty Second Annual Report 1914 
(N. Y. 1915)- 
2 American Silk Journal April 1892. 
3NJBS Twenty Sixth Annual Report 1903 p"596. 
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in 1898. The association's aim, to standardize prices, met 
with little success. Within a year of its foundation, the 
organization had disbanded. By the time a dyers' association 
was revived in 1913 it had forsaken attempts at price regulation. 
Recognition of past failures at regulation, doubtlessly tempered 
by anxiety to ameliorate popular opposition to trusts, resulted 
in a clause forbidding price-fixing being written into the 
association's bye-laws. 
l 
Although by 1900 the Silk Association of America was still 
urging: "... all unite to save the ship, instead of each 
concentrating his efforts in a wild panic to save his own life", 
in the very same year testimony of manufacturers at the U. S. 
Industrial Commission's hearing revealed the hollowness of such 
exhortations. Although they recognized the fact that ruinous-- 
competition plagued the industry they were equally frank in 
admitting a silk trust was near inconceivable. Manufacturer 
could not even agree upon a rudimentary arrangement for fixing 
prices. 
2 Jacob Weidmann, Paterson's leading silk dyer lamented: 
"... one manufacturer is an Englishman, the next a German, the 
next a Swiss and the next French. They are all jealous 
competitors and so you can never harmonize when the thing comes 
up". 
3 The fear of competition and price-cutting was so imprinted 
1Ileusser History of the Silk Dyeing Industry PP-548-551- 
2 Ind. Comm. 1900 XIV p. 692. 
3ibid. 
p. 706. 
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on the minds of silk manufacturers that even a recognition of 
the advantages of large-scale production in lowering costs was 
ignored. Extensive capital investment was shunned; there was 
even a reluctance to build up stocks unless an immediate outlet 
was available. Instead small scale production predominated. 
l 
In 1909, of almost three hundred manufacturers in Paterson, 
twenty nine employed between one and five-people, one hundred 
and two employed between six and twenty hands, and seventy four 
employed between twenty one and fifty people. 
2 
Reducing production costs accompanied the desire for 
combination but assumed a special emphasis after the failure of 
the latter. In Paterson this emphasis was of particular sig- 
nificance. Silk City was the home and by far the most important 
manufacturing centre of the industry. Because of this concen- 
tration the drive for cost reductions was felt more forcefully 
here than anywhere else. More importantly the special problems 
of Paterson's millowners confronted by an ill-disciplined work- 
force and an uncooperative local government, gave their drive 
for economies a thrust and urgency particular to the city. 
Reducing costs, particularly labor costs, had always been 
prominent in millowners' thinking. The American silk industry 
had been founded upon U. S. producers' ability, through technical 
efficiency, to compete with the lower labor costs of European 
1ibid. 
p. 731. 
2Thirteenth Census of U. S. 1910 IX p. 753" 
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manufacturers. Factory organization and the power loom had 
formed the basis of this efficiency. Adaption to the latest 
innovations in production processes became the hallmark of the 
American industry. Yet almost from the outset American mill- 
owners, and particularly those in Paterson, faced considerable 
stumbling blocks to their drive for technological advance, not 
least from an intransigent workforce and an uncooperative local 
administration. As early as 1873 British consuls in the United 
States, reporting on the development of textile manufacture 
abroad, were singling out Paterson millhands for their militancy. 
1 
Throughout the 1870s and 1880s Paterson millowners found that 
the introduction of new production techniques brought hostile 
reactions from their workers, who more often than not gained 
widespread support throughout the city. Both the widespread 
introduction of automatic looms in the 1870s, and again the 
two-loom system in the early 1880s, provoked bitter industrial 
struggles. From an early date Paterson millowners would 
doubtlessly have liked to end their dependence upon their 
intransigent workers; but they found it impossible. Paterson 
had become the haven for Europe's emigrant silkworkers, and 
during the early years of the industry silk technology was not 
so advanced as to make redundant the expertise of skilled hands. 
In this sense millowners' emphasis on continuous technological 
'"Reports 
of Her Majesty's Secretaries of Embassy and 
Legation respecting Factories for the Spinning and Weaving 
of Textile Fabrics Abroad" Parl. Papers 1873 LXVIII 
Cmd. 826. p. 784. 
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progress was a double-edged weapon. Not only was it essential 
to the continued competitiveness of the industry, but hopefully 
would also end the days when the "... business of the mill... 
was at the mercy of its operatives". 
1 
The 1880s was a crucial decade in the development of the 
industry, and the unfolding of manufacturers' intentions. For 
the first time technical innovations greatly increased the 
employment of unskilled and semi-skilled labor in key branches 
of the industry. Improvements in the throwing of silk was 
one crucial area. The speed of spindles was vastly increased, 
and many tasks involved in the throwing of silk almost fully 
mechanized. By the 1890s the spinning, doubling and twisting 
of silk had become virtually one process. Improvements in the 
weaving of silk paralleled innovations in the preparation of 
silk for the loom. The mechanization of broad looms was further 
refined, and after 1889 the automatic ribbon. loom was intro- 
duced. Both the preparation, and to a lesser extent, the 
weaving of silk could now be carried out by a labor force 
requiring not so much skill and experience as the discipline 
essential to machine tending. 
The task of introducing new work processes met with virulent 
opposition from Paterson's workers. In itself this was hardly 
remarkable; indeed, quite natural. 
1Wyckoff The Silk Goods of America p. 29. 
2Tgelfth Census of the U. S. 1900 IX pp. 222-225, Eleventh 
Census of the U. S. 1890 p. 219-222, vol. 13, Clark History 
of Manufactures pp. 53,212-213- 
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The problem was, however, further complicated by the 
particular relationship of mill owners to local government. 
Relations between the two were ultimately very important in 
shaping the form of technological change. Not only had the 
city administration traditionally opposed manufacturers by 
supporting the city's workers in industrial disputes, but more 
generally, and in various forms, it displayed a marked reluc- 
tance to further the interests of millowners or succumb to their 
demands. By the mid-1880s. Paterson ceased. to look the attrac- 
tive site for locating or extending business that it. had 
appeared twenty, or even ten years earlier. The response of 
many millowners was, wherever possible, to simply remove their 
plants elsewhere, to more amenable localities. During this 
decade a slow but steady exodus began, as local manufacturers 
opened up "annexes" in Pennsylvania or the South. 
Although the importance of local government in influencing 
the growth of annexes can hardly be divorced from the primary 
drive for reductions in labor costs, the former was frequently 
used by Paterson manufacturers as a reason for their flight 
from the city. It would seem that the weight of manufacturers' 
invective should have been directed, if at all, against the 
state rather than the local administration. By the 1880s the 
influence of the New Jersey Federation of Trade Unions had 
resulted in the passage of a considerable body of labor 
legislation, much of it irksome to silk manufacturers. A 
factory inspectorate was established, children and women's labor 
regulated, employees' health and safety provisions enacted 
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amongst other things. Yet surprisingly state regulation of 
industrial conditions figured little in Paterson manufacturers' 
reasons for leaving New Jersey. Admittedly the passage of the 
Fifty Five Hour Law in 1892, limiting the working week, was 
viewed as'a severe blow to the state's manufacturing interests. 
The American Silk Journal commented upon its enactment: "The 
fact is that many elements - including the Labor and Legislative 
and the municipal - seem to conspire to drive the silk and 
some other important industries from the State... "1 The 
absence of similar legislation in other states was increasingly 
used by silk manufacturers as a justification for annexes, and 
more importantly for wage cuts and the introduction of labor- 
saving machinery, locally. They were engaged in unequal 
competition, they claimed. 
2 Yet although state legislation, 
and particularly the limitation of the working week, added to 
the momentum of the exodus, it cannot be seen as a prime cause 
in the migration of local millowners. The annex movement 
originated before much of the state's industrial enactments had 
been introduced. Moreover the scant regard paid to it by silk 
manufacturers in justifying their movement suggests other 
concerns were foremost in their reasoning. 
Paterson's local administration was more frequently an 
object of attack by silk interests. Local antipathy to manu- 
facturing interests was contrasted with the attitudes of 
municipalities elsewhere. In the coalmining communities of 
Pennsylvania municipal officials actively encouraged the intro- 
1American Silk Journal July 11392, see also August 1892. 
2 c_ III pp. 2417,2430,2469. 
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duction and growth of industry. Here manufacturers could 
expect interest-free loans, rent-free sites, immunity from 
taxation and a position of considerable status in the local 
community. In Paterson, on the other hand, local officials 
were keen to bleed manufacturers through heavy taxation. Rents 
were high, municipal facilities poor and real estate values 
inflated. Most important, millowners saw little prospect for 
change. Working class influence on the local administration 
far outweighed that of manufacturing interests, denying mill- 
owners the special consideration they felt they deserved. 
During the early years of the movement of millowners to 
Pennsylvania, local boosters were keen to dismiss the growth 
of annexes as insignificant to the future prosperity of 
Paterson. Rumour, in the New York press, of an "exodus" of 
manufacturers was dismissed as an "absurd and unfounded statement". 
Although much of the throwing branch of the industry was now 
being carried on in Pennsylvania, Paterson suffered little 
competition in the weaving of silk. 
l Nevertheless in the course 
of the next year the opening of annexes continued, prompting, 
in turn, a series of meetings in the city to discuss the 
migration of manufacturers and the future of the city's 
dominant industry. The meetings revealed the depth of mill- 
owners' opposition to Paterson's municipal officers. Local 
millowners pointed to the attractions of Pennsylvania "... 
where the communities welcome them and facilitate in every way 
'Paterson Daily Guardian November 11 1885. 
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their establishment". Some municipalities were willing to 
erect mill buildings for prospective manufacturers, others 
offered low interest mortgages, low rents and the "lowest 
taxes possible". To these advantages, could be added cheap coal 
from the Pennsylvania mines and an abundance of cheap labor, 
more often than not the children and wives of miners. Now 
that the throwing branch of the industry required only unskilled 
supervision an annex in Pennsylvania was an alluring prospect 
for many Paterson manufacturers. 
Aside from the positive attractions of new locations, 
Paterson millowners were adamant in picturing themselves as 
the victims of local neglect and hostility, forced to flee the 
city. 'A particular injustice, they felt, was municipal 
taxation. Taxes, a manufacturer explained in 1885, "... are 
regarded by silk men of this city as most burdensome as well 
as unequally imposed... parties are exempted whd ought not to 
be and others on whose success the prosperity of the city 
largely depends are assessed at a rate that in many cases is 
both unjust and ruinous". 
1 There was some substance to manu- 
facturers' complaints, for not only were millowners taxed on 
real estate, but also on machinery within their plants, an 
issue they found particularly galling. Municipal revenues on 
machinery were non-existent in Pennsylvania and most other 
eastern states. Moreover within New Jersey large corporations, 
particularly railroad corporations and municipal franchise 
'Paterson Daily Guardian November 11 1885. 
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companies, were exempted from this "personal taxation". 
1 
Silk manufacturers' invective against the tax assessment 
is revealing, for again it was directed pre-eminently against 
the municipal authority. Although silk interests called for 
the state legislature to equalize the burden of taxation by 
revising the exemption of corporations, the weight of their 
opposition was directed against local officials. Millowners 
claimed that while property owners were frequently allowed to 
evade payment of the municipal assessment, they were expected 
to "manfully" bear the tax load. " "There is no equity shown, 
manufacturers are there only to be bled", a local silk 
manufacturer exploded, "... the city assessor seems to think 
manufacturers are only to be bled. Taxes are advanced yearly 
and when complaint is made to the proper authorities a hearing 
is virtually denied. We have tried again and again to have 
our assessment considered, but without avail'!. 
3 
In addition'to the odium of the city assessment on 
manufacturing plant, millowners pictured municipal officials as 
ravenous in their determination to wring every last penny from 
them. Assessments, manufacturers charged, "... are made with 
inexcusable carelessness, in the doorway of a mill often, 
without discretion, knowledge of the property or regard to 
1Textile America December 25 1897- 
2 Paterson Daily Guardian December 16 1886. 
3Textile America October 16 1897" 
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representations made, on the basis largely of the assessments 
of the previous year. Thus no account is taken of the deprecia- 
tion through wear and tear, and a manufacturer is often com- 
pelled to pay taxes on machinery long after it has gone into 
the scrap heap". 
1 Presumably similar considerations prompted 
the "scrapping match" between millowner Bamford and a city 
tax assessor in June 1890. The local. press reported that: 
"While assessing mill property this forenoon a 
Tax Commissioner was villified by one of the 
Bamford brothers to such an extent that he lost 
his temper, and the mill owner now wears his eye 
in mourning. The Commissioners say that'they al-, 
ways have trouble at this establishment". 2 
All confrontations between silk interests and the municipal 
government did not degenerate into physical assault, but 
bitterness between the two continued throughout the closing 
decades of the nineteenth century. Silk manufacturers charged 
municipal officials with "unjust" taxation, and further claimed 
that incompetent handling of municipal funds was detracting" 
from the city's attraction as an industrial location. In 
particular manufacturers called for improvements in the city's 
transportation system, for asphalt roads paid for by taxing 
"property owners with one-half or two-thirds of the cost". 
Millowner Catholina Lambert voiced a prevalent discontent: 
"The streets of Paterson are poorer and dirtier than 
those of any other city of its size in the United 
States. They are generally constructed of 4 inch 
1Paterson 
Daily Guardian November 11 1885- 
2 
American Silk Journal July 1890. 
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macadam on a clay bottom and as a result the surface 
is ground by heavy traffic into a fine dust which 
the citizens have to live in and breathe. Because 
of this dust it is fast becoming impossible to make 
perfect light shades (of silk) in Paterson". 
Local officials agreed that "... we'might have better roads 
here", but were quick to remark that "... we should have to 
bond the city for them". And such a venture was far from 
guaranteed success for "... a great many property owners would 
use their influence to prevent such additional expense to 
them". 
Such instances indicate the conflicts of interest that 
could exist between manufacturers and the population at large 
in industrial cities, such as Paterson. Many manufacturers 
viewed these problems as intimately connected with the politics 
of municipal administration. Local government, they contended, 
was not only prepared to tax manufacturers into oblivion, but 
municipal revenues were a source of graft for. perpetuating 
the political machine rather than the basis for improving the 
city and encouraging industrial growth. "As to taxation", one 
silk manufacturer grumbled, "I can only say that if the proper 
kind of men were elected as Aldermen Paterson could be governed 
much more economically and the present tax rate would be 
materially reduced". 
1 
Though attacks on local government resounded, the growth 
of the annex movement cannot be primarily attributed to this 
1All 
quotes from Textile America October 16 1897. 
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source of manufacturers' discontent. The magnet of cheaper 
land, loans and buildings, of lower taxes and a pliable 
municipal administration pales under scrutiny. For all figured 
as relatively minor elements in silk manufacturers' costs. 
Table 8 indicates that throughout the period 1890-1910 (the 
heyday of the growth of annexes) the vast bulk of manufac- 
turers' capital was invested in buildings and machinery, or 
tied up in purchases of raw materials and stock in hand. 
Although fuel and rent were appreciably cheaper in Pennsylvania, 
both were relatively insignificant in relation to overall 
operating costs. Moreover taxation, the bane of Paterson mill- 
owners, did not contribute much to costs either. 
1 Far and 
away the biggest single difference in costs between Paterson 
and Pennsylvania was wages. In 1890 wages paid to Pennsylvania 
millhands were a'. ppreciably lower than those in Paterson. 
Moreover this disparity did not alter appreciably prior to 
World War One. In 1910 when the workforce had grown to almost 
double that. of Paterson the wage bill of Pennsylvania's 
millowners was scarcely more than thirty per cent higher than 
that of their New Jersey brethren. "The labor was cheaper 
than Paterson labor at the time", a silk manufacturer explained 
1Taxation is classified in'the census under "Miscel- 
laneous Expenses". Although these rose appreciably during 
the period this was due to a census reclassification, 
rather than any dramatic increase in revenue. In 1910, 
for example, taxation amounted to less than %100,000 
of Paterson manufacturers' miscellaneous expenses. 
Thirteenth Census of U. S. 1910 IX p. 783. 
c 
Table 8 
No. Lstabs. CAPITAL Misc. Exps. Employees 
Total Value Land Value Live No. Value 
& Bldgs. Nchr_. Assets Wages 
Cost of Materials Used 
Value of Products 
Haw Silk + Fuel Tff"t Other 
Princin. Mats. 
1890 12,536,000 Paterson 90 12,533,000 1,507,000 3,546,000 7,479,000 891,000 11,596 5,021,000 11,806 000 Pennsylvania 66 9,362,000 1,462,000 2,941,000 4,957,000 939,051 9,522 , 2,981,000 ' 
1900 
Paterson 136 19,025,000 2,367,000 5,086,000 
11 
11,571,000 2,946,000 16,704 
13,944,000 
7,026,000 19,710,000 
Pennsylvania 121 20,894,000 4,179,000 6,696,000 10,017,000 2,451,000 21,904 5,347,000 
1910 
276 26 446,000 6,832,000 20,099 
1205,000 19,205,000 
10,32 26,000 34,669 000 Pennsylvania 226 49,679,000 
_f 
I 6072,000 38,178 , 13,573,000 
Source: 1890 Census XII pp. 426-9, XIII pp. 211-212 1900 Census VIII pp. 570-1,768-9, 
1910 Census IX pp. 782-3,1100-1101. 
81,000 32,000 107,000 
11 22,058,000 
63,000 9,000 214,000 19,357,000 
61,000 26,006,000 
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in a review of the Pennsylvania silk industry. "It was more 
reliable labor, and it was less liable to labor troubles, 
which are incident to Paterson", he contended. 
I 
The "cheapness" of labor was inextricable from the problem 
of "labor troubles". In Pennsylvania, as the table suggests, ' 
silk manufacturers were prepared to invest in now plant and 
machinery, assured that the workforce was unlikely to resist 
technological change, on the same scale as in Paterson. As a 
result the annex industry boomed. By 1910 investment in 
Pennsylvania was almost double that in the New Jersey city. 
In terms of raw materials consumed, workers employed and value 
of products, the Pennsylvania annexes far outstripped Paterson 
mills. 
Although the Pennsylvania industry was pictured by 
contemporaries as in direct competition with Paterson mills, 
there are two important correctives to this view, both essential 
to understanding the centrality of the labor question in the 
rise of annexes. Annexes were founded primarily as centres 
for the silk throwing branch of the industry, and as such 
offered little serious competition to Paterson. Much of the 
Paterson throwing trade was farmed out on commission to small 
specialised concerns, or was conducted by the larger firms as 
a separate operation from the weaving of silk. When the 
advantages of Pennsylvania locations became evident the smaller 
firms either moved west or struggled on in Paterson. The 
1Ind. Comm. 1900 XIV p. 703. 
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larger concerns simply shut down their throwing departments in 
New Jersey and opened up annexes. 
Initially the movement was viewed with little concern 
by Paterson residents. Paterson will become "a city of looms 
and not of spindles.... the day is not far distant when no silk 
will be thrown in Paterson" the American Silk Journal predicted 
in 1890. Yet as long as the New Jersey industry continued to 
expand Paterson prospects seemed assured, for "... looms (are) 
taking the place in this city of the places made vacant by 
the removal of spinning machinery". 
1 
Only with the development 
of weaving in the Pennsylvania mills, during the . 1890s and 
increasingly in the twentieth century, did the spectre of 
competition appear more ominous. Even then weaving in 
Pennsylvania was restricted, for only in Paterson could be 
found the'skilled weavers essential to the production of fancy 
and high quality silks. Nevertheless, as the weaving of staple 
products, both broad silks and ribbons, was developed in the 
annexes, it was increasingly affecting Paterson. 
Ownership of annexes_by Paterson manufacturers further 
reduced the extent and effects of competition from the silk 
annexes. By the turn of the century most large concerns in 
the New Jersey city had expanded into Pennsylvania or the South. 
Only the smaller concerns, unable or unwilling to move, felt 
the full weight of competition. It was Paterson's millhands 
1American 
Silk Journal May 1890. 
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and municipal officials, not local manufacturers, who suffered 
most acutely from annex competition. It was they who were 
continually pressed to accept the dictates of millowners if 
they wished to preserve their jobs and the city's future as a 
manufacturing centre. 
Dual ownership, rather than competition, was the key 
feature in manufacturers' drive for reducing labor costs. It 
was admitted by Franklin Allen, secretary of the Silk Association 
of America. The "labor element" in Paterson had forced mill- 
owners to seek new locations. "D1ost of these gentlemen who 
have their establishments in Paterson have established these 
branches in these other States", he continued, "for the sake 
of being free of this everlasting labor question which in 
Paterson dominates the situation". He was equally frank in 
recognizing the motive behind re-location: "... the evident 
purpose being to diversify it so that labor tröubles in one 
place will not control the whole industry". 
1 
Much as millowners might gibe at hostile local officials, 
their invective was essentially a veil for a more concerted 
drive to reduce labor costs. As early as 1886 local businessmen 
had attacked millowners for using this ploy. Mr John J. Brown 
"did not think this condition was the result of. taxes... it 
was nothing more than a search for cheap labor". A Paterson 
1Ind. Comm. 1900 XIV p. 680. 
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real estate dealer echoed the sentiment - "cheaper labor... 
was all there was in it". An argument ensued - "in a red hot 
manner" - between the same gentleman and millowner William 
Strange, "... the former claiming that the whole thing was 
merely an effort on the part of the manufacturers to secure 
cheaper labor". Strange, vexed and plainly ill at ease, was 
eventually to admit the primacy of the wages issue. "Either 
the wages in Paterson must come down or those in other places 
go up", he blurted, "for otherwise the Paterson manufacturers 
could not compete with the others". 
1 
In admitting this much Strange indicated that the basis 
of the attack on municipal government was its relation to the 
question of cheaper labor; in. particular local officials' 
support of silkworkers in industrial disputes. Lack of co- 
operation from city authorities in enforcing millowners' 
dictates was "... the fountain source of the evil which threatens 
Paterson's supremacy as a manufacturing center", Strange 
contended: 
"Time and time again have the operatives of our 
mills, satisfied with their wages and treatment, been 
intimidated and compelled to abandon their employ- 
ment by unchecked mob violence; and I am convinced 
that many, if not all, of the serious disturbances 
which have taken place in our midst in the past, 
could have been prevented had the proper authorities 
taken the necessary precaution in the incipient stages 
of the trouble". 2 
1Paterson 




America October 23 1897. ' 
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His vehemence was amplified by other millowners. To them 
the ability of their workers to resist pressure on their 
living standards was intimately related to Paterson's local 
administration. The "... apathy of the city government in 
encouraging her industries and the sleepless agitation of 
the labor element", had resulted in Paterson's eclipse as 
the centre of the silk industry. 
l 
The growth of the annex industry during the period 1890-1910 
was marked by reliance upon the predominantly indigenous labor 
of. the Pennsylvania coalmining regions. It was, in the main, 
women and child operatives, often the kin of miners. They 
were employed in the more technologically advanced branches 
of the industry - throwing and automated weaving - as a semi- 
skilled workforce, and at substantially lower rates of pay 
than Paterson's millhands. 
2 Native labor was a distinct 
advantage for manufacturers in Pennsylvania, claimed one spokes- 
man for the industry. While reluctant to admit that workers 
in the silk annexes were more easily controlled and adapted to 
new forms of production, he indicated as much. "The improve- 
ment in machinery has made`it*so that domestic help is taken 
in preference to the foreign", he stressed. "They are more 
1American Silk Journal April 1902. 
2For 
a comparison of Pennsylvania and Paterson wage rates 
see U. S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics 
Bulletin 175: Summary of the Report on the Condition of 
Woman and Child Wage Larners in the United States 
(Washington, 
, 
191 pp. 19 -197" 
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active and have more push". 
1 If activity and "push" indicated 
a willingness to accept wages and conditions rejected by 
Paterson workers, there was some substance to the claim. For 
in the New Jersey city, even after the spectre of annex 
competition loomed large, "... the same spirit of unrest exists 
as it ever did, because in Paterson there is a conglomeration 
of all nationalities of the earth, including the Turk and the 
Assyrian, the Italian, mixtures of Americans, Germans and 
everything else -a mixture of anarchy and everything else". 
' 2 
Not aversion to new machinery and new work routines, but 
immigrant waywardness was portrayed as the chief source of 
disputes in New Jersey. Here the ethnic ties of Paterson mill- 
hands - "a feeling of self-preservation", which, "brings 
together the laborers of the same nationality" - "... has misled 
them... into demonstrations very much against their own interests". 
3 
Though silk manufacturers were adamant that the peculiar 
truculence of Paterson workers spurred the relocation of the 
industry, they soon confronted familiar labor problems in 
the annexes too. To train and discipline Pennsylvania workers 
was a formidable undertaking, for they were in large part 
unaccustomed to factory discipline. "Children of the soil, 
berry-pickers and herdsmen, street arabs and rough-handed 
1Ind. Comm. 1900 XIV p. 693- 
2 ibid. p. 703. 
3ibid. 
p. 676. 
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mechanics had to be educated to handle the most delicate 
material known", a Paterson annex-owner admitted. 
l The task 
was not easily or quickly accomplished. As in Paterson, pre- 
industrial habits and traditions died hard amongst Pennsylvania 
millhands. "These are pronounced the most unsatisfactory 
hands possible", an observer remarked, "not that they do not 
learn readily enough, but because they refuse to work more 
than a part of the year, and they can be depended upon to 
refuse to work at the very time when they are most needed". 
2 
So formidable was the labor problem in some "country" mills 
that manufacturers commissioned a locomotive to travel daily 
up and down neighbouring valleys, shuttling workers to and 
from the factory. 3 
Typically stringent disciplinary measures appeared within 
the rural mills. And as in. Paterson millowners looked to 
women and children as the source of labor most readily adapt- 
able to factory work. In some cases negro labor was sought, 
with the same purpose in mind. At a mill in Fayatteville, 
North Carolina, negroes were required to sign "contracts" 
entrusting their children to the superintendent, to work and 
discipline as he saw fit. Reports claimed that the whipping 
of workers was not unusual in such an environment - "... poor 
negroes are lashed by their foreman as in the days of slavery", 
J. P. McDonnell observed. 
4 
'Textile 
America October 30 1897- 
2 Textile America September 30 1898. 
31nd. 
Comm. 1900 VII p. 224. 
4American 
Silk Journal January 1901, National Labor Standard 
January 24 1903. 
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If workers in Pennsylvania were less shackled their 
adjustment to mill life was far from smooth. Nillowners 
complained that the "... rough and clumsy fingers of the 
unskilled farm boys and girls" resulted in much "costly 
material wasted". 
1 Absenteeism was a problem, even during 
working hours. "Time work" was introduced in many Pennsylvania 
mills as a result. It became a persistent source of discord 
between millowners and their workers, featuring prominently 
in strike demands of. Pennsylvania silkworkers in 1901. Other 
grievances in the 1901 strike reflect similar tensions stemming 
from millowners' disciplinary measures. Ailing millhands 
resented having to seek permission for absences from the work- 
place. Weavers on "piece rates" demanded the right to measure 
their own yardage of woven silk, because wastages attributed 
to them by mill superintendants were subtracted from the yardage 
they were paid for. 
2 Fines for poor work, or in this case, 
reductions in pay over disputed output, were a common means of 
disciplining uncooperative workers. Most disconcerting of all 
to millowners, annex workers began to display collective resis- 
tance to the dictates of the factory. In 1901 Pennsylvania 
silkworkers struck, led by the indefatigable Mother Jones, 
organizer for the mineworkers' union. 
3 
Again in 1913, during 
the famous Paterson strike, annex workers stopped work. 
Millowners attributed the truculence of Pennsylvania millhands 
1American Silk Journal January 1901. 
2ibid. June 1901. 
3American 
Silk Journal January 1907" 
'. 
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to the disruptive influence of miners' union organizers, and 
to agitators from Paterson who brought "contagious diseases - 
labor measles". 
1 Nevertheless, the evolving pattern of 
industrial relations was ominously similar to that in the 
New Jersey city. 
The problem of training and disciplining a new workforce 
to man the annexes was undoubtedly a major reason for Paterson's 
continued importance as a silk producing centre. Despite its 
slower rate of expansion, Paterson's industry continued to 
grow (Table 8). Local officials, and even silkworkers, were 
prompt to indicate the advantages of the New Jersey city. 
Their arguments all emphasized the local workforce of skilled 
millhands. A workingmen's journal put it thus: 
"Manufacturers who tried the experiment of running 
a portion of their business at a point distant from 
the parent establishment discovered long ago that 
the movement was not altogether successful. Among 
the disadvantages are the loss of time and waste of 
silk incident upon instructing green hands; the 
delay and inconveniences of transportation; the 
uncertainty of communication at times when it is 
of utmost importance that orders be received and 
delivery made with promptitude; the lack of facilities 
for dyeing and finishing, and the greater difficulty 
in procuring parts of machinery in cases of break- 
down, as well as obtaining the thousand-and-one 
things in the way of mill supplies that are constantly 
needed and cannot always be provided in advance.... 
In case of a sudden emergency arising there is no 
surplus of skilled labor to call upon at the annexes, 
and this in itself is a serious drawback, since, it 
is conceded, the American manufacturer more frequently 
realizes a good profit on some speciality that "catches 
on" to the popular fancy, and has a brief run and 
then gives place to some other novelty, than in 
another way". 2 
Paterson mills came increasingly, although not exclusively, 
1Ind. Comm. "' 1900 XIV-'pp . 680-681. _,. 
'.. w.:: 
2United Silk Workers of America, Herald of the United 
Silk Workers (Paterson, n. d. 1892? ) n. p. 
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to concentrate production on weaving high grade, "specialized" 
silks, for which skilled hands were indispensable. A local 
labor activist displayed a rare note of contempt for annex 
operatives in emphasizing the superiority"of Paterson's 
skilled workers. "Skilled workers here prefer to manipulate 
the soft or prepared silk", he contended, "any inexperienced 
hand can manipulate the hard or raw. Besides in three months 
a Pennsylvania Dutch girl gains as much knowledge of the silk 
business as her head will hold, while the Paterson girl has 
snap and go and will have ambition to perfect her work con- 
tinually; she is still learning after being three years a 
silk worker". 
1 Millowners discovered that low wages and free- 
dom from strikes did not always offset the disadvantages'of 
an inexperienced and ill-disciplined workforce. 
Generations of silkworkers in Paterson, whose roots often 
stretched back to the pre-mechanized industry of Europe, ensured 
the city would remain an important manufacturing center. As 
late as 1919 a Paterson millowner admitted: 
"The hands of a silk worker are one of his most 
important assets. Take a man from the fields of 
Siberia, from the plains of Austria, from Southern 
Italy, or from a farm in the United States or Sweden 
.... and it is a different matter to make a silk 
worker of that man, a very different matter, from 
taking men who have been brought up in countries 
where silk is produced, where the very habits and 
occupations have developed the technique and the 
kind of hand that makes a silk worker. A man with 
clumsy awkward hands handling silk warp is a very 
different factor from the man whose grandfather 
before him handled the silk fabric". 2 
1Textile 
America October 30 1897. 
`National Industrial. Conference Board Hours of Work as 
Related to Output and Health of Workers; Silk Manufacturing 
Boston, 1919) p. 21. 
- 171 - 
Sam Sherwood, Paterson real-estate agent and chairman of 
the State Board of Arbitration, confirmed the same in 
conversations with the city's manufacturers. "The experience 
which manufacturers have had who have removed from Paterson", 
Sherwood reported, "is sufficient to teach others the truth 
of the fact that manufacturing can be carried on successfully 
only where there is plenty of skilled labor". lie continued: 
"Only a short time ago I was talking to a well known 
Paterson manufacturer who has several annexes in 
country districts and he told nie that the waste of 
material and the loss entailed by the low rate of 
speed at which machinery had to be run more than 
counterbalanced the profit made by his firm in 
consequence of lower wages". 1 
For millowners who continued production of medium-grade 
silks in Paterson the disadvantages of annexes were not so 
readily apparent. While manufacturers of fancy silks suffered 
little direct competition from Pennsylvania mills, the same 
was not true in the range of staple goods that constituted the 
bulk of the American market. Here, Paterson millowners lived 
in the shadow of their competitors with annexes. Rivalry was 
fierce; survival, at times, appeared desperate. "The manufac- 
turer who runs his mill at a loss", was apparently not unique 
in Paterson, one observer remarked. Ile "... does so in the 
hope that time will bring about happier and more congenial 
conditions. With many manufacturers in Paterson this hope 
has been deferred and deferred until they are about ready to 
New Jersey State Board of Arbitration Annual Report of 
the State Board of Arbitration of New Jersey 1897 
Trenton, 1897) PP-15-16. 
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give up". 
1 Only by reducing production costs could such 
manufacturers continue in business. Technological innovation 
and more efficient production were the obvious methods of 
achieving cheaper production. But the obvious was rarely 
possible. Paterson's silkworkers resisted every move of their 
employers to introduce new production techniques or reduce 
rates of pay. The situation seemed one of deadlock. 
During the last decade of the nineteenth century and 
opening ten years of the new century local manufacturers 
sought two principal means of breaking that deadlock. Both 
were designed to undermine workers' resistance to their require- 
ments. On the one hand they sought new sources of labor; a 
workforce that might prove more amenable to reductions in costs. 
Further they were anxious to influence local government; in 
its traditional support for workingmen and in the hindrances 
it imposed upon manufacturing interests. Neither was an 
entirely new conception. Paterson's millowners had long been 
pre-occupied with labor problems. Now with the emergence of 
competition from cheaper labor areas, the future of manufacturing 
in the city seemed threatened. Millowners' concerns became 
closely identified with those of Paterson as a whole. In this 
atmosphere their recipes for change assumed a new substance. 
1Textile 
America December 18 1897. 
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Chapter Five 
NEW I alIGRANTS 
Immigrants provided the core of Paterson's labor force 
throughout the city's industrialization. Many were European 
textile workers whose skills and experience were an important 
component in the success of the silk industry. The immigrants' 
attitudes toward work, however, were less attractive to silk 
manufacturers. Notoriously wayward, immigrant hands proved 
fiercely resistant to the disruptions of their accustomed 
work patterns by Paterson's factories. Millowners frequently 
pictured immigrants as uncontrollable radicals whose employment 
was an unavoidable hazard. Nevertheless silk manufacturers 
continued to hire new immigrants to the city; and not without 
good reason. For millowners, "green" hands were a traditional, 
and often vital weapon in the struggle to discipline unco- 
operative workers. As cheap labor or as strikebreakers new 
arrivals could act as a check on the power of older established 
groups in the city's mills. 
Paterson's Italians appeared little different from their 
predecessors. The earliest arrivals were textile hands., some 
arriving at the express wish of silk manufacturers. Lilco 
earlier immigrants they were opposed by the city's silkworkers 
as cheap labor, enabling millowners to lower wages and intro- 
duce labor-saving machinery. In turn Italians soon displayed 
the hostility characteristic of earlier immigrants"to many 
features of factory life and were branded, lawless and uncon- 
trollable. Paterson manufacturers planned to use Italian 
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workers as a method of cutting costs and curbing an unruly 
workforce. But they quickly found their design rebounded 
upon them with a vengeance. As earlier, new immigrants were 
only a short term solution to millowners' problems. In the 
long run Italians simply swelled the ranks of ill-disciplined 
and uncooperative laborers. 
While the Italian community in Paterson shared in many 
of the attributes and experiences of earlier immigrants, it 
also developed new patterns owing to the unique economic and 
social climate of the 1890s. Italian immigration coincided 
with economic depression and the beginnings of two troubled 
decades for the city's silk industry. Gloomy forecasts of a 
city dependent upon a decaying industry mirrored the desperate 
conditions of these exotic and impoverished newcomers. 
Contemporaries did not see the connection between industrial 
decay and the swelling tide of immigration ass entirely for- 
tuitous. When Italians actively challenged the dictates of 
silk manufacturers they were vilified as "anarchists" and 
"subversives", hell-bent upon destroying the city's economic 
life-line. The existence of a small but dedicated group of 
Italian radicals seemed to confirm the worst doubts about the 
group as a'whole. In these circumstances older immigrant 
groups, anxious to preserve their status and livelihoods, 
joined the swelling chorus of opposition to Italian silkworkers. 
Peter Frank, an Italian who ran a small fruit store on 
Division St., Paterson in 1880, was an almost exotic figure. 
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With the assistance of his family, Frank probably made a 
comfortable living, supplying produce to silkworkers in his 
neighbourhood. Theodore Cappo, an Italian weaver who boarded 
with the family, supplemented Frank's income. But the fruiterer 
could hardly depend upon fellow countrymen for his patronage. 
Paterson's Italians amounted to fewer than a hundred persons 
in 1880. Scattered about the city, they didn't even form 
an identifiable community. Although Italian immigrants had 
multiplied more than tenfold by 1890, their presence was still 
minor compared to the sizeable immigrant populations from 
northern and western Europe. Not until the following decade did 
Italians emigrate en masse to Silk City. By the turn of the 
century almost six thousand Italians had settled there. Ten 
years later this number had grown to nearer fifteen thousand. 
They were now the largest foreign born group in the city. 
l 
Frank was characteristic of the Italians who drifted into 
Paterson during the 1870s. Although silkworkers came, so too 
did laborers, small businessmen such as Frank, hawkers, peddlers 
and drifters. In 1880 they included four fruit dealers, a 
"junk dealer", a peanut vendor, a handful of rag-pickers, a 
shoemaker, a saloon-keeper, a few general laborers and perhaps 
a dozen silkworkers. 
2 They were people who, on the whole, 
1Tenth Census of U. S. 1880, I pp. 546-551, Eleventh Census 
of U. S. 1890 XV pp. 70-673,710-711, Twelfth Census of 
U. S. 1900 I pp. 800-3,876-877, Thirteenth Census of U. S. 
1910 in p. 136. 
2Tenth 
Census of the U. S. 1880, "Manuscript Population; 
Schedules: volume 19, Passaic County, N. J. ".. 
t 
.,.. ,..,, 
,... . _. _, 
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had no specific reason for coming to Paterson. 'Many had 
probably moved on from New York. In New Jersey, they hoped, 
they would find work, an opportunity to prosper. But if luck 
did not smile on them they could move on again. Their 
coming and going, it seems, was hardly noticed by local 
observers. 
During the 1880s and increasingly in the ensuing decade 
the pattern of Italian immigration to the city changed 
dramatically. Not only did Paterson's Italian colony vastly 
increase, its basic characteristics altered. The origins of 
this new immigration were attributable to declining prospects 
in the homeland and greater opportunities for permanent 
migration. 
Migration was basic element of the economy of northern 
Italy during much of the nineteenth century. Tramping crafts- 
men and artisans formed part of a steady migration to and from 
France, Switzerland and southern Germany. Carpenters, 
building craftsmen, blacksmiths and textile workers all 
travelled regularly throughout the Alpine region, and beyond. 
Italian silkworkers shuttled back and forth between Lyons, 
St. Etienne and their homeland, some to practice acquired 
skills, others to learn new ones. They were supplemented by 
a seasonal traffic of harvest workers from northern Italy. 
1 
During the 1880s migration of a more, permanent character 
assumed an increasing importance. A crisis in Italian agri- 
culture forced many off the land. Moreover, a disease of the 
R. F. Foerster The Italian Emigration of Our Times 
(Harvard, 1919) pp" 129-188. 
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silk worm seriously retarded the growth of northern Italy's 
principal industry. Neighbouring countries, the traditional 
outlets for Italy's surplus population continued to offer 
salvation for many; but now, new opportunities arose to migrate 
further afield. Efficient and cheap steamship travel enabled 
thousands to migrate to South American countries, such as 
Brazil and Argentina. Some travelled merely as seasonal 
workers, but many more settled permanently. The United States 
was another, if considerably less important, attraction to 
northern Italians. lt was to North America, however, that 
large numbers of the region's textile workers travelled; and 
to one city in particular - Paterson, N. J., centre of the U. S. 
silk industry. 
1 
From the 1880s the Italian newcomers were attracted by 
the prospects of responsible positions in the city's expanding 
silk industry. They revived a pattern that had characterized 
the earlier immigration of textile hands to Paterson. Many 
came not directly from Italy, but from the silk regions of 
France and Switzerland. Expert Italian dyers, induced to 
emigrate by high wages, had'commonly plied their trade in 
Lyons, St Etienne or Swiss silk shops. 
2 It is likely many 
1Foerster 
The Italian Emigration of Our Tines (Harvard, 1919) pp 223-319 
, A. Nilward and S. B. Saul The Economic Development 
of Continental Europe 1780-1870 (London, 1973) pp. l 0-1 5, 
S. L. daily "Italians and Organized Labor in the United 
States and Argentine 1880-1910" in 11.11. Engel and S. M. ' Tomasi 
eds. The Italian Experience in the United States, (N. Y., 1970) 
pp-111-123- 
2 Heusser "istory of the Silk Dyeing Industry pp. 237, 
308-309,313-315,320-321,334. 
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other Italian silkworkers followed a similar route. 
1 
A 
stream of immigrants arriving directly from the northern 
Italian provinces of Piedmont and Lombardy began in the same 
decade and accelerated during the 11390s. Not until the 
twentieth century did Paterson receive substantial numbers of 
landless peasants from southern Italy. 
By 1908 Italians formed the largest ethnic group in 
Paterson's mills. They were divided almost equally between 
northerners and southerners. Workers from Lombardy and 
Piedmont predominated in the weaving branch of the industry; 
southerners in the city's dye-shops. 
2 
Like British, French, 
Swiss and German weavers before them, a surprising number of 
northern Italians were experienced textile workers prior to 
their arrival in the United States. In that year a United 
States immigration commission analysed the occupational back- 
ground of northern Italian silkworkers in Paterson. Its 
findings confirmed the remarkable similarity of the northerners' 
immigration to that of earlier ethnic groups to the city. 
3 
Almost eighty per cent of northern Italian males in the city's 
silk mills had worked as textile operatives prior to emigrating. 
1Paterson 
Daily Guardian January 11 1886. 
2Immigration 
Commission XI passim. 
3The 
intention of the Dillingham Commission was, of course, 
the very opposite. Its members sought to highlight sharp 
divergences between the "old" and "new" immigration. For 
a revealing insight into its pre-occupations and biases 
see 0. Ilandlin Race and Nationality in American Life 
(Boston, 1957) PP- 93-138. 
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The figure for females was slightly lower, but still impressive; 
almost sixty per cent. Revealing as such statistics might 
appear, they scarcely suggest the extent to which their back- 
ground would shape the response of Italians to work in the 
city's factories. 
Biella, wool manufacturing centre of Piedmont, and the 
Como region, heart of Lombardy's silk industry, were principal 
sources of emigration to Paterson during the 1890s. 
1 From 
both areas emigrant workers left industries still undergoing 
the basic transformation from handicraft production to a 
mechanized factory system. As in most Seestern countries 
textiles were the pioneers of Italian industrialism but until 
the late nineteenth century they remained scarcely comparable 
to the mills of Manchester, or Paterson. Wool production had 
been an important industry in northern Italy since medieval 
times. During the nineteenth century it was concentrated in- 
the Biella region, north-east. of Turin, where ample water 
supplies from Alpine streams provided power. Here a flourishing 
mill town developed. By the 1860s it boasted almost a hundred 
mills, employing more than six thousand hands. 
2 Nevertheless, 
this concentration 'masked the backwardness of the Italian wool 
industry. Mechanization was only slowly adopted. As late as 
1900, one half of the looms and one third of the spindles in 
the industry were still hand operated. 
3 
Immigration Commission, XI pp. 18-19, C. C. Altarelli, "' 
"History and Present Condition of''the Italian Colony, of 
Paterson,, N. J. "'(Masters'-. thesis, -Columbia 1911) PP-2-3- La Questione Sociale November 15 1896, May 15 1897- 
2 L. Tilly "Italy" in C. L. and R. Tilly The Rebellious 
Century 1810-1930 (London, 1975) pp. 102- . 
3S. B. Clough The Economic History of Modern Ital (New York, 
1964) pp. IN 20-21,62=64* 
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Northern Italy's silk industry differed little in 
essential characteristics from the wool industry. Luxurious 
Italian silks had been famous since Renaissance times. More- 
over Lombardy and Piedmont were the centre of European seri- 
culture. Throughout much of the nineteenth century silk - 
both raw and spun - was the staple of Italy's export trade. 
The raw material was sent to the silk centres of France, 
Switzerland, Germany and. England. During the century a silk 
throwing industry was also developed, and front Italy spun silks 
were exported to weaving centres abroad. Throwing mills 
sprung up throughout the hilly regions of Piedmont and Lombardy, 
most powered by Alpine water. Unlike wool, however, the silk 
industry was geographically decentralized. More often than 
not mills were in rural settings, employing local peasant labor, 
and financed by German or Swiss millowners wanting a cheap and 
plentiful supply of prepared silk for their own weavers. 
l 
Silk weaving, a traditional handicraft industry in the region, 
also developed during the nineteenth century, although it 
remained much less important than silk reeling or throwing as 
an export industry. 
By the mid-nineteenth century silk throwing mills in 
northern Italy were employing 150,000 workers. Most hands were 
L. Cafanga "Italy" in C. M. Cippolla ed. The Fontana 
Economic History of turope: The Emergence of Industrial 
Societies (London, 1973) PP-279-281, L. A. Tilly "Tile 
Working Class of Milan 1881-1911" (unpub. Ph. D., Toronto, 
1973), pp. 140-141. M. F. Neufeld Italy: School for Awakening 
Countries: The Italian Labor Movement in its Political, 
Social and Economic Setting from 1800- 1960 Ithaca, 
i96i p. 30. 
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employed part-time on a seasonal basis. At busy times of the 
year, when the cocoons were harvested and raw silk reeled from 
them, whole villages might turn their hands to the task. A 
few months later the same villagers would be fully employed 
harvesting local crops. The industry was part of a rural 
economy, essentially pre-industrial. Mechanization and factory 
organization of silk throwing had taken place early in the 
nineteenth century in many parts of Europe. In Italy it was 
the most advanced branch of the industry, but here scarcely 
comparable to mill life in more industrialized countries. Silk 
weaving in Lombardy remained predominantly a handicraft industry as 
in other European centres. In 1876 there were a mere 250 
mechanical looms in Italy alongside 12,000 hand looms. Twenty 
years later, although the number of mechanical looms had risen 
to 3,000, they were still outnumbered 4: 1 by handlooms. 
Women and children formed the bulk of the workforce in 
Italy's rural mills. 11any were the wives and daughters of 
peasant farmers whose earnings were an important supplement 
to the family income. More importantly their employment ref- 
lected the familiar problem of disciplining a new labor force 
to factory work. All the problems associated with the transition 
to a new work routine were evident, even though mechanization 
was not very advanced in many mills. Absenteeism was frequent 
and vexing to millowners. 
2 Itosa, an Italian emigrant to 
1L. 
Cafanga "Italy" pp. 306, Neufeld Italy pp. 1141-2. 
2Clough 
Economic History of Modern Italy p. 143. 
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America who worked in various Lombardy silk mills as a girl, 
described how one of her bosses attempted to overcome this 
same problem. "At first the boss had all farm girls", she 
remarked, "but they always left when there was work in the 
fields, so he liked better to have us girls from the village". 
Discipline was frequently harsh. It was not uncommon for a 
millowner to punch young girls in the face for neglect of 
their duties. In another mill, the owner simply avoided the 
burden of controlling unreliable labor by transferring respons- 
ibility for mill discipline to a nearby convent. Convent 
children manned the mill with nuns acting as overseers. In 
return the millowner contributed liberally to church funds. 
Z 
Important though textile mills were as harbingers of a 
new industrial system in northern Italy, many were primitive 
compared to the technologically advanced mills in many parts 
of Europe. Hand driven machines were still common late into, 
the nineteenth century, and the pace of work determined by 
human rather than mechanical capabilities. 
3 Moreover if work 
in Lombardy's rural mills was markedly different from traditional 
tasks in an agricultural society, it was not simply divorced 
from familiar routines. Silk production was often seasonal. 
M. Hall Ets Rosa: The Life of an Italian Immigrant 
(Minnesota, 1970 -P-139- 
2 ibid. pp. 118,87-91. 
3ibid. 
pp. 77-78, Cafanga "Italy" pp. 297-306. 
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In the mulberry growing areas of northern Italy the two were 
intimately connected. During the summer whole villages would 
hatch silkworms in their homes for local silk merchants. The 
women would tend the worms, whilst their husbands spent the 
day picking mulberry leaves to feed them. Mill work was 
suspended, and childworkers such as Rosa sent out into the 
fields in their fathers' absence. Even when the mill was 
functioning normally work was regulated in traditional ways. 
Feste, religious holidays, might halt production for the day. 
Sunlight determined working hours. "Ife had no whistle - no 
certain hour to go to work - in my time", Rosa noted. "So 
long as we could see we worked. In the summer we started at 
four or five o'clock in'the morning, in the winter not so early. 
With the daylight we came and with the daylight we went". Tales 
of gaslit mills in Milan filled the young girl with awe. 
Moreover she looked unfavourably upon a system that would end 
the winter evenings when "... we had more time ... and we did 
other things". 
1 
As mechanization and factory organization developed in 
the textile industry towards the end of the nineteenth century, 
the region's workers also began to organize. Labor combinations 
were outlawed in Italy prior to Unification, and even after 
severely hampered by a government which usually declared 
strikes illegal. Mutual aid societies, usually of local rather 
1ihid. 
pp. 30-34,79-84,18-19,77,101. 
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than trade standing, became the vehicle for collective action. 
Even so organization was sporadic. Often it required the 
leadership of the anarchist followers of Bakunin, doyen of 
the anarchist wing of the First International. 
' 
Concentrating their activities amongst the textile 
workers of the north, these radicals formed "Leagues of 
Resistance" and, during the 1870s and 1880s, led a series of 
spectacular strikes. ßiella, the most concentrated area of 
textile production, was the scene of bitter industrial 
struggles in the 1860s, and again in 1877 when workers there 
struck for more than three months. In the rural silk producing 
areas traditions of organization were probably less marked. 
Certainly the increasing mechanization of the textile trades, 
which ended homework and increased the employment of children, 
was a severe blow to collective organization. It resulted in 
the emigration of many textile workers from the Alpine 
provinces. 
2 Where organization took place it usually only 
achieved a temporary solidarity, centred on specific issues. 
The new work routines and social relations of industrial 
production were only slowly teaching peasant weavers the 
necessity of permanent and effective organization. Thus 
1Clough 
Economic History of Modern Italy pp. 151-156, 
II. L. Gaultieri The Labor Movement in Italy (New York, 
1946) PP. 7-14, It. Hotstetter passim. ' The Italian Socialist 
Movement : Vol. I Origins 1860-1882 (Princeton, 1958). 
N. Vernicone "Tlie Italian a or Movement" in E. R. Tannenbaum 
and E. Y. Noether eds. Modern Ital :A Topical History 
Since 1861 (New York 1,11397 pp. 197-227. 2D. 
Horowitz The Italian Labor Movement (Harvard, 1963) 
pp" 38-41, Neufeld Italy p. 189. 
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violent outbursts rather than disciplined trades unionism were 
to be expected. An observer of the transition from domestic 
to factory production noted the characteristic response of 
ßiella's textile hands: 
"It is necessary to remember that in those pre- 
socialist times the working class was a crowd, not 
an army. Enlightened, orderly, bureaucratic strikes 
were impossible. The workers could only fight by 
means of demonstrations, shouting, cheering and cat- 
calling, intimidation and violence. Luddism and 
sabotage, even though not elevated into doctrines, 
had nevertheless to form part of the methods of 
struggle". 1 
During the 1890s continuing mechanization in the textile 
industry coupled with economic and political crisis in Italy 
spurred the emigration of Italians. Disease amongst silkworms 
disrupted sericulture in Lombardy. A tariff war with France 
in the late 1880s and 1890s adversely affected the raw and 
spun silk industries. Employment in the silk industry actually 
declined in the last quarter of the century, -mainly due to 
technological advances; and during the 1890s unemployment was 
a severe problem. In all branches of textile production women 
and children were replacing adult male labor. 
2 Attempts at 
collective organization were suppressed. So bad'were con- 
ditions that silk workers in the North joined the uprising of 
R. Rigola Rinaldo Ri o1a e il Movimento U eraio nel 
Biellese (Bari, 1930) p. 19 quoted in E. Hobsbawm Labouring 
Men p. 10. 
2Clough 
Economic History of Moclern Italy pp. 65,144, 
Immigration Commission IV pp. 167-169, U. Mack Smith 
Italy: A Modern History (Ann Arbor, '1959) p. 161. 
xF to +ý aý 
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Southern agricultural workers in 1894. The attacks on 
radicals following the Fasci uprising, and again after the 
"Fatti di Maggio in 1898 drove many anarchists and socialists 
abroad. 
1 
Southern Italian emigration to Paterson also increased 
during the 1890s. They were outnumbered by northerners at 
first but by 1910 southerners comprised roughly half of 
Paterson's Italian community. The majority found employment 
in the city's mills and dyeshops despite the fact that few had 
previous experience of textile work. 
2 Most were typical of 
the southern contadini flooding into America prior to the 
First World War: landless peasants fleeing impoverishment. A 
sizeable proportion of them were Sicilians. 
3 The earliest 
southerners arrived in Paterson as laborers, laying streetcar 
tracks, sewers and installing other municipal services. Slowly 
they found employment in the silk mills. The increasing 
mechanization of silk weaving enabled many to secure formerly 
skilled occupations; but more importantly they concentrated in 
the dyehouses, where, for dyers' helpers, heavy manual labor 
rather than skill was required. By 1910 Italians totalled 
1Mack Smith Italy pp. 171-177,191-193,1). Mack Smith A History 
of Sicily; Modern ;; icily After 1713 (London, 1968) pp"f 3- 9, 
L. Tilly "I Fatti di Maggio: The Working Class of Milan and 
the Rebellion of 189811 in R. J. Bezucha ed. Modern European 
Social History (Lexington, 1972) pp. 124-158, W. Hilton-Young 
The Italian Left: A Short History of Political Socialism in 
Italy (London, 1949) PP-35-36, C. Woodcock Anarchism: 
A History of Libertarian Ideas and Movements Cleveland, 
1962) pp"327-355" On the relationship between Italian 
emigration and labor activity see J. S. Macllonald. "Agricultural 
Organization, Migration and Labour Militancy'in Dural Italy" 
Economic History Review 2nd series, XVI 1963 No. 1 pp. '61-75. 
2Immigration 
Commission XI Pp732-33" - "9r 3The`background 
of southern Italian-Immigrants' is- well 
documented. See Mack Smith Sicily, Foerster Italian 
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over forty per cent of the city's dyeworkers, with southerners 
predominating amongst them. 
1 
Although Paterson's Italians were initially seen as a 
pool of cheap labor by city millowners they were soon discovered 
to be no more tractable than previous immigrant silkworkers. 
Their experience in the Italian textile industry was little 
preparation for work in Paterson's mills. Many doubtlessly 
viewed millwork as a short-term prospect, enabling them to 
return to Italy with enough savings to guarantee them a new 
status. Some Italian males avoided factory work, preferring 
manual labor, and as in Lombardy sending their wives and 
daughters into the mills. This was almost certainly true of 
many dyers' helpers. In the dyeshops they worked in "teams" 
of seven or eight, under a master dyer; a form and division of 
labor probably not unfamiliar to workers from an agricultural 
background. It was one way of avoiding the impersonal discip- 
line of the weaving shops. Here the master dyer dictated their 
pace of work. Moreover, here they worked as a unit and not 
individually as mere appendages to a machine. 
Those who entered the weaving mills showed a similar 
reluctance to submit to the new work discipline required of 
them. Their waywardness compelled a continuation of the harsh 
factory rules long familiar in the city. In effect Paterson's 
Emigration, H. Nelli Italians in Chicago 1880-1930:! A-Stud 
in Ethnic Mobility (New York, 1970) PP. 3-21, R. J. Vecoli 
"Contadini in Chicago: A Critique of The U rooted! Journal 
of American History LI December 1964 pp. 0- 17, J. Lopreato 
, Italian-Americans (New York, 1970) Ph"21-35. '=ý- 
Altarel]i "History of the Italian Colony", pp. 2-I4,, Immigration 
Commission XI pp. 117-121, Paterson llaily`Guardian December 
9 18M 
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Italians comprised another generation of migrants to industrial 
society, which had formed the staple of Paterson's labor force 
for more than half a century, and a continual source of tension 
in the silk industry. During the 1913 strike'liberal journal- 
ists visiting the city were aghast at tales of the strict 
factory rules enforced in Paterson's mills. Silkworlcers told 
them of punitive fines frequently imposed. Absences from the 
loom during working hours would result in reductions in the 
weekly pay packet. Fines were imposed for almost every con- 
ceivable offense, including reductions in pay for the loss of 
scissors or hooks by workers who were also required to purchase 
replacements from the millowner. Punctuality was imperative. 
Lateness might result in being locked out for aday. "Maybe a 
girl wastes a little silk", one worker explained, "If they 
do not know who did it they fine everyone... ". Foremen and 
overseers were constantly scolding workers to !! speed-up". 
"The bosses they holler and curse at you so. The superintendent 
and forelady they aren't so bad, but they have to holler when 
the bosses come round". "Pacemakers" were common, to pressure 
hands to work faster. These were favoured workers given the 
best silk to ensure rapid production and held up as an example 
to weavers of poorer silks. Clocks attached to the looms of 
pieceworkers were "locked up so the workers cannot see". 
Many claimed yardage was "stolen" from them at the end of the 
week. If workers questioned the amount attributed to them, they 
received a standard reply: "What for do you want to know? 
That girl over there weaves faster than you, you°damn, kids" 4 
Even if a mill's power supply failed or was: cut during the 
working day, operatives were expected to work after hours, 
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at no extra pay, to make up the lost time. Similarly on 
Saturday, usually a half-day, hands were ordered to clean up 
the mill after work. Again, they went unrewarded. Most 
iniquitous, but perhaps most revealing, was the system of 
"contracts", governing pay, mill discipline and length of 
service, still prevalent at the time of the 1913 strike. Under 
this system the parents of child workers signed a contract 
guaranteeing millowners that their child would remain in his 
employ for at least a year. The millowner would hold back 
fifty per cent - sometimes more - of the child's wages during 
the contractual period. If the year was successfully completed 
accumulated earnings were paid in a lump sum, minus fines and 
other deductions. If the child was discharged or terminated 
its employment during the contractual period, all wages set 
aside were forfeited. Contracts of this sort guaranteed 
millowners a regular and compliant workforce, and considerable 
savings if the unscrupulous exercised their powers of dismissal. 
I 
Taken as a whole the harsh and primitive disciplinary 
codes of Paterson millowners were designed to produce a work- 
force industrious, sober and orderly. That such rules should 
feature so prominently a half a century after they were first 
introduced suggests millowners were-not altogether successful 
in their intentions. How could they be when their encouragement 
I. Weed and L. Carey "I Make Cheap Silk", Masses November 
1913 p. 7. C. I. R. III pp. 2586-2587,,. 2579, -2595-2596. E. Koettgen "Making Silk" International Socialist Review 
14 March 1914 pp. 551-555, E"G.. Flynn ! 'Contract Slavery in 
Paterson Silk Mills" in pageant of the Paterson Strike: 
Official Program(N. Y., 1913 PF. 29-31, New York Times 
April. 1913... , .. 
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of cheap immigrant labour constantly eroded the creation of 
a stable and disciplined workforce? Furthermore the prominence 
of the disciplinary question indicates'that the work habits 
and customs of Paterson's silkworkers - and by this time they 
were predominantly Italian immigrants - necessitated the 
continuation of punitive measures. Cheap Italian labor might 
enable manufacturers to reduce costs, but only at the price of 
an uncooperative and ill-disciplined workforce. For unlike 
the uprooted peasantry that Oscar Iiandlin has characterized as 
forming a pliable labor pool. for U. S. manufacturers, Paterson's 
Italians soon showed signs of collective independence and self- 
assertion. 
' They were prominently involved in the strikes of 
1894,1901 and 1902. Indeed, in the latter they were the most 
active group of millworkers. In some industries the "New 
Immigration" acted as a brake on activism. 
2 In American steel- 
towns, David Brody has shown East European imrnigrants to have 
been a "source of stability", enabling industrial managers to 
control effectively labor for two decades and longer. 
3 In 
Paterson the effect of immigration was markedly different. Here 
immigrants did not face a giant corporation; moreover, here 
immigrants brought with them skills and work traditions that 
10. Handlin The Uprooted (Boston, 1950- 
2 For the argument that "new immigrants" stunted native 
labor radicalism in the United States, see G. Rosenblum 
Immigrant Workers: Their Impact on American Labor 
Radicalism (New York, 1973)- 
3D. 
Brody Steelworkers in America: 'The Non-union Era 
(Harvard, 1960) partic. 'pp. 9 -12 . Sse Also K-PLA 
;7 
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proved a constant source of friction in the city's factories. 
As in the steel towns their background offered little to 
dispose immigrants towards stable and disciplined unionism, 
but inPaterson it did much to perpetuate a pattern of indust- 
rial conflict long evident. 
Italian immigrants, then, appeared little different from 
countless textile operatives who had arrived in the city before 
them. Their reception, however, marked them apart. The 
attitudes towards Italians of both-silkworkers and many of 
the city's longer established ethnic groups denied similarities 
between the two. The timing of the Italians' arrival was 
fundamental in shaping attitudes. Italian immigrants began 
arriving at precisely the period in which Paterson's pre- 
eminence as the centre of the silk industry. was coming under 
threat. They entered a city different in size, complexion, 
and above all outlook, from that of all previous immigrant 
groups. 
Anti-Italian feeling ran high throughout the 1890s, and 
increased in the new century. Viewed principally as cheap 
labor and strikebreakers, Paterson's workingmen heaped scorn 
upon these newcomers. As early as 1886 a prominent local 
official warned manufacturers against "bringing cheap labor 
to Paterson" because it ".... would result in riot, as the 
importation of Chinamen, Italians and other cheap labor was 
not regarded with favour by the working classes". Alderman 
John Boylan, representative of the Irish and working class 
Eighth Ward, voiced a prevalent discontent when he opposed 
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city contract work being given to anyone who was not a resident 
laborer and citizen. Unemployment in Paterson, he bellowed, 
was directly attributable to padrone and their rag-tag 
followers, who "... could live on stale bananas and macaroni" 
at-half the wages of native workers. 
1 Italian strikebreaking 
can only have added to the disfavour. Strikes against the 
employment of Italians in the city mills did little to relieve 
tensions during the 1890x. 
2 
As numbers of Italians increased in Paterson mills 
sporadic attempts were made to form unions amongst them, such 
as "La Lega dei Tessitori" organized by local Italian radicals 
in the late 1890s and modelled on the Italian "Leagues of 
Resistance". 
3 
More often than not organization took place, if 
at all, along ethnic lines. 
4 
It did little to alleviate 
misgivings about Italians entering the industry. The older 
English-speakinggoups increasingly left the. lower paid, 
unskilled jobs in the industry, 'surviving in strength only in 
1Yaterson Daily Guardian March 16 1897- 
2 
Immigration Commission XI pp. 18-19, Paterson Daily Guardian 
December 1 1886, January 30 1894. Paterson Daily Press 
April 11 1894, M. Pachman "History of the Dolphin Jute 
Mills, Paterson, N. J. " (Masters dissertation, New York 
University, 1954) p. 76, Altarelli "History of the Italian 
Colony" P-3- 
3 La Questione Sociale June 30, December 15 1897, Paterson 
Daily Guardian March 4 1897- 
4 
Nntional Labor Standard September 3 1904, Industrial 
Worker March, May 19U6. 
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the skilled weaving departments. When the United Silk Workers 
was formed in the early years of the new century, recruiting 
skilled and predominantly English-speaking workers, it made 
little attempt to organize those branches in which Italians 
were most numerous, and positively opposed the affiliation of 
silk dyers' helpers, who were overwhelmingly Italian. 
I 
The extent and rapidity with which Italians supplanted 
older ethnic groups in the city's mills acted significantly to 
feed prejudice. Its dimensions can be gleaned from census 
materials. Italian immigration after 1890 was the most 
important demographic development in the city prior to the 
First World liar. The group as a whole expanded at a prodigious 
rate (Table 9). East European Jews constituted the only other 
major immigrant group during the period, most arriving after 
1902.2 Their impact, in sheer numbers and, more importantly, 
on communal and work relations, never approached that of the. 
Italians prior to the 1913 strike. The flood of Italian 
immigration was further exaggerated by a perceptible decrease 
of population growth in the city as a whole; and, most 
pertinent, by the near stagnation, and in some cases actual 
numerical decline, of older ethnic groups (Table 10). 
Italian immigration radically altered the ethnic compos- 
ition of working class areas of the city. Unfortunately 
New York Times June 27 1902, Wood "History of Labor" 
PP-170-188- 
2 
Immigration Commission XI p. 19. 
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Table 9 
Growth of Paterson's Italian Community In Relation To Other 
Ethnic Groups 1880-1910 
18801 1890 1900 1910 
City 51,031 78,347 105,171 125,600 
Italians F. b. 89 845 4,266 9,317 
N. b. 197 1,459 5,431 
Americans 2 32,3293 19,730 23,897 32,023 
English/ F. b. 6,439 9,499 9,067 7,739 
Scots. N. h. 3,849 5,038 9,757 
Irish F. b. 5,990 7,719 6,7111 4,971 
N. b. 7,702 8,281 9,937 
Germans F. b. 2,262- - 5,649 6,584 5,741 
N. b. 3,398 4,942 7,204 
1. Figures for native-born of foreign-parentage unavailable 
for 1880 
2. Americans represent U. S. -born of U. S. parents 
3. The 1880 figure for U. S. -born includes U. S. -born of 
foreign parentage. 
(Source: U. S. Census 10th-13th, 1880-1910) 
- 195 - 
Table 10 
Rates of Growth of Paterson's Ethnic Group s 1890-19101 
1890 1890-1900 1900 1900-1910 1910 
City 100 134 16o 
+34/ +19% 
Italians 100 549 1415 
+4490 +157% 
Americans2 100 121 162 
+21/ +34/ 
English/ 100 106 131 
Scots + 6% +24% 
Irish 100 97 97 
- 3% - 
Germans 100 127 143 
+27% +12% 
1. All Ethnic Groups include foreign-born and native-born 
of foreign-parentage, excepting, of course,. Americans, 
who constitute U. S. -born of U. S. -parentage. 
2. The growth of the U. S. group may be exaggerated by the 
inclusion of third generation immigrants in the figures 
of Americans. The grandchildren of immigrants may, 
arguably, belong in another ethnic grouping. Unfortunately, 
they cannot be distinguished, as in census returns they 
were characterized as U. S. -born of U. S. -parentage. 
(Source: U. S. Census 11-13th, 1890-1910) 
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Table 11 
Ethnic Change in Four Paterson Wards 1905-19151 
. 1905 1915 
Americans 23% 26% 
Irish 2 17 Yo 12 
English/ 
Scots 16% 11/ 
Germans 14iß 10 ö 
Italians 9% 20% 
Others 17/ 19i°3 
1. Based on New Jersey Census Returns for the 2nd, 3rd, 
8th 
and 9th Wards. 
2. Each ethnic group comprises foreign-born"and native- 
born of foreign-parentage. 
3. Based upon a'sample of 2,234 persons for 1905 and 
2,491 persons for 1915" 
(Source: New Jersey State Census, Manuscript Volumes 
for Passaic County, 1905 and 1915) 
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census records do not permit quantification of the change 
during the last decade of the nineteenth century. Nevertheless, 
the years for which detailed information is available, bear 
striking witness to the impetus of Italian immigration. 
Analysis of four working class wards, during the period 1905- 
1915, indicate an abrupt change in the ethnic composition of 
much of Paterson (Table 11). In a mere decade Italians rose 
from less than ten per cent to a fifth of the entire population 
of large working class neighbourhoods. In some areas their 
weight of numbers was even more dramatic. In the 9th ward for 
example Italians increased from under 13% of the population 
in 1905, to almost 30% by 1915.1 Everywhere Italians clustered 
a similar pattern evolved: older immigrant groups moved out 
to make way for them. In the 3rd ward Germans and Dutch 
departed; in the 9th ward British and Germans; in the 8th ward 
Irish, British and Germans. The pattern was not always uniform. 
In some districts certain immigrant neighbourhoods refused to 
be broken up. In the 9th ward, for example, the Irish community 
represented a stable 20% of the population throughout the 
decade, probably residing in an area traversing the boundary 
between the 8th and 9th wards, a traditional stronghold of 
Paterson's Irish. Similarly in the 2nd ward all the older 
ethnic groups showed a reluctance to make way for Italian 
1The following statistics are all based upon analysis 
of the New Jersey State Census, Manuscript Schedules 
for 1905 and 1915. See also Appendices. 
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newcomers; thus here Italian immigration was less pronounced 
than in other working class districts. 
l New immigrants were 
concentrated in Paterson's old manufacturing districts where 
rents would be cheapest and travel to and from the mills 
minimal. Outside of working class neighbourhoods their 
presence was negligible. In the 5th ward, stretching east of 
city Hall, and an area of leafy avenues, fine houses and home 
to Paterson's professional and manufacturing elite, Italians 
were scarcely visible. 
2 
Physical presence alone cannot indicate the impact of 
Italians on the working lives of Paterson's millhands. During 
an era when growth in the city's principal industry had been 
blunted by competition from outlying areas, Italians flooded 
into the mills. For them work could only be. obtained at the 
expense of other millhands - older immigrants mostly. The 
proportion of people working declined slightly'in three of 
the four wards analysed. All wards, however, maintained a 
steady proportion employed in silk manufacturing - varying 
from 30% of the working population in the 8th ward to over 
40% in the 3rd ward. The ethnic composition of that workforce, 
3 
'Appendices 1-4. In all four wards native Americans persisted 
or marginally increased during the period 1905-1915. It 
is unlikely that Yankees showed characteristics different 
from Irish or Germans. Their continued importance is almost 
certainly attributable to census demarcations which class- 
ified third generation immigrants as Americans. 
2 Appendix 5. 
3Appendices 6-9. 
- 199 - 
especially the mill workforce, changed notably (Table 12). 
Italians increased from just over 10% of all millworkers in 
1905 to 20% a decade later. English, Scots and Germans 
declined. By 1915 Italians comprised the largest ethnic 
group in the silk industry; a feature absent from all other 
occupational groupings in the city. Statistically the change 
appears notable but not dramatic. Italians were making similar 
inroads into other leading occupations in the city. However 
mere percentage points mask the realities of occupational 
change. Entry of Italians into Paterson silk factories was by 
far the most important development. Because of the impor- 
tance of millwork and the sheer size of the mill workforce, 
the numbers of Italians replacing older ethnic groups assumed 
an importance absent in all other occupations. Gtatistics 
fail to convey the degree to which ethnic change was a starkly 
visible fact. 
The economic condition of the silk industry further 
accentuated the entry of large numbers of Italians. No other 
industry faced the same pressure on wages, employment and 
traditional work practices. The city's metal and machine 
trades declined considerably (luring the decade 1905-1915, yet 
although Italians increased their employment here their 
presence caused little furore. 
I For one thing they were 
1Garber "The Silk Industry of Paterson, N. J. " pp. 94-99. 
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Table 12 
Leading Occupations and Ethnicity in Four Paterson Wards 
1905-1915 
1905 
American Irish Eng/Scot. German Italian Other 
Silk 16 15 18 18 11 20 
Metal iß 25 24 14 2 18 
W. Collar 33 11 24 17 3 12 
Skilled 23 21 19 14 6 18 
Unskilled 30 22 11 9 6 19 
191 
Silk 16 15 14 14 20 20 
Metal 18 24 20 14 7 17 
W. Collar 31 19 10 15 5 21 
Skilled 25 14 13 11 14 24 
Unskilled 30 13 12 8 15 22 
(Source: N. J. State Manuscript Census Schedules 1905 and 1915) 
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confined principally to filemaking in the Kearney and Foote 
Works in the Third Ward. More importantly their employment 
required no sizeable reductions in the proportions of older 
ethnic groups employed. In the expanding white collar occup- 
ations Italians made little impact. Even in the skilled and 
unskilled trades, where again Italians made sizeable inroads, 
only at times of acute depression, such as in the worst years 
of the 1890s, did their employment provoke hostility. It was 
economic objections, brought about by pressure on work and 
wages in the silk mills that, above all else, underpinned 
anti-Italian sentiment amongst Paterson workingrmen. 
Unlike other textile cities such as Lawrence, Massachusetts 
where a variety of new immigrants displaced the older settlers, 
Paterson was dominated by Italians. 
I Jews too came in sub- 
stantial numbers after the turn of the century. But Poles, 
Czechs, Hungarians, Russians and the host of. other Eastern 
European nationalities, who made up America's "new immigration" 
were notable in Paterson for their absence. This pattern of 
immigration had important consequences for the way in which 
Italians were regarded by their fellow millhands. Because they 
were conspicuous, Italians were saddled with every prejudice, 
stereotype and animosity typically aimed at exotic newcomers 
to America. 
Tom Morgan, a native-born loomfixer who, in 1913, had 
1U. 
U. Cole Immigrant Cit : Lawrence, Massachusetts 1845-1921 
(N. Carolina, 1963). 
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worked in the city for more than two decades, put it thus: 
".... as the standard of wages went down the class of workers 
that came in got poorer". That "poorer class" was identifiably 
Italian. l The English-speaking groups that remained in 
Paterson's silk mills did so in the skilled branches of the 
industry, such as warping and loomfixing and in some branches 
of the ribbon weaving trade. Here they formed small and 
exclusive craft unions, anxious to keep at arm's length "... 
immigrants coming into the trade who did not thoroughly 
understand the workings of our organization or had not become 
Americanized, and the manufacturers hiring those foreigners 
2 
at all kinds of wages.... " 
Tom Morgan's concerns about Italian newcomers were shared 
by other Paterson residents, although often for very different 
reasons. Squalor and disease were early associated with 
Paterson's Italians. In 1882 the Board of Aldermen instructed 
the city's Health Committee ".... to take some measures relative 
to the improvement of the filthy conditions of the Italian 
quarters of the city". The local press greeted the. directive 
with a howl: "The Italian must go: ''3 The same month eight 
Italians were arrested for stealing. County Jail Warden 
Buckley found them ".... utterly filthy and unutterably afraid 




Daily Guardian January 10, February A 1882. 
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of water... "; searching their clothes he found them to "... 
fairly bristle with weapons of a deadly character... knives, 
stiletoes, daggers and other weapons". 
1 Perceived as 
degraded and filthy, violent and criminal, Italians were 
hardly greeted as most desirable newcomers. Moreover the 
stigma attached to them does not appear to have diminished as 
their numbers increased. In 1885 a local journal noted that 
0 
"... Italian "dagos" employed on the line of the Erie (railroad) 
are finding shelter during the cold weather in old and condemned 
cars, which are frequently robbed by fellow scoundrels of the 
occupants". 
2 
A decade later, at the height of the 18911 
depression, a Citizens' Relief Committee investigating applicants 
for alms reprimanded Italians as "shirkers" and "imposters". 
"Many who sought relief were Italians whose cases looked 
suspicious", announced millowner William Strange, head of the 
Relief Committee, " and the full amount was not,, given to them 
until an investigation could be made". 
3 
A leading Italian 
citizen was employed by the Committee to investigate countrymen 
who applied for assistance, but was subsequently charged with 
favouritism and dismissed. Father Julian, priest at the 
Italian church, faced the same charge. Neither inspired 
4 
1Paterson Daily Guardian January 13 1882. 
2 
Paterson Daily Guardian December 9 1885. 
3Paterson-Dai. 
ly Guardian December 27 1893- 
4 
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confidence nor could hope to counter the widespread, "deep 
rooted prejudice" against Italian shirkers and ne'er-do-wells. 
l 
Indeed, local workingmen called for a "Tariff on immigration" 
to reduce the legions of unemployed. The "Italian basket 
army" on their daily sojourn to the relief centre, were the 
butt of "numerous jokes... cracked at their expense while they 
were passing down Ellison Street". Humour often masked bitter 
resentments. An Italian hauled into court for throwing away 
food provided as charity was fined ; 526. The local justice, 
in passing sentence, delivered a stinging reminder to Italians 
throughout the city: "The. laws of this country unfortunately 
allow such men. as you to come here, but there is no provision 
in them for feeding you. When you abuse the charity of 
Americans you must and shall be punished". 
2 
Economic depression revealed not only the extent of 
poverty amongst Italians, but also nativist contempt and disgust 
of newcomers. One Relief Committee inquirer, an eminent local 
lady, "had an unpleasant experience" when Italians appeared 
"in large numbers to meet her", for the "filth was more than 
she could endure, and when she was leaving the Italians 
followed her". 3 Social reformers and charity workers frequently 
marked Italians as cases for special treatment. 
4 
and if it 
1ibid. January 5 and 13 1984- 
2 
ibid. December 15,. January 4,10 and 11.1894. 
,, 3ibid. 
December 27,30 1893- 
4 
Twentieth Annual Report of the Paterson Woman's Missionar 
Society (Paterson, 1893) p. 10, William Nelson Collection 
Box 3, Paterson Public Library, Fifth Annual Report of the 
Children's Aid and Society for the Prevention of Cruelty 
to Children, Passaic County, N. J. (Paterson, 1902) p. 4, 
Wm. Nelson Collection, Box 13. 
2 05 
was the product'of middle-class fastidiousness, distaste for 
the "swarthy" newcomers, served along with the economic 
objection to cheap labor, to single out Italians for general 
vilification. 
The association of Italian immigrants with criminality - 
of a particularly horrific nature - fed prejudice. Lurid 
accounts of knifings and vendettas were a common feature in 
the city's newspapers. As early as 1890 a razor fight between 
two Italians led the City Recorder to warn: "Italian cutting 
affrays were getting altogether too numerous to be pleasant". 
' 
Crimes of violence, above all others, were seen as the hallmark 
of Italian lawlessness. A local clergyman was quick to point 
out that arrest figures showed Italians to be more law-abiding 
than other ethnic groups; only "... in crimes against the person" 
did "Italians maintain the record". 
2 
The violent activities of organized gangs of Italians 
proved most disturbing. Fears of secret societies - the 
Mafia and the Camorra - swept America following the assassin- 
ation of a police superintendent by Sicilians in New Orleans 
in 1891.3 "Black Hand" groups - extortionists, who usually 
threatened the non-cooperative with bombing - appeared in 
1Paterson Daily Press January 2 1890. 
n 
`Altlrelli "The Italian Colony of Paterson" p. 111. 
3J. 
lligham Strano, ers in the Lind : Patterns of . American :r Nativism 1 0-1925 (New York, 1973 ed. ) pp. 90-92, 
1{. Nelli The Business of Crime (New York, 1976) 
PP- 69-100. 
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cities throughout the country. Although most were small, 
independent groups of villains, they were frequently portrayed 
in popular journals as part of a highly organized, conspira- 
torial network transplanted to America from Mafia strongholds 
in Sicily and southern Italy. In 1904 the New York Police 
Department established its own "Italian Squad" headed by the 
fabled Joseph Petrosino, to root out the evil. It met with 
little success - Petrosino being assassinated on an investi- 
gative mission to Sicily in 1909 .1 
Paterson spawned its own share of Black hand crimes and 
criminals. Most were not dissimilar from elsewhere. In 1912, 
for example, a hotel proprietor who ignored demands from a 
Black Hand outfit had his property blown up. 
2 Moreover there 
was scattered evidence that some Italians in Paterson were 
seeking to control other avenues of illegality typically 
associated with organized crime. In 1906 for example Federal 
Secret Service agents claimed to have smashed an Italian 
lottery ring - "Lotto Publico Italia" - established in the 
city. 
3, Similarly Police Chief Bimson's attacks on the Italian- 
run Turn Hall were prompted by concerns that its owners were 
1Nelli Business of Crime pp. 95-98.1 J. Landesco "Organized 
Crime in Chicago" in Illinois State Government, Illinois 
Crime Survey (Chicago, 1929) pp. 15-41, U. L. Chandler 
The Criminal Brotherhoods (London, 1976) pp. 67-72. 
Even as learned and judicious a body as the (Dillingham) 
Immigration Commission confirmed the popular stereotype 
of lawless and violent Italians. Immigration Commission 
IV pp. 209-210. 
2 Paterson Daily Guardian February 9 1912... 
. 
3Paterson Evening News October 8 and 23 1906. 
ay 
.. ýF.. ý. _i, 
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harbouring prostitutes and encouraging illegal gambling and 
drinking. Bimson ordered a ban on "scandalous" and "immoral" 
dances, such as the "Grizzly Bear", the "Bunny Hug", the 
"Turkey Trot" and the "African Slide" frequently in evidence 
there. The Chief all but accused his own officers of succumbing 
to bribery, claiming they ignored the "new fangled dances" and 
the "drinking rooms on the back of saloons where young girls 
could be found drinking with men". 
1 When Bimson re-organized 
the city police force in 1907 it is hardly surprising that he 
2 
established his own "Italian Squad". 
No "White Hand" appeared in Paterson to dispel the 
association of Italians with crime. 
3 Indeed the city's new- 
comers seemed too divided amongst themselves to combine 
effectively for their own common defense. Northern Italians 
would not deign to mix with southerners, and vice versa. At 
times mutual antagonism could take a more active form. As 
early as 1882 Peter Frank, the prominent Italian fruit dealer 
and a Neapolitan, claimed a "vendetta" had been launched 
against him by northerners in the city, who were jealous of his 
appointment as a "special policeman" in the Italian quarter of 
the city. 
4 
Whether more than envy motivated northerners' 
opposition to policeman Frank is unknown. The animosity of 
north Italian millhands to southerners entering the silk 
industry suggests a deep rift between the two. 
5 The two 
1Paterson 
Daily Guardian February 2, January 29 1912. `' 
2P'aterson 
Lvening'News April 6 and 10' 1907,, C., Vreeland Who's 
Who in Passaic County (Paterson 1917) P"13" 
3Nelli 
The Italians in Chicago PP-125-155- 
if 
Paterson Daily Guardian January 5 and 31 1882. 
5Altarelli 
"The Italian Colony of Paterson N. J. " p. 3. 
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groups were divided by language and culture. Immigrants from 
Lombardy and Piedmont frequently associated with French textile 
workers. Some had probably worked in the French silk industry 
prior to emigrating; many possibly understood and spoke the 
French language better than the dialect of the southern 
paesani. They lived apart from southerners, and usually 
worshipped in different churches. Our Lady of Victories, where 
many northerners took the sacrament, was originally the church 
of the city's French immigrants, but shared with northern 
Italians. i 
The extreme parochialism of Italian immigrants made group 
solidarity difficult. Divisions within even the larger 
groupings of northerners and southerners produced loyalties 
that often stemmed from a single Italian village. Thus mutual 
aid societies ,a possible'base for city-wide organization, 
numbered almost thirty by 1910. By 1911 the-Sons of Italy - 
was organized in Paterson to unite the scores of independent 
benefit societies nationally as well as locally. Nevertheless 
old habits die hard. One local observer remarked that Italians 
"... so divided patronize the doctor, the grocer, the wine 
dealer and even the priest coming from their own place". 
2 
1Altarelli "The Italian Colony of Paterson N. J. " pp. 3-4, 
W. Nelson and C. Shriner History of Paterson and Its 
Environs (New York, 1920) I PP-173-474, Paterson Daily 
Guardian May 24 1882. 
2Altarelli'"The 
Italian Colony of Paterson N. J. " p. 20, 
A. Baldo L'Ordine Figli d'Italia in America (New York, 
1925) p. 237, E. L. Biagi The Purple Aster: A History of 
the Order, Sons of Italy New York, 1961) PP-15-18. 
., 09 
Italians faced prejudice and animosity from many directions. 
The local chapter of the American Protective Association 
successfully opposed efforts to fund a school for teaching 
immigrants the English language. 
1 The local Catholic Church 
probably neglected them also. Not until 1903 did it secure 
an Italian priest. 
2 Although four Italian journals were 
being published in the city by the early years of the twentieth 
century, one of these was an anarchist publication and the 
others appear to have little influence beyond their limited 
constituencies. 
3 More important, politically Italians appear 
to'have exercised little weight. The political machines, 
traditional avenue of advancement and acceptance for immigrant 
communities continued, prior to World War One, to be heavily 
dominated by the city's older ethnic groups - Irish, British 
and Germans. If an Italian mayor was unlikely, perhaps an 
Italian alderman or city official was less so. Dither was a 
rarity. A glance through lists of city officials in the 
opening decade and a half of the twentieth century suggests 
the extent to which Italians were excluded from any position of 
consequence. Even in those occupations regarded as rewards for 
political support Italians were notably absent. The roster of 
'Paterson Evening News February 2 1900. 
2St John's Roman Catholic Parish Church, Historical Souvenir 
1821-1921 (Paterson, 1921) p. 23. 
3American 
Newspaper Director Thirty Third Edition 
New York, 1901 A ers American Newspaper Annual 1906 
(Philadelphia, 1; 06). 
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city firemen in 1913 apparently included no Italians. The 
three Italian policemen in 1913 reflected not so much political 
"pull" as the problems Paterson's Police Chief confronted in 
maintaining law and order in the city's "Little Italies". 
1 
The one Italian who achieved considerable political success, 
did so on a platform attacking corruption in public life. 
Henry Narelli, Paterson-born son of an Italian weaver and 
himself a millhand as a teenager, was educated at Rutgers 
University before-establishing a law practice in his home town. 
As both "Avvocato Italiano" and defense lawyer to striking 
millhands, Narelli remained closely identified with Paterson's 
Italian iimiigrants. Politically, he rose to prominence in the 
local Republican Party, "twice being elected to the State 
Assembly as a Passaic County representative. On each occasion 
he supported a platform pledged to oppose the machine candidate 
and supporting reform of state and local government. 
2 
Narelli remained the exception. Few Italians achieved 
positions of political influence. The local machines doubt- 
lessly bargained with community leaders and "ward heelers" for 
the "Italian vote" at elections, but the price paid for that 
support must have been small. Many Italians, recent immigrants 
and not naturalized, were voteless. Even the enfranchised 
1Annual Report of the City Officers 191 . pp. 278-289, 
309-317, Paterson Evening News April 6 1907- 
2 Nelson and Shriner History of Paterson II pp. 127-128, 
"Henry Marelli Folder", Rutgers Alumni File - Class of. 
1897, New Jersey i+rchives, Rutgers University, Legislature 
of New Jersey 1906 pp"334,494-496, Paterson Evening News 
September 26 1906. 
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probably lacked the organization and consciousness of their 
potential bargaining power to effectively utilize it. When 
a community leader emerged he was far from assured a disciplined 
and compliant following, as Justice Robert Cortese discovered. 
Cortese was one of a handful of Italians who exercised some 
political influence. Son of an Italian saloonkeeper and 
raised in a heavily Italian neighbourhood, Cortese rose to the 
office of local Justice of the Peace. Although a position of 
no great importance it provided scope for graft, and had been 
proferred in return for service to local politicians. 
' Cortese 
had various allegiances with local politicians and community 
leaders. His assistance was often sought by Paterson's Police 
Department in its searches for Italian suspects; Cortese, in 
turn, sought appointment to the police force. Moreover Cortese's 
cousin was Joe Puglia, a contractor who had important contacts 
with local government officials. Puglia, known as "mayor" of 
Paterson's Italian colony, was like Cortese another minor 
figure in machine politics. 
On the 8th February 1907 Cortese's modest career came to 
an abrupt end. A bomb deposited in his office on Passaic 
Street blew him to pieces. 
2 
The assassination caused uproar in 
the city. It also revealed the extent to which simmering 
hostility towards Italians was never far from boiling over. 
Cortese's death was attributed to "Black Handers". His 
1State 
of New Jersey Report of the Commission of Immigration 
of the State of New Jersey 191 (Trenton, 1914pp. 105-110, 
136-137,1J5. 
ZPaterson 
Evening News February 9 1907. 
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prominence in the detection and arrests of Italian criminals 
had apparently gained him enemies. Certainly some resented 
a public career gained at the expense of fellow paesane. 
Others perhaps disliked Cortese's disregard of omerta, -the code 
of honor founded upon hostility to public authorities. On 
the murky borderline between political favors, corruption and 
organized crime, deaths such as Cortese's were perhaps to be 
expected. Nevertheless it raised a furore across the city. 
The familiar stereotypes of Italian criminality were bandied 
in the press. Citizens' meetings were convened to protest 
the murder. 
Despite an apparent unanimity of abhorrence, Henry Narelli 
clearly recognized the danger such outrage posed for his fellow 
immigrants. He was quick to refute the tag of "lawlessness". 
1 
his efforts were of little avail however. For nativist feeling 
combined not only ethnic slurs but was positively identified, 
with the activities of Italian silkworkers. The city's mill- 
hands were portrayed as anarchist hoodlums, and the murder the 
result of an "anarchist plot". Though connections between 
disorderly millhands and Cortese. 's death werefar from clear, 
rumors to the effect were pervasive. 
In the opening decade of the new century anti-Italian 
feeling assumed a new dimension, colored both by the economic 
condition of the city and by the disorderly behaviour of 
1ibid. February 11 and 12 1907. 
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immigrant millworkers. The fusion of xenophobia with concerns 
for the future of the silk industry produced a distinctive 
nativism in Paterson; and one which the Italians, lacking 
political and social influence, were particularly ill-e4 Aped 
to combat. 
The association of Italian criminality with anarchist 
activity was not novel or unique to Paterson although it 
produced there an hysteria more important for its relationship 
to local relations than to national, nativist sentiment. 
Throughout the 1890s U. S. magazines contained articles discussing 
the problem of Italian immigration, and in particular the 
violent criminal and political traditions of Mediterranean 
newcomers. Anarchists, brigands and mafiosi were frequently 
pictured as natural and mutually contented bedfellows, each 
sharing a common outlook and interest. 
1 Recent scholars of 
the Mafia have indicated otherwise. The organization acted- 
not as a breeding ground for social protest and revolt but 
rather to stifle it. It was a principal means by which southern 
Italian gabellotti controlled their tenants and share-croppers. 
2 
S. Merlino "Camorra, Maffia and Brigandage" Political 
Science Quarterly 9, September 1894 pp. 466-435; S. Cortesi 
"The Last Italian Brigand" The Independent 54, May 22 1902 
pp. 1240-1242; G. Tosti "Anarchistic Crimes" Political 
Science Quarterly 14 1899 pp. 404-417. The latter claimed 
that: "Men like Caserio, Angiolillo and Luccheni (famous 
anarchist assassins) do not become assassins because they 
are more or less imbued with the most superficial aspects 
of the theory of anarchism, but simply because they are, 
born criminals". p. 413. S. Cortesi "Anarchy InAts Birth- 
place" Independent 53, October 3 1901 pp. 2346-2340" 
2E. J. Hobsbawm Primitive Rebels: Studies in Archaic Forms 
of Social fovement in the 19th and 20th Centuries 
Planchester, 1971 ed. PP-30-56, which reviews much recent 
work on the Mafia. 
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In the ! 'nationalist nineties" such distinctions were rare. 
1 
Popular conceptions of anarchists as criminals with roots in 
the secret societies of southern Italy found expression in the 
linking of "black hand" crime with bomb, throwers. One contem- 
porary noted that in Sicily the Nafia was modelled on the 
Spanish Mano Nigra, "... claiming as its ultimate aim the 
establishment of the 'universal republic'". 
2 
In Paterson Italian lawlessness was early associated with 
striking millhands. During the industrial disorders of 1894, 
when millowner William Strange had been the target of a bomb 
plot, the Paterson Daily Press published an editorial attacking 
riotous strikers: 
"The Hoodlum is the dread of 'the police force of 
any city where disturbances of the peace are rife. 
Of late years the ranks of the Hoodlum have been 
greatly swelled by young boys brought or sent here 
from other countries, mainly from Italy, to pick 
up a living on our streets. 
They pass most of their time idling, -fighting 
and gambling. " 3 
The sentiment was echoed by Judge Hopper, who, in sentencing 
the Strange bombers, noted that: "Most, if not all, of the 
men engaged in these acts of violence were of foreign birth 
and were either blindly ignorant or wilfully regardless of 
iHigham's description in Higham Strangers in the Land 
pp. 68-105. 
2Nel. 
li The Business of Crime p. 277,. Merlino "Camoora, Naffia 
and Brigandage" p. 1. For the Black Hand in Spain and 
rural anarchism see G. A. Waggoner "The Black Hand Mystery: 
Rural Unrest and Social Violence in Southern Spain, 1881- 
1883" in R. J. Bezucha ed. Modern European Social History 
(Lexington, Mass.; 1972) Q* 1 1-191. 
3Paterson 
Daily Press July 10 1891. 
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the rights and privileges of free American citizens". 
1 
Although "foreign born' anarchists" were spotlighted as the, 
activists, in the 1894 disorders, they were not yet identifiably 
Italian. No "Black Hand" was seen to have lit the fuse of 
the Strange bomb. 
2 Yet within a decade Paterson's Italians 
were singled out as anarchist subversives, hell-bent on wrecking 
the city's economy and the political fabric of the whole nation. 
Events in the city between 1900 and 1902 endowed such a notion 
with at least some credence. 
In July 1900 an Italian foreman at a leading Paterson 
dyehouse was shot dead by a fellow countryman, Louis Caraboni, 
who in turn killed himself. No motive for the murder was 
readily apparent but hearsay circulated in the local press. 
Caraboni, a proclaimed anarchist, was pictured as avenging 
fellow Italians fired by his victim, " a tyrant ... who respected 
nobody and maltreated his countrymen and workmen". "Secret - 
societies" and the "1. lafia" were rumored to have plotted the 
slaying. There was some suggestion that a mysterious letter 
found on Caraboni indicated that his name had been drawn in 
an anarchists' lottery to assassinate the King of Italy. 
Certainly a meeting of anarchists in a saloon on Straight Street 
did little to dispel such foreboclings. The assembled collected 
1Paterson 
Daily Guardian August 8 1894. 
`ibid. May 239 June 1,27 and 28 1894. 
4 
one hundred dollars to provide Caraboni with a fitting burial 
and proclaimed him a "hero". 
' The significance of Caraboni's 
actions became evident a week later when Gaetano ßresci, a 
fellow Italian anarchist from Paterson, assassinated King 
Humbert in northern Italy. 
A sizeable contingent of Italian anarchists and radicals 
had established themselves in Paterson since the mid-1890s. 
firesci, a silk weaver from Prato, Tuscany who had emigrated to 
Paterson in 1898, was not a prominent figure amongst them, yet 
in many respects typified the cluster of radicals in the city. 
Bresci had been arrested along with fellow activists in 1895 
following the suppression of the Fasci uprising and the Italian 
Socialist Party., Released in an amnesty he fled to America. 
2 
Similar difficulties accounted for the presence of other anar- 
chists in Paterson, many of them more eminent figures than the 
humble Tuscan. Most had arrived during the 1890s as a result 
of political persecution in Italy and, like Bresci, most 
remained engrossed in the affairs of their homeland. They 
comprised a small and secretive group, seemingly uninterested 
in American affairs and scarcely noticeable in Paterson. The 
1Paterson 
Daily Guardian July 19,20 and 24 1900, Paterson 
Daily Press July 19 and 20 1900, Newark Evening News 
July 19 and 30 1900. 
2L. 
V. Ferraris "L'Assassinio Di. Umberto IE Gli Anarchici Di 
Paterson" Hassegna Storica Del Uisorgimento 50 March 1968 
March 1968 PP-54-55, New York World Clipping, - S. Merlino 
La Uifesa Di Gaetano Uresci (Paterson, 1917). A. Cipriani 
Bresci e Savoia (Paterson, n. d. ) - all in the Labadie 
Collection, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor. 
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bulk of their energy and resources was devoted to the public- 
ation of a weekly journal, La Questione Sociale. 
Upon the arrival of these Italian dissidents the Socialist 
Labor Party sought new followers in Paterson. It gained a 
number of important supporters during the 1890s, and for a 
time Paterson's Italians seemed likely to spur a sustained 
recruitment drive amongst the nation's newcomers. The most 
prominent amongst them was I3ernadino Verro, a Socialist and 
organizer of the Sicilian fasci who arrived in America in the 
mid-J90s. Centred in Paterson, Verro travelled extensively 
throughout the Eastern States lecturing to Italian immigrants 
and organizing local branches of the S. L. P. amongst his 
countrymen. Within Paterson his work focused upon recruiting 
Italians to the flourishing (in the 1890s) S. L. Y. local, and 
more importantly, editing I1 Proletario, the Italian language 
journal of the party. For a time Verre's efforts promised 
rewards. "The movement in Paterson is going on very well", 
a. local Italian wrote to, Henry Kuhn, secretary of the S. L. Y. 
in May 1897. The Paterson Italian section had purchased a 
bookstore and were using profits from it to finance their 
journal. i 
Verro was assisted by Camillo Cianfarra, Dino Itondani 
1Verro to Kuhn February 16 1697 S. L. 1'. Papers Box 14/4, 
Cianfarra to Kuhn May 1st 1897 S. L. P. Papers Box 26/2 - 
S. L. P. 't'apers, Wisconsin State Historical Society, Madison. 
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and a handful of political emigres from the textile towns 
of northern Italy. Most were veterans of the Italian leagues 
of resistance. Cianfarra, a Roman and experienced journalist, 
was a former correspondent of the New York Times, and 1-tondani 
was a lawyer long associated with labor and the Italian 
Socialists. 1 Their work was confined to propaganda, and their 
orientation-always across the Atlantic towards Italy. Although 
some were active in local textile strikes, they expended the 
bulk of their energy on exposing oppression in their homeland, 
raising funds for political prisoners, and combatting the 
vitriol of fellow Italian anarchists in Paterson. 
2 
By the 
end of the decade the local branch of the S. L. P. was disbanded. 
Verro and Mondani returned to Italy, I1 Yroletario was bankrupt 
and moved to New York, under the editorship of Cianfarra. 
3 
Significantly the eclipse of these socialists signalled the 
ascendancy of the anarchist movement amongst Paterson's 
Italian milihands. 
Paterson attracted almost every leading Italian anarchist 
during the latter half of the 1890s. By the turn of the century 
the city was popularly described as the center of the Italian 
anarchist movement. 
l} 
Errico Malatesta, Saveiro Dlerlino, 
IA. M. Martellone Una Little Italy Nell' Atene U'America: 
La CommunitÄ Italiana di Boston dal 1880 al 1920 (Napoli, 
1973) PP-151 157, La Parola del I'o polo Cinquantisimo 
Anniversario IX December 1958-January 1959 pp-136--13389 
La Questione Sociale December 15-. 1896. 
2La Parola del Popolo pp. 136-138, % Altarelli "'liIstory 'of the 
Italian Colony of Paterson N. J. " pp. 6-7, Cianfarra to Kuhn 
June 9 1898 Box 21/2, Ferri to Kuhn November 23 1898 
Box 23/8 S. L. P. Papers. 
3Cianfarra 
to Kuhn August 24 1898 and September 21 1898 
Box 22/7 S. L. P. Papers, La Parola del Yopolo PP-138-1110- 
4 
F. II. Nichols "The Anarchists in Avierica" Outlook 6ý 
August 10 1901 pp. 859-863, Woodcock AnargITTM pp. 315-351" 
ý4ý 19 
Giuseppe Ciancabilla, Pietro Gori, Luigi Galleani, all came 
to the city to work on La Questione Sociale. They were joined 
by Pedro Esteve, a Spanish anarchist soon to assume a prominent 
role amongst them. Meeting regularly, in a saloon on Straight 
Street, their activities were felt principally in their home- 
land to which their journal was directed, and amongst the 
other radical groups seeking recruits amongst the'city's 
Italians. Until liresci's desperate act they scarcely merited 
attention. Armed with the grandiose title "I1 Gruppo 
Uiritto 
All'Esistenza" - The Group With the Hight to Existence - they 
devoted their resources to publishing their journal and a 
score of anarchist pamphlets. Discussion groups and lectures 
were arranged, dances and picnics organized. For a time an 
anarchist theater group staged productions. 
' Much energy was 
expended in ideological rivalries both with Italian socialists 
in the city, and within the group itself. Nalatesta, who 
edited La Wuestione Sociale during 1898 and 1899 entered into 
a strained dispute with Ciancabilla which resulted in the 
latter moving to West Hoboken to establish his own following 
and rival journal, L'Aurora. A subsequent attempt on Nalatesta's 
life suggests the depth of emotion these disputes could provoke. 
2 
1La Questione Sociale September 30 1895, August 15 1896, 
October 15, November 15 1896. Ferraris "L'Assassino" 
PP-49,52. 
2A. 
Uorghi 1rrico Nalatesta (Milano, n. d. ) pp. 128-138, 
N. Nettlau Frrico Nalatesta (New York, n. d. ) pp. 255-256, 
U. redeli, Giuseppe Giancabilla (Imola, 1965) Pp"38-53, 
Altarelli "History of the Italian Colony of Paterson N. J. " 
pp. 6-8. 
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Scarcely the same energy characterized efforts to organize 
Italian textile hands. During 1897 "una legs di resistenza" 
was formed, with Esteve preaching "necessita dells organizza- 
zione operaia", during strikes in the mills. 
l As with most 
silkworkers' organizations "la legal' appears to have dis- 
appeared with the termination of the disputes. If it survived 
only a nucleus of committed activists could be numbered. 
Certainly "la legal' created no undue concern amongst Paterson's 
millowners. 
With the assassination of King Humbert Paterson's anarchist 
community was catapulted into public view. Immediately 
federal secret service agents and Italian government spies 
descended on the city as fantastic stories of plots and con- 
spiracies in Paterson and all over New Jersey proliferated. 
The radicals' flagrant disregard of public outrage at the murder 
scandalized newspaper readers throughout America. "Girl 
anarchist proud of Bresci" a New York World headline proclaimed 
- "Queen of Paterson 'Reds' Calls Him a Martyr and Says All 
Kings and Oppressors Should Be Killed As Was Humbert". Al- 
though claiming no prior knowledge of the assassins' intentions 
anarchist spokesmen stoutly refused to condemn Bresci. Only 
when newspapermen questioned whether President McKinley 
deserved a similar fate did they balk. Nevertheless rumors 
1 'La Q. Sociale June 30, July 30, August 15, 
and November 15 
. 
1897. =, ' 
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of a presidential assassination circulated. 
1 Fear of alien 
subversives which had previously gripped only the city's silk 
manufacturers now assumed proportions hitherto unknown. 
Local papers and city authorities took, or at least 
articulated a more level-headed view of Paterson's Italians. 
Until Bresci's thunderbolt they were only dimly aware of the 
impassioned politics of the Italian colony. They had even 
less reason, and probably inclination, to interfere with the 
Italian community. Contempt for Italians, after all, bred 
disgust and the desire to maintain a respectable distance from 
the colony. Local politicians and police officers asserted 
their ignorance of anarchist plots. Moreover they strenuously 
denied the irresponsible, and often unfounded, claims of the 
New York press. Some no doubt feared that vengeance directed 
against the city's Italians might lead to more odious reper- 
cussions. ' The city authorities wished to dispel the hysteria 
surrounding Paterson. The city was only slowly recovering 
from economic depression during the preceding decade. Its 
iron and locomotive industry had been decimated, and the silk 
industry had not escaped worrying setbacks. Unruly strikers, 
industrial upheaval and an exodus of mill owners already 
composed a sorry picture. Paterson simply couldn't afford 
further troubles. "Red City", a haven for foreign radicals 
1Newark 
Evening News August 4 1900, New'York Times August 
3 1900, Paterson Evening News August 2 1900, New York 
World clipping in Labadie Collection. Ferraris "L' 
Assassino" pp. 61-62. 
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in which law and order was maintained only at the behest of 
subversive "secret societies", was hardly the reputation 
savored by local boosters. Further notoriety might bring 
complete commercial stagnation. 
Paterson's Italians were "model neighbours and pain- 
staking citizens with a wide and careful outlook for the 
future of their children and for the good of the whole town", 
the Paterson Evening News announced. This view was re- 
iterated by Paterson's city government. "Beyond a few strikes", 
Mayor Ninchcliffe proclaimed, "we have had no particular trouble 
with the five thousand Italians who live in the city". 
1 
A 
public service in commemoration of the deceased monarch and 
attended by over a thousand of the city's Italians seemed to 
support the mayor's assessment. The congregated were "the 
better class of Italian resident", a local journal noted, and 
clearly hostile to the anarchist element seen to have "laughed 
derisively" outside the church. 
2 The Paterson press were 
anxious to diminish the apparent influence of the anarchists on 
the city's Italians by picturing them as a minority of des- 
perate radicals shunned by the vast bulk of their countrymen. 
Significantly the characterization of the anarchists by 
Paterson's ruling elite reflected familiar ethnic stereotypes 
that had long been in vogue amongst nativists, and which could 
1Paterson 
Evening News July 31 and august 1 1900. 
2 
Paterson Evening News August 10 and 13 1900. 
I 'z3 
be easily extended to embrace the entire Italian community. 
The anarchists are "... an absolute dancer to the lives of 
the people of this community", the press bellowed, "... a 
murderous and bloody" collection of "Stiletto carriers and 
blood loving swarthy devils". 
1 
1: vents during the next two 
years would provide the excuse for stigmatizing the whole 
Italian community as such. 
In the summer of 1901 President McKinley was assassinated 
by an anarchist in Buffalo, New York. Paterson's Italian 
anarchists were an obvious and immediate object of suspicion 
as a wave of anti-radical sentiment swept the nation. The 
New Jersey legislature rushed through an anti-anarchist 
statute, making "the advocacy of hostility or opposition to 
any and all government", punishable by up to fifteen years 
imprisonment. It gave the city authorities leave to harass 
and suppress radical gatherings in the city,. and contributed 
to a growing swell of anti-Italian sentiment. 
2 
The presidential assassination acted as a catalyst on 
the worst fears of Paterson's administrators. In the year 
between the slaying of King Humbert and L"cKinley's death, 
opposition to the city's Italians does not appear to have 
1ibid. July 31 1900. 
2S. Fine "Anarchism and the Assassination of McKinley" 
American Historical Review LX July 1955 PP"777-799, 
Free Society November 11 1902, January 24 1904, March 27 
1904, Wm. Preston Jr. Aliens and Dissenters; Federal 




intensified appreciably despite a charged industrial situation 
in Paterson. In the early months of 1901 strikes and attendant 
disorders broke out throughout the silk industry, principally 
in the ribbon trade. Although Italians were prominent strikers 
in Paterson they were joined by weavers of all nationalities 
and consequently not singled out for special attention. To 
be sure millowners attempted to use nativist prejudices to 
their own advantage, but they were largely unsuccessful. 
"So many of our former weavers are American-born men and 
women", a manufacturer uttered in mock incredulity, "... and 
that these should support a movement so un-American in spirit 
must be due to the fact that they have been hoodwinked as to 
the real cause of their leaving their work". 
1 
In seeking 
defectors from the ranks of strikers he was wasting his breath. 
Italians did not feature as strike leaders, nor could they 
reasonably be accused of "hoodwinking" their fellow workers. 
The anarchist community maintained a notably low profile 
throughout the turmoil. 
To work against strikers' interests, blind prejudice 
needed more to feed on than the vagaries of a millowner's 
tortured imagination. On the contrary the strike was con- 
ducted in the pattern traditional in Paterson. Its conduct 
moreover indicated the extent to which anti-Italian feeling 
was submerged beneath the much clearer class concerns of the 
1NJBS 
Twenty Fourth Annual Report 1901 p. 443. 
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city's workers. When millowners obtained a court injunction 
restraining disorderly strikers a number of Italians were 
arrested. Immediately silkworkers rallied to their defense, 
lobbying city authorities to restrain police from implementing 
the directive. The Paterson Board of Aldermen responded by 
passing a city ordinance permitting picketing. Moreover 
William Hughes, attorney for the arrested strikers, was 
subsequently elected to the state assembly the following year, 
largely on the strength of his spirited defense of the silk- 
workers. 
l Both instances suggest class'rather than ethnic 
considerations were to the fore during the dispute and its 
immediate aftermath, despite the prominence of Italians on 
the picket lines and in the court dock. The increasing number 
of new immigrants in the silk industry had not yet eroded the 
traditional power of the city's millhands. 
McKinley's killing took place towards the'end of the 1901 
strike, and the resulting "Red Scare" was not without effect 
in shifting the allegiances of millworkers. Sensational 
accounts of Paterson's anarchists made good copy in the national 
journals. Although one report indicated that local radicals 
"... had little in-common with the rest of the Italian popul- 
ation in Paterson", most were less discerning. Typical of 
ibid. pp. 444-1i50, National Labor Standard June 27, August 8 
and November 8 1902, Nelson and Shriner History of Paterson 
III Pp. 348-349. 
"'' G 
the macabre excesses struck by the majority was a report in 
the Outlook magazine in August 1901. "This club of assassins", 
it ran, "appears to us even more gruesome than the 'suicide 
club' which Robert Louis Stevenson's imagination created". 
' 
If the writer's imagination appeared no less creative than 
Stevenson's his concerns were more commonplace. 
This rampant national hysteria left sour traces on rel- 
ations between English-speaking; workers and Italians in 
Paterson's factories. Following King Humbert's death demands 
for the firing of Italian weavers had been bandied about, and 
an unfortunate few had suffered. 
2 Now the call was revived, 
by Lnglish-speaking workers. The loomfixers union, a small 
but influential body in the local trades assembly, initiated 
the forming of a committee to protest against the employment 
of "... alleged anarchists in a local mill". One of its members 
complained that "... while he was working he saw many Italian. 
3 
workers wearing Bresci buttons inside their coats". 
Deteriorating relations between Italians and. English- 
speaking workers were fully revealed in the dyehouse strike 
of 1902. This was the first industrial dispute in the city 
that was identifiably Italian. Italians had quickly replaced 
older groups of Dutch, Germans and Irish as helpers to skilled 
1Outlook 68 August 10 1901 pp. 860,844. 
2New York Times august 4 1900. 
3American 
Silk Journal December. 1901. 
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dyers, and by 1902 formed the bulk of the workforce. Initially 
the strike - for higher wages - appeared little different from 
many before. There were the usual disorders, attacks on 
blacklegs, stoning of mills and skirmishes with the police, 
but apart from a few uneasy days during April when police 
officers had exchanged gunfire with strikers, the dispute was 
unremarkable. 
1 1)yeshop owners tried to use anti-Italian 
nativism to win public support for their position. They 
condemned the "lawless and outrageous" behaviour of the helpers, 
who, they characterized as men of "... much less intelligence 
and character than the dyers, and also much more turbulent. 
They are largely Italians, and almost exclusively foreigners". ` 
Even so not until June 1902, when the dispute assumed new 
proportions, did the owners'claims win much support. 
In that month the helpers went on a wild rampage throughout 
Paterson's mill districts, wrecking mills and machinery, 
savagely beating both blacklegs and police officers. The 
riot followed a mass meeting addressed by Luigi Galleani and 
other anarchist spokesmen, both Italian and English-speaking. 
Anarchists had acted as spokesmen for the dyeworkers through- 
out the dispute. Johann }lost, William A1acQueen an English 
anarchist, and Rudolf Grossmann, of Austrian origin, had all 
travelled regularly to the city from New York to address 
1Paterson Daily Guardian April 22 and 23.1902,.: New'York 
Times April 23,24 and 26 1902. 
`American Silk Journal May 1902. 
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strike-meetings. 
1 The local anarchist group performed a 
similar function. Although the English-speaking workers were 
represented during the strike by James McGrath, organizer of 
the dyeworkers' union, their inability to settle the dispute 
led to the anarchists assuming increasing prominence as strike 
leaders. What precisely prompted the riot was never estab- 
lished. MacQueen, McGrath and Galleani all spoke at a mass 
meeting of strikers, before the assembled, with Galleani at 
their-head, converged on the mills. Deaths followed as 
police exchanged gunfire with rioters. Mayor Ilinchcliffe was 
2 
forced to summon the state militia before order was restored. 
In the aftermath of the. 1902 strike anti-Italian feeling 
reached fever pitch. The riot was presented as "remarkable" 
even "in (Paterson's) long career of lawless deeds". Moreover 
it was attributed almost wholly to the Italians and their 
anarchist leaders. "The elements which have made Paterson 
the center of Anarchism in this country seemed to have temporary 
control", one commentator noted. Galleani was pictured as the 
chief villain. "Nad Riot in the Streets of Paterson: Anarchist 
urged them on to Madness" ran the New York Times headline. 
"Many of the former companions of 13resci" were identified 
among the rioters. Inevitably it was Italians, rather than 
1Freiheit (New York) April 26 and June 14 1902., 
2New York Times June 19 1902, American Silk Journal-June 1902. 
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dyeworkers- as such, who suffered most from the backlash 
following the strike. 
The anarchist strike leaders were jailed or forced to 
flee the city as Hinchcliffe pledged to destroy the "anarchist 
element", a mission "... he would accomplish (even) if every 
Italian in town had to be driven out". 
1 
Apparently the 
anarchist minority amongst the city's Italians had become a 
majority. Whereas only a year before city authorities had 
cooperated with English-speaking workers in nullifying an 
injunction granted to the city's manufacturers, Paterson's 
mayor now linked arms with millowners in suppressing disorderly 
strikers. Whilst soldiers and private guards protected mill 
buildings, houses in the Italian section of town were "ran- 
sacked from cellar to attic" (luring police raids for arms or 
other incriminating evidence. Plainclothes detectives scoured 
the Straight Street district, center of anarchist activity, 
whilst others sought to infiltrate the dyeworkers union. 
Meetings of Italian millhands were. broken up.. A local printer 
of La (uestione Sociale, the Italian radical journal, was 
prevented from publishing. The anarchists were subsequently 
forced to move their journal "underground" and publish 
secretly. Galleani, sought by the police, fled the city. 
2 
The English-speaking workers' reaction to the strike and 
its suppression was equivocal. Whilst they condemned the 
New York Times June 
1902, Outlook 71, J 
The Case of William 
Liberated (Trenton, 
2New York Times June 
19,23 1902, Freiheit June 28, July 5 
une 28 1902 pp. 522-523, A. W. Wishart 
DlcQueen: Reasons Wh lie Should Be 
1905 PP-3---1171-- 
24,25,27 and 29 1902. 
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presence of militia in the city, they were reluctant to present 
a united front with the Italian dyeworkers. James McGrath, 
mindful that the strike was still in progress and that mill- 
owners had established an important precedent in obtaining 
municipal support for resisting strikers, assailed the state 
troopers as "lazy loafers", content to lounge and smoke the 
day long, and "a disgrace to the police force". There were 
fears that the whole silk workforce would refuse to work under 
armed protection, as workers claimed "it makes them feel as 
if they were 'scabs"'. But if. traditional hostility to mill- 
owners and militia died hard, opposition to Italians was 
equally vociferous. McGrath, who was "in tears" at news of 
the riot, remained indignantly aloof from the Italian strikers. 
His attitude. was made, plain at a strike meeting following the 
disorders,. when a rioter, identified by a detective in the 
audience, was hauled away to police headquarters. The crowd 
jeered the police, but McGrath quietened them in an instant: 
"Sit down and act like men", he admonished. "If he is wanted 
for doing any rioting he deserves to be arrested for the 
demonstration was a disgrace". The English-speaking dyeworkers 
split from the Italians, and at subsequent meetings of silk- 
workers the city's weavers refused to call a general walkout 
from the mills in support of the dyeworkers. 
1 
1New York Times June 19,20,23,25 and 27 1902. 
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The 'events of 1902 composed a sad picture and marked the 
increasing alienation of Italian silkworkers from both their 
English-speaking brethren and traditional supporters of the 
city's millhands. As Italian newcomers continued to fill 
Paterson's factories during the ensuing decade the rift 
deepened. Harassment of the Italian radical community con- 
tinued. Nillowners saw the advantage of a "red scare" which 
could be used in disciplining and checking the demands of 
unruly workers. City administrators and business leaders 
anxious to demonstrate Paterson's attractiveness as a commer- 
cial location, resolved to root out the evil in their midst. 
Intensified policing of the city! s Italian neighborhoods was 
one result. In 1906 rumors that Paterson's anarchists were 
again involved in an assassination plot against King Victor 
Emmanuel of Italy brought secret servicemen to the city and a 
well publicized investigation by Police Chief liimson. 
1 More 
demonstrative was the hounding of Italian radicals and the 
suppression of La Questione Sociale. 
2 "The fair name of the 
city", had been brought into serious question by the anarchist 
1Paterson Evening News November 14, 
2The 
suppression of the journal was 
with the surveillance of anarchist 
the Immigration Bureau, the Secret 
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publication, Paterson's Mayor McBride explained in justifying 
his decision, a matter which has "... been the cause of great 
financial loss to this City and deep mortification and regret 
to its citizens". The Mayor contended that: 
"Statistics prove this city to be one of the most 
orderly in the world... crimes which would not have 
been noticed in other places were magnified when 
they occurred in Paterson, and the world held its 
hands up in horror at the tales of our wickedness 
which were told.... 
With the aid of the President of the United States 
and the National Government the newspaper was sup- 
pressed, anarchistic meetings dispersed by a quiet 
word from the man in blue with a night-stick in 
his belt, and the worst of the group driven from 
our City.... 
This is Yaterson's, answer to the cruel slanders 
which have so grievously hurt and injured her". 1 
0 
1Annual Report of the Cit Officers 1907-1908 pp. 41-44, 
L. Gaminita Free Country (Paterson, n. d. ) pp. 21-29, 
Paterson Daily Guardian February 28 1912. 
I. runicipal cards in rateruon 1905-1915 
I 
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Chapter Six 
THE POLITICS OF MUNICIPAL REFORM 
The structure of local government in many American cities 
pre-dated their emergence as large-scale industrial and urban 
centres. Paterson was no exception. Granted a city charter 
in the 1850s, its machinery of government was comprised 
essentially of an executive in the person of mayor who rep- 
resented the city at large and a board of aldermen directly 
elected from several wards. Ultimate responsibility for both 
the long term development and day-to-day functioning of the 
city was their combined task. The mayor and aldermen were 
overseers of taxation, education, public health and essential 
services. To them fell the task of appointing city officials 
to superintend the everyday business of the city - from tax 
assessors down to police officers and even alms-house assis- 
tants. Their duties were all-embracing and, with rapid urban 
and industrial expansion in the latter half of the nineteenth 
century, increasing. 
A leading urban historian has characterized this partic- 
ular form of government as reflecting the "decentralized" 
pattern of urban development in American industrializing cities. 
1 
Prior to industrialization cities were "pedestrian communities" 
in which the "geographical separation" of social groups and 
different classes "was not as sharp as it became in the late 
S. P. Hays "The Changing Political Structure of the City 
in Industrial America" Journal of Urban History 1 
November 1974 pp. 6-38. 
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nineteenth century". Early city government reflected the 
"integrated community". City councils were generally elected 
at town meetings, and "invariably they were composed of men 
dominant in the community's social and economic life - 
bankers, commission merchants, lawyers". 
With rapid industrialization and urbanization differen- 
tiation and decentralization in social and economic life 
emerged. Ethnic subcommunities replaced the integrated 
community. Heightened class and occupational divisions found 
their counterpart in increased social and residential segreg- 
ation. Moreover a "decentralized political system" appeared 
in response to these social and economic realities. Each 
city sub-community demanded its own representation, and 
obtained it in the ward-elected alderman. Only the office of 
mayor survived as the expression of city-wide political life; 
and a mayor's room for manoeuvre was circumscribed by the, 
often, parochial interests of local aldermen. Embodying both 
the traditional concern with "checks and balances" and the 
dictum "no taxation without representation", it was a system 
true to the ideals of America's founding fathers. If cumber- 
some, and later to be condemned as inefficient and corrupt by 
urban reformers, the ward system had the virtue of making city 
government responsive to large sectors of the electorate. 
Changes in the form of-government altered the kinds of 
men elected as city fathers. Increasingly ward politicians 
reflected the ethnic and occupational backgrounds of their. 
constituencies. As Samuel Hays noted; °"By='1900, 'the typical 
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ward-elected city councilman was a small businessman-retailer, 
director of a funeral home, real estate promoter and contractor, 
director of a community bank - a'clerk, a skilled artisan, or 
an unskilled laborer. Professional and large business classes 
were greatly outnumbered". 
1 Although many of these local "pot 
house politicians" were products of a city "machine" and 
engaged in a variety of corrupt practices usually costly to 
their electors, they were, at the same time and of necessity, 
never far divorced from the interests of their communities. 
In the burgeoning industrial centres that mushroomed across 
19th century America they proved wonderfully enduring. 
2 Both 
the factory novice and the recently arrived immigrant found a 
spokesman and symbol in their local alderman, and frequently a 
means of easing the transition to a new way of life. 
Not surprisingly it was men of this breed who emerged as 
officeholders in Paterson's city government during the final 
quarter of the nineteenth century. Despite the economic 
dominance of silk manufacturing in the city, millowners were 
sparsely rep es 
ed 
at City Hall. Only one millowner occupied 




a recent, account of machine politics and its demise 
under the impact of urban reform see Z. L. Miller Boss Cox's 
Cincinnati: Urban Politics in the Progressive Era (New 
York, 1968). Elsewhere however the machine and its 
supporters sometimes proved very adaptive and survived 
the progressive refashioning of city government. See 
D. D. McKean The Boss: The Hague Machine in Action., (Bostong 
1940). An even more remarkable, but certainly atypical, 
example was the Daley machine in Chicago. See M. Royko 
'Boss: 'Richard J. Daley of Chicago (New York, '1971)" 
3Noble "The Relation of the Middle Classes" pp. 75-85" 
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born and celebrated pioneer of the U. S. silk industry, headed 
the city government in the late 1860s. His term of office 
did not, however, herald an era of millowning mayors. Ryle 
was an exception. He had settled in Paterson long before the 
arrival of most millowners and the city's development as the 
nation's silk manufacturing centre. Moreover in the course of 
his career Ryle had become something of a celebrity, closely 
identified with the civic and commercial growth of Paterson. 
1 
No other silk manufacturer-possessed a similar standing or 
popularity, and none equalled Ryle's political success. 
Paterson's mayors included lawyers, store-owners, brewers and 
manufacturers connected with the ailing iron industry. Whilst 
no silk worker headed the municipal government, many mayors had 
begun their careers that way, or in other manual occupations, 
including John Ryle. Benjamin Buckely, mayor from 1875-1878, 
was the closest silk interests came to the coveted chair of 
chief city custodian. Buckely ran a spindle-making concern 
in the city, supplying first the cotton industry and later 
silk mills with machinery. 
2 But a host of leading millowners, 
including William Strange, Catholina Lambert and Jacob Weidmann 
never even got their names onto the ballot sheet. 
Election to the board of aldermen proved no more attain- 
able to millowners. Between 1871 and 1909 only three served 
as ward representatives. Typically, neighbourhood politicians 
were just what their description suggests: local storekeepers 
or - community. businessmen, skilled workers and unskilled factory 
ý fý . 
1 Clayton and Nelson History of Bergen and Passaic Counties pp 465-468. 
2ibid. 
pp. 441. 
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hands. 1 Aldermen were often "machine" candidates, and also 
closely identified-by their ethnic ties. They were elected 
with the official backing-of their party's "bosses" and decked 
with the colours of the local ethnic community. After polls 
closed a successful candidate would be chaired through the 
streets of his neighborhood, proceeded by the regalia of a 
marching brass band. In the 7th and 8th wards it was Paterson's 
Irish Democrats who usually called the tune; in the 1st and 
2nd wards Englishmen, Dutchmen and Germans acted in like 
fashion. But both the political and ethnic affiliations of 
ward voters were overlaid with class interests. A majority of 
the "Dubliners" in the 8th ward were iron and silkworkers, 
whose support for the city's Democratic machine depended upon 
a mutual recognition of their occupational interests. Thus 
could workingmen be elected to the board of aldermen. Even 
when not, the extent to which Paterson's wards were heavily 
dominated by working class electors, meant their influence was 
seldom ignored, at least on issues directly affecting their 
livelihoods. 
The backgrounds and interests of successive city fathers 
indicate the problems silk manufacturers faced in their rela- 
tions with city government. Repeatedly, during strikes, city 
governors rebuffed millowners' demands for official support for 
their. cause. Instead both mayors and aldermen maintained a 
strict, neutrality during industrial disputes,,, knowing full well 
1R. A. Noble "Relation of the'-'Middle' Classes"'pp. 101-103. 
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that short of police protection and municipal sanction silk 
manufacturers were powerless to effectively combat strikers. 
Similarly millowners discovered the attitude of city officers 
to be equally unfavourable to their longer term interests. 
Millowners complained vigorously and persistently at the lack 
of municipal inducement to invest in new plant and machinery. 
City taxes on industrial machinery and mill buildings dis- 
couraged industrial expansion. Moreover municipal revenues 
were not spent on improving the city as an industrial location, 
but used instead to support the corrupt dealings of local 
politicians. Elsewhere millowners could expect local govern- 
ments that were responsive to their welfare, providing low 
interest loans, attractive sites for new mills and exemptions 
from taxation. Short of municipal commitment to their aims, 
many silk manufacturers found the advantages of re-location too 
attractive to pass up. 
The immediate effects of the millowners' exodus on 
Paterson's city government in the 1880s and 1890s were not 
dramatic. For one thing, its full significance was masked by 
the continued expansion of the local silk industry and, -with 
it, the city as a whole. Moreover in the propaganda war between 
local promoters and migrating manufacturers, reports of problems 
in the silk annexes led some to suggest that Paterson's 
industrial pre-eminence was not seriously threatened. Probably 
more important was the lack of common interest between millowners 
and city officials., Storekeepers,. real,. estate agents and the 
like'- typical Paterson aldermen: - did not. share: silk: >,: 
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manufacturers' grievances against the city's tax load or 
against its troublesome workforce. They only appreciated that 
a shift in taxation from millowners would increase their own 
burden. Nor were they susceptible to scaremongering directed 
at unruly millhands. Many had intimate connections in the 
city's working class neighbourhoods; were dependent upon 
millhands'earnings for their own livelihoods; and often proved 
valuable supporters to strikers during periods of industrial 
strife. They recognized workers' passions to be directed 
almost exclusively against their employers. Attacks on 
property and persons during strikes were confined to mills and 
blacklegs. It was seldom any third party suffered. Moreover 
the penalty for city officials who ignored workers' interests 
was political boycott. The structure of local government 
placed the city's politicians in a position of popular access- 
ibility, and with it responsibilities to their. constituents 
which they could not easily shirk. 
In the quarter century before America's entry into the 
First World War the movement for political reform transformed 
the structure and personnel of government in many American 
states and cities. Popularized as the "progressive" movement, 
it reached its fullest expression in the national Progressive 
Party, founded and led by Theodore Roosevelt'in the 1912 
presidential election. Although the Bull Moosers were defeated 
at the polls, and as a recognizable party scarcely survived 
the decade, at, the state and local level they had already 
achieved notable success prior to Roosevelt's candidacy. 
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Although political reform was a prominent cause amongst 
progressives, their attention embraced a spectrum of economic 
and social evils, and included a stricter regulation and 
humanization of industrial and civic relations. 
' Municipal 
re-organization was from the outset subsumed in this much 
broader vision of reform. 
"Middle class" and "old-stock" was the characterization 
of the typical progressive offered by Richard Hofstadter in 
the 1950s, in a widely-read analysis of the reform impulse. 
2 
Hofstadter claimed the "movement" obtained much support from 
middle-class intellectuals and professionals. Their concern 
with political and social abuses was motivated by their 
declining status in the maturing industrial economy of the 
late 19th century. Such men were for the most part old-stock 
Protestants, adherents to the ancient American ideals expressed 
in Jacksonian democracy. In a society increasingly dominated 
by big business, organized labor and political machines they 
felt dismayed and helpless. The "progressive movement" 
reflected their intent to both correct the abuses of industrial 
America and to return government to its "true" state of 
republican democracy. Reform of these dimensions required more 
active and direct intervention by the state in the everyday 
functioning of American society. It resulted in 
,a 
vast body 
of "progressive" legislation, the growth of state. regulatory 
G. Mowry The California Progressives (Berkeley 1951) and 
The Era of Theodore Roosevelt (New York, 1958). -- 2R. Hostadter The Age of Reform: From Bryan to F. D. R. 
(New York, 1955) partic. pps. 131-271. 
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agencies, and marked the transformation from "laisser-faire" 
to "corporate" capitalism in America. 
Recent historians of the Progressive era have raised 
important correctives to the "status" interpretation of 
Hofstadter. Samuel Hays has pictured reform as reflecting 
the "integrative tendencies" inherent in urban development 
from 1900 onwards. 
1 Whereas in the early nineteenth century 
"production technologies" which "substituted machines for 
manual labor" had given rise to the decentralized city and 
its characteristic working class neighbourhoods, now new 
"organizational technologies" predominated and "dramatically 
increased the speed and flexibility of human contacts". The 
telephone, new modes of transport and expanded, specialized 
management activities all required and made possible larger 
units of administration. City-wide organization replaced 
localized, neighbourhood groupings. Characteristic community 
units - the local school board, neighbourhood political clubs, 
retail outlets, commercial houses and professional elites - 
were replaced by city-wide institutions and elites. Admin- 
istrators, businessmen and their clienteles expanded and united. 
Centralized and specialized units usurped the functions of 
localized institutions. The "... new political order arose 
to limit the variety of (localized) claims, to channel them 
into fewer centres of decision-making, and to integrate more 
S. P. Hays "The Changing Political Structure": pp. 16-25, 'and 
also Hays Conservation and the-Gospel of Efficiency 
(Cambridge, 1959). 
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activities into a , relatively small number of systems of human 
relationships". For Hays the impetus behind progressive 
reform arose not'from a disenchanted, status conscious middle- 
class but from businessmen, professionals, such as education- 
alists and health experts, and the "urban upper class", all 
with a vested interest in city-wide units of administration. 
This "urban upper class", which had dominated political life 
in pre-industrial cities, now re-emerged, because "... by 
the early twentieth century they had learned new methods of 
integrative control from their experience with corporate 
systems". Progressive reform of city government "marked the 
re-entrance into political life of members of the upper class 
after several decades of relative absence". 
l 
Hays' interest in the influence of technological change 
and business leadership upon progressive reform featured 
strongly in James Weinstein's and Gabriel Kolko's revisions 
of the "status" explanation. 
2 Both have dwelt upon the trans- 
formation of the U. S. economy from laisser-faire to corporate 
capitalism. They have focused upon measures sponsored and 
supported by business interests to regulate economic and social 
life. Such regulation, they contend, was designed to both 
increase the control of corporate interests whilst at the same 
time disarming critics of the capitalist system. They reach 
ibid. 
pp. 16,24.1 See also the two important studies by 
R. H. Wiebe Businessmen and Reform: A Study of the"Pro- 
, gressive 
Movement Harvard, 1962)-and The Search for Order 
1877-1920 (New York, 1967). 
2J. 
Weinstein The Corporate Ideal in the Liberal State 
1900-1918 (Boston, 1968), G. Kolko The Triumph of Con- 
servatism (New York, 1963)" 
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similar conclusions that, in the words of Weinstein, ".... 
liberalism in the Progressive Era was the product, consciously 
created, of the leaders of giant corporations and financial 
institutions that emerged astride American society in the 
last years of the nineteenth century.... "1 
Other historians of the Progressive Era, attracted less 
by, corporate involvement in legislative programmes, have 
attacked Hofstadter's emphasis upon the old-stock and middle 
class origins of reform and reformers. 
2 They have demonstrated 
that, in many urban centres, progressives reflected the indus- 
trial and immigrant backgrounds of their constituents. It 
was not uncommon for urban politicians, with workingmen's 
support and often themselves of lower class origins, to sponsor 
and support. reform measures. Indeed these urban progressives 
were more often than not machine politicians. They contributed 
to the reform movement a lower class dimension and impetus 
hitherto overlooked. 
That such widely divergent interpretations of the Pro- 
gressive Era should arise need surprise no-one for this reform 
movement of the early 20th century was no less amorphous than 
others of its kind. Under the umbrella of "reform" the move- 
ment attracted a variety of supporters, each with their own 
1Weinstein Corporate Ideal p. xv. 
2J. J. Ituthmacher "Urban Liberalism and the, Age of Reform" 
Mississippi lley Historical Review` LXIX'September_1962 
pp. 231-2 1, J. D. BuenkerUrban Liberalism and Progressive,.,. 
Reform-'(New York, ' 1973) .. 
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particularist concerns, and not all necessarily sharing common 
goals. The very success of "progressive liberalism" doubtlessly 
depended upon its ability to accommodate divergent interests. 
Only then could it obtain the mass support necessary for its 
varied aims. 
New Jersey was an important centre of Progressive reform. 
Exposed by "muckrakers" as "home" of the trusts, with its 
legislature pictured in the pockets of corporation magnates, 
the state received inordinate attention from reformers. More- 
over a highly urbanized and industrialized region, it appeared 
ripe-for progressive renewal. The New Jersey progressives 
engineered several sweeping successes in the first decade of 
the new century. A comprehensive code of labor and welfare 
legislation was introduced, and with a few exceptions success- 
fully guided through the state legislature. Anti-trust 
measures, outlawing the grosser malpractices, of corporation 
businessmen and bringing public utilities under government 
supervision, were passed. Corrupt election practices were 
prohibited, the direct election of Senators introduced along 
with civil service reform and the direct primary. 
1 
Guided by reform Governor Woodrow Wilson and George Record, 
a Yankee from Maine, New Jersey progressivism seemed to comply 
with the national characterization provided by Hofstadter. 
R. E. Noble New Jersey . Pro ressivism Before Wilson (Princeton, 19 passim, J. D. Buenker "Urban, New-Stock 
Liberalism and Progressive Reform in New Jersey" New Jersey 
History LXXXVII Summer 1969 PP"79-104. 
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Its earliest historian' certainly agreed that its motive power 
was provided by middle class concerns and supporters. 
1 More 
recently this view has been challenged. Much of the leader- 
ship and support for progressive measures came from machine 
politicians of immigrant and Catholic backgrounds. Joe Tumulty, 
raised in the Irish working class streets of Jersey City, rose 
via the city machine to become Wilson's private secretary, and 
a dogged fighter for reform. 
2 Cornelius Ford, president of 
the State Federation of Labor, James Blauvelt and Henry Marelli 
labor lawyers from Paterson, William Hughes an Irish labor 
lawyer and former millhand in Paterson, were equally important 
figures. They joined arms with progressives from Newark and 
Jersey City and gave the movement a solidly working class, 
"new stock" base. 
3 Their concerns and backgrounds are reflected 
in the labor and welfare measures adopted in the New Jersey 
statute-book. The regulation of factory hours,. lunch breaks, 
lighting and ventilation, industrial accidents, convict labor 
and the employment of women and children, composed an impor- 
tant list of advances for New Jersey's industrial toilers. 
Men such as Ford and Hughes were heirs to the mantle borne 
twenty years earlier by J. P. McDonnell and his supporters in 
'Noble New Jersey Progressivism. 
2J. ri. Blum Joe Tumulty and the Wilson Era (Yale, 1969 ed. ) 
pp. 1-19. 
3R. J., Vecoli The-People, of New Jersey (Princeton, 1965) 
pp. 168-172,13uenker "Urban, New-Stock-Liberalism" 
pp. 81-84. .: e .... _ .. , ý. ".. __., 
a.,. - .... ýý.... 
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the Trenton legislative chamber. 
l The labor and welfare 
measures they ushered in were neither the amelioration of a 
middle class or a corporate elite, designed to pacify and 
"incorporate" disenchanted factory hands. Instead they 
reflected a much longer tradition. of lower class activism and 
self-help. If McDonnell's earlier work revises the con- 
tention of a recent historian that progressive "... legislation 
designed to promote the security and welfare of the state's 
disadvantaged citizens was clearly unsurpassed", lower class 
influence on New Jersey reform was clearly important. 
2 
At the local level the impetus for reform in New Jersey 
shared similar lower class dimensions, at least in the indus- 
trialized, northern counties of the state. Paterson, an 
important centre for "New Idea" Republican progressives and 
the home of Democrat liberals, such as William Hughes, mirrored 
the various strains of the state-wide movement. It spawned a 
number of legislative representatives who took up the cause of 
reform; and more often than not measures explicitly framed to 
benefit their working class constituents. Hughes and James 
Blauvelt, the lawyers who had defended silk strikers during 
the 1901 injunction cases in the city, both took up working- 
mans' interests; Hughes in the House of Representatives and 
later the U. S. Senate, Blauvelt in the State Assembly. 3 
'McDonnell 
and Hughes were close friends in fact, -Hughes 
receiving the endorsement of the National Labor Standard 
in his electoral campaigns. See National Labor Standard 
November 8'1902, October-31904. 
2 
Buenker "Urban, New-Stock Liberalism" P-95- 
3 Legislature of N. J. 1913 p. 304, Legislature of N. J. 1909 
p. 362. 
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Blauvelt successfully introduced a bill providing compensation 
for victims of industrial accidents. He also worked to prevent 
employers' future access to strike injunctions. With the 
support of Hughes, the State Federation of Labor and Samuel 
Gompers, Blauvelt furnished a bill to limit the power of 
chancery courts to punish violations of injunctions. It was 
unsuccessful, but indicative of his sympathies and support. 
' 
Henry Marelli, former silk worker, immigrant community spokes- 
man and counsel to Italian strikers in 1913, was another 
Paterson "New-Idea" progressive elected to the state assembly 
in 1904.. Even some not elected on specifically "progressive" 
tickets advanced labor and welfare measures included under the 
general title of progressive reform. Tom McCran, a Paterson 
Republican, introduced measures guaranteeing minimum wages for 
workers on public works projects. Tom Layden, a local 
machinist, pressed the state assembly to adopt, old-age 
insurance. 2 None of these men can be easily identified as 
status-conscious Yankees or corporate leaders. Nevertheless, 
they represented an important dimension of the reform movement 
both locally and state-wide. Their careers suggest that the 
impulse for reform was rooted as much in the class concerns 
of industrial workers as in the manipulative designs of others. 
Labor and welfare legislation was not, however, the sole 
lßuenker "Urban, New-Stock Liberalism" p. 95, Noble 
New Jersey Progressivism pp. 127-129. 
2Buenker. 
"Urban, New-Stock Liberalism" pp. 92-93,, Le islature 
of N. J. 1905 p. 328, Legislature of N. J. 1910 PP-357-3589 
Legislature of N. J. 190 pp"30-309. 
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or even main thrust behind progressive reform. Regulation of 
public utilities and monopolies, democratization of the 
electoral process and, most importantly in urban centres, 
the reform and re-organization of municipal government all 
received more publicity and attention. Behind such measures 
business interests and workingmen joined forces. In localized 
settings the former may have had little in common with working 
class activists, but all shared a common vocabulary and traded 
upon a common, if diffuse, desire for "progressive" change. 
In such an atmosphere the conflicting interests of businessmen 
and workers continued to exist, but were blunted. On the face 
of it workers stood to gain by the rooting out of political 
and economic malpractice,, from civil service reform, the 
regulation of public utilities and a range of other reform 
measures. In practice however the advantages were less obvious. 
The snuffing out of corruption would, in principle, shatter 
the urban political machine. Civil service reform aimed to" 
deprive urban bosses of a major source of dispensation by which 
recruits were won and supporters rewarded. The direct primary 
would usurp the internal discipline of the machine. Neither 
measure could have endeared progressivism to workingmen. The 
prospect of a "safe job" on the fire or police service now 
appeared a distant horizon. The machine had traditionally put 
up candidates sympathetic to lower class interesta. When it 
had not, demonstrative lobbying by workingmen usually rectified 
any misunderstanding. Would the direct primary ensure pol- 
itical parties were any more responsive to lower class voters? 
'A., 
n,, 
ý.. ü"t aýý ,_.. ý. 
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Above all, the reform of municipal government - usually in the 
form of appointive commissions under the nominal jurisdiction 
of an-elected mayor replacing the old aldermanic system - 
sounded not only the death knell over the political machine, 
but threatened to remove all public officials, but one, from 
popular accountability. It was reform fraught with dire 
consequences for workingmen reliant upon municipal allies. 
The *progressive$# orchestra which played the virtues of 
"returning government to the people" must have struck a hollow 
note amongst urban wage-earners. 
Opposition from machine politicians to "good government" 
measures introduced in the state legislature was strenuous. 
A recent study has shown that some younger machine represent- 
atives, recognizing the need to "adjust to these new realities 
or cease to be viable", supported political and municipal 
reform. 
I Thus measures such as the direct election of senators 
or corrupt practices legislation received their endorsement. 
Most, however, sought to defeat or emasculate reform proposals. 
Civil service reform was defeated and a direct primary law 
only narrowly passed. Proposals to implement the commission 
form of government in New Jersey cities in 1911 met considerable 
opposition from this same urban contingent.. They amended the 
original-bill and stalled its passage so effectively that only 
the intervention of Governor Wilson assured its passage. Even 
then the law was so compromised that the adoption of city 
commissions was far from assured. 
1Buenker "Urban, New-Stock Liberalism" pp. 98-103. 
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In 1907 Paterson's municipal government was converted to 
commission rule. The revised city charter adopted in that 
year reflected a similar struggle to that existing at the 
state level between "bossism" and reformers. Nonetheless its 
enactment in Paterson differed significantly from the wider 
struggle. Commission rule came to Paterson four years prior. 
to the passage of similar legislation governing all New Jersey 
cities. It derived from state legislation specifically- 
designed to amend government in New Jersey's medium-sized 
cities. 
' The reform was proposed by a Paterson represent- 
ative, Senator John Hinchcliffe, a former city mayor. His 
bill was limited and particular in scope. It excluded the 
state's largest urban centres, where opposition to municipal 
reform was likely strongest and most effective. Proposed late 
in the legislative session, the bill's passage was orderly and 
unceremonious. Scarcely anyone seemed to pay it much 
attention. 
Hinchcliffe's shrewd framing and presentation of his 
reform bill doubtlessly assisted its passage. But political 
engineering in Trenton's legislative halls should not obscure 
the fact that Hinchcliffe and local supporters of commission 
government had fought a much longer and harder tussle to win 
community support for the measure. Why they were successful 
remains obscure. Machine politicians in the state's largest 
1Paterson Guardian April 7 1906, April 9 1907. 
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cities defeated proposals for municipal reform. Their resis- 
tance was only broken by the combined action of reformers 
throughout the state in 1911. Even in lesser New Jersey cities, 
such as Camden and Passaic, opposition to commission government 
was fierce. When a bill, proposing municipal commissions, was 
introduced in the 1906 legislative session by Paterson represen- 
tative, George Wright, it was successfully undermined by 
amendments from Camden and Passaic politicians. 
1 Paterson 
reformers remained unusual in both the initiation and espousal 
of their cause, and in their success. Their atypicality 
suggests the origins and impetus for municipal reform in 
Paterson differed significantly from that of other New Jersey 
cities. 
What made Paterson ripe for reform in the first decade of 
the twentieth century? Were its municipal problems signif- 
icantly worse than those in other Eastern cities? Or its city 
officials any more susceptible to "boodle" than those else- 
where? Why did progressives in Paterson achieve a degree of 
power and influence over one specific aspect of reform - 
municipal re-organization - that was not evident in other New 
Jersey cities? Further research would be required to effec- 
tively answer these questions. In particular, attention might 
focus upon the relations between local and state supporters 
of commission government, the funding of reform organisations 
and'a biographical analysis of their membership. '' Despite 
1The Paterson Guardian April 9 and 12 1906. The bill when 
passed established city commissions appointed by the 
Board of Aldermen, a system of government hardly different 
from that extant. 
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these limitations the general contours of the local movement 
for commission rule can be sketched in. Above all, the effects 
of commission government upon local political and social 
relations can be delineated. 
Certainly the call for city commissions had echoed in 
Paterson for many years. It increased as the New Jersey reform 
movement gathered momentum and cities throughout the U. S. 
adopted various designs for municipal re-organization. More- 
over to the extent that progressive reform in Paterson, and in 
New Jersey in general, was identified with measures explicitly 
designed to benefit urban workingmen, commission rule became 
part of a grand design for urban renewal and reform. None of 
these features marked Paterson apart from other New Jersey 
cities however. A broader analysis, taking into account 
particular economic and social tensions within the city, is 
required. For what gave Paterson its unique quality was its, 
dependence upon the silk industry; and the city's urban 
problems derived essentially from this dependence. By the 
opening years of the new century the troubles of silk manu- 
facturers reverberated throughout Paterson. The exodus of 
millowners threatened not only city finances but the whole 
commercial future of Paterson. The traditional scepticism of 
city fathers towards manufacturers' carping now conflicted 
with the need to counter the lurid image of "Red City" and 
to attract capital to Paterson. Slowly but surely mill- 
owners' problems became identified with those of the city at 
large. Ultimately the changing character of Paterson's 
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textile hands tipped the balance in favour of millowners' 
interests. Italian millworkers were not only intimately 
associated with the city's degraded reputation, they also 
lacked sufficient political influence within the city to 
effectively, combat opposition to them as both immigrants and 
silkworkers. 
As early as 1892 Paterson's government had experimented 
with city commissions. In that year Senator John Hinchcliffe 
campaigned for a Police and Fire Commission to-supervise-these 
essential services in the city. A Police Justice bill was 
subsequently passed, creating a bi-partisan commission of four, 
appointed by Paterson's mayor and police justice. 
I Although 
the commission was heralded as a great saving to local tax- 
payers and an attack on corrupt aldermen and municipal 
officials, it reflected tensions within the local Democratic 
party and moves to. increase local party influence over city 
appointments. 
2 The Commission proved shortlived. Soon after 
its creation Paterson's Mayor Beveridge declared his belief 
that appointive commissions would never gain favour over 
elective offices. 
3 He proved correct. Two years later during 
a general walkout in the local. silk industry, Mayor Christian 
Braun, reacted to demonstrative millhands, by bypassing the 
1Paterson. 
Daily Guardian February 1,9,16 and 25 1892. 
2ibid. 
February 5,6,9,16,24 and 26 1892. 
3ibid. February 16 1892. 
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Commission and personally supervising the preservation of 
order in the city. 
I His action both questioned the raison 
d'etre of the commission and demonstrated that, in times of 
crisis, popular pressure on elective officials could not be 
easily ignored. The commission was abandoned soon after. 
Despite the failure of the Police Board of 1892 the cry 
for commission rule continued to swell throughout the 1890s 
and on into the new century. The abolition of the Police 
Board in 1894 prompted local advocates of reform to declare 
their continued faith in city commissions. A Citizens Reform 
League asked: "Is it (commission rule) not the more enlightened 
way in which almost all modern cities are carrying on their 
own affairs? "2 Both the local political machine and its 
officeholders, city aldermen, were objects of the League's 
spleen. "Doodling" and corruption, it declared, are "... a 
burning shame and a... disgrace to this already overdisgraced 
little State". 3 The relationship between. city. officers and 
local franchise corporations prompted further rebuke. The 
street railroad corporation, the "telephone monopoly" and 
the Erie railroad were all held up. to public scorn. But behind 
them, and more insidious, lurked the grasping fingers of 
1Paterson Daily Press March 99 12 and 14 1894. " 
2Paterson Pencilings March 3 1894. 
3ibid. 
September 30 1894. 
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corrupt politicians: 
"Corporations are not the incarnation of evil as 
some would have us think. Kept in their proper 
sphere they are the dispensers of much good, nor 
do they menace the public weal half as much as those 
who, taking advantage of their offices, seize every 
opportunity to subject them to what is known in 
privileged circles as the 'bleeding process"'. 
announced local reformers. 
I Commission government was the 
cure. Its supporters were convinced'that such a "state of 
affairs cannot be effected under a Commission .... "2 
Though the demand for commission government appeared to 
emanate from indignant taxpayers, perhaps not dissimilar from 
Hofstadter's middle class progressives, it was amplified by a 
significant lower class and radical critique of urban corrup- 
tion. From the outset lower class reformers held reservations 
about city commissions. Popular control of both corporations 
and municipal government was central to their criticisms. 
Matt Maguire, a machinist and city alderman on the Socialist- 
Labor Party ticket from 1894-1898, led a sustained and scathing 
attack on municipal corruption during his years at City Hall. 
Elected in opposition to a "regular" machine candidate, 
Maguire soon made plain his position by supporting councilman 
Stiles, a spokesman of the Citizens' Reform League, for the 
presidency of the Board of Aldermen. 
3 Thereafter Maguire 
launched an unceasing barrage of criticism at municipal corruption. 
1Paterson Pencilings January 2 1892. ' -=- 
2ibid. March 3 1894. 
3Paterson People July 14 1894. 
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He was less concerned with the form of government than with 
business manipulation of municipal officers. The debased 
morality of public life, for Maguire, only reflected the 
inordinate and uncontrolled power of corporate business. The 
resultant evil was not personified by avaricious aldermen and 
harassed taxpayers, but by inadequate schooling, poor public 
facilities and exorbitant charges for essential services. 
1 
Maguire's solution was not commission government, but municipal 
ownership of city franchises. "Good government", Maguire 
lectured the Board of Aldermen in 1894, is "government by the 
people, for the people". 
2 Public ownership of municipal 
utilities satisfied Lincoln's dictum. It both left government 
and utility regulation subject to popular control whilst 
rooting out corruption at its source by abolishing private 
profit and, its corollary, "The bleeding process". In 1895 
Maguire campaigned upon the issue of municipal. ownership of 
the city's water supply. Although ultimately unsuccessful 
the campaign marked growing publicity for the cause of 
3 
municipal reform. 
By the late 1890s criticism of both the form and personnel 
of Paterson's city government was rife. In 1896 Maguire's 
persistent claims of corruption in the police. and fire services 
The People June 24, August 19 and September 23 1894, 
Press Clipping July 10,1897 in Socialist Labor Party Papers, 
Box 40/2 Scrapbook II 1880-1903, Wisconsin State Historical 
Society. 
2Paterson People October 21 1894.3Handbill 
of the Paterson Socialist Labor Party, April 4 
1895 in S. L. Y. Papers Box 8/3 Wisconsin State Historical 
Society. The People April 7, July 28 1895 and see 
S. L. Y. electoral platform May 23 1897" 
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led to well-publicized investigations. Maguire was supported 
by the city's clergy. The local Evangelical Alliance denounced 
the police for accepting bribes from prostitutes and saloon- 
keepers. It claimed patrolmen were turning a blind eye to 
violations of the Sunday-closing law and to houses of ill 
repute in the city. As patrolmen were aldermanic appoint- 
ments fury was again vented against the city fathers. The 
clergy held up the English system of local government as a 
fitting model of municipal administration; and at the minimum 
they demanded the present aldermanic system be replaced by the 
election of Aldermen-at-large. 
l Maguire probably shared little 
of the clergy's faith in political re-organization. Neverthe- 
less strange bed-fellows though they appear, the common ground 
shared by a socialist and Paterson's churchmen indicated the 
primacy of municipal corruption as a local political issue. 
It was given similar precedence that same year in an address 
by a local Catholic father at the opening of the new City Hall. 
Contrasting the "elegant new quarters" with "abuses that have 
crept into the management of city affairs, " he called for a 
new attitude towards municipal administration, based upon 
businesslike and not partisan considerations. "Citizens 
must remember", he urged, 
"... that the relations which they bear to our city 
employees are the same as the relations which exist 
between bankers and their clerks. If the hankers 
leave the management to the clerks mistakes or worse 
will occur, and all at once a crash is heard.... 
1Paterson 
Daily Guardian January-8,16,17, February 8, 
March 3,13 and 17 19" 
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Just as in the management of railroads, insurance 
or silk corporations the political creed of the 
members is never mentioned, so it should be in 
city government. It is a hopeful sign of the times 
to see men of education, lawyers, professors and 
literary bodies discussing the science of government. 
The scattering broadcast amongst the people of 
magazine and newspaper articles upon this subject 
would necessarily enlighten them and enable them 
to discharge intelligently their civic duties. 
One of the best means of reaching our own fellow 
citizens would be by public meetings held under the 
auspices of the Board of Trade. This body composed 
as it is of enlightened men in almost every walk of 
life, cannot help exerting vast influence with the 
masses". 1 
The notion that municipal governing was essentially a question 
of efficient and businesslike administration appeared to be 
taking firm root. 
As the "progressive movement" flourished nationwide after 
1900 it was aped in a host of localities. In Paterson the 
demand for municipal reform was always its most prominent 
feature. Various groups had a direct concern in its outcome, 
from temperance reformers to over-taxed manufacturers. 
Increasingly a re-fashioned city government was projected, 
by interested parties, as a panacea for the community's ail- 
ments. Nevertheless the populistic call for "clean government" 
reflected no more than a loose alliance of interests. Most 
were discrete and often mutually conflicting. Above all else, 
the previously dormant tension between workingmen's and middle 
class reform interests was exposed. For a time it threatened 
1Paterson City Hall Commission The City Hall, Paterson 
(Paterson, 1896) pp. 69-70. 
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to bifurcate the local movement for municipal reorganization. 
J. P. McDonnell, New Jersey's veteran labor activist, 
sustained the earlier working class interest in reform. He 
attacked the growth and influence of trusts, campaigned for 
municipal ownership of essential. services, and generally 
supported any reformers who promoted the interests of working- 
men. Thus in 1903 local assemblyman Van Blancorm was warmly 
praised in the National Labor Standard for his bill to limit 
child labor in New Jersey factories. 
I On this and many other 
issues, McDonnell's position differed little from what it 
had been two decades before. In response to the new call for 
political and electoral changes McDonnell's attitude was more 
complex. He was prepared to support only measures that would 
produce tangible benefits for New Jersey's laboring class. 
His backing of middle class "taxpayers" was restricted to 
those concerns which-they directly shared with workingmen. 
McDonnell, like Maguire, endorsed the call for municipal 
ownership of public utilities. He was anxious that trade. 
unionists throughout the state should push to end corporation 
control of essential services and encourage popular participation 
(in this case, ownership) in municipal affairs. Though 
rebuked McDonnell even pressured the State Federation of Labor 
into declaring its position on the question. Long after 
1National Labor Standard February 14 1903" 
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New Jersey's leading unionists refused to support the movement 
for municipal ownership McDonnell continued to endorse it. 
l 
McDonnell also joined the New Jersey Direct Legislation 
League, supported the direct election of senators and civil 
service reform, and attacked corruption in the handing out of 
city contracts. 
2 His stance on the latter was characteristic 
of the pragmatic gains McDonnell sought for workingmen in 
progressive measures. Corrupt city contracts were attacked 
not as an affront to public morality or a waste of municipal 
funds, but because "outside" contractors employed non-citizens 
and non-Paterson residents at below union rates of pay. "Have 
the Board of Aldermen of this city, sprung as they are from 
the ranks of the working people - have they nothing to say 
about this open unfairness to their own constituents", 
McDonnell wondered. 
3 Like the city's businessmen McDonnell 
was aware that Paterson's-precarious economy did not augur 
well for the future. He was anxious that expansion should 
boost local firms and provide jobs for the city's workers. The 
decline in the number of silk manufacturers threatened the 
economic viability of a host of small retail businesses. Big 
city department stores moved in to replace them, a feature 
'ibid. April 13, June 1 and August 31 1899. 
2ibid. February 16 1899, June 1 1899, August 24,1899, 
February 28 1903" 
3ibid. April 11, August 24 1899. 
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McDonnell found particularly distasteful. Local merchants, 
"... have been for years the pioneers in'every movement that 
looked to the betterment and well being of this community", 
he argued. Macy & Co., Siegel Cooper & Co. and "other big 
concerns in New York City" would neither provide jobs for 
native sons nor support in City Hall for city workingmen. 
Above all, they would do nothing to reverse the economic 
plight of the city. "Every dollar spent (with these big city 
concerns) stays in New York", McDonnell observed. 
"Not a cent of the money comes back to us in wages, 
in rent, in taxes or in any way. None of those 
big city concerns ever contributed a dollar either 
to beautify this town or to add to its comforts or 
its pleasures. They take all the money we have - 
and leave us the remainder". 1 
Yet for all his reservations about corruption at City 
Hall and local economic stagnation, McDonnell was adamantly 
opposed to replacing the aldermanic municipal system with 
appointive commissions. He saw commission government as part 
of a much larger movement to refashion American civilization 
in the interests of big business. McDonnell pilloried 
America's'imperial ambitions, and the influence of trusts 
"... in their work of debauching the public sentiment and 
conscience of the people". The American people stood at a 
crossroads: 
"Choose ye this day whom ye will serve, God or Mammon, 
the trades unions or the trusts, the principles of 
the Declaration of Independence or an imperial 
government". 
1National Labor Standard August 10 1899, April 19 1901. 
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Just as newly-won subjects overseas had "... the right of every 
people to choose for themselves the form of government under 
which they will live", so too did Americans at home. Commission 
government, for McDonnell, was not popular government, but a 
means of removing public officials from popular accountability. 
"The privileged classes have no use for popular government", 
he announced. "A large army and an imperialistic government 
is what they want.... " Conversely the working class had no 
use for commission rule. 
I 
Immediately the local movement for commission rule began 
to attract significant attention McDonnell announced his 
dissension. The "new style" government, popularized by 
President Roosevelt, would remove politicians from popular 
accessibility. " If Paterson is to have Commissions, they 
must be elective, not appointive", declared McDonnell. "Let 
the people rule". The Taxpayers' Association, most active of 
Paterson's reform groups and chief proponent of appointive 
commissions, was vehemently attacked. McDonnell foresaw the 
perils of placing appointive powers in the hands of a single 
figure, the mayor, and the resultant decline in neighbourhood 
representation at City Hall. A board of aldermen uniformly 
negligent of workers' interests was extremely unlikely, but a 
mayor much less so. Such considerations produced McDonnell's 
characteristic attitude to municipal reform: 
'National Labor Standard August 39: 249-September '7 1899, 
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"The people of Paterson are opposed to Appointive 
Commissions and won't have them. The people don't 
see the wisdom of handing over their power to elect 
into the hands of any one man. Popular rule must 
prevail". 1 
McDonnell died before Senator Hinchcliffe's bill trans- 
formed Paterson's city government. Had he lived to fight 
against commission rule there is little evidence to suggest 
that the outcome would have been substantially different. 
Local workingmen continued to campaign for reform, and some 
fought tirelessly against appointive commissions. For all, 
the problem was to tread a path that protected their interest 
in progressive change, but which avoided them being subsumed 
in a broader movement for reform directly at variance with 
workingmen's concerns. McDonnell had faced the same dilemma 
but had never been forced to resolve it. Those that followed 
2 
him showed only a dim awareness that it required resolution. 
Henry Marelli, local Italian lawyer with strong roots in 
the city's working class districts, and his cohort James 
Blauvelt, another lawyer, who in the state legislature pushed 
for reform of the law permitting employers' injunctions, 
illustrate the ambivalent and at times confused stance of 
many to the question of commission rule. Both were "New Idea" 
Republicans, opposed to machine politics and active in the 
1ibid. October 3 1904, December 13 1902, February 14 and 
28 1903. (Emphasis in the original) 
M me- Sc6oysm and`, Mss 
we 16"C J RE5xrA.: like r mi &MK- (ec) SOC. IJ1u5M AN-V 0ý- C'ýoýfýKME, nýG i+l Passaic in_ tfuGE. M. Sb, * 
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drive for municipal reform. They could count among their 
supporters not, only the local Citizens' Association, but also 
local notables, such. as Sam McCoud, former president of . 
the Brass Finishers' Union and real estate dealer, and Gustav 
Iiunziker, ex-weaver and "self-made" lawyer. Such men, although 
not instrumental in determining the new city government, 
certainly attracted workingmen's support for municipal reform. 
' 
So too did Tom Morgan, local organizer for the Loomfixers' 
Union whose father had been a faithful supporter of J. P. 
McDonnell in Paterson a generation earlier. Morgan was nom- 
inated by the local Municipal Ownership League as an aldermanic 
candidate in 1906. He received endorsement from the local 
Trades Council. Although unsuccessful Morgan reflected the 
strong interest of workingmen in the eradication of municipal 
corruption. 
2 None of these figures, or indeed any other lower 
class reformers, appeared to have fully considered the implic- 
ations of their position. Most were probably not unduly 
concerned by the 1906 reform, which created city commissions 
appointed by the local board of aldermen. However with the 
1907 law - instituting commissions appointed solely by the 
mayor - workingmen in the city realized too late the dangers 
McDonnell had campaigned against. 
A hastily convened meeting in April 1907, protesting 
against iiinchcliffe's bill illustrates the: anxiety many, felt 
IPaterson, Evening News September 24'and 26 1906. 
2ibid. October 13, 19 November 2_ and 7 1906. 
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at the prospect of commission rule. City aldermen naturally 
led opposition to the proposed legislation, for itaimed to 
reduce their civic duty to the granting of municipal licenses. 
Machine politicians were also prominent, men such as John 
Boylan, Irish alderman from the Eighth Ward. Boylan also 
represented scores of Irish workingmen in Paterson and his 
presence can hardly be attributed solely to selfish interests. 
Most significant, however, was the prominence at the meeting 
of Matt Maguire, local labor activist and former crusader for 
civic reform. 
1 The protest meeting contrasted sharply with 
a party of lobbyists for Hinchcliffe's bill, which travelled 
down to Trenton four days later. The excursion included not 
only local progressives, but the "boss" of Paterson's 
Democratic machine, William Gourley, and significantly at 
0 
least four Paterson silk manufacturers. ` 
Taken together the protest meeting and the Trenton 
excursion indicate the complicated class and political currents 
to be found in the local movement for municipal reform. 
Whilst persistent workingmen's interest in reform measures 
belies the characterization of progressivism as a middle class 
or "corporate" movement, there is a sense in which Hays' and 
Weinstein's analyses remain useful. As these two Paterson 
incidents illustrate, the question of commission government 
clearly had political implications and a class dimension that 
transcended the concerns of Paterson's amorphous "taxpayers". 
1Paterson 
Evening News April 5 1907- 
2 ibid. ' April 9'1907. 
, ', 
ý: ; ' ýe 
..,.,, 
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To be sure correction of urban abuses attracted supporters 
from all walks of life. More research would be required on 
the funding and personnel of the Taxpayers' Association and 
other reform bodies before clearer answers could be given. 
Equally important was the ethnic dimension to municipal reform. 
1 
It may well be the case that the political machine in Paterson, 
accepting that municipal reform was only a matter of time, 
accommodated itself to change and to engineering for advant- 
ageous positions within the new form of administration. 
2 The 
support of "boss" Gourley for the commission bill suggests as 
much. Moreover Irishmen - who traditionally dominated the local 
political machine - continued to receive an inordinate share of 
municipal posts after the 1907 reform. The list of city 
officers in 1908 is peppered with Celtic names. 
3 The new mayor, 
Andrew F. McBride, was an Irishman, and the progeny of Erin 
dominated the re-organized police and fire services. 
Overriding both, and of signal importance, was the new 
and unprecedented involvement of businessmen in the reform 
movement, and more starkly, in the new city commissions 
established in 1907. Weinstein has labelled the city commis- 
sion movement "... a plan to make government more businesslike 
and to attract businessmen to government". Paterson's mill- 
owners clearly conform to Weinstein's model of "small business- 
men" who 11 ... as participants in local chambers, of commerce 
1W. Issel "Class and Ethnic Conflict in San Francisco 
Political History: The Reform Charter of 1898" Labor 
History 18, No. 3 Summer 1977 PP"341-359, analyses ethnic 
and class conflict in the commission movement in the West. 
2G. E. Nathans "The Mayor and the Machine" Passaic County 
Historical`Society, 1970 No-3 PP-1-4-', 
3Annual Report of the City Officers 1907-1908 p"3" 
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and boards of trade... could identify the future of their 
cities with that of their own business interests". 
1 The 
prominence of local silk manufacturers in the Trenton lobby 
suggests the same. 
Although millowners appear to have maintained a low 
profile throughout the reform campaign, they were joined by 
other businessmen who sought to put local government on a 
"businesslike" basis. John Ferguson, prominent in the Tax- 
payers' Association and a leading advocate of city commissions, 
was a Paterson contractor who obviously felt "clean government" 
would benefit him. Moreover William Gourley and John 
Hinchcliffe, machine politicians and advocates of reform, 
both had diverse interests in local corporations. Gourley was 
a director and counsel of the Paterson and Passaic Gas and 
Electric Company, the local Trolley Trust and the Public 
Service Corporation. Hinchcliffe too, had corporate business 
interests, not least in the local "Brewery Trust", a consol- 
idation of Paterson brewers. 
2 These individuals apparently 
feared little from a re-organized municipal government. All 
shared with city millowners a mutual interest in the future 
growth of Paterson. That growth could only be assured by 
retaining and expanding silk manufacturing, and by encouraging 
new industries - preferably "male employing industries" that 
would keep silk, "... a female industry well supplied with 
help" - to Paterson. In the years immediately following the 
1907 city charter reform, the local Board of  Trade; stepped, 
J. Weinstein The Corporate Ideal pp. 97,92. 
2Paterson Evening News October 29 1906. 
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up this campaign in 
to build mill sites 
newcomers. The two 
designed to "give tl 
to attract "... male 
in the city". 
1 
conjunction with city government - offering 
at "... a reasonable rental" for prospective 
developed "... a well worked out policy" 
ie local manufacturer a helping hand" and 
employing industries backed by all interests 
Significantly local businessmen, and particularly mill- 
owners, were appointed to important posts in the new city 
commissions. The ideology of "businesslike" conduct - the 
gospel of efficiency - pervaded the re-organization of municipal 
departments. Local editors enthusiastically hailed the new 
city commissions as a government of "sound businessmen". 
The commissions, comprising a Board of Finance, a Board of 
Public Works and a Police and Fire Board, certainly contained 
an ample quota of just such men. The Board of Finance, composed 
of four commissioners, included Leopold Meyer, "banker and 
owner of a department store on the city's major commercial 
thoroughfare, J. Edwards Barbour, a member of one of Paterson's 
oldest and wealthiest millowning families, and William"Buckely, 
son of a former city mayor with interests in silk manufacture. 
The Board of Public Works claimed Ed Weiss, manager of 
Paterson's German-American bank and Thomas Morgan 'a grocer with 
interests in a local silk throwing plant. Weiss was soon 
1Paterson 
Board of Trade, Paterson June 1911 p. 14, May 1912 
pp. 22-24, the Board's publicity handout Paterson, N. J.: 
A Modern City (n. p. 1910? ), and Annual Report of the City 
Officers 1907-1908 pp. 44-45. 
ýýi. 
ýýc. ... ... _ ,.,..., ....... .... ,ý.. 
ýr 
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replaced by Julius Brandes, a German-born ribbon manufacturer. 
Even the new Police Board,, although the territory of old- 
time "machine" politicians such as William Ryan and John 
Mallon, contained Ralph Baer, owner of the large Helvetia silk 
mills. 
1 The latter was surely an unusual, and provocative, 
choice in the key area of municipal government responsible 
for maintaining peace during industrial disputes. Yet Baer's 
appointment was neither fortuitous nor the result of a hasty 
and ill-judged assessment. At the time of the 1913 strike the 
Police Board included Commissioner Bailey, partner in one of 
Paterson's largest silk mills. 
2 
Both, men reflected the new 
prominence of manufacturers and businessmen in city government, 
working in partnership with machine politicians but at the 
same time bringing their own interests to bear in municipal 
decision-making. 
Municipal reform in Paterson bore important similarities 
to the emergence of the "corporate ideal" depicted by James 
Weinstein. Most historians have, however, focused almost 
exclusively upon the ideological and legislative dimensions of 
"corporate rule", and upon the small elite which shaped it. 
If commission government is to be interpreted within this frame- 
work it is important to make clear that the effects of the new 
municipal order reverberated far beyond the confines of 
National Civic Federation conventions,, corporation boardrooms 
and a handful of trade union headquarters. The gospel of 
efficiency infused decision-making throughout local government, 
1Paterson 
Evening News April 15 1907- 
2 
C. I. R. III p. 2592. 
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and frequently at the most mundane level. Most importantly, it 
did not always promote class harmony and a common aspiration 
"toward the good society for all citizens". 
1 It could be, and 
was, interpreted in various fashions by local officials. 
Paterson's Police Commissioners might mouth the vocabulary of 
a national business elite but their actions and decisions mocked 
a view of them as corporate minions. The social control 
desired by far-sighted politicians and business leaders was not 
easily, or even demonstratively, translated into the programmes 
of the new city commissions. 
The re-vivified Paterson Police Department revealed as 
much. The creation of a Police Commission, freed from the 
shackles of suspicious Aldermen and their demonstrative con- 
stituents, provided the means. to refashion the city force. 
Immediately Chief Bimson prodded the new commissioners into a 
campaign to strengthen and modernize his department. Unlike, 
his predecessor Chief Graul, John Bimson had traditionally 
adopted a hostile attitude towards workingmen's demonstrations, 
and frequently had been singled out for villification by 
strikers. To these long-standing antipathies Bimson added an 
intense fear mixed with contempt for the city's Italians. The 
uproar of 1902, when Bimson had temporarily replaced his sus- 
pended chief as head of the Police. Department, was not easily 
forgotten. Moreover the indignity of subordination to state 
1Weinstein The Corporate Ideal p. xiv. t-, ' 
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militia in 1902 still rankled. Bimson was determined to prevent 
a repetition. By 1907 the Chief's problems extended beyond 
plans to contain unruly millhands in future disputes. He was 
still conducting investigations into the Italian anarchist 
community -a campaign which culminated, the following year, 
in the suppression of their journal. To these burdens was 
added the ominous growth of "Black Hand" crime in the city. 
Two months prior to the commission law, Justice of the Peace 
Robert Cortese, a close informant of Bimson's, had been viciously 
murdered by unknown, but presumably, Italian criminals. 
Cortese's death caused a sensation throughout Paterson, and may 
well have been the final straw in Bimson's resolution to expand 
and revitalize his department. Certainly Bimson's aims, and 
the reforms he introduced, seemed to reflect Paterson's rather 
special policing problems. They co-incided with the aims of 
corporate reformers only in so far as they reflected Bimson's 
concern with more "efficient" criminal detection, but can 
hardly be interpreted as derivative, or even directly influenced 
by that source. The outcome of the Chief's modernization pro- 
gramme was to intensify, at least in the short-term, the social 
and class division in the city, as the 1913 strike made clear. 
Immediately the commission bill became law the Police 
Chief called for an expansion of his force, for two Italian 
recruits to assist in the detection of Italian crimes, and for 
a new precinct station in the heavily Italian-populated 
Riverside section of the city' The'respons'e'of the Police 
1Paterson-Evenin News April 6 1907. 
- 272 - 
Commissioners was revealing. It demonstrated that if they 
did not fully endorse Bimson's programme, they too shared 
little in common with a corporate elite. Political favour - 
a patrolman's job was traditional reward for political assis- 
tance - was an important consideration in expanding and re- 
organizing the force. The attitude of some commissioners 
revealed the extent to which the political machine adapted to 
"clean government". One commissioner dissented from Bimson's 
plea for Italian recruits with the categorical statement that 
"Irishmen make the best policemen". 
1 Particularly if they are 
loyal supporters, he might have added. Argument raged for 
weeks over the numbers of new policemen and who they should be. 
Commissioner Ryan publicly announced: "I wish applicants would 
stop bothering me at my home". Presumably prospective patrol- 
men agreed with his assessment: 
"I regard the position of a patrolman a, gentleman's 
job, especially for men who have worked in the shops, 
and I want men appointed to the force to be of that 
make-up to appreciate their job and not abuse it". 2 
Ryan pressed a case for thirty five additional men. All should 
be under thirty years of age and none should receive appoint- 
ment in return for political favours. Nevertheless candidates 
were supported by prominent city officials and politicians, 
and not all, one suspects, for purely disinterested reasons. 
Senator Hinchcliffe nominated a possible Italian recruit. 
Bimson and Judge Scott. pressed for Pat Zirpoli, a barber and 
associate of Cortese's. Joe Puglia, Italian contractor and 
"mayor" of the city's Little Italy, endorsed two more Italian 
1Paterson 
Evening News April 10 1907. 
2 ibid. April 12 1907. 
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candidates; both of them subsequently appointed. 
1 
The wrangling over Italian recruits typified the more 
general problem of who the new patrolmen would be. Disagree- 
ment amongst the commissioners and between the Police Board 
and the Mayor could not be suppressed. All sought political 
kudos from the appointments. Commissioner Mallon, adopting a 
lofty pose, announced that the names of all candidates would 
be publicized and subject to two weeks scrutiny before any new 
men were sworn in. 
2 The Commissioner's statement acted as a 
signal for a new surge of applications. Prominent local figures, 
such as James McGrath, ex-chairman of the dyeworkers union, 
announced their intention to join up. "Hundreds loitered" 
outside City Hall on the night the new recruits were named. 
All men eventually accepted were sponsored by aldermen, the 
mayor, a police commissioner or some other prominent city 
official. 
3 The expansion of the-force was the 
cue for a "shake- 
up" in the Police Department, Chief Bimson announced. Aged 
patrolmen were retired, and new patrolmen given a stringent 
examination. New patrols were to increase the efficiency of 
the force and new disciplinary measures to root out corruption. 
Bimson even led a public inspection and parade of his men 
through the city streets. "Shirkers" on both the Police and 
Fire services were denounced. Drunkenness and bribery amongst 
patrolmen would be extinguished. Yet. despite, this frenzied 
libid.; April 10 and 15, May 31 ; 1907., 2ibid. April 20 and 25 1907- 
3 ibid. April 29 and May i 
1907, 
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public relations campaign rumours of corrupt appointments and 
political favouritism did not abate. The force was pictured 
as "... a dumping ground to give a lot of men life jobs", and 
patrolmen as "shirkers... not on the level". 
1 
Reviewing the re-organization of the Department some six 
months later, Mayor McBride praised the effort to "build up 
(the) morale, esprit du corps and efficiency" of the Police 
Department. The city had benefitted by boasting a "better 
police record" than any other comparable city in the United 
States. "Considering the fact that Paterson is a manufacturing 
city", McBride continued, "with a mixed population (a large 
proportion foreign-born) the record is one which we have reason 
to regard with pride and satisfaction". 
2 Chief Bimson re- 
iterated the mayor's message. He went on to announce further 
police reforms, including new precinct stations within the 
city, additional detectives and an expansion-of his recently- 
introduced "mounted squad". 
3 In subsequent years Bimson 
extended this work. ' More precinct stations were opened, patrol- 
men on the beat were linked to headquarters by a city-wide 
telegraph system, an Italian Department was added to the 
Bureau of Detectives, a motorcycle squad and later automobile' 
patrol wagons were introduced, and the Chief adopted the 
Bertillion and finger print systems of 'criminal identification. 
In February 1912 Bimson proudly announced that his department 
1ibid. April-. 27,29 May 4,9, '°14, '22,24 and"27 1907., 
2Annual Report of the City'Officers, 1907-1908 p. 24. 
3ibid. 
pp. 253-5" _: ;.. 
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had joined the National Bureau of Criminal Investigation, a 
national records department. Membership would "bring the 
department to the highest degree of efficiency". 
1 
Despite Bimson's exuberant language the expansion of 1907 
and subsequent police reforms revealed that that "efficiency" 
sought by the Chief and Paterson's Police Commissioners 
differed markedly from the vision of progressive reformers or 
corporate executives. Far from extinguishing "political pull" 
in municipal government, favouritism and reward continued 
unabated. Machine politicians adapted to the new situation 
and continued their political dominance of the city. More 
importantly, lines of social and ethnic division within the 
city were more clearly drawn. Pater son's oldest immigrant 
communities, particularly the Irish, dominated city politics, 
and hence the new appointments created by municipal reform. 
The fifty five new patrolmen recruited in 1907"were almost 
exclusively Irish, 'British or German-Americans, a factor of 
considerable importance in the near future. 
2 A corollary to 
this ethnic dominance of the "old" immigrants was both the 
exclusion of "new" immigrants from municipal appointments, and 
an intensified campaign against them, particularly against the 
city's Italians. An Italian Department and precinct stations 
in Italian neighbourhoods might increase the "efficiency" of 
the Police Department, but they hardly dampened nativist 
1Paterson Guardian January 13, February l and 2 1912, 
. C. Vreeland Who's Who in Passaic County (Paterson, 1917) ES 
p. 13. 
} 
2See the analysis of the-Paterson Police-Force , in: 1913, ° -' Appendix. 
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opposition to the Mediterranean newcomers. Even the appoint- 
ment of two Italians to the force cannot be interpreted as a 
token of the rising political fortunes of Paterson's Italian 
community. It more likely reflected police difficulties 
(particularly language difficulties) in investigating Italian 
crimes. The 1908 suppression of La Questione Sociale indicated 
continued suspicion of the city's Italians. 
Finally the 1907 reforms marked the exclusion of workingmen 
from accessibility to municipal officers. That the city's 
workers were increasingly Italians may have carried considerable 
weight in influencing the acceptance of commission rule. It 
is difficult to imagine a similar pattern of reform being 
adopted twenty years earlier. Then the political machine was 
too heavily dependent upon workers' votes to endorse such a 
move. And as long as the backbone of the machine's strength 
remained in Paterson's mills, manufacturers and reformers would 
be resisted. In the opening decade of the twentieth century 
economic decline and new patterns of immigration radically 
altered the relationship of workingmen to city politics. 
Significantly Italians carried little weight politically; 
indeed they had become a convenient scapegoat for both mill- 
owners and urban reformers. If both machine politicians and 
city businessmen could reach an amicable settlement on the 
spoils of office what matter were Italian silkworkers? The 
strength of the police Department was increased by over 50% in 
1907, a measure no longer. resisted or even protested by city 
politicians. More patrolmen might strengthen millowners during 
industrial troubles, but were not the new officers favoured sons 
and reliable supporters of the machine? 
Residence of the Arrested in the pater son strike 1913 
/-' "- -' 
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Chapter Seven 
WAR IN PATERSON 
In 1913 a "war" erupted in Paterson. Although originating 
as an industrial dispute it quickly became more than simply a 
work stoppage. Whole communities were sucked into its orbit 
and everyone felt compelled to take sides, declaring in favour 
or against the strike. As a result the whole city was polarized. 
Under the leadership of the Industrial Workers of the World 
Paterson's silkworkers remained on strike for six months. They 
brought the economic life of the city to a standstill. Hundreds 
of arrests and several deaths resulted from the brutal street 
battles between police, armed guards and strikers. 
The events of 1913 have long been notorious, perhaps 
because, for several reasons, they appear novel. Never before 
had Paterson workers struck for so long. Never before had 
their actions engendered such enmity and violence. For the 
first time an "outside" organization, the I. W. W., assumed a 
prominent role in organizing and directing strikers. A number 
of historians have studied the "war" closely and paid particular 
attention to its violence. But in seeking to explain the 
hostility they have concentrated almost exclusively upon the 
I. W. W., exaggerating its influence in the dispute.,. Wobbly 
leadership and strike methods have been uncritically . 
taken as 
dominating both the course and " outcomeof. the, strike. Moreover 
the I. W. W. 's presence is taken as --sufficient, excuse'for, the 
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hostility of millowners and city authorities towards strikers. 
I 
Whilst there is some substance to these claims their effect 
has been to overlook a number of important considerations. 
The strike came after more than a decade of intense anxiety 
over economic and social changes taking place in Paterson. 
It followed shortly after the refashioning of local government, 
but before the consequences of commission rule upon the trad- 
itional relationship of city authorities to strikers were 
apparent. For these reasons existing historical work has 
seriously impaired both our understanding of the strike and 
the nature and function of the I. W. W. in it. 
The origins of the 1913 strike owed little to the I. W. W. 
The Doherty Manufacturing Company, scene of the initial walkout 
in January was hardly a typical Paterson mill. Situated a mile 
or more from the city's industrial heartland, it-was a modern 
structure, technologically in advance of its downtown competitors. 
Its patriarch Henry Doherty, an English-born handloom weaver 
and self-made millowner, prided himself upon the good industrial 
1M. Dubofsky'We Shall Be All: A History of the I. W. W. 
(Chicago, 1969) PP. 269-290. P. Renshaw The Wobblies: 
The Story of Syndicalism in the United States (New York, 
19 ? pp. 112-118. Y. S. Foner The History of the Labor 
Movement in the U. S.: IV The Industrial Workers of the 
World (New York, 1965) PP"3 0-372, J. R. Conlin Bread and 
Roses Too: Studies of the Wobblies (Westport, 1-9U91- 
pp. 88,90,12 -131, and Big Bill Haywood and the Radical 
Union Movement (Westport, 1969 pp. 137-1 3. See also 
J. L. Kornbluh ed. Rebel Voices: An I. W. W. "Antholo 
(Ann Arbor, 1964) pp. 197-226, G. Adams Jr. Age of 
Industrial Violence 1910-1915: ''The Activities and 
Findings of the U. S. Commission on Industrial Relations 
New York, 1966) pp. 75-100 R. Zeiger "Robin Hood-in the 
Silk City: The I. W. W. and the Paterson Strike of 1913" 
'Proceedings of the New Jersey Historical Society 84 1966 
pp. 182-195" M. Mooney "The Industrial Workers of the 
World and the. Immigrants of Paterson and Passaic, New 
Jersey 1907-1913" (Masters thesis, Seton Hall University 
-1969), J.. Wood. "History. of Labor in the broad Silk Industry 
of Paterson, New Jersey" (Ph. D. thesis, U. of California, 1941). 
- 279 - 
relations and technical superiority in his domain. The issue 
which disrupted this apparent harmony had been simmering for 
more than two years. As with countless silk strikes before it 
involved the introduction of new machinery and a new work-load. 
The Doherty management claimed that the new four-loom system 
was necessary to enable Paterson manufacturers to compete with 
Pennsylvania annexes, which had already adopted similar tech- 
nological advances. Although weavers' work loads would be 
increased, higher earnings would provide adequate compen- 
sation, argued Messrs. Doherty. Doherty's"workers thought 
otherwise. Their response reflected a mixture of hard-headed 
self interest and a more general concern with the disruption of 
customary work routines. They argued that the doubling of the 
loom requirement and output of each weaver ought to be followed 
by a hundred per cent increase in earnings. The four-loom 
issue was viewed by weavers as part of the general "speed-up" 
which had characterized Paterson's silk industry for the past 
decade. Increased speeds on the customary two-loom weaving 
machine were taxing enough. Adolph Lessig, a Wobbly and local 
weaver explained: 
"You have one running in front of you and one running 
in back of you and you have to watch them both. If 
you work with one and watch it you can't at the-same 
time be watching another one back of you". 
In comparison the four-loom machine would require physical and 
mental gymnastics. It was excessive and unacceptable. Lessig 
recalled four-loom weavers so exhausted by. their labor that 
in their dinner break they were to be found "... lying down 
between their looms between twelve and one and trying to get 
some rest". 
1 
1c. I. K. III pp. 2469-2470. 
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Moreover, what if the four-loom system was adopted through- 
out the New Jersey silk town? Would it not result in halving 
the labor requirement of millowners? Would it not result in 
a labor surplus and act as a depressant on wages? Was the 
four-loom system the initial wedge in a drive to completely 
mechanize silk production? Henry Doherty Jr., managing 
director of his father's plant, certainly felt so. In 
expounding the virtues of technological advancement, Doherty 
indicated that "... as soon as you can get a loom to perfection, 
as they have in the cotton mills, where they can go home and 
leave the looms running... we won't need weavers". 
1 
The Doherty weavers had initially resisted the intro- 
duction of the four-loom system by enlisting the assistance of 
the United Textile Workers, a New England based affiliate of 
the American Federation of Labor. The U. T. W., a conservative 
body, was convinced that the attempt to halt technological 
advance was both futile and costly. In 1911, when local 
weavers rejected its call to accept the new looms, it washed 
its hands of the affair. 
The Doherty weavers persisted with a series of spon- 
taneous stoppages, and switched their allegiance to new leader- 
ship, in the form of the Detroit I. W. W. The Detroit I. W. W. 
was an offshoot of its parent, the Chicago faction. Headed by 
the veteran Marxist, Daniel DeLeon, it was a small and- 
faltering faltering organization in 1911, overshadowed by its notorious 
1C. i. R. IIi pp. 2434, 
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namesake and restricted to a handful of local unions in the 
New York region. It recognized in Paterson an opportunity to 
revive its flagging reputation, and hastily dispatched Rudolph 
Katz to organize the Doherty weavers. With limited resources 
and a dispute that was as yet confined to a single Paterson 
mill, Katz was remarkably successful. Within two months he 
had organized a general strike throughout Paterson's weaving 
mills. 
1 The arrest of Katz and other strikers followed as 
millhands took to the streets, picketing mills in a series of 
threatening demonstrations. 
Faced with a solid front of strikers, and anxious to 
complete their spring orders, some Paterson millowners offered 
their weavers improved wages. Other manufacturers, fiercely- 
critical of these concessions, refused to budge. Their hands 
remained on strike. The four-loom question no longer remained 
the main bone of contention between millhands and owners, only 
the question of wages. A majority of silkworkers returned to 
their looms. 2 
Within a month the battle was resumed. Faced with a 
slackening of trade after the seasonal rush, small millowners, 
who had earlier conceded to weavers, now withdrew concessions. 
A second general walkout in the broad-silk weaving shops 
followed but to little effect. Rifts amongst the strikers 
weakened their position. Those who had earlier returned to 
work were criticised by weavers who had remained on strike. 
libid. 
pp. 2473-247.7, Paterson Guardian_January'16, -"23,:, " February 23 1912.. 
New York Call February 24,. 27,28 and 29 1912. 
.. -, 
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Dissatisfaction with the leadership of Katz'and the Detvoit 
I. W. W., led to the city's Italian weavers inviting Haywood 
and the Chicago I. W. W. to Paterson. Wearing the laurels of 
victory from Lawrence, Big Bill briefly appeared in Paterson 
during March 1912. His arrival was too late, to prevent a 
disintegration of the strikers' morale and a return to work. 
1 
In itself the strike of 1912 was unremarkable. Its 
significance only became apparent the following year when 
I. W. W. organizers arrived to conduct a fresh campaign for 
improved wages and conditions. The failure of 1912 discredited 
both the United Textile Workers and the Detroit I. W. W. and, 
along with the Lawrence success, helped establish the I. W. W. 
with a reputation for strike leadership. In like fashion the 
dispute convinced both workers and manufacturers of the future 
need to prevent any break in ranks until a settlement favourable 
to all was reached. The spectacle of-disunity" enraged some 
manufacturers in 1912. A corollary to this was the partial 
return to work in February 1912 which split the ranks of 
strikers. Both millowners and millhands applied the lesson 
in 1913. 
A major strike was possible at any time after the defeat 
of March 1912. Paterson silkworkers claimed that the general 
deterioration of wages, conditions and most hated, the "speed- 
up" of the past decade made a major dispute unavoidable. 
2 
1Paterson Guardian February 28,, March 7 and 13, April 9 1912. 
For accounts of the 1912 strike, see NJBS Thirty Fifth 
Annual Report 1912 pp. 229-231. M. D. Sumner "Broad-Silk 
Weavers of Paterson" Survey 27, March 16 1912, M. Ebner 
The Passaic Strike of 1912 and the Two I. W. W. s. '" Labor 
History XI Fall 1970 pp. 452-466. 
2C. I. 11. III pp. 2469,2573,2586-2589. 
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The four-loom issue was seen as part of this same process, 
while the passions it provoked indicated widespread discontent. 
The threatened dispute did not come until January 1913 
when the Doherty management again tried to revive the four- 
loom system. 
i Despite agitation by local I. W. W. members 
throughout the winter of 1912-1913, the organization exercised 
little influence over the calling of the strike or the initial 
walkouts. Doherty's weavers struck spontaneously in January, 
and the following month weavers in other mills followed suit. 
Local Wobbly activists, Adolph Lessig and Ewald Koettgen tried 
to organize shop committees in every mill in the city to 
mobilize support for the Doherty workers. Even so it appears 
that most stoppages owed more to the ingrained strike trad- 
itions and work and ethnic ties of Paterson's millhands than 
to Wobbly planning and co-ordination. Tom Morgan, a local 
loomfixer, described the characteristic method by which the 
strike was called: 
"... maybe half a dozen workers in a shop will decide 
it will be a good thing to call them out, and with 
the class of people they have working in the mills 
at the present time, they simply say 'Come on stop 
the looms. Get out. Get out'. So God knows who 
calls that kind of strike. " 2 
Certainly it appeared to bear all the hallmarks of Paterson's 
longstanding strike traditions. 
By late February 1913 the city's broadsilk mills had all 
closed. Within two weeks dyeworkers and ribbon weavers 
1Dubofksy We Shall Be All pp. 268-269. 
. ýn, 2C. I. k. III p. -'2418. 
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joined the walkout. Twenty five thousand millworkers were 
now on strike and Paterson's entire silk industry was at a 
standstill. 
1 
From its outset the 1913 dispute was an ethnic, indeed. 
an "Italian", strike. In the long tradition of disruption in 
the Paterson silk industry it reflected the concerns and 
characteristic actions of recent immigrants. As in the past 
violence and disorder became the predominant expression of 
collective action. Paterson silkworkers resorted to strike 
methods typical of "immigrants to an industrial system", who 
were only slowly learning "the rules of the game". They were 
undisciplined and inexperienced strikers, uncertain of forging 
solidarity amongst the city's millhands, and prone to disorder 
and violence to achieve their aims. 
The disorder of 1913 appears part of a pattern long 
established in they city. Its roots were independent of the 
I. W. W., local in character and sustained by the closely knit 
ethnic and occupational ties of Paterson's sub-communities. 
County Prosecutor Michael Dunn recounted a variety of techniques 
used by the "foreign element" to intimidate and terrify. In 
the main they were directed against strikebreakers, but they 
also reveal, targets closely identified with millowners' 
personal interests. Dunn claimed that twenty. eight houses. 
were "stoned at night, ' windows broken, families terrified", 
1New-York-Times March 4 and 8 1913, New York Call 
March 7 1913. 
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and fourteen homes were bombed. Three unsuccessful attempts 
were made to derail locomotives supplying mills with "scab" 
labor and supplies, by "boulders on the track" and by fastening 
chains around the rails. Between forty and fifty individual 
assaults took place - "most of them occurred at night" - 
usually with a length of "lead pipe" or with a "gas pipe used 
as a bludgeon". Clubs and-even pistols were sometimes resorted 
to should the victim require further persuasion. In all twenty 
policemen were injured by "stones and other missiles thrown at 
them". 
1 
Despite any official bias Dunn's measure of the disorder 
by striking silkworkers was undoubtedly an underestimate. His 
figures were based upon official court cases. The majority of 
assaults and disorders were either unreported or not pursued 
for lack of evidence. Daily the local press was riddled with 
accounts of beatings, "serenadings" and attacks on mill 
buildings. Moreover the effect of such attacks reverberated 
far beyond the sore heads of strikebreakers. Workers preferred 
to stay away from mills rather than risk the fury of pickets. 
Millowners employed private guards to protect their property 
and whole neighbourhoods within the city were divided between 
supporters and critics of the strikers. 
Attacks on factories, millowners and their most trusted 
servants could not be taken lightly. Mills were stoned and 
shots fired through broken windows at blackleg weavers. 
Factories were dynamited. 
2- Some '. millowners deliberately 
1C. I. It. III pp. 2550-2551- 
2 C. 1-11. III pp. 2446,2547-2548,2561, Paterson Guardian 
June 29, July 9 and 22 1913. 
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flaunted the violent threats of strikers. Moses Straus, 
manager of the Frank and Dugan mill, went so far as to direct 
police arrests of pickets outside his factory. Most were 
more fearful and with good reason. Henry Doherty Jr., symbol 
of the intransigent millowners, was beaten up aboard a Main St. 
trolley car. On another occasion Doherty testified that he 
"... had a gun drawn on me coming to work; an Italian drew a 
gun on me, but we chased him and caught him". Other manu- 
facturers felt enough unease to arm themselves. 
' "Anonymous 
threats" and "Black Hand" demands were frequently received at 
the mill office. Dire consequences were threatened if their 
instructions were ignored. An-alleged Black Hand threat to 
derail Erie locomotives, if the railroad did not refrain from 
transporting blacklegs to work was duly carried out. More 
common were Black Hand demands for the withdrawal of mill 
superintendents, foremen and even watchmen from the mills. At 
the Frank and Dugan mill strikebreakers, although anxious to 
continue working, were sent home when it became clear that 
their safety could not be guaranteed. Private guards and 
police escorted them home, followed by a jeering and hostile 
mob. Many were forced to change their residences, even though 
millowners "... had men posted", outside their homes, "at night 
to stop stone throwing". Albert Bohl, a "boss color dyer" at 
Weidmann's Dye Works leapt from his bed on the night of 
C. I. R. 1III pp. 2592, -2439, Paterson Guardian June 6 and April 11 1913, New York Tribune June 7 1913. 
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March 27 to find his home bombarded by stone-throwing strikers. 
It goes without saying that "... the automobile police patrol 
arrived too late to arrest the assailants". Hohl was more 
fortunate than some. Henry Hudding, a strikebreaking foreman 
in another mill, had his home destroyed by a bomb. Their 
cases were typical of scores of attacks on millowners and their 
servants. 
l 
Though the 1913 disorders appeared as part of a long- 
standing tradition, in one important respect they marked a 
new departure from the pattern of the late nineteenth century. 
The difference reflected the recently changed ethnic complexion 
of Paterson and its mill workforce. The dispute was charac- 
terized as an "Italian" strike, with an ethnic dimension 
previously absent from the city's troubled industrial relations. 
Adolph Lessig indicated as much when he summed up local opinion 
for the Industrial Relations Commission in the summer of 1914, 
"... everyone blamed it on the Jews and the Italians for the 
strike. The year before there had been a strike and they 
called it a Jew strike, and last year they called it an Italian 
strike". 
2 Earlier 'strikes had been confined to the silk 
industry's dominant ethnic groups, but never before had strikers 
appeared so ethnically exclusive. 
Strike arrests provide an interesting illustration of 
the ethnic and communal origins of the 1913 disorders. More 
1C. I. R. III pp. -2569-2570,2561,2489-2490, 'NJBS Thirty 
Sixth Annual Fteport'1913 pp. 203,215, Paterson Guardian 
April 15, June 11,27,28,29, July 18 1913- 
2 C. I. R. III p. 2469. 
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than 1,800 individual arrests took place, a figure unprece- 
dented in Paterson. Italians and Jews were most likely to 
fall foul of the law. Of more than 1,100 arrested persons 
who can be reliably characterized, almost fifty per cent were 
Italians and Jews constituted another twenty five per cent. 
The residencies of the arrested provide further insight into 
the ethnic and neighbourhood character of disorder (See Map). 
There were five main concentrations, each in areas heavily 
populated by "new" immigrants, and each clustered around 
principal mills and dyehouses. Residents of the predominantly 
English-speaking localities were rarely arrested either. 
Irish, English, German and Dutch silkworkers were able to 
resist arrest through personal influence with police officers 
or, more likely, they did not actively participate in picketing 
and disorder. 
I It was the immigrants of the Italian- 
dominated 3rd, 6th and 9th wards who felt the long arm of the 
law. 
Although millhands lived in close proximity to their 
workplaces it did not deter them from aggressive action against 
strikebreakers and millowners. Indeed neighbourhood connec- 
tions and communal solidarities help explain the character 
and incidence of disorder. Intimate knowledge of local streets, 
1Walter Licht "Young Immigrant Workers, in Revolt - The 
Paterson Silk Strike of 1913" (dissertation paper, Princeton 
University, 1973). Licht's figures and information were 
taken from official arrest statistics of'the Paterson 
Police Department, which were unavailable to the author. 
Licht kindly allowed the author to reproduce his map of 
the residencies of the arrested. 
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and often homes or friendly havens were important weapons in 
the strikers' armoury. The sanctity of a front porch or a 
local bar was usually inviolate, even to police officers. To 
these vantage points strikers fled after an attack on a mill 
or strikebreaker. From here millhands could hiss, shout and 
taunt both police and blacklegs. John Reed described a typical 
scene in Paterson's Sixth ward: 
At six o'clock in the morning-a light rain was 
falling. Slate-grey and cold the streets of Paterson 
were deserted. But soon came the Cops - twenty of 
them - strolling along with their night-sticks under 
their arms.... In every doorway, at every window of 
the houses clustered foreign-faced men and women, 
laughing and chatting as if after breakfast on a 
holiday... As the warmer light of full day came the 
people drifted out of their houses and began to pace 
back and forth, gathering in little knots on the 
corners. 
Suddenly appeared a policeman, swinging his club. 
"Ah-h-h! " said the crowd softly. 
Six men had taken shelter from the rain under the 
canopy of a saloon. "Come on! Get out of that! " 
yelled the policeman advancing. The men quietly 
obeyed. "Get off this street! Go on home now! 
Don't be standing here! " 
A workman appeared with a tin pail, escorted by 
two detectives. "Boo! Boo! " shouted a few scattered 
voices. Two Italian boys leaned against the mill 
fence and shouted a merry Irish threat, "Scab! Come 
outa here I knocka you' head off! A policeman grabbed 
the boys roughly by the shoulder. "Get to hell out 
of here! " he cried, jerking and pushing them violently 
to the corner, where he kicked them. 1 
Most police officers discovered their tasks to be more 
difficult than those described by Reed. Police Captain, 
Andrew McBride, claimed that this same neighbourhood was 
"... the worst place that we had to contend with for disorder". 
And what made it difficult to patrol? Simply the fact that 
1J. Reed "War in Paterson" MASSES IV June 1913 p. 14. 
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local residents could use the privacy of their own homes to 
resist police attempts to scatter or confront them. McBride 
explained: 
It is-a thickly settled population of Italians; 
all Italians in that neighbourhood, practically, 
and they are very old-time, neat houses, according 
to the old architecture; there are some very old 
stoops, old-fashioned, ' and hold a number of people 
.... They would gather in large numbers on the stoops, 
hiss, and insult, and at sometimes stone people; 
look around you couldn't see. 1 
The murder of Valentino Modestino resulted indirectly 
from this same neighbourhood opposition to police and strike- 
breakers. Although the Italian was later to become a 
celebrated martyr under the direction of Wobbly strike leaders 
his killing is significant for the extent to which it reflected 
community support for strikers in the heavily populated immig- 
rant and silkworker sections of the city. Valentino lived in 
the Third Ward, close to the Weidmann Dye Plant and worked in 
a local file works. He was not a striker or an I. W. W. member, 
but almost certainly some of his friends and neighbours were. 
Because'his home was located near an important centre for 
pickets, he "... used to invite one or two of the strikers 
in at a time to have a cup of coffee or a bite of lunch... " 
A few yards from Valentino's home stood a saloon, the natural 
meeting-point and talking-shop for mill pickets. In such a 
locale Paterson's police faced difficult problems, exacerbated 
by the presence of private. guards patrolling the Weidmann 
plant. A few days prior to Valentino's shooting "a riot took 
1C. I. R. III p. 2560. 
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place" here - "... there had been stoops blown off houses, and 
bombs had been exploded in the rear of houses where people were 
sleeping, and the glass of the windows shattered and thrown 
upon the beds of children and wives". 
1 Valentino's death 
resulted from a similar commotion. Private detectives, 
escorting strikebreakers from the dye plant, commandeered a 
passing trolley car to usher their charges through an aggressive 
crowd of pickets. Strikers' passions seethed and broke out 
into open hostilities. Empty beer bottles, grabbed from crates 
on the stoop of the saloon, were hurled at the blacklegs and 
their guards. Both the private detectives, and later police 
investigators, saw the attack as a premeditated design - "a 
concerted effort". Both pointed accusing fingers at the saloon 
and the fact that "... there were two boys in there with two 
hats full of stones that the men could use them; that is, they 
grasped the stones and slung them into the crowd, in addition 
to the bottles they were firing". The guards charged the 
pickets, firing wildly. In the ensuing melee Valentino was 
mortally wounded. 
2 
Local saloons, children (perhaps strikers) from the 
neighbourhood, and even innocent parties not directly involved 
in the dispute, such as Valentino, all point to the community 
associations underlying strike disorder and workers' solidarity 
in the 1913 strike. That they were predominantly ethnic in 
character is not, in itself, surprising, but nonetheless 
1C. I. R. III pp. 2525,2548. 
2C. I. R. III pp. 2562,2567-2568. 
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significant against the background of Paterson's long strike 
history. In the past community support, often from the city's 
middle class and petit bourgeoisie, had stiffened the back- 
bone of strikes, legitimizing the wayward actions of millhands 
and increasing the "pull" workers could exert upon municipal 
officials. Doubtless such endorsement was rooted in innumerable 
ethnic and communal ties, but prior to 1913 it was never seen 
to be exclusively ethnic in orientation and ranged against 
Paterson's leading social and immigrant groups. Previously 
Irish workers found allies in Irish saloonkeepers, Irish police- 
men and Irish aldermen and were joined by Germans, Englishmen 
and Scots, with similar connections, acting in like fashion. 
In 1913 Italian strikers received assistance from their 
communities' independent middle class, but found it of little 
avail. The Italian community as a whole suffered from the 
taints and abuse commonly directed at immigrant millhands. 
More importantly Italian store-owners and lawyers lacked the 
political and social influence of earlier strike supporters. 
Their aids to silkworkers only served to bolster opponents' 
claims that the dispute and its violence was ethnic in origin 
and orientation. 
Paterson's Italian communities responded enthusiastically 
to the strike call. Numerous retailers extended credit to 
millhands and those that were reluctant to do so found the 
consequences sometimes unpleasant. In July, an Italian store- 
keeper on Mill Street, Nicholas Delasei, was assaulted by 
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three strikers to whom he had denied credit. 
i Many storeowners 
actively assisted pickets. In March Borena Neva, retailer on 
Straight Street, was arrested in a strike disturbance, along 
with a "well-known contractor", a baker, a barber and a 
jeweller. The previous day, Abram Milstein, a Jewish shop- 
keeper, had been taken into custody for obstructing the side- 
walk with chairs and benches provided for pickets at the 
nearby Hall Mill. 
2 Similarly Mrs Gallo, a storeowner on 
Straight Street was beaten in a fracas with Patrolman Ed Duffy. 
She took out a complaint against the City Police Department. 
Her action exasperated local police officers. Defending his 
colleague in court, Police Sergeant Murner explained: "... it is 
the outsiders that we have to keep after, they are the most 
3 
active". 
Communal codes of justice, although nebulous and probably 
dictated by custom, often informed group attitudes to the 
strike. They are most readily discerned in the Black Hand 
threats to fellow Italians who were strikebreaking. Michele 
Coscia received the following note in March 1913: 
"Dear Friend - We ar writing this letter to ask a 
favour of you. There are seven girls out on strike 
at... mill. They are not scabs. Your daughter is 
working in this place and we want you to call her 
out. If you do not you will have a cause to be 
sorry". (sic) 0 
The letter was signed with a grinning face aýsymbol, a local 
journal noted, "significant to the foreigner, and means to 
1Paterson Guardian July 25 1913. -- 
2ibid. March 26 and 27 1913" 
3Paterson Guardian March 29 1913" 
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imply death". 1 Mose Laporte, another Italian strikebreaker 
was similarly warned: 
"Signor Mose: 
You do not realize how much bread you are taking 
away from the mouths of a whole lot of poor children 
.... Vile man you are against your companions, 
traitor against the working class... For the present 
do not fear. You live at Dundee Lake, and have the 
deputies, with you... At the present you are well 
liked, for the time being, while you are a traitor 
against the poor fathers and families. Shaine on a 
man like you.... At present you are a friend of the 
bosses and of the Americans. You are a creator of 
poverty in the Italian class. Think for a moment 
what you are doing. Do not think that we are of 
the stupid class.... " 2 (sic) 
The anonymous threat, usual in the dealings of Italian "Black 
Hand" criminals, clearly had other functions, not typically 
associated with the ethnic community as a whole. Paterson's 
police and English-speaking groups viewed the Black Hand 
messages as further evidence of the intimate links between 
Italian crime and secret societies, anarchism and strike 
violence. There is little evidence to support their case. 
Paterson'. s anarchist community had long dispersed. No anarchist 
leader played a prominent part in the strike. Nor did any 
threat demand money as would be expected by Black Handers. 
Moral outrage and the meting out of justice formed the basis of 
these anonymous warnings, few of which, if any, were likely to 
have come from the real Black Hand. They were in fact, a form 
of popular pressure applied to workers obviously not cowed by 
1ibid. March 14 1913. 
2NJBS Thirty Sixth Annual Report, 1913 p. 199" 
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the picket line and public abuse. They constituted a final 
warning that severe punishment would follow if ignored. 
Black Hand threats were the most sensational, but probably 
not the most effective method of group support amongst Italians. 
Aid and intimidation derived from an intimate network of 
neighbourhood relationships. The Sons of Italy, a recent 
amalgam of ethnic mutual aid societies, pledged backing for 
strikers. Its president "told members to stay out on strike", 
and despite a heavy toll on the organizations' finances 
continued to provide relief throughout the dispute. The 
Italian owners of Turn Hall, James Cadgenella and Thomas Cappa, 
offered a meeting house and strike headquarters. Ignoring 
police harassment and the threat of closure, Cadgenella and 
Cappa continued to open their doors to strikers. They were 
eventually prosecuted for "keeping a disorderly house" and 
their property deemed out of bounds. 
2 Community brass bands 
often provided meetings and processions with a carnival atmos- 
phere. The cry of "Musica, Musica" invited one and all to 
participate. 
3 Henry Marelli, "New Idea" reformer and Italian 
lawyer, whose father had labored in Paterson's mills, was the 
strikers' foremost defence counsel. Bail for both I. W. N. 
leaders and less famous detainees was frequently raised by 
1G'. Mason "Industrial War in Paterson" Outlook June 7 1913- 
p. 287, Paterson Guardian March 6 and 13, May 23 and 24 1913. 
2Paterson 
Guardian May 19 and 21 1913" 
3ibid. March 11 and 20.1913- 
4 
C. I. R. III pp. 2529-2530. 
., 96 
local Italians. ' Local restaurants and cafes, such as Tony 
Diello's on Prospect Street, were used a relief centres. 
Sometimes they could'be adapted for other purposes. Frank 
Barbaro, proprietor of a coffee-shop near the Cedar Cliff Mill, 
was prosecuted for admitting to his premises pickets who were 
fleeing the police. Two horse drawn wagons, provided free of 
charge by James De Luccia, distributed groceries to strikers' 
families or transported the household possessions of evicted 
millhands to new homes "... given free-by those who sympathize 
with the strike". 
2 
Communal solidarity was widespread and effective within 
the'limits of Paterson's ethnic neighbourhoods. Outside its 
scope was severely curtailed by the residential and social 
confines of Paterson's Italians. In dealings with the police, 
for example, Italian strikers lacked sufficient influence with 
individual officers to intimidate or persuade. The vast 
majority of patrolmen were from English-speaking groups and 
lived in-localities apart from the "new" immigrants. Thus 
angry weavers might chant the station number of an-aggressive 
officer, but to little practical effect. The officer was 
defended by his colleagues. Similarly, striking girls boycotted 
a police dance, condemning patrolmen to "... dance with their 
night sticks". But again the effect was purely symbolic. 
3 
Previous generations of silkworkers had benefited from exerting 
popular pressure on policemen, and in 1913 it-was not entirely 
1Paterson Guardian April 30 1913- 
2 ibid July, 9 and i8 _, 
1913. 
3Paterson 
Guardian March 28 and 29 1913. 
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absent. Detective De Lucci, one of two Italians on the force, 
and used by Chief Bimson in the Italian sections of town,, 
certainly suffered dilemmas common to officers in the past. 
Following disorders in the Third Ward, he was asked by his 
Captain, why 11... he-was using peaceful means instead of using 
the means he should have used on such an occasion to make an 
arrest". Both De Lucci, and fellow Italian detective Pirola, 
were reluctant to answer, or to name disorderly strikers 
familiar to them. Their superior offered his own explanation 
for their reticence. "Of course they were young in the 
business", he pointed out: 
"... and being of their own kind, "they knew more of 
them than Americans, and possibly they have several 
reasons that we don't know about. Sometimes you 
know so much it may deter you in your work a bit. 
In other words if you don't know the danger you are 
in, sometimes you will take a chance, and get away 
successfully. And they, possibly, realized the 
danger more fully than an American person would 
have done, and acted differently". 1 
His analysis indicated that the potential for pressuring officers 
was slim, whilst "Americans", unfamiliar to their ethnic 
neighbours, dominated the Paterson Police Department. 
Jurors at strike trials faced similar anxieties to De 
Lucci. Some were "... afraid to do their sworn duty by reason 
of consequences, by reason of effect to their business, and 
there is no doubt about it that they have a whole lot of 
reasons". "A whole lot of reasons" might constitute "threat- 
ening letters" or "gatherings that have spoken about them and 
threatened ' them". 
2 After the conviction of strike leader 
C. I. R. III p. 2568. 
2ibid. 
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Pat Quinlan one juror "... was followed for weeks by a rough 
looking person". Jurors were advised by a court official 
"... to carry a gun and use it if anyone stopped them anywhere". 
The jurors were "marked men". Another was warned "'... tell 
your wife she must not let your child out of her sight for one 
minute and tell her to be very careful about receiving packages 
at your home". 
1 As with policemen however, the effect of 
intimidation was blunted for most jurors were English-speaking 
people with "no strikers, no workingmen". The local grand 
jury was selected by Passaic County Sheriff, Amos Radcliffe. 
It was characterized by Henry Marelli as "... made up of 
manufacturers. and businessmen who deal largely with manu- 
facturers... not a single workingman or representative of the 
working class was on it". 
2 Most of the arrested were charged in 
the local police. recorders' court, where the recorder was both 
judge and prosecutor a factor further reducing strikers' 
influence. Here no jury system existed. 
The pitfalls confronting strikers in the courts suggest 
the limited utility of disorder in the 1913 strike. Despite 
its long tradition in Paterson strike disorder was less effec- 
tive than ever before. Perhaps because of its ineffectiveness 
violence was also more widespread and, at times, more brutal 
than in the past. Traditionally this social violence had been 
1Unpublished 
manuscript "Patrick Quinlan Defense", File 24, 
Rose Pastor StokesCollection, Tamiment Library, New York 
University. 
2C. I. it. 'III pp. 2529,2536-2537" 
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founded upon a bedrock of shared assumptions and attitudes 
towards strikebreakers and millowners. To endure it required 
that strikers' aims and methods were recognized as legitimate 
and just. The concensus. of support for millworkers during 
industrial troubles was rooted in-the neighbourhood networks 
of late nineteenth century Paterson. It had been breaking down 
for a decade or more under the impact of social and political 
change. The 1913 strike exposed its fragile and transitional 
nature. Even if the strike had been confined to the city's 
"green" immigrant hands intimidation and assault would likely 
have been insufficient. For by 1913 the mill workforce was 
divided between old-time, English-speaking workers and the more 
volatile new arrivals. Moreover to serve the millhands' pur- 
pose intimidation required the tacit approval, or at least 
indulgence, of city authorities. This was notably absent in 
1913. 
From the outset the English-speaking were reluctant 
strikers. A decade of animosity and prejudice doubtless 
coloured the attitudes of these older immigrant workers. 
Even so more immediate concerns were not unimportant. The 
fiery passions of immigrant strikers convinced many English- 
speaking workers of the futility of the walkout. Thomas 
Morgan, local organizer of the A. F. of L. loomfixers' union, 
struck a familiar note in explaining his opposition to the 
strike. Immigrant millhands, Morgan explained, had "... no 
definite understanding as to what they were out on strike for", 
they simply "... merged practically into one mass. You could 
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not hardly call it an organization because I don't suppose 
there was five per cent of them organized when the strike 
took place". He lamented the fact that even Italian workers, 
long resident in the city, failed to exert any influence or 
discipline over the recent arrivals: 
"... those men when you form an organization they 
want instant action. Now, you know, as well as 
any man does if he knows anything about organization, 
you have got to protect your organization and you 
have got to educate your people and you have got 
to build up your fund and you have got to lay your 
plan how you are going to succeed. But these people 
seem to want instant action. If an organization 
is formed today, they want a strike tomorrow". 1 
James Starr, English-speaking secretary of the Horizontal 
Warpers' Union, voiced similar misgivings. His organization 
remained aloof from the "... too many immigrants coming into 
the silk trade that did not thoroughly understand the workings 
of our organizations, or had not become Americanized, and the 
manufacturers hiring those foreigners at all-kinds of wages!. 
Such workers "... have not had any drilling in organization work", 
Starr complained. They 
"... can't see a form of organization whereby they 
won't be allowed to strike just as soon as they are 
organized. They have got some radical ideas in 
their heads and until those radicals have been 
supplanted with others by some kind of organization 
that don't stand for such things as what they would 
like to have and like to have carried out we are 
going to have trouble right on with those people". 
Both Morgan and Starr echoed dismay'similar to that 
expressed a generation earlier by J. P. McDonnell. Unlike 
1C. I. R. III pp. 2416,2417,2430. 
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McDonnell's, their criticisms were peppered with nativist 
prejudice. But there is little reason to doubt that both 
recognized the crux of their problem rested with silk manu- 
facturers never-ending search for a cheap and pliable workforce. 
Starr recognized the cyclical nature of millowners' hiring 
practices upon union organization. For as soon as immigrant 
millhands "... had been here for two or three or four or five 
years they become Americanized and want a little more than 
they had been getting.... and when the manufacturer finds out 
they are starting an agitation he tries to get rid of those 
men and supplant them with other foreigners, if he can do it, 
and in that way the agitation is kept going on". Such policies 
made stable trade unionism practically impossible for the vast 
mass of immigrant millhands. Silkworkers "... have had maybe 
20 or 25 organizations in the last 20-years, but the trouble 
has been to get them to see the necessity of organization". 
Instead the constant arrival of newcomers made for an ill- 
disciplined and volatile workforce prone to the furious out- 
bursts characteristic in Paterson. 
1 
The English-speaking loomfixers and warpers both agreed 
that the strike organization formed in 1913 was doomed to failure. 
Both unions refused to join the mass walkout. "We did not 
recognize it as a trade-union movement", Morgan recalled, "and 
for that reason we did not wish to be mixing with then or 
mixed up with them". Many more English-speaking workers 
Z 
1C. I. it. III pp. 2612-2614. = 
2C. I. R. III p. 2418. 
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shared the loomfixers' reluctance to unite with Italian mill- 
hands, but did not openly flaunt the strike call. The-most 
notable group were ribbon weavers, who hesitated for two weeks 
before joining the original walkout, and whose return to work 
in July 1913 broke the workers' united front. They organized 
and held meetings separately front the mass of immigrant mill- 
hands. I Throughout they were anxious to disassociate them- 
selves from the impulsive actions of immigrant strikers and 
the fiery denunciations of the I. W. W. 
2 Intimidation forced 
many to accede to the general walkout. Manufacturers claimed 
that the older immigrant groups were "afraid of being called 
scabs", but fear of physical, not rhetorical, violence was 
the most effective deterrent against blacklegs. When English- 
speaking workers hesitated to strike in early March they were 
stoned and jeered. 
3 More common were individual assaults on 
recalcitrant strikers. Morgan was quick to point out: 
"There was a lot that went on that did not appear of" 
the disorder; threats and intimidation, and all that, 
that was done very quietly. At the same time it was 
very effective". 4 
The rift between English-speaking workers and their 
immigrant colleagues was most clearly marked'in intimidation 
and assaults on strikebreakers. In the final week of March 
1913, for example, a blackleg weaver Joseph Thomas of Straight 
Street in the heavily Italian populated 9th ward, limped into 
1Paterson Guardian February 27,28, March 10, May 13 1913. 
2ibid. April 1st, May 22, June 11 1913" 
3ibid. March 3 and. 4 1913.; 
4C. 
I. R. III p. 2420. 
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court supported by two policemen. He was'to give testimony 
against three Italians who had attacked him a few days prev- 
iously. The case was quickly heard, the Italians convicted, 
and duly led away. It was a common sort of incident. Such 
assaults were an almost daily occurrence during the strike. 
The assailants were Italian (sometimes' Jewish). The victims 
wer. e. second-generation immigrants, usually of British, German 
or Dutch origin, who were strikebreaking. Often the blackleg 
had been warned to quit work, sometimes in so many words but 
often by "serenading" outside his home. Yet neither the courts 
nor the rough justice meted out by pickets did much to reduce 
the need for such attacks. English-speaking workers continued 
to work and strikers ignored the law. In sentencing the 
assailants of Joseph Thomas, City Recorder James Carroll warned: 
"I want to impress on you men that you have overstepped the 
bounds". 1 His words were wasted, for beneath the surface of 
their antipathy was a decade or more of tension between Italians 
and the older immigrant groups. Second-generation workmen were 
hostile to the new-immigrants who had flooded into the mills 
and driven down wages. In their view cheap labor and inade- 
quate organization was a major cause of the dispute. The 
Italians, on the other hand, recognized only the need for 
strike solidarity. Its necessity, in their view, was absolute. 
A similar impasse divided Italian strikers from their 
traditional allies, the city's middle class and, more importantly, 
1Paterson 
Guardian March 14 and 26 1913" 
,-ý- 
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politicians and city officials. For the first time in an 
industrial dispute millhands were confronted with outright 
hostility from municipal authorities. Although the I. W. W. has 
frequently been pictured at the heart of this significantly 
new departure clearly other factors were influencing the 
animosity of Paterson officials towards the strike. Both 
police and city administrators feared a repetition of the 1902 
riots. -The unsavoury reputation of "Red City" underpinned 
official hostility to millhands. To stem the exodus of manu- 
facturing plants and attract new industries to Paterson such 
demonstrations were no longer tolerable. Similar misgivings 
had-been expressed by city officials for a decade or more, but 
prior to 1913 had not resulted in outright and uncompromising 
support for silk manufacturers. In the past Aldermen, Mayor 
and even police officers, prodded and cajoled by popular 
pressure, usually refused to yield to demands for repressive 
measures. Frequent middle class support for millworkers only 
added to silk manufacturers' problems. Only when the demand 
for repression was amplified by the "red scares" of 1900 and 
1902 did this traditional alliance falter. 
In 1913 two factors combined with fears of economic 
stagnation to produce a new and virulent hostility towards 
disorderly workers. First was the massive influx of "new, 
immigrants" into the city during the opening decade, of the 
twentieth century, most of whom found work, at the expense of 
older immigrant groups, in the-silk mills. By, 1913 Italians 
formed the largest ethnic"group, in Paterson's silk industry. 
Tension between English-speaking workers and Italians was a. 
persistent feature of the strike. More important the dispute, 
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and in particular its violence was closely associated with 
Italian workers. As was noted earlier, it was in fact 
identified as an "Italian strike". Nativist opposition to 
newcomers gave both manufacturers and city officials leave 
to crack down on silkworkers in 1913" 
The results of the recent municipal reforms combined 
with nativist antipathy to disrupt the traditional relationship 
between strikers and city authorities. It is important to 
recall that the new city charter removed all officials, save 
one, from popular accountability. It left the mayoralty as 
the sole elective. office in local government. Neighbourhood 
aldermen, traditional allies of striking silkworkers, were 
replaced by appointees of the mayor. The new boards of 
commissioners did not need to be responsive to workingmen's 
wishes, nor indeed did the mayor,, even sit on them. At a 
sweep the municipal reform had radically altered the character 
of local government. Changes in municipal personnel accompanied 
commission. reform. Two of the chief beneficiaries of the new 
city charter were millowners and machine politicians. Silk 
manufacturers, for the first time, achieved positions of 
considerable influence at City Hall. Their presence goes. some 
way towards explaining official hostility to workingmen in 
1913. Machine politicians were less obviously partisan in 
their sympathies. Many were of humble origin with careers 
rooted in neighbourhood political clubs and associations. They 
were however from overwhelmingly old-stock immigrant back- 
grounds predominantly Irish. Their allegiances were first 
and foremost to their supporters, English-speaking immigrants. 
- 3o6 - 
And in the tense atmosphere surrounding new immigration to the 
city, this usually meant at the expense of ethnic groups not 
yet incorporated into the machine. In 1913 Paterson's 
Italians wielded scarcely any political "pull" with the city 
bosses and could expect little favour in return. On the con- 
trary, they were more usually the target of objection amongst 
the machine's staunchest supporters, old-stock immigrants. 
Concern that the "good name" of the city was being harmed 
by unruly millhands was a prominent feature of strike oppos- 
ition. In large part this hostility was inflamed by the I. W. W. 's 
leadership. Reporter John Fitch was shocked by "... the 
attitude of the so-called 'best people' in Paterson. "More 
than once", he witnessed "Patersonians, wearing immaculate 
linen and irreproachable clothing, shouting at me, red-faced 
and gesticulating, their denunciation of Haywood and his 
fellows". 1 Prejudice against immigrant millhands was often 
inextricable from this anti-radical bias, in part because 
Italians had long been associated with radical outrages. A 
year or more after the strike, Rose Pastor Stokes discovered 
hostility to the strikers had scarcely subsided. Interviewing 
a city clergyman she found him opposed to wage increases for 
silkworkers. "If men get more wages they would spend more 
money in the saloons, and there would be more drunkenness and 
crime". His view was re-iterated by others.. "I have observed 
J. Fitch "The I. W. W.: An Outlaw Organization". 
Survey June 7 1913, 'p. 357. 
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the workers", declared another interviewee, "... dirty, unclean 
and disgusting, staggering along the streets and into the 
saloons and, I think they are a disgrace to the community. 
It would be a sin to give them any more money to spend in that 
way". 
1 Crime, dissolute habits and radicalism were part and 
parcel of the "red scare" which had gripped Paterson since the 
turn of the century - "... a hidden Cancer trying to reach the 
Vitals of Our Beloved Country", wrote an "old lady Interested 
in the Welfare of Paterson", to President Wilson. 
2 
City officials were equally adamant that their civic 
responsibilities required stout and uncompromising opposition 
to the strike. Mayor Andrew F. McBride was deeply concerned by 
the "... harm that was being done the name of the city". He 
later lamented the "blow" struck "at the industrial supremacy 
of our city". 
3 The spectre of Paterson as a hotbed of anarchism 
must not be revived. John Ferguson, a local building con- 
voiced similar sentiments. "Paterson has had its 
notoriety in the past", he declared, "... and we who think a 
great deal of our city and are interested in its prosperity 
and welfare did not want to have a repetition of the conditions 
in Lawrence". More than civic pride formed the basis of such 
1"Pat Quinlan Defense", Rose Pastor Stokes Collection. 
2Unsigned letter to Secretary Tumulty, June 2 1913 in 
Reports and Correspondence relating to the Paterson silk 
industry 1913-1919, Records of the Department of Labor, 
R. G. 280, National Archives, Washington D. C. 
3Annual Report of the City-Officers, 1912-1913, p. xxxv. _, 
SS : ; 
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expressions, as a local editor made clear. The threat of 
economic and industrial stagnation fuelled his opposition to 
the strike. He was appalled that new business concerns "... 
gave up the idea of coming here because they were really 
scared off by the industrial unrest here". His anxiety was, 
apparently, widespread in the local business community, even 
"... among those who were not directly interested 
in this trouble, but who were interested to maintain 
the good name and character of this city without 
having a disturbance and having the militia coming 
here and all that sort of thing which would only 
add to the notoriety which we had in the past". 1 
It was against this background of fear, prejudice and 
anxiety that Police Chief John Bimson and Mayor McBride took 
the decision to "nip the strike in the bud" in February 1913.2 
Bimson consequently banned strike meetings, broke up picket 
lines and dispersed demonstrations. His motives revealed more 
than a passing anxiety that the debacle of 1902 should not 
be repeated. The presence of militia in Paterson could only' 
lead to public censure, suffered by his predecessor, Chief 
Graul. Moreover Bimson recognized that policing a strike in 
an industrial city posed special problems. A local editor 
expressed the Chief's views: 
"A strike in New York City does not affect the entire 
community as it does in Paterson. 
New York with its big army of policemen can safely 
permit agitators to influence the passions of a few 
of its workers, nothing serious can happen, 
A big strike in New York is merely an incident. A 
big strike in Paterson means business paralysis and 
a state of uneasiness for every resident'of this 
community. 
New York canlet, professional labor agitators rant 
and roar, because it does not affect public safety. 
A similar policy in Paterson would mean a constant 
menace to life, and property'. F3 
C. I. R. 1III pp. 2553,2580-2581,2584. 
2C. I. R. III pp. 2522. 
3Paterson 
Guardian February 27 1913" 
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Civic officials and magistrates backed Bimson whole- 
heartedly, providing legal support and sanction for his 
policies. But increasingly their support, and indeed the 
whole campaign mounted to destroy the strike, revealed that 
more than concern for the "good name" of Paterson was shaping 
official opposition to millhands. 
The new civic influence of manufacturers could scarcely 
fail to intrude on relations between police and strikers. Some 
idea of the extent to which businessmen's concerns shaped 
official responses to the strike is indicated by the personnel 
of the Paterson Police and Fire Commission in 1913. It was 
headed by James 1*1cWilliams, secretary of the Watson Machine 
Company which built looms and machinery for Paterson's silk 
mills. Alongside him, sat Thomas Morgan, a grocer with 
interests in silk manufacturing, William Hopson, editor of 
the Paterson Morning Call, and Josiah Bailey, partner in the 
giant Ashley and Bailey mills. 
l Responsible only to the Mayor, 
these supervisors of Bimson's force proved staunch supporters 
of the Chief's tactics. After the strike Bimson was to "... 
thank the members of your honourable board for your support 
... making it possible for me to look after the welfare of 
the city... " Through "their arrangement with the sheriff" of 
Passaic County, Amos Radcliffe, Bimson was empowered to recruit 
"special policemen" and auxiliary "deputy sheriffs" to police 
both the city of Paterson and the county at large. 
2 It came 
1Paterson Guardian January 12 1912, New York Tribune 
April 2 1913. Annual Report of-the City Officers 
1912-1913 p. 4.. w.... 2Annual 
Report of the' City' Officers 1912-1913, ' p. 296'. -- 
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as no surprise that private detectives, employed by manu- 
facturers to protect mill property, were frequently recruited 
as "specials". Two federal agents, investigating the strike 
in 1914, calculated that sixty private policemen were "clothed 
with the authority of the police and of-the sheriff", and 
concluded that they were "... employed, not strictly as an 
adjunct to the state authority, but as a private army of the 
mill owners". 
' 
Liaison between millowners and city officials was often 
unofficial, the result of personal influence and favour. 
Strike leader Adolph Lessig complained: "... the day I got 
six months, I saw a manufacturer come walking out of the 
recorders' room". An automobile, owned by the National Silk 
Dyeing Company, was at the disposal of Paterson police officers. 
Individual silk manufacturers were sworn in as special deputies 
while others directed the arrests of pickets.. 
2 More insidious, 
perhaps, was the flagrant partiality shown by the local 
judiciary. 
The Police Commissioners appointed City Recorder, James 
F. Carroll, presiding judge in the police magistrates' court. 
By an anomaly in the New Jersey Constitution, all judges in 
the state were appointees. At the state and county level they 
were nominated by the Governor, at the local level they were 
appointed by municipal authorities. It was an unusual arrange- 
ment, paralleling the removal of city officers from popular 
1P. F., Gill and R. S. Brennan "Report 
and Police of Paterson, N. J. " Unpu 
Commission on Industrial Relations 
the Department of'Labor, R. G. 174, 
2C. I. R. III pp. 2463,2524,2592. 
on the Inferior Courts 
blished Reports of the 
1912-1915, Records of 
National`: Archives, p. 7. 
- 311 - 
accountability. The federal investigators of the strike were 
quick to note that as no judges were elected, "... none of them 
are directly answerable to the electorate". 
1 The Recorder 
dealt with all local arrests, meting out justice on the spot 
in trivial cases while for more serious misdemeanours referring 
cases to the superior county and state courts. In the 
Recorder's court no jury system existed. The presiding officer 
was a combined prosecutor, judge and jury. Appeal against his 
decisions had to be taken to a superior court. As in all 
courts, the City Recorder was empowered to set bail. Thus 
Carroll was a key figure in the official city opposition to 
the strike. Only with his cooperation could the police have 
pursued a policy of mass arrests. Carroll, Bimson, Sheriff 
Radcliffe and County Prosecutor Michael Dunn combined to swear 
in "specials", tie up strike funds in excessive bail require- 
ments and badger supporters of the strike. 
All arrested persons appeared before Carroll, and the 
vast majority of cases were adjudicated by him. Only the actions 
against I. W. W. leaders were passed on to the county courts. 
Most strikers were arrested on charges of "disorderly conduct" 
or "unlawful assembly". Fines and jailings were the common 
result. The marked contrast in the attitude of the superior 
courts to the cases of I. W. W. leaders is a striking indication 
of the bias of the local judiciary. Judge Minturn of the 
State Supreme Court upheld the appeals of a number of I. W. W. 
leaders against sentences in the city and county courts. More- 
over Minturn agreed to allow the arrested to appear before 
1Gill 
and Brennan "Reportý'on". the=Inferior Courts" p. 4. 
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"foreign' juries in the county court, composed of jurors 
residing outside Passaic County, for "... a fair and impartial 
trial could not be had by a jury composed of Passaic County 
men". 
l 
As a result Federal investigators of Paterson's courts 
made a scathing attack on the local police and judiciary. "We 
found that the police organization, coupled with the magistrates' 
court, became tools of oppression", they asserted. Legal 
authority was, "in effect, turned over to the mill owners". 
They viewed it as the logical result of the 1907 commission 
reforms: 
"The Board of Fire and Police Commissioners.... were 
in sympathy with the mill owners. One member of 
the Board was a silk manufacturer. As the Board 
controlled the actions of the police and the Recorder, 
the instruments created for the administration of 
justice and the safe-guarding of the rights of indiv- 
iduals became tools of oppression in the control of 
the few operators as against the 25,000 silk workers 
on strike". 2 
Such effective and rapid assumption of municipal power by 
millowners seems scarcely credible in a city traditionally 
amenable to working men. Yet it was possible because the 
spoils of office in the new administration were intimately 
bound up with the ethnic tensions dominating social relations 
in Paterson. Commission government made possible an alliance 
between city officials and millowners and ethnic prejudices 
and anxieties cemented it. Thus could Sheriff Radcliffe 
justify his aggressive policy towards strikers, by referring 
to "foreigners" as a "lower order of animals, unfit for free 
1Gill 
and Brennan"! 'Report'onithe Inferior,, 'Courts"-'Appendix, 
Exhibit "C". C. I. R. III p. 2539. 
2Gill. 
and"Brennan"! 'Report on the Inferior Courts" PP. 1-7,20. 
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speech", and who naturally had no "right to be on or along 
the streets or sidewalks in the vicinity of the mills during 
the strike". 
1 Mayor McBride voiced similar feelings. His 
reasons for opposing immigrant supporters of the I. W. W. were 
uncannily similar to those of Paterson's English-speaking 
skilled unionists. "No American citizen who understands the 
principles of the I. W. W., could under any circumstances sub- 
scribe to its teachings", he argued. If unionism was to be 
admitted in the city, "... it must be an American Labor Union, 
infused with a patriotic spirit and directed to American 
ideals". ` Such shared assumptions indicate the common ground 
between city officials and old-stock immigrants. They also 
point to`the ease with which millowners obtained sanction for 
their opposition to immigrant millhands. When James Starr, 
British-born member of the Paterson trades council, announced 
that the "police behaved themselves admirably". during the dis- 
pute, he merely re-emphasized the yawning gulf which separated 
Paterson's ethnic groups. 
3 
Ethnic prejudice was most clearly revealed in the courts, 
and amongst patrolmen on the beat.. Arrested strikers felt 
Recorder Carroll to be "kind of antagonistic" towards them, 
and "... in most cases they seemed to think he gave them more 
than they deserved; that he was too severe with them". 
t 
Strikers' counsel might argue in court, that his clients were 
"... impulsive and ignorant of the law" but this argument 
1D. S. McCorkle to President Wilson, June 9 1913, Department 
of Labor Files R. G. ' 280, National Archives. 
2Annual 
Report of the City Officers 1912-1913 p. xxxvi. 
3C. 
I. R. III p. 2614. 
4C. 
I. R. III p. 2422. 
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usually fostered Carroll's partiality. The appearance before 
the bench of whole families arrested on picket duty, filled 
the Recorder with contempt and dismay. Ile usually meted out 
sentences indiscriminately, and sometimes with more than a 
little spleen. One unfortunate girl made the mistake of smiling 
in court. The gesture upset Carroll: 
"She was smiling in anticipation of being released. 
Her lawyer had told her it would be alright - and 
so the poor girl smiled, and for smiling Recorder 
Carroll said: 'I will make you smile on the other 
side of your face' (Snaps fingers) 'Sixty days"'. 1 
In the case of a strikebreaker, charged with murdering picket 
Vincenzo Madonna in an affray, Carroll declared: "I am reluc- 
tant to accept a complaint of murder against you, for I believe 
2 
you did. right". 
The prevalent attitude of Paterson's judiciary towards 
strikers was best summed up by'the Passaic County prosecuting 
attorney, Michael Dunn. Comparing the 1913 strike with 
previous silk strikes, Dunn explained to the Industrial 
Relations Commission, in 1914: 
"We never had such depredations during those times 
as transpired at these times, and this is the first 
time we ever had in our midst a foreign element 
that seems to have no moral motive or moral policy 
on which an adjustment of differences should be 
based". 
Dunn saw the "foreign element" as propagator of strike violence, 
and sorely in need of a severe lesson in American liberty and 
justice. Presumably Dunn agreed with the remarks of John 
Ferguson, made before the same Commission. Ferguson, a city 
1Paterson Guardian April 10,29 1913, C. I. R. III p. 2526. 
2Paterson Guardian July 9 1913" 
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contractor and staunch advocate of commission government in 
Paterson, justified the actions of local judges in much the 
same terms as Dunn: 
"I think that the foreigner who comes here with 
these ideas of freedom and then gets this licensed 
thing thrown into him, should be made to respect 
the laws of this country and understand that he is 
to obey the law, and that we have laws and they 
should be enforced". I 
Ferguson was certainly attuned to the glaring gulf separating 
the attitudes and morality of immigrant millhands from their 
social peers. His analysis appears even more pointed in 
relation to conflict between police and immigrants. 
Commission reform had fundamentally reshaped the functioning 
of the Paterson Police Department and its relationship to the 
public. The size of the force had been increased some fifty 
per cent by the new Police Commissioners. Bimson's "shake-up" 
and reforms had modernized the department. Most importantly, 
officers were increasingly removed from the popular pressures 
so common in the past. Under commission rule the department 
was accountable only to appointed commissioners. No longer 
could popularly elected city fathers hope to influence the 
internal workings of the force. Bimson's modernization pro- 
gramme emphasized the same general development. The number of 
detectives - men not readily identifiable as policemen - was 
substantially increased. The numbers of motorized, and horse- 
mounted officers likewise grew. Increasingly policemen, now 
concentrated upon specialized assignments,, such as those in 
1c. I. R. III pp. 2550,255zß 2582. 
Zý'1". f ". .. ana, a 
4` 
_i°ýý. 
r .. rr .fcft 
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the "Traffic Squad" or in the Detective Bureau's "Italian 
Department". 1 
The character of Bimson's rejuvenated force was heavily 
influenced by its ethnic make-up. Of one hundred and forty 
seven members of the Police Department in 1913, personal 
details can be traced of one hundred and seven, from the 1915 
N. J. State Census. Of this number the overwhelming majority 
were native Americans or old-stock immigrants. One hundred 
and one were of American, Irish, British or German origin, with 
the Irish clearly predominating. Italian representation on 
the force amounted to two members - Detectives Pirola and De 
Lucci. There were no Jewish policemen. A second outstanding 
feature of Bimson's department in 1913 was its youth and 
relative inexperience. Almost sixty per cent of the force had 
been appointed since the 1907 charter revision and re-organ- 
ization of the police, many of them Dimson's, personal selections. 
Predominantly Irish or native Americans, these new recruits re- 
enforced the old-stock immigrants' domination of the department. 
The new recruits' average age in 1913 was thirty four years, 
almost fifteen years younger on average than the remaining 
members of the force. 
2 These recent appointments comprised, 
in effect, a new generation of policemen in the city. They had 
no official experience of the disorders'that had accompanied 
In 1901 of one hundred and four, members. on the force, 
eighty seven were patrolmen. - By 1908, although the force had expanded to one hundred and forty three officers, 
patrolmen amounted to one hundred and three members. Annual 
Reports of the City°Officers 190.1-1902, '1907-1908 
'PP- 135-137,258-261. -2 
The youth of the post-reform recruits is, of course, 
relative to the then existing members of the department. 
Their average age at time of recruitment, 1907-1910, 
would have been about thirty years. By contemporary 
standards this may seem "mature" for new officers. At 
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previous disputes, and had been groomed under a chief proud 
of the. efficiency and discipline of his force and pledged to 
detroy the alien radicals in his midst. 
I They comprised also 
a generation radically different in ethnic origin from the 
vast majority of the city's silkworkers and strike activists. 
The latter feature was re-emphasized by the residential 
characteristics of patrolmen. (See Appendix) Policemen 
residing in the heavily Italian populated 3rd, 6th and 9th 
wards were underrepresented on the force. Indeed in 1913 
there was no policeman at all resident in the 6th ward. Both 
the ethnic and residential characteristics of the force served, 
along with Bimson's reforms, to accentuate the removal-of 
officers from popular influence. ' 
Bimson's policies for maintaining order in 1913 were not 
solely the product of nativist bias, though they were 
undoubtedly influenced by such sentiment and by his arduous 
and prolonged campaign against Paterson's Italian radicals. 
the turn of the century their age was probably not regarded 
as unusual. A job on the force was a "desirable" and 
much sought after position, as is witnessed in the scramble 
for appointment in 1907 (see pp. 272-273). 
- 
Presumably a 
prospective policeman had to wait several years before his 
selection was considered. However if we accept thirty as 
a relatively advanced age, a number of intriguing questions 
are suggested. Among them: Was a policeman's lot in 1900 
such that mature men were better equipped to patrol city 
streets? Did the selection process merely reflect the 
ageing of Paterson's established ethnic groups? Most- 
intriguing, and unfathomable: Was it the case that selection 
reflected reward, from the political machine or the civically 
influential, for past favours, a factor which surely would 
have excluded younger, -candidates? 
1Statistics 
compiled, from ManuscriptTolumes of the New 
Jersey State Census 1915 and the, Annual Report of the City 
Officers'1912-1913 'pp" 309-316. 
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The Chief recognized responsibilities to his superiors on the 
Board of Commission and, perhaps more significantly, to his 
"office" and department. He was anxious to pre-empt an appeal 
to the Governor for state militia. Both duties, in his eyes, 
demanded vigorous suppression of strike disorders. Bimson's 
prompt response to the walkout of February 1913 indicated the 
same. The Chief ordered the whole force to headquarters where 
cots were installed, a kitchen and a barbers' shop improvised. 
In addition the entire city fire department was sworn in as 
"special deputies". 1 All officers were assigned extra duties 
and expected to be available at a moment's notice should the 
need arise. Bimson was clearly determined to stamp out strike 
disorders and, freed from the shackles of a restraining mayor and 
indignant middle class, he was plainly able to do so. 
In like fashion Bimson's recent re-fashioning of the Police 
Department bore fruit in the street battles of 1913. The two 
Italian recruits of 1*907 were essential to the apprehension of 
immigrant culprits. Further they proved useful for recruiting 
police infiltrators at strike meetings and discussions. 
2 The 
new equipment was at times an essential adjunct to police 
patrols. The squad's telephone system enabled the Chief to 
locate trouble and direct officers to scenes of disorder. 
Bimson's mounted squad - dubbed "Cossacks" by fleeing pickets 
- were a fearsome weapon in dispersing crowds. 
3 Above all, 
1Paterson Guardian March 3 and 25 1913- 
2 C. I. R. III p. 2488, Paterson Guardian May 9 1913" 
3Paterson 
Guardian February 25 1913" 
I 
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the introduction of police automobiles made possible both 
prompt suppression of disturbances and the policy of mass 
arrests adopted by the Paterson authorities. In the past 
escorting arrested strikers to headquarters was a hazardous 
task. Culprits were sometimes freed by jeering crowds of 
pursuers. Patrol wagons put an end to this in 1913. Bimson's 
deputy, Captain McBride summed up his department's satisfaction 
with the new apparatus: 
"I would say that the facilities that we had with 
automobiles was more than helpful to us. Had it not 
been for them we could never have gotten along. We 
could never have made the time. Between the telephone 
and the automobiles and the willingness of the men 
to work, is what made the thing successful". 1 
The "willingness of the men" was never in question. I3imson 
must have been satisfied, and perhaps even a little relieved, 
by the predisposition of his force towards strikers. Millhands 
complained bitterly of the incidence with which "officers 
became very brutal". The sentiment fuelling this aggression 
was never in doubt. "Several of the officers seemed to dis- 
criminate in certain ways as to arresting Italians and Jews, 
principally", lamented strike organizer Lessig. Missing was 
the familiar leniency towards millhands, and in its place 
"... animosity against the foreign nationality of the people". 
In an exchange before the Industrial Relations Commission in 
1914, Lessig pinpointed the dramatic change in relations 
between police and workingmen. lie was asked: "... did you feel 
that the police conducted themselves as you would do as a 
1C. I. R. III p. 2564. See also Bimson's comments in Annual 
Report of City Officers 1912-1913 p. 297. 
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policeman, or not? " 
Lessig: "Well, I thought I could have winked the 
other eye on many occasions. Many of them 
were silkworkers themselves a few years ago". 
Q. "What do you mean by 'winked the other eye? "' 
Lessig: "Looked the other way". 
Q. "Why? " 
Lessig: "Give the other fellow a chance". 
Q. "What to do? " 
Lessig: "Well, walk up and down; he was really doing 
nothing. They, were simply too strict. No 
doubt about that". 1 
Others protested in a similar fashion. Captain McBride 
was later to contest these accusations, claiming that many 
patrolmen had relatives working in the mills, and "... all 
sympathize with the labouring men and women in getting better 
conditions". 
2 His claims appear credible. Of the members of 
the force traced in the census almost half-were found to have 
a relative working in the silk industry or to be sharing a 
house with at least one silkworker. Of the remaining only 
eighteen were living without a milihand as a close neighbour 
(within two houses). 3 It seems likely, however, that kinfolk 
or neighbours - if friendly - were English-speaking workers, 
perhaps strikebreaking. Nativist feeling was such that 
although many patrolmen were immigrants - admittedly old-stock 
1C. I. R. III p. 2463-- 
2 ibid. p. 2563. 
3Appendix 
10. 
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or second-generation - "... a great many of them don't regard 
themselves as such. They had been here a little bit ahead of 
the-other fellow, that's all". 
1 Although Captain McBride 
made appeals to foreigners to "... try to do as Americans 
usually do", his efforts were uncharacteristic of his sub- 
ordinates. Most police were "very obnoxious", goading strikers 
with taunts such as: "If you don't like it, just start some- 
thing". Striker Ed Zeursher described the typical confrontation 
on the picket line: 
"They (the po, 
and sometimes 
if there were 
and told them 
Waps and Jews 
the workers a 
Lice) generally came with a drawn club, 
with curses on their lips, especially 
a foreign element on the picket line, 
to get out of there , and called them 
and such names as that, which incensed 
great deal'. 2 
Strikers replied equally vociferously. After an arrest 
at Turn Hall, a "howling mob" followed police officers 
"threatening violence, kicking the detectives... and firing 
missiles at them". After invading the precinct station, the 
mob was only turned away by squads of police who had to "... 
start right in and disperse them with violence". Such incid- 
ents were not common, but hardly untypical of the sour relations 
between police and public. More usual was the barracking of 
individual officers, a tactic that had worked admirably in 
previous silk strikes. Strikers "... had a cry they used to 
use, kind of a boo-hoo, kind of a lonesome, wailful cry of 
derision, and showing distaste towards the police". 
3 Its 
1C. I. R. III p. 2463. 
2ibid. 
pp. 2569,2465,2594. 
3C. I. R. III pp. 2560,2546. 
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demonstrative failure to influence police actions suggests the 
incidence of violence in 1913. No other course of popular 
rebuke was effective. 
In sum, confrontation and violence became the ultimate 
and only method of communication between Paterson's immigrant 
workers and their social peers. The deepening rift in social 
relations in the city, during the two decades 1890-1913 split 
wide open under the tension of an I. W. W. -led strike. Long 
after the Wobblies had fled Paterson the scars of "war" were 
still healing. 
Too much can be made of the I. W. W. 's role in Paterson's 
great strike. The press identified it as a Wobbly strike and 
Paterson's foremost citizens endeavoured to support the same 
interpretation. Immigrant millhands were pictured as, the 
innocent dupes of a handful o' "anarchists" hell-bent on 
destroying the city's principal industry. Thus John Ferguson, 
a leading city building contractor, complained of the I. W. W. 
beguiling "... non-English-speaking workers, who are easily led 
... and hard to control when their passions are excited". Police 
Captain McBride similarly attributed the strike uproar to 
poor immigrants being It... misled by those agitators who are 
very able and resourceful". 
1 Of course both city administrators 
1c. I. u. III pp. 2579,2565,2569. 
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and manufacturers were keen to load the onus of respons- 
ibility onto the Wobblies. They sought to disguise their own 
misdeeds. Boosterism undoubtedly motivated them to present 
Paterson as a normally stable and law-abiding community, whose 
present predicament reflected only the incendiary activities 
of the I. W. W. 
Unfortunately their partiality has been perpetuated - for 
different reasons and in a different form -'in more recent 
analyses of Paterson's war. Essentially Paterson's millworkers 
remain, still, putty in the manipulative hands of Haywood and 
followers. Social history which focuses upon the organizational 
expression of working class activity has an in-built tendency 
in this direction. Historical accounts of the I. W. W. in 
Paterson are no exception. While the work of Foner, Renshaw, 
Dubofsky and Conlin has provided important and illuminating 
insights into the dispute, it has by and large'glossed over 
the role of millhands in the strike, and the extent to which 
the dispute reflected tensions wholly independent of the I. W. W. 
It has failed to remark upon the important continuities between 
1913 and the long tradition of industrial disorder in the city. 
Like countless strikes before it the "War in Paterson" 
reflected a half-century of struggle between millowners and 
an immigrant workforce new to industrial society. Disorder 
was the stock reaction of millhands to industrial crisis. The 
disorders of 1913 appear excessive only because of the new 
attitude of city authorities towards. strikers. Past indulgence 
or lenience towards riotous workers now gave way to determined 
opposition. It revealed the extent to which progressive reform 
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had enabled silk manufacturers to wield a new authority in 
municipal affairs, and the degree to which nativist abuse and 
prejudice could intrude into industrial disputes. 
Far from occupying the centre of the stage, the I. W. W. 's 
role in Paterson was limited. It too reflected the new divorce 
between millhands and municipal authorities. Whilst silk- 
workers could expect little local support for their cause, the 
I. W. W. might provide enough publicity and concern on a national 
scale to tip the balance in their favour. The I. W. W. 's 
function in the dispute was almost wholly devoted to this end. 
The I. W. W. 's ability to capture newspaper headlines 
during the Paterson dispute was best personified by its leading 
figure, Bill Haywood. A former miner from the Far West, 
"Big Bill" had devoted his life to organizing and educating 
America's working class, not very successfully by 1913- Spect- 
acular success in leading recent strikes amongst the immigreint 
millhands of New England quickly evaporated leaving a weak 
and disheartened minority of activists in its wake. Nowhere 
had the permanent organization of workers replaced the ad hoc 
solidarity Haywood so effectively engineered. It was galling 
and especially depressing to Big Bill, a naturally pessimistic 
man. Nevertheless when the call for assistance came from 
Paterson, he responded with characteristic verve. To be sure 
Haywood would have felt-happier going to meet the rough-and- 
tumble miners of his native region, but he was not one to 
duck a challenge. He was heartened by the success ofI. W. W. 
organizers in assuming strike leadership. Paterson's silk- 
workers were energetically united behind the strike. If 
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Haywood could discipline that energy and harness it to his 
organization there were surely grounds for optimism. 
i 
Big Bill arrived in Paterson in-late, Narch 1913" 
Immediately the. bitterness and attention surrounding the strike 
escalated. Haywood was popularized as the villain of the 
piece, the whipping-boy of outraged conservatives and a 
symbol of defiance for liberal sympathizers. His presence 
undoubtedly pepped the dogged spirits of local silkworkers, 
and as surely added to the misfortunes of overburdened Police 
Chief Bimson. Most importantly Haywood made the Paterson 
dispute a national spectacle. The drama of a handful of I. W. W.. 
organizers and their ragged army defying hunger, cold and the 
excessive might of Paterson's millowners captured the public's 
imagination. It was heroic, tragic, and also good newspaper 
copy. For the next few months Big Bill monopolized the head- 
lines of the New York dailies. Reporters flocked to Paterson 
in anticipation of the next sensation. IIaywood's every word 
and gesture was hungrily taken down and printed. fie revelled 
under the spotlight, intuitively playing upon the fears and 
predilections of his unknown spectators. Haywood demanded 
then acquiesced, threatened only to next counsel peace. The 
photographs and descriptions of Haywood in full voice, supported 
by a mass of chanting millhands served his purposes exactly. 
J. R. Conlin Big Bill Haywood and the Radical Union Movement, 
W. D. Haywood The Autobiography of-Big Bill Maywood (N. Y. 
11929) pp. 261-277, New. York Times; February 26 19131, 
Paterson Guardian Marcht7 1913. 
_ y 
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If the strike was to be judged as a public relations exercise 
Big Bill was triumphantly successful. 
The Wobblies' grasp of the actual strike administration 
and control of Paterson's immigrant strikers was far less 
secure. Although Elizabeth Gurley Flynn, her partner Carlo 
Tresca and Socialist Party spokesman Patrick Quinlan had 
arrived at its outbreak, they exercised little direction over 
the initial walkouts or day-to-day progress of the dispute. 
They had been invited to the city by local Wobbly activists. 
They certainly had links with the local Italian anarchist 
community. Above all, the I. W. W. had an awesome reputation 
from success in Lawrence, Massachusetts in 1912.1 But their 
assumption of leadership and popularity with strikers could 
not disguise the fact that they were "outsiders". 
The formal strike administration, hastily , assembled at 
the end of February, revealed the limited influence of the 
I. W. W. It was composed of a Central Strike Committee and an 
Executive Board. To the Committee were elected delegates from 
each mill. In total it was composed of almost three hundred 
shop representatives. 'Although Strike Committee delegates 
were frequently members of the'I. W. W. 's Paterson local, as many 
had no, or only informal, connections with the union. I. W. W. 
national organizers, such as Flynn and Haywood, exercised no 
1Socialist Labor Party Daniel DeLeon: The Man and His Work 
(N. Y. 1934), pp. 131,, 151-152, Industrial Union Bulletin 
April 13, May 25 1907, J. Ebert The Trial of a New Society 
(Cleveland 1913), D. B. Cole-Immigrant City: Lawrence, 
Massachusetts 1845-1921 (North Carolina, 1963). 
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formal control over the Committee. Their capacity was purely 
advisory. The Executive Board appeared less independent of 
the I. W. W. It was composed entirely of local I. W. W. activists. 
Even so, I. W. W. national organizers were not represented, and 
most local followers were Wobblies of recent standing. Although 
the Executive Board was responsible for day-to-day strike 
administration, its power was severely restricted. All 
decisions reached by it, and by the Strike Committee, were 
referred back to the rank and file for approval. 
I 
The strike administration was loose, ad hoc, and later 
condemned as ineffective by some Wobblies. Analysing the 
Paterson defeat, Elizabeth Gurley Flynn warned of drawbacks 
to such administration. The Strike Committee's recommendation 
of a return to work in August 1913, against the advice of I. W. W. 
organizers, prompted Miss Flynn to suggest that in future if 
the I. W. W. "... assumes the responsibility of a strike the 
I. W. W. should control the strike absolutely through a union 
strike committee... "2 Certainly the strike administration 
did not indicate strict I. W. W. control of strikers. Over the 
day-to-day functioning of the strike the I. W. W. was incapable 
of exercising much authority. I. W. W. ideology did not encourage 
national organizers such as Haywood to issue strike directives. 
It held that workers were quite capable of managing their own 
affairs. - Moreover Paterson's millworkers were scarcely dis- 
ciplined trade unionists or experienced in organized stoppages. 
1C. I. 12. III p. 2457, J. Fitch "The I. W. W., An Outlaw 
organization" p. 362. 
2E. 
G. Flynn "The Truth About the Paterson Strike" Rebel 
Voices p. 226. 
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Not only was the I. W. W. new amongst them, but by habit union 
organization and discipline was foreign to them. Their 
immigrant background and deeply entrenched strike traditions 
suggested that no professional organizer could have hoped to 
dominate and direct such people. 
The disorderly antics so readily adopted by Paterson 
millhands posed more than a minor problem for the Wobbly 
organizers. Throughout the dispute, the I. W. W. sought to 
attribute strike violence to Paterson's municipal authorities. 
In this way it hoped a concerned and outraged public would 
demand state or federal intervention, as in Lawrence, and a 
favourable settlement. There was one major drawback to this 
strategy: the unpredictability of the strikers. Wobbly 
organizers were concerned that spontaneous and uncontrolled 
acts of violence by millhands would undo their work. 
Passive resistance was the I. W. W. answer to municipal 
aggression. "Qo on the picket line and keep your hands in 
your pockets", Maywood advised strikers. "Your power is in 
your folded arms". 
1 Although some I. W. W. leaders threatened 
acts of sabotage few were keen to be taken seriously. Flynn 
noted the limited value-of inflammatory suggestion: "Physical 
violence is dramatic.... it's especially dramatic when you 
talk about it and don't resort to it". 
2 Both she and Haywood 
F. S. Boyd "The General Strike in the Silk Industry" 
Paterson Pageantpp. 4-5. 
2Flynn "The, Truth About The Paterson Strike" p.; 218. 
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were experienced campaigners; too experienced to seriously 
consider violent resistance. It could only alienate public 
support for the silkworkers. The I. W. W. 's hold over the strikers 
was far from secure. It had to be wary of creating a situation 
in which it would sacrifice control of the dispute. The 
spectre of rampaging millhands could do untold damage. In fact 
individual acts of violence by strikers were rife throughout 
the dispute. Significantly local Wobblies were later to admit 
that their discouragement of violence was usually ignored 
once millhands took to the streets. Ed Zuersher, Wobbly and 
Executive Committee delegate, was adamant, in 1914, that 'ý... 
we never counselled the workers, to use any violence". His 
colleague Adolph Lessig re-iterated the point. But both 
admitted that the majority usually acted independently of their 
instruction. Lessig argued that violence ".... was done by 
people on the outside of the organization". His distinction 
was, however, worthless. The overwhelming majority of the 
I. W. W. strikers were recent and only temporary union members. 
In or out of the organization they were wayward and ill- 
disciplined. Lessig admitted as much when he conceded that 
"... at times our people were very hostile, in fact, they 
threatened to become so, and we had a great deal of trouble to 
hold them in check". 
1 
It is testimony to the success of the Wobblies' publicity 
campaign that acts of violence were largely overlooked in the 
national press or blamed upon the aggressive attitude of local 
police officers. As late, as Nay 1913 r three months after 
the original walkout°= an-independent observer concluded that 
1L i"e. s1k e_ q c. z. it. III pp. 2459,2463,2593" :., ý. 
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"... considering numbers and duration, this is one of the most 
peaceful strikes on record". 
1 His view was echoed by other 
journalists. 
, 
Where local opinion had once bolstered the 
claims of strikers the I. W. W. now achieved a groundswell of 
sympathy that was nationwide. John Reed, a young New York 
newspaperman who coined the phrase, a "War in Paterson", 
published bitter attacks on the local police and government. 
A local rabbi wrote a series of articles in national journals 
bewailing the "manifest miscarriage of justice" in Paterson. 
Detached observers reached the same conclusions. "City Officials 
Adopt Repressive Measures" wrote a correspondent in Survey 
magazine. Few appear to have disagreed with Reed's famous 
statement: "There's war in Paterson. But it's a curious kind 
of war. All the violence is the work of one side - the Mill 
Owners". 2 
For a time it seemed likely that widespread public concern 
would force .a settlement or compel government 
intervention. 
President Wilson was beseiged with appeals for federal inter- 
vention, from both local and independent organizations. The 
Socialist Party organized an extensive campaign for a federal 
investigation similar to that conducted into the Lawrence strike 
in 1912. Even local businessmen and residents fearful of the 
I. W. W. pleaded with Wilson. to spare their city from the mercies 
of "The Horde of Anarkists who dominate Paterson, Devils in 
the form of Labor Leaders"0 Wilson stood apart, ignoring 
1J. Fitch "The I. W. W.:, AnýOutlaw organization" p. 358. 
, 
J. Reed "War in Paterson" pp., 14-16, L. Mannheimer, 
"Darkest New Jersey" Independent 74, May , 29` 1913'pp. 1190-1192, 
J. Fitch "The I. W. W.: An Outlaw Organization" pp. 355-362, 
G. Mason "Industrial War in Paterson" pp. 283-287, Anon. 
"City Officials Adopt Repressive Measures" Survey 30 April 19 
1913 
3Unsigned letter to Tumulty June 24 1913, Department of 
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the furore. Unlike Lawrence in 1912, intervention now was 
unlikely to win or lose votes. In Washington the dispute 
was simply inconsequential politically. 
Even after it became clear that intervention from Washington 
was unlikely, the I. W. W. policy of mounting public support for 
a strike settlement remained unchanged. Attempts at arbitration 
by local clergymen and by the Paterson Board of Aldermen 
proved fruitless but did not modify I. W. W. attitudes. 
l As long 
as Chief Bimson and Paterson's city judiciary persisted in 
arresting and jailing strikers, the I. W. W. maintained its 
vibrant publicity campaign and held out a chance of success. 
Each new wave of repression prompted a Wobbly response. When 
meetings were outlawed in Paterson, the Wobblies held open-air 
mass gatherings in the adjoining borough of Haledon. The 
Passaic County Sherrif, assisted by Bimson arrested fialedon's 
Socialist mayor, William Brueckmann in. an attempt to suppress 
the meetings. The I. W. W. responded with a new appeal to out- 
raged liberals at the suppression of civil liberties. 
2 When 
the I. W. W. was short of funds - tied up in excessive bail 
requirements - and fearful of flagging strike morale, it hit 
upon the idea of sending strikers' children to the homes of 
sympathizers in New Jersey and New York. In response Paterson 
Mayor Andrew McBride asserted "... Paterson people would take 
Labor Records, R. G. 280, National Archives. This file 
contains ample evidence of the widespread concern evoked 
by the strike. 
1NJBS 
Thirty Sixth Annual Report 1913 pp. -204-205., 
2Paterson 
Guardian July 16,17 and 19 1913l New York Call 
July 21 1913. 
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care of any who needed food", but he need hardly have bothered. 
Once again the I. W. W. had upstaged the city government. 
Reporters flocked'to city railroad stations to record the 
departure of innocent strike victims. 
l The death of Valentino 
Modestino marked an especially interesting example of the 
I. W. W. 's persuasive powers. Valentino's killing was the direct 
result of disorder initiated by strikers. The victim was not 
a union member nor even a silkworker. Yet the Wobblies stage- 
managed his funeral and produced a chilling spectacle of 
martyrdom. I. W. W. organizers, heads lowered to a brass band's 
dirge, led a mass burial procession through the streets of 
Paterson. Crowds of up to twenty thousand were reported 
following Valentino's coffin to the graveside and subsequent 
mass meeting held by the I. W. W. 
2 
The Paterson Pageant, more than any other episode, dis- 
played the I. W. W. 's talent for public spectacle, and preserved 
the strike as a major landmark in U. S. working class history. 
The unique spectacle of hundreds of ragged millhands performing 
their strike before the social elite of New York City captured 
the imagination of people everywhere. It remains the I. W. W. 's 
supreme propaganda achievement. Ironically the Pageant was 
planned and directed by a handful of New York intellectuals and 
dilettantes, associated with Haywood and John, Reed, but 
certainly not strikers or strike organizers. Maywood later 
New York Times April., 20, 
K21, May 7 and 9 1913. Paterson 
Guardian May 1 1913.1 12 
New York Call April 21 and 23 1913, Paterson Guardian April 
18 and 21 1913" 
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confessed the Pageant was suggested to him "at a small gathering 
in the home of a New York friend of mine". 
1 Ile seized upon 
the idea, announcing to Paterson's strikers "... we are going 
to take this strike to New York City'". 
2 Reed, Bobby Jones, 
a theatre designer and Mabel Dodge Luhan, a freethinker and 
patron of the arts from New York's Fifth Avenue, combined 
to stage the production. 
3 Madison Square Garden was hired and 
strikers diverted from routine picket duty to rehearse. 
On the day of the Pageant a mass procession of Paterson 
silkworkers marched across the Hudson River to publicize the . 
spectacle. A giant lighting arrangement, depicting the initials 
"I. W. W. " blazed from the top of Madison Square Garden. Inside 
twelve thousand ticketholders and three thousand strikers 
formed an excited and expectant audience. They were treated 
to a brass band rendition of the "Narseillaise" followed by 
six scenes depicting the origin and development of the 
Paterson strike. Over a thousand millhands re-enacted police 
clubbing of strikers, the funeral of Valentino, a Haledon mass 
meeting and the exodus of children from Paterson. They were 
directed on stage by fiery speeches from Haywood, Flynn and 
Tresca. 
4 
1The Autobiography of Big Bill Haywood p. 262. 
2New York Times May 19 1913. 
3M. 
Dodge Luhan Intimate Memoirs III: Movers and Shakers 
(New York, 1936) pp. 188-212,, G. hicks John Reed: The 
Making of a Revolutionary (New York, 1936) pp. 96-112, 
J. R. Conlin Big Bill Haywood pp. 86-89,141-2. 
4The 
Pageant of the=Yaterson Strike pp. 16-17. 
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The press hailed the pageant as a remarkable achievement. 
Both Haywood and the strikers were jubilant. "The success of 
the Madison Square venture has given new hope to the agitator 
and fresh courage to the strikers", the New York Times 
announced. Its rival the Tribune was equally optimistic. 
It saw in the Pageant evidence of a maturity and discipline 
amongst Paterson's silkworkers hitherto submerged. "It is 
gratifying", the paper declared, "to know that strikers have 
reached that stage of self-control at which they can look at 
their case objectively and present it to the public with the 
reasoned calculation of dramatic art". 
1 Left-wing sympathizers 
applauded unreservedly. "The World's Greatest Labor Play" was 
the description of the International Socialist-Review. 
2 
The euphoria was quickly dispelled. Although the Pageant 
attracted ample publicity it was essentially a re-iteration of 
the I. W. W. 's campaign throughout the strike. - It failed to 
induce state or federal mediation. I. W. W. organizers mistook 
the novel and favourable atmosphere which had prompted a con- 
gressional investigation into Lawrence in 1912 for a general 
concern with industrial mediation. Haywood had seriously 
overestimated the influence of I. W. W. tactics. The Wobblies 
might rail against mighty industrialists and predict uncon- 
trollable violence if a settlement was not reached, but their 




1913 pp. 7-9.. 
June 9 1913, New York Tribune June 9 1913. 
World's. Greatest` Labor , Play: They Paterson 
International Socialist Review 139 July 14 
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message simply hardened local opposition to the strike. 
The Pageant raised strikers' hopes and promptly dashed them. 
It was a financial disaster. Far from raising funds for strike 
relief the Pageant organizers ran up a sizeable deficit. 
Charges of mismanagement and corruption were levelled against 
them. ' "It is openly charged... that the Paterson strikers 
have been exploited by the I. W. W. ", the New York press reported. 
2 
The departure to Europe of Reed and Mabel Lodge did little to 
alleviate doubts. Haywood, exhausted by illness, followed 
shortly after. 
3 Flynn was left to direct strike strategy. 
It was an unenviable task. The aftermath of the Pageant 
revealed widespread dissension amongst Paterson's silkworkers. 
Jealousy between Pageant participants and strikers forced to 
remain on picket duty threatened strike solidarity. Picketing 
had been neglected in the hurried preparations for the Pageant. 
Flynn, critical of the New York show from its outset, caustically 
observed: "... the first scabs got into the Paterson mills 
while the workers were training for the pageant ...... 
Distraction from their"real work" - the struggle at the point 
of production - was, in Flynn's view, a major factor in the 
silkworkers return to work. 
In the wake of the Pageant disagreement and blacklegging 
increased. The strike was never more violent than in its last 
1New York'Call Letters to editor Nay 2'and°9,? June=ý9 1913" 
2New York 'Times' June 244 1913. 
3The Autobiography of Bill Haywood p., 272. 
4Flynn 
"The Truth About The Paterson Strike" p. 221.. ' 
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month. Demoralization and starvation forced many back to the 
looms. Moreover the I. W. W. 's fragile control of the strike 
was exposed. Tension between English-speaking workers and 
recent arrivals, predominantly Italian, broke into open revolt. 
The older immigrant workers "formed the complicating element 
in the strike, continually pulling back on the mass through 
their influence as the English-speaking and their attitude as 
conservatives". 
' They had reluctantly joined the walkout in 
March and throughout remained aloof from the mass of Italian 
strikers. The riots of 1902, in which the English-speaking 
had vigorously denounced Italian dyeworkers, probably coloured 
attitudes. Perhaps a similar debacle was feared following 
the pageant disaster. At any rate the older immigrant groups 
broke ranks in July 1913 and began a return to work. The I. W. W. 
was at'a loss to stem the tide. It did not control the Strike 
Committee. With its influence waning it could not prevent a 
referendum vote in favour of a return. 
2 By mid-July Paterson 




2Flynn "The Truth About The Paterson Strike" p. 224, 
Paterson Guardian July 11 and 18 1913". 
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A NOTE ON SOURCES 
Available sources on Paterson silkworkers, the central focus of 
this study, are unfortunately sparce. Though vociferous at flashpoints 
in the city's history, millhands in Paterson remained, for the bulk of 
the period under study, unorganised and inarticulate. As such few left 
records of their experience. The structure and composition of the mill 
workforce can be gleaned from official statistics and publications. 
Supplementing the published federal censuses are both federal and state 
unpublished census manuscript schedules. Both are essential for the 
community and demographic studies central to this research, for they 
contain information on residence, age, occupation, ethnicity and household 
structure of the city's workers. The 1880 federal census manuscript 
schedules were used. Those for 1890 were almost totally destroyed and 
thus are unavailable for research purposes. The schedules for 1900 have 
recently become available; but unfortunately too late to be incorporated 
in this study. ' The New Jersey state census manuscript schedules were used 
for the years 1905 and 1915. Although available for the years 1885 and 
1895 the state census at this stage neglected to collect much information 
on the ethnic origins of New Jersey inhabitants and thus was of little 
value for' this research. 
The Dillingham (Immigration)-Commission Reports vol. XI contains 
essential material, onzthe European background-of-Paterson millhands and 
is an, important adjunct to census data. Likewise trade"directories,, and 
city histories, especially. for; the early years of. Paterson's silk industry, 
contain_a glut; of information on size of enterprises, number, of"employees 
and levels of technology in individual plants. Bulletin's Handbook of 
Silk Manufacturers, L. P. Brockett's The Silk Industry in America, 
W. Clayton and. W. Nelson History of Bergen and Passaic Counties ' 
A. H. Heusser The History of the Silk Dyeing Industry, are leading'examples 
ofJocal contemporary, publications intended to promote the success of 
f 
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local manufacturers, but not to be disregarded for that fact. 
Disappointingly no extant company records were discovered or 
located. It was hoped that schedules of employees and payrolls would 
reveal much on the turnover of the workforce within mills, on the problems 
of industrial discipline within individual plants, on the ethnic structure 
of mill workforces and on kinship patterns within plants. Searches for 
company records at local and state depositories proved fruitless as did 
enquiries at the business records centre, Harvard University. 
Trade journals such as The American Silk Journal and Textile 
America contain a fund of information on the interests and plans of 
local manufacturers. Both reflect Paterson millowners' prevalent 
discontent and provide illuminating insights into the reaction of 
manufacturers during periods of upheaval in the silk industry. 
In all the above, Paterson silkworkers remain, for the most part, 
faceless and nameless. Organization was always weak amongst millhands 
and few union records remain. The most dedicated activist amongst 
Paterson workingmen was J. P. McDonnell. His personal papers, and above 
all, the Paterson Labor Standard edited-in Paterson by'McDonnell for almost 
thirty years, provide important documentation`on some aspects of-Paterson's 
industrial history: The Labor Standard illustrates local: industrial 
disputes, "especially for the years 1876-1884. Hereafter its coverage'. ,,, 
of the local scene is selective, as increasingly its columns reflected 
McDonnell's effortsb to influence the state legislature., McDonnell's ". F.,.. 
personal papers document the work of the New Jersey Federation of Labor 
throughout the 1880's-and 1890's. Containing correspondence from both 
local and state figures; ' reports of McDonnell's work on the State-Board 
of ' Arbitration, and press clippings and diaries relating to McDonnell's 
work, they proved a useful supplement to the labor Standard. 
I 
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Aside from the Labor Standard and trade journals, sources on labor 
relations are confined almost exclusively to the local Paterson press. 
The Socialist Labor Party's Papers and its weekly Journal The People 
provide coverage of the years 1894-1898 in support of Alderman Matt 
Maguire's reform efforts in Paterson. The Paterson branch of the party 
also ran a local journal, the Paterson People, edited by Maguire, for a 
short time during the 1890's. It is available for the years 1894-95. 
The national notoriety achieved by the city's anarchists found 
expression during the period 1900-02 in a host of newspapers and 
journals. Freiheit, the anarchist publication directed by Johann Most, 
is a useful source on this period, particularly for the strike of 1902. 
Local Italian anarchists published their own paper, La Questione Sociale. 
Unfortunately copies only survive for the years 1895-97. 
Sources on Paterson's imigrants are scattered. The national and 
state census remain the single most important starting point for composing 
a picture of the city's changing immigrant communities. The-Dillingham 
Commission, although directing its attention to post 1890 period is 
similarly essential. For the early arrival of Englishmen, British 
newspapers were used. The local Macclesfield press provided regular accounts 
of emigrating weavers to Silk City. Parliamentary papers contain background 
on the home silk industry and the conditions which prompted the emigration 
of both weavers and silk manufacturers. So close were ties between English 
weavers in Paterson and their homeland that a number of British visitors to 
. the city recorded their impression of work and social life in the New. World. 
-Thomas 
Greenwood's A Tour of the United States and Joseph Wright's A 
Centennial Tour of the United States and Canada contain illuminating 
chapters on silk work'in the city and the new work ethic confronting 
European -immnigrants. 
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Italian immigration to Paterson assumed importance during the 
1890's, and like the British was closely linked to a declining home 
industry. The Italian silk industry is well documented in a number 
of economic histories of Italy. Maria Hall Ets' Rosa, an account of 
a young girl's work in the rural mills of northern Italy in the late 
nineteenth century, is the most illuminating source on the work experience 
and expectations of emigrating weavers. Robert Foerster's The Italian 
Emigration of Our Times remains, despite being written in 1919, the 
classic work on the Italian emigration of this period. Much of the 
character of Italian immigration to Paterson can be gleaned from the 
local press particularly during the period of the "Red Scare" in the 
city when attempts were made to pinpoint and dissect the Italian community 
by inquisitive journalists. Carlo Altarelli's "History and Present 
Condition of The Italian Colony of Paterson&, written in 1911, is a 
useful contemporary account of Italians in the city, but probably less 
illuminating than a careful perusal of local press accounts of court 
hearings, industrial and housing conditions. The Commission on Industrial 
Pelation , III contains a wealth of material on Italian's work. and social 
conditions at the time of the 1913 uproar. 
Numerous other immigrant groups were attracted to Paterson, 
although none, apart from the British,. assumed the singular importance 
of the Italians. Prior to the twentieth century it was more, often than 
not the English who took the lead in organizing and leading strikes. 
Irish immigrants, although important numerically and politically in 
the city, never approached the influence of the English in the silk 
industry. As the census makes clear, Irish menfolk, having no background 
in silk weaving, tended to seek their fortunes in the city's iron and 
locomotive shops, leaving the mills to their wives and children. 
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Germans and Dutch were other significant groups of newcomers. Germans, 
mainly fron silk communities in the homeland were prominent in all 
branches of the textile trade in Paterson. In contrast the Dutch, often 
rural folk, were employed mostly as laborers in the city's dyeshops. 
Although both groups could be relied on to join strikes and demonstrations 
neither was singled out as strike leaders or troublemakers. Like the 
British and Irish, the Germans and Dutch formed their own distinct 
neighbourhoods in Paterson, signified by ethnic churches, halls, 
fraternal clubs and newspapers, and in time, political influence. 
Unfortunately only sparce attention was paid to them in the local press 
and contemporary publications. None of their ethnic journals have been 
preserved. 
East European Jews, aside from Italians, were the only other major 
group of "new" immigrants attracted to Paterson in large numbers following 
the 1890's depression. The host of other newcomers from southern and 
eastern Europe, so common in other American industrial centres, were 
notable in Paterson by their absence. By the time of the 1913 strike 
Jews were well established in the silk trade, although their arrival 
was very recent. The Immigration Commission dates their earliest arrival 
in the city at 1902, and many more must have followed after the upheavals 
and pogroms in Eastern Europe during the first decade of the new century. 
In 1913 they had as yet no political influence and scarcely identifiable 
communities. Indeed the strike brought them, as a group, to a new social 
prominence in the city. Their presence is best identified through census 
data, but little else is available, prior to 1913, to document the adaption 
and growth of this newest immigrant group to the city. 
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The municipal history of Paterson is contained in a variety of 
local histories. W. W. Clayton and W. Nelson's History of Bergen and 
Passaic Counties and C. Shriner's Paterson. New Jersey, are voluminous 
accounts of the development of nineteenth century Paterson. Both Nelson 
and Shriner were local men; avid historians and antiquarians. Their 
joint work History of Paterson and Its Environs supplements their earlier 
efforts. Many of the city's municipal records for the nineteenth century 
were destroyed by fire in 1902; however the Annual Reports of the City 
Officers are available for the whole period studied. These-contain 
annual reports by the mayor and heads-of all the major municipal departments. 
They contain essential information on the social composition of the 
city's municipal servants, particularly the Paterson Police 
Department. 
The intricacies of local machine politics can only be grasped 
from a careful perusal of the Paterson press. State publications, such 
as the annual New Jersey Legislative Manual, feature useful information 
on the social background of local political figures, but the grass roots 
ties and influences operating on machine politicians are most clearly 
evident in press accounts of. election meetings and the sittings of the 
Paterson Board of Aldermen. 
On the national. movement for civic reform there is a glut of 
material., Richard Hofstadter's Age of Reform is the most useful starting 
point, but the important correctives of James Weinstein The Corporate 
Ideal in the Liberal State and Samual. Hays "The, Changing Political 
Structure of the City, in Industrial America" Journal of Urban History 
1974 must also be consulted. Reform in. New, Jersey is, dealt with in ,s 
Ransom Noble's New Jersey Progressivism Before Wilson although this work 
throws little light on the origins of the movement in Paterson. 
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J. Buenker's article "Urban, New-Stock Liberalism and Progressive 
Reform in New Jersey" New Jersey History 1969-contains--several 
interesting references to Paterson reformers, but again skirts around 
the movement for commission government in the city. The origins of 
the reform movement in Paterson remain hazy. No extant papers of local 
reform groups were available. The efforts of leading figures are well 
documented in the local press, particularly during elections preceding 
the refcrm bills of 1906 and 1907. Working class opposition to city 
commissions figures prominently in the local press and McDonnell's 
National Labor Standard. For local millowners' support of the movement 
see the local Board of Trade's Paterson. The immediate effects 
of commission rule are again evident from a review of local journals, 
but the unpublished report of the Commission on Industrial Relations 
by P. F. Gill and R. S. Brennan "Report on the Inferior Courts and 
Police of Paterson, N. J. " are of singular importance. Details of 
commission rule of the Paterson Police Department are amply furnished 
in the Annual Reports of the City Officers of Paterson 1908-1913. 
The 1913 Strike is well documented in a number of specialist 
histories of the Industrial Workers of the World. Graham Adams Jr. 's 
Age-of Industrial Violence features the strike from the standpoint of 
the Commission on Industrial Relations. Joyce Kornbluh's Rebel Voices 
contains a number of important documents relating to the strike. 
Unfortunately all these accounts have treated the strike as an aspect 
of a general history of the I. W. W. The focus of this study, although 
markedly different from that of earlier accounts of the 1913 strike, 
did not require the use of notably different sources from these earlier 
versions. Reports III of the Commission on Industrial Relations remains the 
single most important document. It was supplemented by the 
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previously untapped and unpublished reports of the Commission, which 
are available in the National archives, Washington D. C. The local 
press was used extensively (earlier historians of the strike have 
concentrated upon the national and radical press) for a commentary on 
the strikers Der se The Annual Reports of the City Officers of 
Paterson for 1913 and 1914 contain the local administration's position 
vis. the strike. These should be consulted in conjunction with the 
New Jersey Bureau of Labor Statistics' Annual Reports 1913 and 1914. 
The Rose Pastor Stokes Papers contain the "Patrick Quinlan Defense" 
File relating to the persecution of local radicals in the years 
immediately following the strike. Walter Licht's unpublished paper 
"Young Immigrant Workers in Revolt" presents essential information 
concerning the ethnic origins of arrested activists during the strike. 
This latter data was taken fron official police records which were 
unavailable to this author. 
,. ý - -. 
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'APPENDICES 
APPENDIX 1 
Ethnic Structure of the 3rd'Wdrd'1905-1915 
1905 1 on= 03 . .. . 1915 "100_679 
New Jersey II. 8" 
a 15.4 
13.0. 
- = 16.8: U. S. 3.6 
.... ... ..... 
3.8 
......... . 
Irish F. b. 1.7 3.5 o. 
6. 
- 3.4 N. b. 1.8 2.8 . 
English/ F. b. 3,3 7.3 1.6 - - 4,5 Scottish N. b. 4,0 2.9 . 
German F. b. 7.5 
= 17.5 
5.7 
- 9.5: N. b. 10.0 3.8 
Italian F. b. 9.1 12.3 12.5 24.4 
N. b. 3.2 11.9 . 
Dutch F. b. 9.5 20.3 5.7. = 14.1 10.8 8.4 . 
Others N. b. 14.4. 
= 24.0 
15.2 
a 27.1 F. b. 9.6 11.9 
(Source: New Jersey State Census 1905 and 1915) 
APPENDIX 2 
Ethnic Structure of'the'9th*Ward'1905-1915 
... ... ." . 1905-100=534--, ... 1915 '100=553 
: New Jersey 21.7 
= 25.4 
21.2" 
= 22.3 . U. S. 3.7 1.1 
Irish N. b. 
= 19.5 = 19.7 N. b. 10.9 
...... ........ 
13.4 
.... .... .... 





: German F. b. 4.5 " 9.0 2.4 6.2 
N. b. 4.5' 3.8 
Italian F. b. 7.3 -= 12.9 13.7 -= 28.0 
N. b. 5.6 14.3 
others F. b. 5.3 
= 12.3 
6.1 12.2 
N. b. 7.0 U. J. 
(Source: New Jersey State Census 1905 and 1915) 
APPENDIX 3 
Ethnic' Structure of ' the' 2nd' Ward' 1905-1915 
... 1905.. . 100=704 .... 1915..... 100=829. 
. New Jersey 26.7 . 32.8 26.9 = 30 8 U. S. 6.1 3.9 . 
. Irish F. b. 3.8 
= 10.3 
2.7 
= 6.8 -N. b. 6.5 4.1 
British F. b. 11.2 
_ 19.2 - 
7.1 
= 15.9 N. b. 8.0 8.8 
German F. b. 6.0 15.8 6.2 = 13.6 N. b. 9.8 7.4 
: Italian F. b. 4.3 5.4 = 
6.6 
= 13.4 N. b. 1.1 6.8 
: Others F. b. 10.5 = 16.2 
9.8 
= 19.6 N. b. 5.7 9.8 
(Source: New Jersey State Census 1905 and 1915) 
APPENDIX 4 
Ethnic'Structure'of'8th'Wdrd'1905=1915 
.... 1905.. . 100=393........ 1915..... 100=430. 
New Jersey 15.0 
= 16.8 
31.6 
33 7 U. S. 1.8 





Irish F. b. 15.5 
= 36.4 
2.1. 
= 16.5 N. b. 
... .... .... 
1 




German N. b. 6.1 
= 12.5 
3.5 
= 8 8 F. b. 6.4 5.3 . 
Italian Nb. 2.8 
_ 4.1 
6.5. 
= 13.7 F. b. 1.3 7.2 
Others N. b. 9.0 13.6 7.8 15 7 F. b. 4.6 7.9 . 
(Source: New Jersey State Census 1905 and 1915) 
APPENDIX 5 
Ethnic Structure 5th Ward 1905-1915- 
4 
1905 100=343 1915 100=360 
New Jersey 32.9 46.9 33.3. = 50.0 U. S. 14.0 16.7 
: Irish F. b. 4.4 
_ 8.8 Q 
22 9.1 
N. b. 4.4 6.9 
British F. b. 11.1 
- 24.2 
11.7 22.5 
N. b. 13.1 
-German F. b. 1.5 = 5.9 
o. 8 5.2 
N. b. 4.4 4.4 
Italian F. b. 0.3 
= 0.3 
0.8- 
= 0.8 N. b. 
: Others F. b. 6.7 = 13.7 
7'3 
= 12.1 N. b. 7.0 4.8 
(Source: New Jersey State Census 1905 and 1915) 
jf 
APPENDIX 6 
Occupational Structure of'the Ninth'Ward'1905-1915 
1905 100-534 1915 100=553 
Silk 15.5 14.8 
Dyer's Helper - 0.2 
Jute 0.2 - 
Flax 1.7 0.2 
Garment 1.3 0.5 
Metal/Machine 6.6 3.1 
Self 5.1 3.4 
White Collar 3.4 5.2 
Professional 2.1 0.9 
Skilled 7.7 7.6 
Unskilled 4.7 8.1 
Not working 51.7 56.0 
Occupational Structure of the Working Population of the 9th Ward 1905-1915 
1905 100=257 1915 100=243 
Silk 32.3 83 33.7 82 
Dyer's Helper - - 0.4 1 
Jute 0.3 1 - - 
Flax 3.5 9 0.4 1 
Garment 2.7 7 1.2 3 
Metal/Machine 13.6 35 7.0 17 
Self 10.5 27 7.8 19 
White Collar 7.0 18 11.9 29 
Professional 4.3 11 1.6 4 
Skilled 16.0 41 17.3 42 
Unskilled 9.7 25 18.5 45 
(Sources New Jersey State Census 1905 and 1915),, - 
APPENDIX 7 
Occupational Structure of'the 3rd Ward 1905-1915 
1905 100=603 1915 100=679 
Silk 13.8 13.1 
Dyer's Helper 5.8 4.0 
Jute - 0.1 
Flax - - 
Garment 1.3 2.7 
Metal/Machine 2.8 1.9 
Self 2.7 2.7 
White Collar 1.7 3.5 
Professional - 0,9 
Skilled 4.1 4.1 
Unskilled 7.8 9.6 
Not working 60.0 57.4 
Occupational Structure of the Working Population of'the 3rd Ward 1905-1915 
1905 100=241 1915 100=289 
Silk 34.4 83 30.8 89 
Dyer's Helper 14.5 35 9.3 27 
Jute --0.3 1 
Flax ---- 
Garment 3.3 8 6.2 18 
Metal/Machine 7.1 17 4.5 13 
Self 6.6 16 6.2 18 
White Collar 4.1 10 8.3 24 
Professional - - 2.1 6 
Skilled 10.4 25 9.7 28 
Unskilled 19.5 47 22.5 65 






























Occupational Structure of the Working Population of the 8th Ward 1905-1915 
1905 100=197 1915 
Silk 29.4 58 28.2 
Dyer's Helper 0.5 1 1.6 
Jute 3.0 6 2.1 
Flax 8.1 16 2.7 
Garment 2.0 4 1.6 
Metal/Machine 10.7 21 4.8 
Self 6.6 13 6.4 
White Collar 11.7 23 13.3 
Professional 0.5 1 
. 
0.5 
Skilled 7.6 15 12.8 
Unskilled 19.8 39 26 1 
' ý. . 














Occupational'Structure'of 2nd Ward'1905-41915 
1905 1915 
Silk 18.2 14.0 
Dyer's Helper 0.4 1.6 
Jute - 0.1 
Flax 0.3 - 
Garment 1.3- 1.7 
Metal/Machine 4.3 1.8 
Self 3.3 3.5 
White Collar 4.3 6.3 
Professional 0.6 0,6 
Skilled 6.8 7.2 
Unskilled 3.4 6.0 
Not working 57.1 57.2 
Occupational Structure of the Working Population of the 2nd Ward 1905-1915 
1905 100=301 1915 100=355 
Silk 42.5 128 32.7 116 
Dyer's Helper 1.0 3 3.7 13 
Jute - 0 0.3 1 
Flax 0.7 2 - 0 
Garment 3.0 9 3.9 14 
Metal/Machine 10.0 30 4.2 15; 
Self, 7.6 23 8.2 29 
White Collar 10.0 30 14.6 52 
Professional 1.3 4 1.4 5 
Skilled 15.9 48' 16.9 60 
Unskilled 8.0 24 14.1 50 




Structure. Ethnicity. Age'and'Residence of the'Paterson'Police Department 
1900-1915 
a) Size'of Force 
1900 = 104 
1908 = 143 
1913 = 147 
b) Deployment of Police 
'1900 '1908 1913 
Chief 1 1 1 
Captain 1 1 1 
Captain of Detectives - - 1 
Lieutenant - - 1 
Detective Sergeants 4 4 3 
Detectives - - 7 
Sergeants 12 12 12 
Patrolmen 87 103 103 
Chief's Secretary - 1 1 
Warrant Officers - 2 - 
Desk Officers - 3 3 
Reserve Officers - 2 7 
Doormen - 3 - 
Court Officers - 1 - 
Truant Officers - 1 2 
Erie Depot Officers - 1 1 
Traffic Officers - 3 6 
Mounted Officers - 5 - 
City Hall Officers _ 1 
APPENDIX 10 (Cont'd. ) 
c) 'Ethnicity'of Police 
1905 1915 
Total 
U. S. 17 30 
Irish F. b. 75 
N. b. 22 29 43 38 
British F. b. 45 
N. b. 10 14 16 li 
German F. b. 22 
N. b. 57ý 12 10 
Others F. b, 26 
N. b. -26- 
69 107 
(Totals represent numbers for whom personal details could be traced in the 
1905 and 1915 State Censuses. ) 
d) Ethnicity of'Police in 1915: Post-1907 Recruits 
U. S. 17 
Irish F. b. 3 
N. b. 24 27 
British F. b. 2 
N. b. 35 
Germans F. b. 2 
N. b. 24 
Others F. b. 4 
N. b. -4 
57 
(Total represents numbers for whom personal details could be traced in the 
1905 State Census. ) 
APPENDIX 10 (Cont'd. ) 
e) Age Structure of the Force in 1913 
Total Average'Age 
Pre-1907 Officer 59 49.6 years 
Post-1907 Recruits 88 34.1 years 
f) Residence of'Police 
'Ward ' lst " 2nd -3rd 4th '5th 6th -7th 8th 9th 10th 11th 
1905 59478589644 
1915 6 15 798-9 19 9 14 11 
g) Neighbourhood and Kinship Relations of Police 1915 
Sharing Residence2 Close Neighbour3 Not Close Neighbour 
Totall with Silkworker(s) Silkworker(s) Silkworker(s) 
107 42 47 18 
1. Number traced in 1915 State Census. 
2. Either resident relative/kinfolk silkworker or residence shared/sublet 
to silkworker. 
3. Silkworker living within two houses. 
(Source: (for all tables in Appendix 10) New Jersey State Census 1905 and 
1915. Annual Report of'the City Officers 1900-1901; 1907-1908; 1912-1913) 
